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Foreword
Concerns about climate change and the risks induced by nuclear power have led
many countries to induce a transition toward an energy system based mostly on
renewables. This transition is likely to take several decades, to require substantial
investments, and to be at least partially enabled by changes in individual behavior.
Given the challenges involved in such a transition, several countries have decided
to provide dedicated research funding for large-scale projects that result in insights
and innovations for accelerating the energy transition or reducing its costs. In
Switzerland, this has resulted in the creation of eight Swiss Competence Centers
for Energy Research (SCCER), among which the Center for Energy, Society and
Transition (SCCER CREST) is conducting research on non-technical aspects of the
energy transition.
This collective volume presents results from several research groups that have
worked on the governance of energy transitions in the context of the SCCER
CREST. It illustrates the unique possibilities arising in large-scale projects that
span more than the usual 3–4 years and that involve researchers with strongly
differing backgrounds and perspectives. Furthermore, it exemplifies how to success-
fully navigate the pitfalls that arise when academic research is confronted with
demands to provide simple and unified answers.
The contributions to this volume cover a wide range of topics in energy gover-
nance. Some contributions relate to the international context of energy policy—for
example, analyzing the question of how non-EU countries like Switzerland can
influence the development of EU energy policy. Other contributions investigate
national regulatory strategies—for example, whether past ideas, such as unbundling,
are still appropriate in a decentralized system or how legal settings can inhibit or
foster the development of new technologies. Finally, there are contributions that
connect policy and individual behavior, as illustrated by the study on the effects of
policy risks on wind power development as well as by the study of media coverage
of energy policy and its influence on voting behavior. Despite using different
perspectives and approaches, the studies published here do not only cover a wide
v
range of topics, but they do so in a way that provides an overall picture of challenges
and potential solutions in governing an energy transition.
This illustrates important advantages of large-scale research projects: the ability
to decide jointly which topics are to be covered, to conduct research on similar topics
simultaneously, and to exchange results between individual teams early on. Due to
this coordination and exchange, individual research projects provide added value to
each other, and the overall achievement becomes more than the sum of the individual
projects.
The above examples also point to another important advantage of large-scale
projects: Such projects provide the funding required to analyze important questions
not only from a single but from several disciplinary perspectives. Imagine a collec-
tive volume on energy governance written solely by political scientists, solely by
legal scholars, or solely by economists. Even if all of these imagined books were
based on top-quality research, all of them would be impecunious compared to the
volume you are reading. Each of the above disciplines has its own way of perceiving
the world, of analyzing problems, and of inferring solutions. These ways overlap
only partially. Joining these perspectives provides a picture that is, albeit more
expensive in terms of research funding, much more informative.
But this scale of funding is not only a chance but also a challenge. Often, large-
scale research projects are asked to not only analyze a question from different
perspectives and compare results but also to arrive at joint results, preferably
based on joint approaches. Such demands are important for communicating over-
arching recommendations to persons outside academia.
But, if taken too far, such demands impoverish research. Progress in science
stems from controversies, from the unwillingness of researchers to accept easily
what they perceive to be false, from the drive to convince others who hold different
views. If contrasting views have to be merged, results become vague and consensual
with little prospect to provoke new ideas. If disciplinary methods are exchanged
completely for “interdisciplinary” approaches, the precision on which scientific
work hinges is diluted, and the ability to place results in an appropriate scientific
context is lost. Finally, the false ideal might be served (once again) that there is a
single “scientifically correct” answer to societies’ needs and questions.
This collective volume exemplifies how to step around these pitfalls. The contri-
butions are based on perceptions and methods stemming from different disciplines.
They do not seek consensus at all costs but feel free to provide diverging, and, in
some instances, even contrasting, perspectives and conclusions. Yet, it is clearly
visible that the contributions originate from a joint project, that the authors have
fruitfully engaged in discussions, and that they work toward common goals. The
collective volume thus provides a picture of energy governance that is not a total
perspective, where each element is configured to be a designated part of the whole,
but rather a coordinated arrangement of individual perspectives. This provides the
contrast and the level of detail that lead to a vibrant and informative picture.
In addition to these points, the collective volume provides a compelling argument
that research on energy governance has a vital role in facilitating a timely and
efficient transition to a new energy system.
vi Foreword
It is a futile hope that technological innovations will automatically induce a broad
deployment of “green” technologies or that large-scale transitions will not have to
rely on changes in individual behavior. Consequently, a timely energy transition will
require adjustments to policies, institutions, and framing conditions. But the transi-
tion will still take decades and will require the active engagement of a large and
highly diverse set of actors. Therefore, such adjustments have to be developed taking
into account the necessity of maintaining public support, of keeping essential actors
engaged, of integrating new policies and institutions in the context of existing ones,
and of ensuring coherence with international developments.
The contributions to this volume show how difficult it is to meet these challenges
but also how much research in energy governance can contribute toward easing the
energy transition. Even though research on energy governance has no shiny new
technologies to show, its impact on the success of the current energy transition is
likely to be substantial.
In summary, this collective volume is a remarkable achievement, thanks to the
quality of the contributions and to the efforts of Prof. Hettich and Prof. Kachi, who
not only initiated and edited this volume but also created and coordinated the work
package in the SCCER CREST that provided the frame for the research
published here.
Faculty of Business and Economics,
Environmental Economics, University
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1 Swiss Competence Center for Research in Energy, Society
and Transition (SCCER CREST)
In 2014, the Swiss Confederation established the Swiss Competence Center for
Research in Energy, Society and Transition to respond to important challenges
posed by the Swiss energy transition, envisaged by the so-called “Energy Strategy
2050”. It was only in 2017 that 55 researchers within SCCER CREST decided to
form a specific work package dealing with energy governance. The work package
aims at identifying and providing recommendations to overcome governance chal-
lenges, thereby making energy governance more effective, efficient, and transparent.
The researchers seek to achieve impact by scientific analysis, by the provision of
data or legal recommendations on governance arrangements as well as by the active
P. Hettich (*)
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engagement with stakeholders, and by creating new networks within governance
systems themselves. This book comprises some of their most important insights
from their research during the seven years of SCCER CREST.
To be effective, research on governance needs to cut through the several disci-
plines that make up the social sciences. As a consequence, our research in energy
governance is essentially interdisciplinary: In SCCER CREST, researchers mostly
from political science, law, and management contributed to the work package.
Nevertheless, research on governance necessarily draws upon frameworks of other
disciplines such as sociology and psychology, for instance. Only a broad perception
of governance allows us to evaluate, for example, the social acceptance of (energy)
regimes or to analyze the changes in investor behavior to complement existing
research findings from behavioral economics.
Involving such a great number of disciplines results in the use of a variety of
different methods, from normative to qualitative and quantitative empirical methods.
These methods include, but are not limited to, content analyses, comparative case
studies, network analyses, and interviews, as well as predictive analyses that are
based on theoretical modelling and simulations. Sometimes, different problem
perceptions, approaches, and methods give rise to conflicting results – this is to be
expected and inherent to the scientific process and not to be judged or resolved by the
coordinators of a scientific research project.
The variety of researchers involved in CREST’s work package on energy gover-
nance introduces a specific set of challenges to overcome barriers to collaboration.
First of all, in order to pursue the jointly set goals of our research, a shared perception
of the term “governance” is needed (Sect. 2.1). Second, a common understanding of
the abilities and limits of the different research methods is required to see what
research on “energy governance” might possibly achieve; we provide an overview
on the research presented in this book in Sect. 2.2. Furthermore, and inherent to
state-sponsored research projects, there is the understandable urge to provide
accountability for the research funds spent: Bureaucrats easily succumb to the fallacy
that, among any group of researchers, there should be a commonly accepted vision
of the future and a commonly accepted way forward; since this is mostly not the
case, we conclude this introduction with some thoughts on “narratives” (Sect. 3).
2 Research on Energy Governance
2.1 On “Governance”
Theories on “governance” have emerged in and have been transfused between many
of the social sciences. The term is used in many different ways today by different
researchers (as well as non-academics) and its meaning seems to be quite imprecise
and open to many different interpretations. That may be the reason, as Adrian
Rinscheid has put it, why various researchers representing different disciplines
(social sciences, law, economics) can cooperate under this “umbrella term”. For
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the purpose of this research project, we have incompletely theorized the term
“governance” in order to start the contemplated research of the energy system and
not to lose time trying to unify the several underlying governance theories.
In general, we see that the transformation of a whole industry requires overcom-
ing legal, political, and behavioral obstacles—that is, overcoming situations in
which the current state of governance impedes the transformation towards the policy
goal and in which more adequate policies, regulations, and processes could facilitate
the transformation. Against this backdrop, a common point of reference for our
research might have been set by Elinor Ostrom, who would “ask where the rules that
individuals use in action situations originate”.1 The policy process theories applied
by Raphael Klein and Matthias Finger basically still use that approach to understand
why actors behave as they do; of course, because actors are not totally rational and
the policy process is complex, their approach has undergone some refinement.
Applying this perception of governance, we analyze obstacles to good gover-
nance by highlighting the role of key actors including the results they achieve. The
key actors in energy governance are inherently heterogeneous in their policy pref-
erences as well as in their practices of handling, steering, and defining policies and
markets. These actors are also multi-leveled: Some are nested state actors (munic-
ipalities, cantons, and federal government), others are non-state and transnational
(e.g., individuals, market participants, political parties and interest groups, industry
associations, and NGOs). Incorporating this broad battery of actors into a compre-
hensive—legal, political, and economic—framework of analysis helps to investigate
not only formal procedures, such as political and democratic processes, but also
market behavior and societal practices. As evidenced in the contribution by Lena
Schaffer and Alessio Levis, researchers of energy governance are not only interested
in the policies and institutions that have to be implemented and designed for a
successful energy transition; they are also investigating how the relevant actors
discuss energy policy within the public sphere—that is, how these actors establish
governance mechanisms from discourses.
Keeping this in mind, we understand why scholars of political science like Adrian
Rinscheid refer to Rod Rhodes in order to shed light on the various understandings
of governance, stipulating that governance is a new (at that time) and different
(or “complementary”) mode or process of governing that can be distinguished
from markets and hierarchies as governing structures.2 Governance, according to
Rhodes, is described as “self-organizing, interorganizational networks” that are
somewhat autonomous from the state and resist central guidance; the “challenge
for government is to enable these networks and to seek out new forms of
1Ostrom (2005), p. 19.
2Rhodes (1996), p. 652.
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co- operation”.3 This approach is more comprehensive than those we sometimes find
in the economic literature.4
Thus, most of our research on energy governance analyzes how the behavior and
practices of the actors in the energy industry influence policy implementation and
how they feed back into the existing legal, political, and economic framework,
reshaping the dynamic energy governance system. Consequently, we focus on the
behavior as well as the positive and normative framework of political actors,
bureaucracies, courts, international organizations, lobby groups, civil society, eco-
nomic actors, and individuals; our analysis comprises the emergence of new policies,
the enabling of such policies by use of legal instruments and procedures, and the
implementation of such policies including their feedback loops. For legal scholars
like Markus Schreiber, this requires to look beyond governmental or legislative
behavior and to take into account the actions of private actors, including public-
private hybrids, and the possibilities for cooperation between the state and the
private sector.5 For legal scholars, the governance perspective has the advantage
of analyzing the actual state of affairs, without being narrowed down too early by
preconceived, normative notions such as the rule of law or democracy6—this, of
course, does not preclude the inclusion of normative elements such as “good
governance”. Nevertheless, and again referring to Rhodes, governance by self-
organizing networks may be seen as a challenge to democratic accountability, but
it might also be seen as a mode of governing that empowers citizens.7
2.2 The Governance of the Energy Industry
This book is structured in three parts. Part I deals with the interactions between the
Swiss and European energy systems and policies, taking into account the Swiss
system of multi-level governance. Against the backdrop of these and other frame-
work conditions, in Part II, we take a closer look at state and non-state actors that
drive (or are affected by) the energy transition; actors, which might use certain
catalysts or which might face obstacles. The first two parts place greater emphasis on
international and domestic institutions, laying out legal, political, and business
contexts in which incentives and behaviors of various actors are considered. Based
on the observed behavior of these actors, in Part III, we illuminate some of the
emerging and more detailed questions to be answered with regard to two types of key
actors: voters and other stakeholders such as industry players and interest groups.
The overarching question that runs through Part III is what type of issues we need
3Rhodes (1996), p. 666.
4See, e.g., Williamson (2000), p. 597.
5Cf. Hoffmann-Riem (2011), p. 18.
6Müller (2008), p. 58 et seq.; Schuppert (2008), p. 13, 27.
7Rhodes (1996), p. 666 et seq.
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solve in order to mitigate policy and acceptance risks that are expected in the process
of an energy transition in Switzerland.
2.2.1 Interactions Between the Swiss and the European Energy System
in the Context of the Swiss System of Multi-Level Governance
(Part I)
Developments in international energy governance are important and often neglected
conditions for the success of the Energy Strategy 2050. Such developments poten-
tially comprise global climate policy, the changing institutional landscape of energy
governance, changes in the political economy of renewable energies and European
energy geopolitics, developments of global oil trade and markets, and new transna-
tional challenges provoked by a global digital revolution (e.g., cyber security of
smart grids). In this first part of the book, we analyze how the Energy Strategy 2050
interacts with such developments: Which developments on the global and European
level will impact the success of Swiss energy governance? And how can Switzerland
leverage its assets and strengths to support an energy transition on the European or
even a global scale? Such questions, of course, are more easily answered by learning
from experiences abroad, as seen in the comparative analysis by Sebastian
Heselhaus, who describes the quest of the EU and Switzerland to shape the future
energy mix: Should these entities combat climate change or prioritize security of
supply? In the global context, energy governance also points to quite complex
interactions between different actors at multiple levels, which is clearly visible in
the field of climate change law: The chapter by Julia Hänni and Tienmu Ma seeks to
provide an overview of how this interaction—involving judicial, legislative, and
executive actors at the national, European, and international levels—has shaped how
the area of climate change is regulated in Switzerland and beyond.
As the contribution by Benjamin Hofmann, David Kolcava and Philipp Thaler
shows, Switzerland may be seen as a shaper in European electricity governance:
Swiss influence is especially visible in matters related to grid management and cross-
border electricity trade. Despite being a non-EU country, Switzerland has relatively
high access to important European governance bodies. Switzerland also possesses
structural power in serving as a European transit hub for electricity and as an
important source of technical expertise. However, the authors highlight uncertainties
resulting from the present lack of an electricity agreement between Switzerland and
the EU, giving rise to a recommendation to strive for viable forms of energy
cooperation with the EU and to strengthen the transit function and technical exper-
tise of the country. Putting a policy transfer from Europe on display, Leonore Haelg,
Tobias S. Schmidt and Sebastian Sewerin observe how policy instruments to boost
the deployment of RE have diffused from frontrunner countries like Germany to
jurisdictions like Switzerland: Switzerland implemented its first comprehensive
support policy with the adoption of a cost-covering and technology-specific feed-
in tariff in 2009, following Germany’s example. Nevertheless, policy designs look
Introduction 5
very different in both countries, which makes it interesting to examine the reasons
for these policy design differences.
2.2.2 Catalysts and Obstacles for State and Non-state Actors Driving
the Energy Transition (Part II)
Given the Swiss federalist system, the enabling of policies in the context of a multi-
level governance structure provides interesting insights as well. Martin Föhse
emphasizes the fact that the energy sector has been subject to regulation since
ancient times, with the cantons as primary drivers of lawmaking in Switzerland.
Recently, however, more and more competencies have been transferred to the
federal level. This transfer, together with the increasing complexity of the subject
matter, has led to a legal framework that is difficult to understand and to apply, even
for legal experts. It becomes clear that the Energy Strategy is the result of different
energy strategies and networks of affected stakeholders and shaped not only by
legalistic considerations of good lawmaking but very much also by dynamics of
power, agency, and politics. Particularly, we see that Swiss multi-level governance
affects the formulation and implementation of energy policy goals, for instance,
because of the necessity to achieve sufficient socio-political acceptance for certain
policy instruments. In this context, Raphael Klein and Matthias Finger investigate
the impact that the electorate can have on the transition towards carbon neutrality, in
particular looking at the Swiss electricity market. They use a hybrid agent-based
model that allows them to study which policy instruments are more likely to be
implemented depending on the Swiss electricity market progression and on policy
actors’ interests. They show that the electorate has a limited impact on the policy
chosen and on the electricity market. Overall, an environmentally conscious elec-
torate leads policy actors to select the carbon tax as a policy most often, which has
the adverse effect to increase the electricity price and to exacerbate the import
dependency in winter. At the same time, this is not sufficient to stem the construction
of gas turbine power plants.
Confronted with visible state action driving energy governance, we easily lose
sight of bottom-up approaches that enact decentralized, local energy strategies.
While the energy sector is moving away from a traditional utility regulation to a
market regime, we may identify private arrangements that coexist with public-sector
regulation. Consequently, it is important to know how legal and political processes
are influenced by and impact the practices and processes of local and private actors
in the governance system. This way, we account for the fact that energy governance
not only comprises state institutions but a broad variety of stakeholders that have
their own agendas and interests—e.g., private service providers, existing market
participants, and municipalities that all work towards the creation of self-sufficient
energy regions or that adopt localized energy strategies. Thus, we acknowledge that
these actors construct governance arrangements that do not involve governmental
actors (e.g., area networks or virtual power plants using privately owned heat
pumps).
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One of the newly emerging hybrid actors in energy markets are utilities that not
only carry out the public tasks assigned to them by the legislator but that are also
active as entrepreneurial entities in the private sector. Andreas Abegg and Phil
Baumann shed light on these activities, which range from electricity products for
large customers, photovoltaic and e-mobility installations to services in the field of
building services engineering, internet offerings, and the sale of household appli-
ances and which can give rise to distortions of competition. As they point out, it is
not only cross-subsidization but also financing advantages, exceptions to taxation,
and considerable economies of scope that need to be considered when allowing such
entities to operate on private markets. In this context of new business models, Mary
Jean Bürer, Matthieu de Lapparent, Massimiliano Capezzali, and Mauro Carpita
point out that we continue to measure progress on energy transitions in a superficial
and extremely limited way, while the study of smart second-generation policies for
the energy transition is neglected in the literature. Understanding how to redesign
energy governance to allow for business model reconfiguration among incumbents
and how to stimulate business model innovation from start-ups and new entrants is
important for a viable energy transition in the long term. Existing laws will often not
be suited to accommodate a new technology or business model, and the legislator
may be slow in reacting to these new challenges. As evidenced in the contribution by
Peter Hettich, many innovative business models with a potential of benefiting the
consumer might be preempted by overcautious regulation, e.g., looking at the
restrictions in the use of smart meter data or taking into account the effects of grid
charges. However, as Markus Schreiber shows in his contribution, legal provisions
may also serve to promote innovation: In his view, laws which stipulate favorable
conditions for renewable energy sources might serve as an obvious example. In his
contribution, Markus Schreiber investigates how the legislator, regulatory agencies,
and private standard-setting bodies are responding to three different energy innova-
tions: new renewable energy sources, new storage systems, and smart grids. He
seeks not only to analyze commonalities and differences in the approach but also to
identify best practices.
In summary, these contributions show that a thorough understanding of the
agendas, interests, and arrangements of actors involved in the energy transition
helps to make recommendations for a suitable legal, political, and business frame-
work for the transformation of energy systems—a framework that fosters the goals
of energy market regulation on all levels of the state and strengthens private
autonomy at the same time. In particular, we have to ask which innovative forms
of governance (e.g., network governance and forms of self-regulation) help to
achieve a sustainable energy future, enabling adaptive and interactive systems
which are able to learn and improve.
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2.2.3 Understanding the Pressure Points of Policy and Acceptance Risks
in the Context of Everchanging Framework Conditions (Part III)
In order to find more effective policies, it is important to know how interests and
practices of key stakeholders can influence energy policymaking. Only if the role
played by competing domestic interests is understood, can a sustainable transforma-
tion of energy systems succeed. In light of the asymmetric redistribution effects
generated by a transformation of the energy system, we again need to look beyond
state actors and make inquiries about the socio-political acceptance of certain
policies by a variety of stakeholders such as voters, interest groups, and individual
companies. Moreover, energy governance needs to respond to the puzzle that public
acceptance for renewable energy technologies and policies is high, whereas the
implementation of policy innovations is slow, particularly compared to other coun-
tries. In order to trace the socio-political barriers of a sustainable transformation of
the energy system, we therefore need to examine strategic choices and other sources
of influence asymmetries among different interests. With this in mind, the first two
chapters of Part III look into challenges around voter perceptions, and the last two
chapters focus on other stakeholders such as interest groups and individual
companies.
Moving beyond the topic of diffuse public support, this part of the book first
identifies two specific factors of energy policymaking in Switzerland that need to be
addressed with regard to voter preferences. Here, media coverage of certain issues
plays an important role: Adrian Rinscheid and Linards Udris investigate the patterns
in media coverage in Swiss energy policymaking and the extent to which the media
influence voters’ decisions at the ballot. Based on the media coverage in the run-up
to three recent energy-related referenda (2015 initiative “Energy tax instead of
VAT”; 2016 nuclear phase-out initiative; 2017 referendum on the federal Energy
Strategy 2050), they demonstrate that the three energy policy referenda are charac-
terized by patterns similar to non-energy votes but also have distinct features. They
find that the failure of the phase-out initiative can be partly explained by exposure to
newspaper coverage: One in four left-wing voters who had initially been in favor of
the popular initiative but were exposed to strongly negative coverage about it during
the “hot” campaign phase changed their initial voting intention. Looking at the
evolution of public discourses on energy policy in general, Lena Schaffer and
Alessio Levis analyze another important factor reflecting policy discussion and
contestation within the political arena from a more macroscopic viewpoint: They
make a case for the disaggregation of energy policy and its public perception to add
to our understanding of energy transition pathways, allowing for a more compre-
hensive understanding of the idiosyncrasies of Swiss energy policy regarding tem-
poral as well as sectoral variation. In their contribution, they argue that an increased
politicization of energy policy may affect future policy choice, and thus any account
on energy transition policy needs to scrutinize potential feedback effects from
policies that will manifest in policy discourses.
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Another crucial factor for achieving the objectives of the Swiss Energy Strategy
2050 is to mobilize sufficient amounts of capital. While investments in energy
infrastructure used to be exclusively the domain of electric utilities, recent experi-
ence shows a rise in investor diversity, suggesting an increasing importance of
institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies and commu-
nity finance. However, despite the entrance of new investors and significantly
reduced technology cost, “soft costs”—e.g., the policy risk premium and the cost
of capital—still hamper the financing of projects in Switzerland. Lowering these
costs—which are perceived differently depending on investor type—may be impor-
tant for achieving Swiss energy policy targets.
Looking specifically at wind energy, we see that the administrative processes in
Switzerland are particularly long and complex, with the planning phase taking up to
a decade, more than twice as long as the European average. Against the backdrop of
the slow development of wind energy projects in Switzerland, Anna Ebers Broughel
and Rolf Wüstenhagen quantify the risk premium that lengthy permitting processes
imply for wind energy investors in Switzerland; they suggest ways to reduce policy
risk, i.e., ways to design “investment-grade” policies. They have empirically inves-
tigated the policy risk premium for financing renewable energy projects to get a
realistic understanding of how capital flows from different investor groups (e.g.,
institutional investors vs electric utilities vs retail investors) will change under
various policy scenarios. Their model shows that the highest profitability risks are
related to the availability of feed-in tariffs, but other changes in the permitting
process can also have a critical impact on the project’s bottom line. The findings
illustrate that energy project developers in Switzerland face a significant policy risk
premium in the pre-construction stage.
Part III closes with the work by Duygan et al. by zooming out and providing a
bird’s eye view of perceptions on the energy strategies pursued by various interest
groups, companies, and cantonal administrations in Switzerland. With regard to
issue dimension, too, their work provides a rare opportunity for us to peruse through
those actors’ perceptions on a wide range of transition measures that have been
debated in the context of the Energy Strategy 2050: electric vehicles, wind energy,
deep geothermal energy, hydropower, and feed-in tariffs. By using novel data from
an original survey conducted with more than 300 energy actors, they show that there
is large variance in how realistic these actors think the Energy Strategy 2050
measures are in each of the aforementioned energy subdomains. Some actors believe
strongly that the considered measures are absolutely realistic, while others believe
the opposite. In some cases, such beliefs are correlated with the degree to which the
actors are engaged with media-related activities, implying that what voters see in the
media could reflect only the perception that is on one end of the stakeholder
perception spectrum. As Rinscheid and Udris find out, voter opinions can depend
substantially on what is covered by mainstream media. Therefore, these findings
combined, we illuminate an emerging challenge that policymakers will face in the
near future: How can they make sense of the divergence in energy stakeholder
perceptions about the transition paths, and how can they communicate on it with
voters without biases?
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In short, Part III of this volume covers the concluding elements of the regulatory
cycle, evaluating the impact of specific energy policies on various actors and their
views. It also reminds us of the fact that, in addition to designing and implementing
specific energy policies, policymakers in Switzerland will likely be required to better
communicate the diverging views and preferences held by energy actors to their own
voters. Elections and referenda will then determine the level of public acceptance for
each of these measures, all of which gives rise to new issues on diverse political
agendas that will let new legislation emerge.
3 A Narrative for the Energy Transformation?
Given the plethora of findings and recommendations compiled in this volume, the
reader rightly will ask whether these can be stitched together into an integrated
narrative, thereby providing guidance on how to transform an energy industry.
In general, public funding agencies nowadays are keen on having such narratives
because they make it easier to explain to politicians and taxpayers how research
projects have contributed to the achievement of political goals. For communication
purposes, significant funds are reserved for image videos and shiny brochures, even
in basic research, even in the social sciences. On the upside, a decreasing distance to
politicians makes it easier for social scientists to obtain third party funding to pursue
their research interests. On the downside, such funds rarely are granted without
strings attached. When funding research in the social sciences, politicians are not
only deprived of photo opportunities in laboratories or high-tech industrial plants;
they will also have a hard time to accept that most research that is done in the social
sciences will materialize just in text and will not be commercialized: There are no
technologies to be explored and developed, no innovations to be developed for
commercialization.
In contrast to technical research producing technical innovation, the research
results in the social sciences are less tangible. In particular when pursuing contro-
versial political projects, politicians might still hope that social scientist help them to
achieve “social innovation”—that is, to find ways to increase the social acceptance
of the government’s plans for the energy industry. It is questionable, however,
whether a government should ask researchers to engage in such “social engineer-
ing”. Commonly accepted policy goals (e.g., a carbon-free energy supply) should
not be mixed up with political goals (i.e., the Energy Strategy 2050). A statement by
Henry Kissinger comes to mind:
[I]n some respects the intellectual has never been more in demand; that he makes such a
relatively small contribution is not because he is rejected but because his function is
misunderstood. He is sought after enthusiastically but for the wrong reasons and in pursuit
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of the wrong purposes. . . . [A]ll too often what the policymaker wants from the intellectual is
not ideas but endorsement.8
Of course, politicians wish their policy proposals to appear science-based and,
consequently, without alternative. Vice versa, researchers always have to fear that
their research could be steered or channeled to support a political goal. Such fears are
fomented when, as it is often done these days, the research results of very diverse
research groups are boiled down into simple narratives that tell readers, briefly, how
funded research contributed to one or another political goal. As John Kay and
Mervyn King recently phrased this phenomenon:
Our need for narratives is so strong that many people experience a need for an overarching
narrative – some unifying explanatory theme or group of related themes with very general
applicability. These grand narratives may help them believe that complexity can be man-
aged, that there exists some story which describes ‘the world as it really is’. Every new
experience or piece of information can be interpreted in the light of that overarching
narrative.9
Drawing from the intriguing allegory of the hedgehog and the fox, Kay and King
circumscribe beautifully what is wrong with such an approach:
The hedgehog knows one big thing, the fox many little things. The hedgehog subscribes to
some overarching narrative; the fox is skeptical about the power of any overarching
narrative. The hedgehog approaches most uncertainties with strong priors; the fox attempts
to assemble evidence before forming a view of ‘what is going on here’. We both have the
experience of dealing with researchers for radio and television programmes: if you profess
an opinion that is unambiguous and – for preference – extreme, a car will be on its way to
take you to the studio; if you suggest that the issue is complicated, they will thank you for
your advice and offer to ring you back. They rarely do. People understandably like clear
opinions but the truth is that many issues inescapably involve saying ‘on the one hand, but
on the other’.10
In order to provide some closure to this extensive research project, the editors of
this volume would very much like to provide the readers with the two or three “most
important” recommendations for decision makers. However, this would devalue,
even deface, the work of our researchers. In order to properly consolidate the results
contained in this volume, the assumptions and value judgments that are the founda-
tions of our work would need to be discussed extensively. It is very unlikely that a
consensus could be reached on only a few of the many parameters that influence the
success of the energy transformation. With good reasons, for example, the assump-
tions of the government regarding the electricity demand in 2050 may be regarded as
frivolous by some or as well-founded by others. Consequently, with an aggregation
of our results and a push for consensus, recommendations will become much more
generic and, therefore, meaningless. Even if such consensus could be achieved, good
advice for decision-makers would require not only a reference narrative but also an
8Kissinger (1959), p. 30, 33.
9Kay and King (2020), p. 219.
10Kay and King (2020), p. 222.
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admission that this narrative could be false; we would therefore need to provide
decision-makers with a set of alternative narratives that might be relevant, as well.11
Since, in this volume, the overarching narrative is set by the government in the form
of its Energy Strategy 2050, it seems indeed a formidable task for researchers to
challenge the government’s narrative in every conceivable way in order to detect
misconceptions and potentials to make it more resilient to alternate futures. This
would constitute a huge task in itself and a task that does not form part of the
research design chosen here.
While the urge to disseminate the results of large (and expensive) research
projects to the wider public is innocuous, the push for integrated narratives is not.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a narrative as “a story or representation used
to give an explanatory or justificatory account of a society, period, etc.” Based on
this definition, Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Shiller shows, in his recently
published book, how such narratives may go viral and cause or support changes in
the economy and in economic behavior.12 For political scientists familiar with
narrative studies, this is nothing new: Already in 2012, our research partner Giorel
Curran emphasized that narratives and discourses are central to how we interpret and
understand the world:
The capacity to construct and disseminate compelling stories about particular issues is hence
critical to an agent's capacity to advance their interests (sic!).13
In policy studies, the relevance of narratives has even led to the development of a
distinct research program, bound together by the “Narrative Policy Framework”,
which has resulted in several hundred academic publications over the past decade.14
These studies focus on the power of narratives in various ways, for instance in terms
of their influence on public perceptions. As Elizabeth A. Shanahan and colleagues
put it:
Policy narratives are the lifeblood of politics. These strategically constructed ‘stories’
contain predictable elements and strategies whose aim is to influence public opinion toward
support for a particular policy preference.15
Giorel Curran rightly points out that “[t]he capacity to shape the main knowledge
claims of discourses so that the interests of some actors are promoted while others
are contained thus connotes a considerable exercise of power.”16 Such power has not
been granted to the editors of this volume. In order to form a narrative, we would
need to select the supporting elements suitable for the composition of a storyline,
bypassing a process that normally is, at least in part, left to the peer review process
that validates contributions to the progress of science. Conflicting results, that
11Kay and King (2020), p. 285.
12Shiller (2019).
13Curran (2012), p. 236.
14E.g., Shanahan et al. (2011), p. 535 et seq.; Shanahan et al. (2018), p. 173 et seq.
15Shanahan et al. (2011), p. 374.
16Curran (2012), p. 236.
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normally would point to possibilities for further research, would most probably find
their place based on how they fit the overarching narrative. Furthermore, connecting
the research results of this volume towards an integrated narrative would necessarily
be a construct, since the individual researchers involved never have intended that
their results should support a general storyline. In short: Joint visions and common
narratives are not indispensable parts of the scientific method but rather political
instruments.
The analysis of discourses and narratives in a certain field of interest ex post is
completely different from drafting and constructing narratives for the use of agencies
and policymakers ex ante. While the ex post analysis of narratives is an accepted
field of scientific research, the ex ante construction of narratives forms part of a
playground for public affairs departments and spin doctors. We are confident that the
readers of this volume will understand our qualms, that they will accept our
conclusion that there is no easy recipe to follow here, and that they will enjoy the
diversity of insights furnished to them when reading this book.
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Abstract This chapter explores the relationship between Swiss climate change law
and the international and European climate change regimes. At the international
level, the chapter reviews the three major international agreements regulating the
field: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, and the Paris Agreement. And at the national
and regional levels, the chapter briefly describes the CO2 Act—often considered the
heart of Swiss climate change policy—and questions whether it will prove effective
in achieving its explicitly stated emissions reduction targets. The chapter then
reviews the most significant recent innovation in the evolution of Swiss climate
change policy: joining the Emissions Trading System (ETS) established by the
European Union. Due to long-standing problems afflicting the ETS, the authors
raise doubts about whether Switzerland’s joining the scheme will lead to meaningful
reductions in the country’s greenhouse gas emissions. As an alternative to an
ETS-centric approach, the authors refer to an approach centered on human rights.
Drawing on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the
major international climate change agreements, other sources of international law,
and the recent Urgenda decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, the
authors argue that under the human rights approach, Switzerland would be obligated
to take stronger measures to reduce emissions than it could hope to achieve through
the ETS and the CO2 Act alone.
1 Introduction
Perhaps more than in other areas, the field of climate change law involves a complex
interaction among different actors at multiple levels of governance. This chapter
seeks to provide an overview of how this interaction—involving actors at the
national, European, and international levels—has shaped the way in which the
field of climate change is regulated in Switzerland. The aim of the chapter, then,
will be to explore the relationship between Swiss climate change law and the
international and European climate change regimes; and a further aim will be to
show how Switzerland’s approach to regulating this area might be improved in light
of recent developments in the field of human rights law.
The chapter is divided into four main parts. The first part (Sect. 2) presents an
overview of the international climate change regime as embodied in the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol
to the UNFCCC, and the Paris Agreement. Switzerland is a state party to all three
agreements. The second part (Sect. 3) describes the current version of the CO2 Act—
often considered the heart of Swiss climate change policy—and questions whether it
will prove effective in achieving its explicitly stated emissions reduction targets.
Section 3 then discusses the most significant recent innovation in the evolution of
Swiss climate change policy: joining the Emissions Trading System (ETS)
established by the European Union. It will be argued in the third part (Sect. 4),
however, that the long-standing problems afflicting the ETS raise doubts about
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whether joining the scheme will lead to meaningful reductions in Switzerland’s
greenhouse gas emissions. As an alternative to an ETS-centered approach, the fourth
and final part of the chapter (Sect. 5) suggests the possibility of a reorientation:
Drawing on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the
major international climate change agreements, other sources of international law,
and the recent Urgenda decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, it argues
that under the human rights approach, Switzerland would be obligated to take
stronger measures to reduce emissions than it could hope to achieve by joining the
ETS and implementing the CO2 Act.
2 Switzerland and the International Climate Change
Regime
Switzerland does not rank as one of the main emitters of greenhouse gases in the
world today: According to official data reported in 2015, it is only responsible for
around 0.1% of today’s global greenhouse gas emissions, which amounts to approx-
imately 6.4 tons per capita per year.1 In spite of this, the effects of global warming
are felt to a greater degree in Switzerland than in many other countries, both in terms
of the raw increase in temperature and in terms of the life-threatening ramifications
of that increase. Thus, according to Proclim (Akademie der Naturwissenschaften
Schweiz)/IPCC Switzerland,2 the average annual temperature in Switzerland has, in
the last 150 years, risen about twice as much as the global mean, with a global mean
temperature increase of about 0.85 C, as compared to a mean increase of 1.8 C in
Switzerland.3 These significant rises in temperature over such a short period of
time—considerably more rapid than the relatively gradual temperature changes of
pre-industrial times—are suspected of causing deadly natural events, such as
mudslides and landslides in mountainous areas of Switzerland.4
1See “Switzerland’s intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) and clarifying informa-
tion,” available at the UNFCCC website at: https://www.unfccc.int.
2IPCC Switzerland, run by ProClim on behalf of the Federal Office of the Environment, aims to
provide specific information on the IPCC that is relevant to Swiss researchers and stakeholders, as
well as to the general public in and from Switzerland.
3See Swiss Academies of Arts and Science (2016), p. 14, summarizing national studies in
Switzerland prepared for the IPCC AR5 (https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5). The IPCC was
established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) in 1988 with the aim of providing the world with a scientific view on the
current state of knowledge on climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic
impacts (https://www.ipcc.ch/about). The most recent data from the Swiss Federal Office of
Meteorology and Climatology, from 2019, indicates an even larger increase of 2.1 C in the
previous 150 years. See “Climate Change in Switzerland,” available at https://www.meteoswiss.
admin.ch.
4See, e.g., McClanahan (2019); see also “Klimaseniorinnen reichen Klage ein”, Neue Zürcher
Zeitung (25 October 2016), available at https://www.nzz.ch, which describes the first climate
change–related lawsuit filed in Switzerland. The lawsuit was filed by a group of elderly women
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Despite not being a major greenhouse gas emitter, Switzerland has reacted
sensitively to the global problem of climate change. It has ratified the UNFCCC,
the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. All of these agreements impose greater
obligations and expectations on Switzerland and other developed countries than the
corresponding obligations they impose on developing countries. The following three
subsections review and compare the respective agreements.5
2.1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC)
2.1.1 Overview and Main Purpose
The UNFCCC was opened for signature at the 1992 Rio Conference and has been in
force since 1994, with 195 parties. The UNFCCC is a framework convention, in the
sense that it sets the most important guidelines but does not impose any substantive
targets.
According to Art. 2 of the Convention, preventing dangerous human interference
with the climate system is the aim of the UNFCCC. The primary objective is “to
achieve (. . .) stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is
not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.”
2.1.2 Main Principles
In their actions to achieve these aims, the Parties to the UNFCCC are to be guided by
four main principles (Art. 3 UNFCCC).
First, the Convention states that the Parties should “protect the climate system for
the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity
claiming that the Swiss government violated their human rights by failing to take adequate measures
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. According to the plaintiffs, this failure has contributed to
increasingly intense and frequent heat waves in Switzerland as a result of global warming, thereby
putting the plaintiffs’ life and health at risk. For a comprehensive overview of the litigation, see Bär
et al. (2018), p. 194. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, First Public Law Division, dismissed the
lawsuit; see the Court’s judgment no. 1C_37/2019, issued on 5 May 2020. On 26 November 2020,
the plaintiffs filed an application before the ECtHR, challenging the Federal Supreme Court’s
ruling. A copy of the application can be found at KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz’s website: https://
klimaseniorinnen.ch.
5For an overview of the UN climate treaties, see Hänni (2020), pp. 619–620, as well as Hänni
(2019), pp. 3–6, for further details.
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and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities. Accord-
ingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate
change and the adverse effects thereof” (Art. 3 para. 1 UNFCCC). This distinction
between the obligations of developed countries and those of all countries in
addressing the problem of climate change is an example of the principle of “common
but differentiated responsibilities.”
Second, the UNFCCC incorporates a version of the precautionary principle,
obligating state Parties to take “precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects” (Art. 3 para.
3 UNFCCC).6 Significantly, Article 3 also makes clear that, where there is a threat of
serious or irreversible damage, the absence of full scientific certainty should not be
considered a reason to postpone the precautionary measures.
Third, according to the integration principle, “The Parties have the right to, and
should, promote sustainable development. Policies and measures to protect the
climate system . . . should be integrated with national development programmes,
taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to
address climate change” (Art. 3 para. 4). This principle attempts to strike a careful
balance between, on the one hand, the right of countries—especially developing
countries—to pursue their own economic development and, on the other hand, the
expectation that these countries will take steps to ensure that this development
proceeds in such a fashion that it does not impede the achievement of climate
protection goals.
And fourth, the principle of cooperation states that “[t]he Parties should coop-
erate . . . to address the problems of climate change” (Art. 3 para. 5). Climate change
is a global problem, and this provision recognizes that it requires a global solution,
involving cooperation among all parties, with each party doing its fair share. As we
shall see below, this principle gains in significance when climate change is viewed
from a human rights perspective.7
The first principle—the principle of “common but differentiated responsibili-
ties”—is perhaps the most important of the four. The principle finds expression
not only in the UNFCCC but also in the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
And it also provides a key to understanding the substantive obligations these
conventions impose on developed and developing countries, respectively.
6The term mitigation refers to all efforts to reduce or prevent emission of greenhouse gases.
Mitigation can mean using new technologies and renewable energies, making older equipment
more energy-efficient, or changing management practices or consumer behavior (see Art. 3 para. 3;
Art. 4 para. 1 subpara. b; Art. 4 para. 1 subpara. f; Art. 4 para. 2 subpara. a UNFCCC). A secondary
objective of the Convention is adaptation to the change. This refers to helping communities and
ecosystems cope with changing climate conditions (Art. 4 para.1 subpara. b, Art. 4 para.1 subpara. e
and Art. 4 para. 4 UNFCCC). Examples of adaptation include the more efficient use of water
resources due to climate change—induced droughts and the building of physical defenses against
floods caused by rising sea levels.
7See note 68 below and Sect. 5 generally.
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The differing responsibilities imposed on developed and developing countries are
a reflection of the fact that the former countries are the source of most past and
current greenhouse gas emissions.8 Therefore, industrialized countries are expected
to contribute the most to cutting emissions on home ground, in this way taking the
lead in modifying anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases consistent with the
objective of the UNFCCC (Art. 4 para. 2 subpara. a UNFCCC). These countries are
called Annex I countries, which are those belonging to the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), including Switzerland, as well as
12 countries considered to be “economies in transition.”
In line with this, Art. 4 of the Convention sets up a system of differentiated
commitments applying to developed countries and developing countries respec-
tively. For example, the industrialized countries listed in Annex I are required to
adopt national policies to mitigate climate change by limiting greenhouse gas
emissions through the protection and enhancement of greenhouse gas sinks and
reservoirs (Art. 4 para. 2 subpara. a UNFCCC).9 The aim is to individually or jointly
return to their 1990 level of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol (Art. 4 para. 2 subpara. b
UNFCCC). However, it must be noted that the Convention does not contain any
information on concrete measures, nor does it include a binding definition of the
reduction target (level of 1990 until the year 2000). Concrete legal implications
come only with the Protocols.
According to Art. 4 para. 2 subparas. a and b UNFCCC, industrialized countries
shall individually or “jointly” return to their 1990 level of anthropogenic emissions
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. The concentration of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere does not depend on where they are emitted or reduced.
Industrialized states may therefore implement the required measures “together with
other states,” and measures can be taken where the marginal cost is the lowest. This
clause has opened the Convention to criticism on the part of developing countries, as
it allows the most powerful industrial states to find ways around their duties of
reduction.
Annex II of the Convention deals with new financial resources. The UNFCCC
directs new funds to climate change activities in developing countries as a duty of
countries listed in Annex II, which is a shorter list, also including Switzerland. Thus,
industrialized nations listed in Annex II agree to support climate change activities in
developing countries by providing new financial support for action on climate
change, above and beyond any financial assistance they already provide to these
countries (Art. 4 para. 3 UNFCCC). Furthermore, a system of grants and loans has
been set up through the Convention and is managed by the Global Environment
8See, e.g., Center for Global Development (2015); see also Rocha et al. (2015).
9According to Art. 1 paras. 7 and 8, respectively, a “reservoir” is defined as “a component or
components of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is
stored”; and a “sink” is defined as “any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse
gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.”
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Facility (Art. 21 para. 3 UNFCCC). Developing countries are to be supported with
regard to costs of adapting to the adverse effects of climate change (Art. 4 para.
4 UNFCCC). And industrialized countries agree to share environmentally sound
technologies and know-how with developing countries to enable the implementation
of the Convention (Art. 4 para. 3, Art. 4 para. 5, Art. 4 para. 8 UNFCCC).
Despite the more stringent duties imposed on the developed countries, the
UNFCCC also imposes some duties on developing countries, such as establishing
inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks, and
developing and implementing national/regional programs to mitigate climate change
and to communicate information related to implementation (Art. 4 para. 1 subparas.
a, b and j UNFCCC).10
Such duties, however, are subject to a relationship of conditionality vis-à-vis the
developed countries’ fulfillment of their duties. Art. 4 para. 7 UNFCCC states:
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commit-
ments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed
country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and
transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development
and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country
Parties.
2.1.3 Conference of the Parties
The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme body of the Convention, as
provided for by Art. 7 UNFCCC. The COP is charged with the following
responsibilities:
• regular review of the implementation of the convention, that is, periodic exam-
ination of the Parties’ obligations (Art. 7 para. 2 let a UNFCCC);
• providing and facilitating exchange of information on measures adopted by the
Parties to address climate change (Art. 7 para. 2 subpara. b UNFCCC);
• making recommendations on matters necessary for implementation (Art. 7 para.
2 subpara. g UNFCCC).
Ordinary COPs are to be held every year (Art. 7 para. 4 UNFCCC). All states that
are Parties to the Convention are represented at COP meetings, and the admission of
observers (agencies of the UN, NGOs) is also possible. Meetings of the COP are
10For example, the Fourth National Communication of Mexico to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Mexican Interministerial Commission on Climate Change [2011])
describes updates to its National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (pp. 55–103) as well as various efforts
at mitigation and adaptation, such as a National Water Program that aims “to reduce the risks
associated with meteorological and hydrometeorological extremes and address their impacts”
(p. 116). Switzerland’s greenhouse gas inventory is available at the website of the Federal Office
for the Environment, https://www.bafu.admin.ch.
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numbered in the order in which they are held. For example, “COP 13” represents the
thirteenth Conference of the Parties.
The COP also has the power to adopt related legal instruments. Thus, “the
Conference of the Parties may, at any ordinary session, adopt protocols to the
Convention” (Art. 17 para. 1 UNFCCC). Protocols11 can contain regulations
concerning specific air pollutants or groups of air pollutants as well as provisions
on concrete quantitative reduction targets. The most important related instruments
are the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC (Kyoto Protocol) and recently the Paris
Agreement.
2.2 The Kyoto Protocol
2.2.1 Overview
The first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 1) took place in Berlin in
1995. There, the Parties agreed to produce a Protocol containing quantitative
measures and reduction targets. Two years later, COP 3 in Kyoto adopted a Protocol
to the UNFCCC, containing legally binding reduction targets and imposing time
limits on industrialized states concerning greenhouse gases (Art. 3 in conjunction
with Annexes A and B Kyoto Protocol). The Protocol entered into force on
16 February 2005.
Recognizing again that developed countries are principally responsible for the
current high levels of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more
than 150 years of industrial activity, the Protocol places a heavier burden on
developed nations under the aforementioned principle of “common but differentiated
responsibilities.” The Kyoto Protocol currently has 192 Parties, including Switzer-
land.12 The negotiations were difficult, and some major countries have still not
become parties to the Protocol, including the United States and Canada.
2.2.2 Emission Reduction Mechanisms
Art. 3 para. 1 of the Protocol states:
The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate
anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex
A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the
11This is not to be confused with the Montreal Protocol of 1987, whose aim was to protect the ozone
layer from depletion (SR 0.814.021).
12See the Kyoto Protocol’s status of ratification, available at: https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-
protocol/status-of-ratification.
24 J. Hänni and T. Ma
provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at
least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.
States listed in UNFCCC Annex I must therefore individually or jointly ensure
that they do not exceed the emission limitations listed in Annex B of the Kyoto
Protocol. The industrialized states listed in UNFCCC Annex I are required to
achieve different quantitative reduction targets listed in the Kyoto Protocol’s
Annex B in order to achieve the aim of the Protocol.
According to Art. 2 para. 1 subpara. a of the Protocol, industrialized states must
develop and implement national measures to reduce CO2 emissions, adopting
policies of energy efficiency, reforestation, and sustainable agriculture, and to
phase out fiscal incentives, tax exemptions, and subsidies that run counter to the
aims of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.
But the Protocol also offers additional means to meet emission reduction targets.
These include joint implementation and fulfillment, the Clean Development Mech-
anism, and international emissions trading.
Art. 3 para. 10 and Art. 3 para. 11 of the Protocol, in conjunction with Art.
6, foresee joint implementation, allowing states listed in UNFCCC Annex I to
transfer emission reduction units to other states listed in Annex I. When financing
emission reductions in another state, the respective emission reduction units are
attributable to their own reduction targets.
The Protocol also provides for joint fulfillment. According to Art. 3 para. 1, in
conjunction with Art. 4 of the Protocol, states can meet reduction targets in groups
(the sum of individual reduction targets can be met by the whole group of states),
e.g., the countries of the European Union.
The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism is delineated in Art. 12. It
allows a country with an emission reduction or emission limitation commitment
(Annex B country) to implement an emission reduction project in a developing
country. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction credits, which
can then be counted towards meeting the Protocol’s targets.
The Clean Development Mechanism represents the first global environmental
investment and credit scheme of its kind. It might involve, for example, a rural
electrification project using solar panels or the installation of more energy-efficient
boilers. The mechanism stimulates sustainable development and emission reduc-
tions, while giving industrialized countries some flexibility in meeting their emission
reduction or limitation targets.
2.2.3 Emissions Trading
As indicated above, another major innovation of the Kyoto Protocol is emissions
trading, covered under Art. 17: “The Parties included in Annex B [industrialized
states] may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their
commitments under Art. 3 [compliance with their reduction targets].”
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Emissions trading allows countries that have emission units to spare—i.e., per-
mitted emissions left unused—to sell this excess capacity to countries that are over
their targets. Art. 17 rests on two main premises: (1) emissions trading is open to
states subject to the commitments in Annex B; and (2) trading must be supplemental
to domestic actions. Since carbon dioxide is the principal greenhouse gas, emissions
trading is often referred to as the “carbon market.”
2.3 The Paris Agreement
2.3.1 Overview
In terms of effectiveness, the Kyoto Protocol had the advantage of a top-down
prescriptive nature, as well as an implementation clause. However, in the end it
proved not to be as effective as initially hoped. This is in large part due to the fact
that, as noted above, it has failed to gain the support of some of the countries that
contribute the most to worldwide greenhouse gas emissions.
In December 2015, the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC adopted
the “Paris Agreement,” a new collective treaty to fight anthropogenic climate
change. The Agreement is an instrument linked to the UNFCCC. After 25 years of
UN climate diplomacy, the Paris Agreement was the first treaty to envisage climate
action by all nations. Notably, the Agreement’s preamble makes an explicit link
between climate change and the fulfillment of human rights obligations.13
2.3.2 The 2 C Limit
Article 2 of the Paris Agreement proposes some ambitious objectives. The long-term
goal of the Agreement is to keep global temperature rise “well below 2C” (Art.
2 Paris Agreement). This is a strengthened goal in comparison with earlier language.
According to recent science (IPCC), the 2 C limit would probably—though not
certainly—prevent the most severe effects of climate change. Article 2 also contains
the aim to “pursu[e] efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C above
pre-industrial levels”, as proposed by small island states and least developed coun-
tries. This will be a challenge, especially for countries that have yet to lift the
majority of their citizens from poverty.
13See Preamble para. 11 Paris Agreement: “Acknowledging that climate change is a common
concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect,
promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of
indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in
vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of
women and intergenerational equity.”
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How, then, can the “well below 2C” goal be reached? First, Parties aim to reach
“global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible” (Art. 4 para.
1 Paris Agreement). However, no peaking dates and no percentage reductions are
mentioned, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing countries.
Second, rapid reductions are foreseen thereafter: achieving a balance between
anthropogenic emissions by reducing the emission of greenhouse gases during the
second half of the century (Art. 4 para. 1, Art. 5 para. 1 Paris Agreement). Third,
Parties shall formulate and implement long-term low greenhouse gas emission
development strategies (Art. 4 para. 19 Paris Agreement). And fourth, stronger
mitigation is provided for through so-called Nationally Determined Contributions
(NDCs; Art. 3 Paris Agreement).
2.3.3 Nationally Determined Contributions
Let us take a closer look at this last mechanism, the Nationally Determined Contri-
butions (NDCs). The Paris Agreement states that “[e]ach Party shall prepare,
communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it
intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim
of achieving the objectives of such contributions” (Art. 4 para. 2 Paris Agreement).
The Agreement contains no binding concrete contribution—only an expectation. It
is, however, binding in the sense of an obligation of conduct in good faith (Parties
are required to “prepare,” “intend to achieve,” etc.).14 The NDC scheme therefore
represents a “bottom-up approach,” unlike its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol.
According to the Agreement, developed countries should continue to take the
lead by undertaking an “absolute emission reduction target”; developing countries
are to continue enhancing mitigation (Art. 4 para. 2, Art. 4 para. 4 Paris Agreement).
Furthermore, each successive NDC is to represent a progression beyond the
previous and to reflect the “highest possible ambition.” This means that adjustment
of the contributions is possible only in the direction of enhancing the level of
ambition (see Art. 4 para. 3 Paris Agreement; “ambition” or “ratchet mechanism”).
But again, the “highest possible ambition” is left to national determination. The
efforts of all Parties are to represent a progression over time (Art. 3 Paris Agreement;
collective requirement).
2.3.4 International Linkage and Adaptation
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement provides for a Sustainable Development Mecha-
nism. International linkage under this provision gives the Parties a “green light” to
develop carbon markets to promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions
while fostering sustainable development. Thus, similar to the Kyoto Protocol,
14See Hänni (2019), p. 4, for a detailed discussion.
Swiss Climate Change Law 27
emission reductions occurring outside of a Party’s territory can be counted toward
achieving the Party’s Nationally Determined Contribution (Art. 6 para. 4 subpara. c
Paris Agreement). This enables both the formation of coalitions and bottom-up
heterogeneous linkage.15 Different forms of emissions trading, explicitly provided
for in the Kyoto Protocol, are therefore also possible under the Paris Agreement.
Article 7 of the Paris Agreement deals with mechanisms for adaptation, that is,
instruments for dealing with the inevitable effects of climate change. The Paris
Agreement establishes a global goal on adaptation, including through support for
and international cooperation on adaptation efforts (Art. 7 paras. 1 and 6 Paris
Agreement). Developing country Parties will receive enhanced support for adapta-
tion actions (Art. 7 para. 7 Paris Agreement). All Parties are expected to engage in
adaptation planning and to submit and periodically update an adaptation communi-
cation on their priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions (Art.
7 para. 10 Paris Agreement).
2.3.5 Loss and Damage and Global Stocktake
Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, concerning loss and damage, provides for yet
another mechanism for climate action, in addition to mitigation and adaptation.
Thus, the Paris Agreement builds on the Warsaw International Mechanism by
providing for formal recognition and comprehensive risk management approaches
to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.
This new mechanism has not, however, been fully developed and will have to be
concretized by future COPs in order to serve as an effective basis for compensation.
Most recently, the mechanism was subject to intense negotiations at COP 25, where
a key sticking point was the issue of how to finance the mechanism. There was
consensus among the Parties that financing to avert, minimize, and address loss and
damage must be “scaled up.”16 But the Parties could not come to an agreement to
obligate developed countries in particular to fund this scaling up.17
15There are three relevant types of heterogeneity. First, there may be heterogeneity of policy
instruments: It is possible not only to link two cap-and-trade systems, for example, but also a
cap-and-trade system and a carbon tax system. Second, there may be heterogeneity in the formu-
lation of the countries’ respective NDCs themselves: Some NDCs, for example, might specify an
aggregate emissions cap, while others might have only a cap on emissions per unit of economic
activity. And third, there may be heterogeneity of jurisdiction: The systems to be linked can exist at
regional, national, or sub-national jurisdictions. The agreement linking the EU and Switzerland’s
respective emissions trading systems (see Sect. 3 below) is an example of this kind of heterogeneity.
The various types of heterogeneity are explained in Stavins (2016), pp. 54–55.
16See Decision 2/CMA.2, Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with
Climate Change Impacts and its 2019 review, §§ 30, 32, 33, and 35.
17For an account of the negotiations, see Pierre-Nathoniel, Siegele, et al., “Loss and Damage at
COP25 – a hard fought step in the right direction,” The Climate Analytics Blog (20 December
2019), available at: https://climateanalytics.org.
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The Paris Agreement also provides that each Party is to report information on
mitigation, adaptation, and support; the agreement requires that the information
submitted by each Party undergo international review. A “global stocktake” is slated
to take place in 2023 and every 5 years thereafter to assess collective progress toward
fulfilling the purpose of the agreement (Art. 14 Paris Agreement). The outcomes of
the stocktake will inform Parties in updating and enhancing their own national
actions as well as international cooperation.
In 2018, a facilitative dialogue took place in order to encourage collective
progress towards the long-term emission reduction goal of Art. 4 Paris Agreement.
The dialogue was officially named the “Talanoa Dialogue,” inspired by the Fijian
tradition of dialogue in an inclusive and participatory manner. The dialogue culmi-
nated in the “Talanoa Call for Action” issued jointly by the Presidents of COP
23 and COP 24. The call was directed towards a wide range of actors and stake-
holders, including state institutions, the private sector, and civil society, reiterating
the goal of the Paris Agreement “to hold temperature rise well below 2 degrees
Celsius and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5 degrees.”18
2.3.6 Assessment of the Paris Agreement as Compared to Its
Predecessors
The Paris Agreement is distinctive in a number of ways as compared to its two
predecessors, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The guiding principles stated in
the UNFCCC are put into more or less concrete form in the Paris Agreement. But
unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement does not take a top-down, prescrip-
tive approach—an approach that, as noted above, has thus far proved politically
unsuccessful in gaining the support of some of the world’s most important countries
in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, though it remains to be seen whether this will
change in the future.19 The Paris Agreement instead takes a bottom-up facilitative
approach20 as a starting point, with national contributions constituting the bottom,
and with rules of transparency, reporting, and so on constituting the top elements.21
The Paris Agreement represents a facilitative rather than a prescriptive instrument. It
tries to find a balance between, on the one hand, ensuring autonomy for states in the
determination of their contributions and, on the other hand, strengthening oversight
18See the “Talanoa Call for Action,” available at https://unfccc.int.
19It should be noted, however, that the Paris Agreement has also run into difficulties in this respect:
It lost the support of the United States during the Trump Administration, which filed a formal
withdrawal notice on 4 November 2019. The withdrawal took effect one year later, in accordance
with Art. 28 para. 2 Paris Agreement. The United States’ withdrawal ended up being a temporary
one: On his first day in office, President Biden signed an executive order rejoining the Paris
Agreement. See Milman, “Biden returns US to Paris climate accord hours after becoming presi-
dent,” The Guardian (21 January 2021), available at https://www.theguardian.com.
20This term is also used in Dehm (2018), p. 74.
21On the combination of bottom-up and top-down elements, see also Rajamani (2016), p. 502.
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of these contributions through a robust transparency system, a global stocktake
process (leading to the incremental adjustment of Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions in service of the long-term goals), and a compliance mechanism. However, the
Agreement leaves mechanisms to be finalized by the Parties. And there are no clear
and specific goals in relation to finance, technology and capacity-building.22
3 Swiss Climate Policy and the EU Emissions Trading
System
3.1 The CO2 Act and the Agreement on Linking
the Emissions Trading Systems of the EU and Switzerland
The heart of Swiss climate policy is commonly considered to be the Federal Act on
the Reduction of CO2 Emissions, or simply the CO2 Act. The current version of the
Act, of 23 December 2011, entered into force on 1 January 2013 and has been
subjected to occasional revisions in the interim,23 whereas a new version of the Act,
of 25 September 2020, has been approved by the Parliament but has yet to enter into
force, pending the results of a popular referendum.24
The aim of the Act, stated in Article 1, is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
in particular CO2 emissions resulting from the use of fossil fuels in energy. Echoing
Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, the Act aims to contribute to limiting the increase
in global temperatures to well below 2 C compared to pre-industrial levels and to
contribute to efforts to limit that increase to below 1.5 C.
More specifically, Article 3 of the Act also stipulates concrete emission reduction
goals for Switzerland: a target of 50% in emission reduction compared to 1990
levels, by 2030, with a 35% reduction over the period of 2021–2030. It is worth
noting that, in addition to these statutory aims, the Federal Council has set an even
more ambitious post-2030 goal: net-zero emissions by 2050. This commitment has
22As noted by Arens et al. (2015), p. 4: “The Paris Agreement only contains vague language
concerning concrete financing contributions for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.
Legal bindingness of financing contributions in the Paris Agreement has been sacrificed due to
pressure by the USA.”
23Bundesgesetz über die Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen (CO2-Gesetz; SR 641.71) vom 11.
Dezember 2011.
24Bundesgesetz über die Verminderung von Treibhausgasemissionen (CO2-Gesetz) vom 25.
September 2020. Unless otherwise stated, references to the Act will henceforth be to this, the latest
version. Regarding the popular referendum, see “Climate and Covid laws set to come to public
vote,” SWI Swissinfo.ch (12 January 2021), available at https://www.swissinfo.ch. As the article
notes, opponents of the law appear to have gathered more than enough signatures to force a
referendum, but this has yet to be officially confirmed.
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been confirmed in Switzerland’s official communication to the UNFCCC under the
Paris Agreement.25
That the CO2 Act is considered the heart of Swiss climate policy is affirmed in its
own text, which states that the aforementioned emission reduction target is to be
achieved primarily through the Act’s provisions (Art. 4 para. 1). One of the central
instruments for the achievement of that target is the CO2 levy, which imposes a tax
on the production, extraction, and import of thermal fuels (Art. 34–41). The resultant
increase in the price of fossil fuels creates an incentive to use them more econom-
ically, as well as to choose more low-carbon energy sources. And in a major revision
of the previous version of the Act, the latest version adds a tax to be imposed on
airline tickets and on aviation operations generally (Art. 42–52).
Furthermore, the Act aims to contribute to the reduction of emissions through the
improvement of building standards (Art. 9–10) and the imposition of more stringent
limits on vehicle emissions (Art. 11–20). Article 19 of the Act provides for fines on
vehicle manufacturers that fail to abide by these limits.
In line with the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol—specifically, the
aforementioned Clean Development Mechanism and joint implementation—the Act
allows for emission reductions achieved abroad to count toward the overall emission
target (Art. 5), though it stipulates that 75% of the reductions must come by way of
measures undertaken in Switzerland (Art. 3 para. 2). Notably, however, the Act does
nothing to address emissions in the agricultural sector, which is responsible for
12.9% of Switzerland’s overall emissions, according to recent data.26
The Act foresees an emissions trading system (Art. 21–33). Companies in specific
categories that operate installations with high greenhouse gas emissions are required
to participate in the scheme (Art. 21), as well as operators of aircraft taking off from
or landing in Switzerland (Art. 22). The permits are allocated to the companies free
of charge to the extent that the emissions are necessary for greenhouse gas–efficient
production, whereas further permits are auctioned (Art. 26). Each year, companies
must surrender emission permits or emission reduction certificates equal to the
emissions caused (Art. 21 para. 2). The Federal Council determines in advance the
quantity of emission permits available each year until 2030, taking into account
comparable international regulations (Art. 25 para. 1). For emissions that exceed the
permits, companies must pay 220 CHF per tonne CO2 equivalent (CO2eq), and the
missing emission permits must be surrendered to the Confederation in the following
year (Art. 29).
The Act also establishes a special Climate Fund based on the proceeds raised
from the CO2 levy, the airline and general aviation taxes, the auctions of emission
permits, and the penalties paid by vehicle manufacturers failing to abide by vehicle
emissions limits (Art. 53–61). The Act specifies how these proceeds are to be spent,
25See “Communication and update on Switzerland’s NDC in accordance with UNFCCC decision
1/CP.21, § 24-25” (submitted in 2020, reaffirming the 50% reduction goal by 2030 and declaring a
new goal of net-zero emissions by 2050), available at https://www.unfccc.int.
26See Federal Office of the Environment (2020), p. 282.
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such as for initiatives aimed at further reduction of greenhouse gas emissions or at
the prevention of damage to persons or property as a result of climate change (Art.
53 para. 2 and Art. 53 para. 3).
As noted above, the version of the CO2 Act currently in force has been in place
since 2013. Its effectiveness, however, has been called into serious question. The Act
had set a national target of a 20% emissions reduction, compared to 1990 levels, by
2020 (Art. 3). But according to current projections, Switzerland has probably fallen
short of that goal: The Federal Office of the Environment has reported that the
reduction in emissions from the base year 1990 until 2018 was only 14%; it thus
deems the 2020 goal unlikely to be achieved and declares the current evolutionary
trend to be “unsatisfactory.”27 There is also reason to worry that Switzerland will
miss the even more ambitious 50% reduction target set by the new CO2 Act for the
year 2030. At least one independent analysis predicts that, even on the assumption
that the new version of the Act is approved by the popular referendum, enters into
force, and is fully implemented, the country would only manage a 37.5% emissions
reduction compared to 1990 levels.28
3.2 Agreement on Linking the Emissions Trading Systems
of the EU and Switzerland
As noted above, the emissions trading system is one of the main mitigation measures
foreseen by the CO2 Act. Recently, Switzerland has taken a major step toward
linking that system with the European Union’s parallel scheme. Along these lines,
the “Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the
linking of their greenhouse gas emissions trading systems” was ratified, and it
entered into force on 1 January 2020.29 The effect of the agreement is that companies
in the Swiss scheme are now permitted to trade on the EU ETS market.
27Federal Office for the Environment, “Climate: Indicators,” available at: https://www.bafu.
admin.ch.
28Climate Action Tracker, Country Summary: Switzerland (30 November 2020); see section
entitled “Current Policy Projections,” available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/
switzerland.
29Abkommen zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Europäischen Union zur
Verknüpfung ihrer jeweiligen Systeme für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionen, SR
0.814.011.268.
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3.3 EU ETS and the “European Green Deal”
Let us take a more detailed look at the EU Emissions Trading System. The ETS is a
regional realization of emissions trading as foreseen in Article 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
The point of departure of the emissions trading system is to ask: What if pollution
had a financial price? The “cap and trade system” created by economists has three
main elements. First, authorities limit the amount of CO2 emissions that industries
are allowed to produce; this is the “cap.” Permits to pollute are then distributed to
companies; if a company emits more than its limit, it is required to pay a fine, thereby
creating an incentive to find cleaner ways of operating. Finally, if a company emits
less than it is permitted to, it can sell its permission to other companies; this is the
“trade.”
Every year the total number of permits is reduced; there is thus a “declining cap,”
entailing that it will become increasingly expensive to pollute.
In 2005, the EU introduced the world’s biggest carbon trading system to date. The
system represents the European Union’s main effort at reducing overall emissions.
The legal basis of the system is Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive
96/61/EC.
The Directive adopts the market-based approach characteristic of cap-and-trade
systems: Emitters operate under a declining emission cap and CO2 is priced. The aim
is to generate financial incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The ETS
limits emissions from power stations, industrial plants, and airlines, encompassing
more than 11,000 such entities, which together comprise nearly half of the EU’s CO2
emissions.
Heavy CO2 emitting companies in the EU receive emission permits (“cap”), with
each permit granting the holder the right to emit one ton of CO2 or the equivalent
amount of two more powerful greenhouse gases, nitrous oxide (N2O) and
perfluorocarbons (PFCs).
At the end of each year a company must surrender enough allowances to cover
all of its emissions; otherwise, fines are imposed. If a company reduces its
emissions, it can keep the spare permits to cover its future needs or sell them to
another company that is short on permits (“trade”). Like Switzerland, the EU has
set ambitious goals for emission reduction: The European Commission has pro-
posed a minimum 55% reduction in emissions by 2030 as compared to 1990 levels
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and no net emissions by 2050.30 The ETS remains the centerpiece of the EU’s
effort to achieve these goals; and indeed, the Commission foresees an expanded
role for the ETS going forward.31
3.4 Details of the Scheme
The EU ETS covers the following gases and sectors:
(1) Carbon dioxide (CO2) from power and heat generation; energy-intensive indus-
try sectors including oil refineries, steel works and production of iron, alumi-
num, metals, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, pulp, paper, cardboard, acids; and
commercial aviation;
(2) Nitrous oxide (N2O) from production of nitric, adipic and glyoxylic acids and
glyoxal (production of nylon, fertilizers, disinfectants, antibiotics etc.);
(3) Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) from aluminum production.
The EU ETS has proceeded thus far in three phases. The first phase, described as
the “learning-by-doing” phase, began on 1 January 2005 and ended on 31 December
2007. Among the key features of Phase 1 were:32
(1) It covered only CO2 emissions from power generators and energy-intensive
industries.
(2) Almost all allowances were given to businesses for free.
(3) The penalty for non-compliance was 40€ per ton.
Phase 2 of the EU ETS overlapped with the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol, which had set concrete reduction targets for state Parties. The European
Commission identifies the following key features of Phase 2 of the EU ETS:
(1) There was a lower cap on allowances (approximately 6.5% lower compared to
Phase 1).
(2) Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway joined the scheme.
(3) Nitrous oxide emissions from nitric acid production were included by some
countries in the scheme.
(4) Free allocation of allowances fell to 90%.
(5) Several countries held auctions of allowances.
(6) The non-compliance penalty was increased to 100€ per ton.
(7) Businesses were permitted to buy international credits amounting to approxi-
mately 1.4 billion tons of CO2-equivalent.
30See European Commission (2020).
31European Commission (2020), pp. 13–16.
32These are the key features of Phase 1, as identified by the European Commission. See “Phases
1 and 2 (2005–2012),” (https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013_en#tab-0-0).
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(8) A Union-wide registry replaced national registries and the European Union
Transaction Log replaced the Community Independent Transaction Log.
(9) The aviation sector was brought into the ETS on 1 January 2012.33
Phase 3 of the EU ETS ran from 2013 to 2020. The European Commission has
pointed to four main changes from the previous two phases:
(1) A single, EU-level cap has been imposed in place of the previous national caps.
(2) Auctioning has replaced free allocation as the default method of allocating
allowances, and a unified set of rules now governs allowances that are distrib-
uted for free.
(3) More sectors and gases have been included.
(4) 300 million allowances have been set aside in the New Entrants Reserve to fund
the deployment of innovative, renewable energy technologies and carbon cap-
ture and storage.34
The current phase of the ETS, Phase 4, is expected to run from 2021 to 2030. In
order to achieve even a 40% reduction in emissions compared to 1990 levels—
which is significantly lower than the European Commission’s proposed 55% reduc-
tion ambition noted above—the Commission calculates that the sectors included in
the EU ETS would have to reduce their emissions by 43% compared to 2005
levels.35
With this target in mind, the Commission plans to implement a number of
revisions to the scheme. Among the key revisions are:
(1) Increasing the pace of annual reductions in allowances to 2.2% as of 2021;
(2) Strengthening the Market Stability Reserve;36
(3) Continuing the free allocation of allowances to ensure the competitiveness of
industrial sectors, while at the same time ensuring that free-allocation rules are in
line with technological progress;
(4) Aiding industries and the power sectors with low-carbon funding measures.37
33These are the key features of Phase 2, as identified by the European Commission, in “Phases 1 and
2 (2005–2012).”
34These features are the key features identified by the European Commission in its description of
the EU ETS (https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en).
35See “Revision for phase 4 (2021–2030)” (https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/revision_en).
36The Market Stability Reserve is a mechanism that began operating near the end of Phase 3, in
January 2019, with the aim of reducing the allowances surplus in the carbon market and improving
the scheme’s resilience to future shocks. See “Market Stability Reserve” at the European Commis-
sion’s Climate Action website (https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform_en). The mechanism
is described in further detail in Sect. 4.3 below.
37These key features of Phase 4 are identified on the Commission’s Climate Action website,
“Revision for phase 4 (2021–2030).”
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4 Criticisms of the Emissions Trading System
4.1 Far More Modest Reduction than Required
The ETS is the EU’s flagship emissions reduction scheme, in operation for the past
15 years. As noted above, the fourth phase of the scheme, running from 2021–2030,
has already begun. And yet, critics of the scheme have raised significant doubts
about its success and viability.
The most important criticism is that the ETS has failed to reduce the EU’s
greenhouse gas emissions anywhere near the levels that were hoped for or that are
required under international climate change conventions, such as the Kyoto Protocol’s
requirement that developed Annex I countries reduce their overall emissions of such
gases by at least 5% below 1990 levels. In this respect, the results of Phase 1 of the
scheme were disappointing. Rather than achieving a reduction in emissions, the
aggregate emissions data for participating countries actually showed a slight increase,
from 2034 billion tons of CO2 in 2006 to 2050 billion tons in 2007.
38 Even on an
optimistic recent scientific assessment covering the period 2008–2016, the EU’s
scheme has led to only a 3.8% greater reduction in emissions than if the scheme did
not exist at all.39 This is a far more modest reduction than is necessary to meet EU
countries’ obligations already under the Kyoto Protocol. It is also far moremodest than
both Switzerland’s and the EU’s ambitious plans for a 50% or 55% reduction in
emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels and net-zero emissions by 2050.
4.2 Windfall Profits
Another significant criticism is that the ETS allows energy companies to generate
windfall profits due to the allocation of allowances. This calls into question the
fundamental fairness of the carbon-trading scheme, which is also compounded by
the problem of increased energy costs for consumers. A study by Matthew Sinclair,
Research Director of the UK’s Taxpayer Alliance, explains the problem as follows:
Allowances are given to the firms for free but they are scarce and have a value, as can be seen
from the price in the carbon market. That means that, whether firms are buying the
allowances in the market or using those they have been freely allocated, the need to hold
them pushes up the cost of production relative to not producing and selling the allowance or
not buying it in the first place. Increasing the opportunity costs of production increases the
price those firms charge consumers.40
There is thus a double unfairness at work here: On the one hand, by receiving the
allowances for free and having the opportunity to sell them to the market, the
38European Commission (2008), p. 2.
39Bayer and Aklin (2020), p. 117.
40Sinclair (2009), p. 11. On this point, see also Ellerman and Joskow (2008), pp. 24–26.
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companies in question are able to secure windfall profits and are therefore unfairly
advantaged; and on the other hand, consumers are unfairly required to pay increased
prices due to the energy companies’ having the opportunity to trade the freely
allocated permits.
An important question raised by this issue is whether European judicial institu-
tions—and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in particular—can adapt to the
challenges posed by the ETS or at least allow EU countries sufficient leeway to
address such challenges themselves.
The ECJ has ruled on the effort of at least one EU country, Slovakia, to deal with
the problem of windfall profits. Slovakia had decided, in 2011, to tax emission
allowances (allocated free of charge) which had been sold or which had not been
used at 80% of their value. The question presented in the case was whether
Slovakia’s actions were in conformity with the EU ETS (Directive 2003/87/EC).
The ECJ’s judgment, issued on 12 April 2018 (C-302/17, PPC Power a.s.),
answered this question in the negative. According to the Court, states are not
permitted to undermine the objectives of the Directive 2003/87/EC. The ETS aims
to encourage enterprises to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, specifically by
allowing them to trade the emission allowances they do not need. A tax of 80% on
these allowances eliminates nearly all of their economic value, which would upset
the delicate balance of incentives that the ETS is meant to create. The result of this
judgment, however, is that national governments are prevented from addressing the
problem of windfall profits that has been created by the ETS. This case provides an
indication that the ECJ may not be so willing to allow the necessary flexibility in the
operation of the ETS to address some of its most significant problems.
4.3 Instability and Volatility
Another common criticism is that the price of emission allowances has been subject
to significant instability and volatility. As Ellerman et al. explain in a review article
of the first two phases of the ETS, the first 10 years of the scheme saw extreme
fluctuations in the price of emissions allowances, ranging from a few Euro cents to
almost EUR 30.41
The problem with such price volatility is that it undermines the incentives that the
ETS provides to companies to invest in emission reduction technologies. In general,
the environmental effectiveness of an emissions trading scheme depends on the
ability of the scheme and its regulations to provide consistent and stable incentives
for companies to invest in such technologies. With highly volatile prices, however,
“no clear investment signal is provided and hence firms’ decision-making and
planning is rendered difficult.”42 By undermining incentives to invest in clean
41Ellerman et al. (2016), pp. 96–97.
42Köppl et al. (2011), p. 3.
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energy technologies, price fluctuations therefore end up undermining the very goal
of the ETS, namely that of the reduction of emissions.
In order to address the problem of instability and volatility, in January 2019 a
so-called “Market Stability Reserve” (MSR) began operating within the ETS. The
idea underlying the MSR is a simple one: When the number of allowances in
circulation exceeds a specified upper limit, the mechanism automatically withdraws
allowances and stores them in the reserve. And when the number of circulating
allowances falls below a specified lower limit, the withdrawn allowances are again
released into the market. The MSR is designed to advance two main objectives:
(1) to reduce the short-term excess in allowances, and (2) to stabilize the ETS in the
long term, especially when demand for allowances falls during economic slow-
downs.43 The European Commission emphasizes that the reserve operates according
to pre-defined rules, leaving no discretion to the Commission or to member states in
the MSR’s implementation.44
How effective the MSR will be in ensuring market stability in the ETS remains to
be seen. One significant problem, noted by a number of commentators, is that the
adjustments made by the MSR are subject to a delay vis-à-vis the behavior of market
participants that the adjustments are meant to influence.45 Imagine, for instance, that
at the end of a given year, the MSR determines that there is a surplus of allowances in
the market, which has led to an excessively low price per unit of carbon. In response,
the MSR reduces the number of allowances on the market, thereby pushing up the
price. By that time, however, it is possible that external economic factors will already
have influenced the price in the same direction, thereby leading to an overcorrection.
In any case, because the MSR began operating only in 2019, it is still too early to tell
whether it will be effective at achieving its goal of stabilizing the ETS market.
4.4 Undue Political Pressure
Also undermining the effectiveness of the ETS has been the problem of undue
political pressure, especially in the context of the free allocation scheme. One
economic analysis found signs that the initial allocation of emission permits had
been influenced by lobbying: “Under the EU ETS, governments influenced by
special interests made a tradeoff between the quantity of quotas issued and the
decision to auction or to grant them for free.”46 The result was that the allocation of
permits for 2005 exceeded real CO2 emissions by approximately 100 million tons.
47
43Andor et al. (2016), p. 90.
44
“Market Stability Reserve” at the European Commission’s Climate Action website (https://ec.
europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform_en).
45See, e.g., Andor et al. (2016), p. 90; and Richstein et al. (2015), p. 3.
46Hanoteau (2014), p. 83.
47See Kettner et al. (2008), pp. 41–61.
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In this way, the lobbying efforts of industries have damaged the effectiveness of the
ETS itself. This goes some way toward explaining why the scheme has failed to
achieve significant emission reductions.
One interesting question, however, is whether lobbying has continued to damage
the effectiveness of the ETS even in Phase 3, where free allocation of permits has
been almost completely replaced by an auction scheme. According to one analysis,
the shift to an auction-based allocation of permits has not solved the problem but
merely shifted the target of lobbying efforts. As part of the auction process in Phase
3 of the ETS, allocations are now made by reference to EU-wide “benchmarks” for
emissions per unit of production.48 But this seemingly objective process was, in the
end, again biased by the power of lobbyists:
Despite the quasi-scientific veneer of technical benchmarks, the decisions on how to define
the categories and which criteria to adopt remain subject to the power politics of the industry
lobby. Those with access to Brussels decision makers, or to national government depart-
ments willing to push their agenda, did best.49
The seemingly endless problems and recalibrations of each successive phase of
the EU ETS raise a legitimate question: Could it be the case that the problem with the
ETS lies not in the details of how it is designed but rather more fundamentally in the
very idea of a carbon trading scheme? One potential explanation that merits further
attention is the following: The ETS encourages not only companies but also the
entire EU public to view greenhouse gas emissions as a problem that one can simply
buy one’s way out of, while minimizing the impact on the bottom line. Given that the
scheme encourages such a profits-based mindset, it is no surprise that companies
have felt emboldened to use their lobbying efforts to exploit every facet of the
scheme to their maximal advantage. Perhaps, then, what the EU and Switzerland
must do in order to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions is to focus not on
further recalibrations of the ETS scheme but on a fundamental reorientation in how
the challenges of climate change and emission reductions are conceived of. The next
section will present one possible reorientation of this kind.
48
“To set these new standards, the EU split the whole range of industrial goods into 53 categories,
such as newsprint, coloured glass bottles, and roof tiles. An emissions limit was defined for each
product that was intended to reflect the standards achieved by the most efficient 10 per cent of
factories in the EU.” Carbon Trade Watch (2011), p. 5; see also Jung (2010).
49Carbon Trade Watch (2011), pp. 5–6.
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5 A Human Rights Approach to Climate Change
5.1 Link to the Human Rights Approach in the Paris
Agreement
One approach to the problem of climate change that has recently been gaining
attention is the human rights approach,50 and as has already been noted, the Paris
Agreement itself explicitly casts climate change as a human rights issue. It is of
course impossible to do full justice to the human rights approach in this short space.
So we shall instead focus briefly on how the human rights instrument most relevant
to Switzerland and the EU—the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—
can be seen to generate strong obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
5.2 Art. 2 and 8 ECHR and ECtHR Case Law
The key provisions in the ECHR in connection with climate change are Art. 2 and
8. Art. 2 para. 1 guarantees the right to life, stating, in relevant part, that “[e]
veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law.” And Art. 8 para. 1 states the
following: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.” Although not expressly specified in the wording of Art.
8, the ECtHR’s case law has made clear that the provision includes physical and
psychological integrity within the scope of its protection.51 Thus, while Art. 2 guar-
antees the right to life, Art. 8 guarantees a certain quality of life.52
Art. 2 has not infrequently been invoked by the ECtHR in environmental cases.
Much of the Court’s Article 2 jurisprudence in the environmental arena deals
specifically with industrial hazards and dangerous activities. However, foreseeable
environmental disasters can also fall within the scope of the provision. According to
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, a contracting state is obligated under Article 2 to
take appropriate measures if there is a real and immediate risk to life and the state is
aware of this risk, and this includes risks due to environmental hazards.53
Traditionally, Art. 2 and 8 have been understood as negative rights: They prohibit
the state from engaging in certain forms of life-threatening conduct (Art. 2) or from
50For more details, see Hänni (2019), pp. 1–20.
51See Hänni (2020), p. 617; Vöneky and Beck (2017), p. 146.
52See ECtHR 7 April 2009, No. 6586/03, Brânduşe v. Romania, § 67. For similar provisions in the
Swiss Constitution, see Art. 10 and 13.
53See, e.g., ECtHR 20 March 2008, Nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02,
Budayeva v. Russia, para. 133; ECtHR 24 July 2014, Nos. 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11, 62312/
11 and 62338/11, Brincat v. Malta, paras. 85 and 102; ECtHR 28 February 2012, Nos. 17423/05,
20534/05, 20678/05, 23263/05, 24283/05 and 35673/05, Kolyadenko v. Russia, para. 212; and
ECtHR [GC] 30 November 2004, No. 48939/99, Öneryildiz v. Turkey, paras. 89–90.
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unjustifiably interfering with an individual’s private and family life (Art. 8). In this
sense, the state has so-called “negative duties” toward individuals. Negative duties
correspond to an individual’s rights against state interference. However, the
ECtHR has also interpreted Art. 2 and 8 as more than just negative rights. Indeed,
it has ruled that a state’s failure to protect individuals against adverse environmental
effects—even those brought about by private third-parties—can constitute a viola-
tion of the right to life, as well as of the right to respect for private and family life.
This results in so-called positive duties for member states under the Convention.54
For example, in the case of López Ostra,55 a complainant (successfully) filed suit
on the basis of Art. 8 because of the failure of Spanish authorities to act to prevent
fumes that were being emitted from an industrial plant, causing health problems for a
number of nearby residents. In a later case, the ECtHR held Italy responsible for
failing to provide a functioning garbage collection system, even though there was no
proof of a health hazard; the fact that a private company was responsible for the
collection did not, in the eyes of the court, exempt Italy from its duty to protect its
citizens under Art. 8;56 for the situation tolerated by the state led to a deterioration in
the applicants’ quality of life, constituting a violation of their right to respect for
private life.57 The foregoing cases demonstrate that in the area of environmental
protection the Court has recognized that the state has a positive duty of protection. In
light of this positive duty of protection, states can in principle be held responsible for
damages to the quality of life that result from their failure to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions sufficiently—as long as this failure can be traced back to the breach of
some legal duty.
5.3 Landmark Judgment in The State of the Netherlands
v. The Urgenda Foundation
The ECtHR itself has not yet ruled on whether the failure to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions constitutes a breach of a legal duty—specifically the positive duty of
protection—leading to a violation of the Convention. But in December 2019, for the
first time, the highest court of a state party to the ECHR—the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands—made precisely such a finding in its landmark judgment in the case of
The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy)
v. The Urgenda Foundation.58
54See Hänni (2019), pp. 7–9. For overviews of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on positive obligations,
see Sudre (1995), p. 363; Mowbray (2004), Klatt (2011), p. 691.
55ECtHR 9 December 1994, No. 16798/90, López Ostra v. Spain, § 51.
56ECtHR 10 January 2012, No. 30765/08, Di Sarno and Others v. Italy, §§ 104–108.
57See Di Sarno, § 108.
58See Hänni (2020), pp. 617–633, for a detailed analysis of the judgment.
Swiss Climate Change Law 41
One of the most important contributions of the Urgenda judgment is that it
develops a powerful link between Art. 2 and 8 ECHR, on the one hand, and
international climate change obligations, on the other. It does this via the “common
ground” interpretive approach. Thus, quoting from the ECtHR’s judgment in the
case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey,59 the Supreme Court writes:
The Court, in defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, can
and must take into account elements of international law other than the Convention,
interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the practice of European States
reflecting their common values. The consensus emerging from specialised international
instruments and from the practice of contracting States may constitute a relevant consider-
ation for the Court when it interprets the provisions of the Convention in specific cases.60
The common-ground interpretive principle therefore opens the door for the
consideration of other elements of international law in the interpretation of Art.
2 and 8 ECHR. Two such elements are especially relevant in the climate-change
context.
The first is the so-called “no harm” principle, which was developed in the Trail
Smelter arbitration case from the first half of the twentieth century61 and is now part
of customary international law. According to that principle, states are under an
obligation not to allow any activities within their jurisdiction that could cause
harm to other states, including individuals in other states. Given that the damages
resulting from activities causing global warming are not contained within the states
in which such activities take place, the no harm principle can provide a powerful
basis for interpreting Art. 2 and 8 to account for damages resulting from climate
change.
Second, Article 47 of the International Law Commission’s Draft articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides that when
several states are responsible for an internationally wrongful act, each state may be
held partially responsible for the resulting harms. In this way, partial fault gives rise
to partial responsibility. This provides a way of holding individual countries
accountable for their excessive greenhouse gas emissions, independent of whether
59ECtHR [GC] 12 November 2008, No. 34503/97, para. 85.
60Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Supreme Court Judgment, 20 December 2019, The State of the
Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy) and Stichting Urgenda, 19/00135,
§ 5.4.2 (English version).
61Trail Smelter Case, the United States v. Canada, 1938 and 1941, Report of International Arbitral
Awards, vol. III, p. 1905 at p. 1965: “No State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or person
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.”
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each country’s emissions—taken in isolation—are sufficient to bring about climate-
related harms.62
This notion of partial responsibility sets the stage for the next step of the Supreme
Court’s argument, which is that “Articles 2 and 8 ECHR relating to the risk of
climate change should be interpreted in such a way that these provisions oblige the
contracting states to do ‘their part’ to counter that danger.”63 In determining what it
means for contracting states to do “their part” in combating climate change, the
Supreme Court invokes a firm international consensus that UNFCCC Annex I
countries would need to undertake significant reductions in order to avoid the
most severe consequences of global warming. The linchpin of the Court’s analysis
is the IPCC scenario in AR4 in 2007. The Court writes: “This scenario provides for
Annex I countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25% to 40% in 2020 and
by 80% to 95% in 2050, both compared to 1990 emissions.”64 The judgment goes on
to marshal a dazzling array of other international sources in support of this signif-
icant level of reduction, including the Bali Action Plan, which emerged from the Bali
Climate Change Conference in 2007 (COP 13); a resolution passed at the Cancún
Climate Change Conference in 2010 (COP 16); another resolution passed at the
Durban Climate Change Conference in 2011 (COP 17); and the Doha Climate
Change Conference in 2012 (COP 18).65 All of these conferences referred back to
the IPCC scenario for AR4 as a benchmark for UNFCCC Annex I countries. In
addition, the Court also cites the fact that “[s]everal EU bodies — the Council, the
Commission and the Parliament — expressed the scientifically supported necessity
of reducing emissions by 30% in 2020 in comparison to 1990.”66
In light of this international consensus, the Supreme Court held that the state of
the Netherlands, as an Annex I country, has a human-rights based obligation to meet
precisely these targets for significant reduction. As stated in the Court’s summary of
its judgment:
All in all, there is a great degree of consensus on the urgent necessity for the Annex I
countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25–40% in 2020. The consensus on
this target must be taken into consideration when interpreting and applying Article 2 and
8 ECHR. The urgent necessity for a reduction of 25–40% in 2020 also applies to the
Netherlands on an individual basis.67
62International Law Commission (2001), Art. 47 para. 1. This provision is explicitly invoked at
Urgenda, § 5.7.6. See also Nollkaemper et al. (2020), p. 16, Principle 2, which explicitly recognizes
shared responsibility for injuries due to “cumulative contributions,” in which “the conduct of
multiple international persons together results in an injury that none could have caused on their
own” (p. 25, para. 5 of Commentary to Principle 2).
63Urgenda, § 5.8.
64Urgenda, § 7.2.1.
65These conferences are referred to at Urgenda, §§ 7.2.2 and 7.2.3.
66Urgenda, § 7.2.6.
67Urgenda, summary of §§ 6.1–7.3.6 of the Court’s judgment.
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It is often said that climate change is a global problem that necessitates a global
cooperative solution, rather than a problem that any one country can solve on its
own.68 Nonetheless, the Court found that a 25–40% reduction by 2020 was the
minimum reduction required for the Netherlands to individually do “its part” in that
global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.69 Failure to attain this benchmark
would, according to the Court, constitute a breach of the Netherlands’ obligations
under Art. 2 and 8 of the ECHR.70
5.4 Future Prospects of the Human Rights Approach
It is too early to tell what the implications of the landmark Urgenda judgment will be
for other Annex I countries such as Switzerland. This will depend on at least two
related factors: (1) whether the highest courts in other European countries will follow
the lead of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in imposing the same requirements
on state institutions, and (2) whether the ECtHR will eventually step in to impose
such requirements on all, or at least some, Council of Europe states, including
Switzerland.71
68Recall the principle of cooperation, Art. 3 para. 5 UNFCCC, discussed in Sect. 2.1.2, herein.
69Urgenda, summary of §§ 5.6.1–5.8 of the Court’s judgment.
70It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court found that the applicability of Articles 2 and 8 ECHR to
the context of climate change was sufficiently clear, such that it explicitly refrains from requesting
an advisory opinion from the ECtHR in accordance with Protocol No. 16 of the Convention, which
states, in relevant part: “Highest courts and tribunals of a High Contracting Party, as specified in
accordance with Article 10, may request the Court to give advisory opinions on questions of
principle relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the
Convention or the protocols thereto” (Art. 1 para. 1). See Urgenda, § 5.6.4.
71These two factors are related because the ECtHR often looks to the existence of a “European
consensus” among member states in order to determine each state’s “margin of appreciation” in
state actions and policies that affect human rights fulfillment. On this principle, see Goodwin v. The
United Kingdom, no. 28957/95 (2002), §§ 85–86; Tekeli v. Turkey, no. 29865/96 (2004), § 61;
Handyside v. The United Kingdom [Plenary], no. 5493/72 (1976), § 48. At least two high-profile
cases are now pending before the ECtHR, both involving Switzerland. First, in September 2020, six
Portuguese youths filed an application to the Court against 33 states, including Switzerland,
claiming violation of the ECHR due to the failure to take sufficient action for the prevention of
climate change. A copy of the application in the case is available at https://youth4climatejustice.org.
Because of the urgency of the case, the Court has granted it priority consideration under Rule 41 of
the Rules of the Court. (Rule 41 states, in relevant part: “In determining the order in which cases are
to be dealt with, the Court shall have regard to the importance and urgency of the issues raised on
the basis of criteria fixed by it.”) The governments of the 33 states have also been ordered to respond
to the applicants’ claims. See the Court’s communication of 13 November 2020 (published
30 November 2020), in the case of Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Other States,
no. 39371/20, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. And in the second case, mentioned previously
(see note 4 above), KlimaSeniorinnen has filed an application against Switzerland, though the Court
has not yet issued a communication regarding that application.
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Even before these questions are definitively settled, however, this chapter has
aimed to provide a basis for further exploration of whether Switzerland’s human
rights obligations might require it to achieve a far greater reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions than participation in the EU’s Emissions Trading System and imple-
mentation of the CO2 Act would be able to produce on their own.
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Abstract Switzerland and the European Union (EU) face similar challenges when it
comes to the decarbonisation and securing of energy supply. Both lack sufficient
domestic energy resources, apart from nuclear energy. But nuclear energy has
become controversial after the nuclear meltdown accident at Fukushima, Japan, in
2011. Without reconsidering nuclear energy as a future energy resource, the coop-
eration in the energy market between the EU and Switzerland becomes even more
vital for securing energy supply. While in the past, Switzerland has fulfilled an
important function in securing energy supply in neighbouring EU Member States,
lately, the EU has provided for its own governance for emergency situations.
However, Switzerland will maintain its function as an interface in the electricity
sector. This is even more true, since the new focus on renewable energies fosters the
demand for flexible cross-boundary solutions. An electricity agreement between
Switzerland and the EU might provide a stable legal framework for these develop-
ments. The price to pay for Switzerland will be a further opening of the market,
offering the private consumer a choice of energy providers. The good news for Swiss
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strategies for promoting renewable energies is that EU Member States are still
allowed to take a flexible approach towards national promotion measures, especially
in designing them to their territory. Therefore, the cooperation between Switzerland
and the EU offers some advantages in terms of flexibility in the quest for security of
supply while fighting climate change.
1 Similar Challenges
As highly industrialized European states, Switzerland and the Member States of the
European Union contribute to climate change based on the greenhouse effect in a
similar way. Both respond to this responsibility by similar self-binding commitments
for reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases under the Paris Agreement, like
before under the Kyoto Protocol, especially concerning CO2 emissions.
1 At the same
time, both have to fulfill their constitutional resp. primary law based obligations to
secure an adequate supply of energy in the national2 resp. supranational3 framework.
Notwithstanding the diversity of the EU Member States, the EU and Switzerland
face comparable challenges. Moreover, during the period covered by our research in
SCCER CREST (since 2013), they have responded to these challenges in a similar
manner, despite their autonomous, independent policy approaches. An important
reason for this is that—although differences in detail may exist—neither the EU
Member States nor Switzerland possesses significant domestic energy resources.
Notwithstanding nuclear energy and the important, but limited, part of hydropower,
Switzerland cannot rely solely on domestic energy resources. Similarly, nuclear
energy still plays a decisive role in the EU. Besides, some Member States can rely
on coal resources. But this energy resource is detrimental to the climate and too small
to secure energy supply in the Union. Furthermore, it is a cost-intensive energy
resource. In addition, natural gas available in some EU Member States has
1Switzerland ratified the Paris Agreement on 6 October 2017 and has accepted reduction targets of
50% by 2030 as compared to 1990. For 2050, there is a common reduction target of 70 to 85% as
compared to 1990. Both targets include a partial use of emission reductions abroad. See Federal
Office for the Environment (FOEN), The Paris Agreement, available at https://www.bafu.admin.ch.
The EU ratified the Paris Agreement on 5 October 2016. In the Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (NDC) of the EU in the framework of the Paris Agreement, the reduction target for greenhouse
gas emissions amounts to 40% by 2030 as compared to 1990. See European Commission, Paris
Agreement, available at https://ec.europa.eu.
2See the objective of a sufficient (“ausreichenden”) energy supply according to Art. 89 para.
1 Federal Constitution (FC) as a task for the Swiss Federation as well as for the Swiss cantons.
3See the task to “ensure security of energy supply in the Union” according to Art. 194 para. 1 lit.
b TFEU.
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diminished considerably over the last years.4 Last but not least, the petroleum in the
North Sea is less profitable due to the low prices for petroleum on the world market.
Against this background, it is understandable that the EU and Switzerland are
eager to conclude a bilateral electricity agreement. Despite the great mutual under-
standing in the negotiations, these have been stopped due to the demand by the EU to
first conclude an Institutional Framework Agreement, which would grant the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) a considerable role in legal disputes.5
Hereinafter, the focus will be on the development of interests of the negotiation
partners with regard to promoting certain energy resources. Regularly, the objectives
of the EU are identified as promoting security of supply—especially with reference
to the blackout in Italy in September 2003—, stable and affordable prices and
balancing effects with regard to the feed-in of electricity from renewable energies
as well as fostering competition.6 From a Swiss point of view, with reference to the
Energy Strategy 20507 one has to mention the fostering of security of supply, better
market access, especially for so-called balancing energy, as well as stabilizing the
Swiss function of an “electricity hub for Europe”.8
2 Development of Energy Resources
2.1 Nuclear Energy
The EU only has a limited legal basis for regulating the choice of energy resources.
The provisions on energy regulation in Art. 194 TFEU leave a lacunae in this regard.
But under the competences on the environment, Art. 192 para. 2 TFEU allows for
regulating the choice of energy resources; however, unanimity is required. There-
fore, any single Member State can block a legislative decision. It is true that
promoting nuclear energy is a task of the EU, provided for by the Euratom Treaty.
However, the treaty does not include an obligation for Member States to do so. The
focus of the work under that treaty has shifted to safety in the field of nuclear
energy.9
In the end, the possible acceptance of nuclear energy in the Member States has
never been harmonized on the EU level, allowing for a divergent development.
While some Member States, such as the so-called Visegrad-States and the United
4Heselhaus and Becker (2019), p. 249, 256 et seq.
5For details, see Hettich et al. (2015), pp. 3–4.
6Hettich et al. (2015), p. 6, with further references.
7Federal Council Dispatch on the Swiss Energy Strategy 2050 (Energiestrategie 2050), see Federal
Council (2013), p. 7580 et seq.
8Weber and Kratz (2009), § 7 n. 25.
9Classen (2011), n. 16.
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Kingdom, opt for modernizing and enlarging nuclear power plants,10 others, such as
France, have decided to reduce nuclear energy at least in some parts, even if supply
remains on a comparatively high level. Other Member States have never been into
nuclear energy, like Austria and Italy, or are exiting from nuclear energy in the
aftermath of the nuclear meltdown in Fukushima in 2011, like Germany, where the
last reactors will be taken off the net in 2022.11
So, the development of the EU policy in the area of nuclear energy is ambivalent.
After Fukushima, the basis for running reactors has been to pass the so-called stress
test, designed to check the security of all reactors in use. At the request of the
European Council in 2011, the group of national surveillance authorities ENSREG
(European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group) set up methods, the extent and the
procedure of the stress test.12 After the completion of the tests in 2012, all reactors
could be kept in use. In the recent past, some reactors have been put off the net due to
minor incidents. In a Belgian case, the ECJ decided that restarting the operation of a
nuclear power station that had previously been shut down is basically allowed, even
after a longer period of time. However, an environmental impact assessment has to
be carried out.13 In the European legal context, that leads to the participation of the
public. Therefore, the risks of re-operation of nuclear power plants will be discussed
in public.
According to a ruling by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate
(Eidgenössisches Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat [ENSI]), the operators of Swiss
nuclear power plants were required to take part in the EU stress test, too. In their
assessment of the Swiss country report on the EU stress test, the EU experts
concluded that the Swiss nuclear power plants fulfil all the international require-
ments in all areas. Emphasis was put on the proactive measures of the Swiss Federal
Nuclear Safety Inspectorate after Fukushima, on the seven safety layers of the Swiss
nuclear power plants, as well as on the protection against a loss of the ultimate heat
sink, i.e. cooling the reactor. Only with regard to extreme weather conditions and
hydromanagement in case of severe accidents, the experts recommended further
testing.14 According to ENSI, there is an adequate framework for a systematic
management of ageing in Swiss nuclear power plants. So, possible damages by
ageing can be detected already in an early stage and countermeasures can be taken.15
10Heselhaus and Becker (2019), p. 249, 256 et seq.
1113. Gesetz zur Änderung des Atomgesetzes, regulating the exit from nuclear energy and acceler-
ating the energy U-turn, German BGBl. 2011 I p. 1704 ff.
12ENSREG (2011).
13ECJ, C-411/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018/972 – Inter-Environnement Wallonie et Bond Beter Leefmilieu
Vlaanderen.
14Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (2012a); see in addition Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety
Inspectorate (2012b). See also ENSREG (2012).
15ENSI has written the country report for Switzerland and, by the end of 2017, submitted it to the
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group ENSREG. Besides, ENSI has identified some areas for
optimisation, see Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) (2018); Swiss Federal Nuclear
Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) (2017).
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In reaction to the meltdown incident in Fukushima, Germany put most of its
nuclear power plants preliminarily off-line and then regulated the legally binding
exit from nuclear technology.16 In Switzerland, the Federal Council first took a basic
decision in favour of a phase-out of nuclear energy on 25 May 2011. According to
this, the existing nuclear power plants should go off-line at the end of their safety-
related operational lifespan and shall not be replaced by new nuclear power plants. A
necessity for an early exit from nuclear energy has not been identified.17 With the
slow phase-out, there is more time at hand for implementing the new energy policy
and the conversion of the existing energy system.18 In a second phase, the applicable
laws have been changed: According to Art. 12a KEG19 since 1 January 2018, the
granting of general licenses for the construction of new, and according to Art.
106 para. 1bis KEG for the modification of existing, nuclear power plants has been
prohibited. Although it is up to Parliament to change these rules for the future, the
relevant law would be subject to a people’s referendum. The decommissioning of a
nuclear power plant is regulated in Art. 26 KEG und Art. 45 KEV. The proprietor
has to decommission a plant if it has been definitely taken out of operation or the
operating license has not been issued, has been withdrawn or has expired according
to Art. 68 para. 1 lit. a or b KEG and the responsible authority (DETEC: Federal
Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications) has
ordered the installation to be decommissioned (Art. 26 para. 1 KEG). Pursuant to
Art. 27 KEG the proprietor of the plant has to submit a project for the
decommissioning of the plant to the authorities. The supervisory authority will set
a deadline for this. Then the competent department (DETEC) will decide on the
measures for the decommissioning (Art. 28 KEG). After the decommissioning
activities have been completed, the department will decide whether the plant is no
longer a source of radiological dangers and therefore will not be subject to the
legislation on nuclear energy anymore (Art. 29 KEG). The first of the five Swiss
nuclear power plants, the Mühleberg Nuclear Power Plant, has been shut down at the
end of 2019.20 Other dates for a shutdown of power plants have not yet been set resp.
have been postponed.21 Because of the step-by-step approach the situation of energy
supply in Switzerland is, at the moment, less volatile than in Germany. However, in
the mid term one has to deal with the loss of nuclear energy in Switzerland as an
energy resource contributing to a stable basic supply.
1613. Gesetz zur Änderung des Atomgesetzes, German BGBl. 2001 I p. 1704 ff.
17Federal Council (2013), p. 7592.
18Federal Council (2013), p. 7608.
19Nuclear Energy Act (Kernenergiegesetz KEG) of 21 March 2003 (SR 732.1).
20See Federal Department for the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (2018).
21See Banholzer et al. (2019).
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2.2 Fossil Energy Resources
In the European Green Deal, the European Commission calls for a fast exit from
coal.22 During the past seven years, the Commission has succeeded in building a
strong consensus among Member States in favour of an exit from the coal industry.23
Poland with its huge resources of coal is the only Member State still abstaining.
However, under EU competences this single vote is enough to stop any direct
regulation concerning the choice of energy resources in the Member States. The
political reasoning by Poland is understandable when compared to the development
in Germany. There, after long political discussions, a compromise on the exit from
coal has finally been reached. However, the remaining operation period until 2038 is
rather long and the financial payments are rather generous.24 In the end, it becomes
obvious that all states are hesitant to abstain from using their own energy resources.
The strategy behind the Green Deal becomes clear when taking into account the
financial mechanism.25 The acceptance of Poland could be reached by offering
payments in other areas. However, the enormous amount of financial resources
necessary to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic makes it rather doubtful that the
financial mechanism will be realised as envisioned.
In Switzerland, there are no coal-fired power plants and the small share of coal in
the Swiss energy mix is due to electricity imports.26 However, Swiss private
enterprises are still investing in the coal industry abroad, primarily in Germany.27
But a further decline is expected in Switzerland due to the high burden of CO2
levies.28
In the EU, the pressure on coal has been increased indirectly by issuing stricter
emission limits for coal power plants. Based on the Directive on Industrial Emissions
(or IED), the Commission Implementing Decision 2017/144229 adopts the instru-
ment of BAT (best available techniques) conclusions.30 The BAT conclusions
strengthen the limits set up by the IE Directive and call for stricter limits in case of
new plants.
22European Commission (2019), no. 2.1.2., 7.
23Heselhaus and Becker (2019), p. 249, 256 et seq.
24In June 2020, the deliberations took place in the German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag); also
see Franzius (2018), p. 1585 et seq.
25For details, see Heselhaus (2020).
26Schweizerische Energie-Stiftung, Kohlekraft in der Schweiz, available at https://www.
energiestiftung.ch. Coal accounted for 0.5% of gross energy consumption in 2017 and 2018, see
Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019c), p. 2.
27See the website of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy regarding fossil fuels and coal, available at
https://www.bfe.admin.ch.
28The CO2 levy on coal of CHF 60 per tonne of CO2 equals CHF 150 per tonne of coal; see the
website of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy regarding fossil fuels and coal, available at https://
www.bfe.admin.ch.
29OJ. EU 2017, L 212, p. 1.
30For details, see Vollmer (2017), p. 822.
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In addition, the technique of unconventional fracking is under debate in the EU
and likewise in Switzerland.31 The method applied for extracting gas or petroleum
comprises a cocktail of water and hazardous substances pressed with high pressure
into the earth in order to pump fossil energy resources to the surface. In the EU, there
was a strong political debate whether fracking should be allowed at all or at least be
strictly regulated. The European Parliament had at least asked for a duty for an
environmental impact assessment.32 In 2014, the European Commission opted in
favour of a compromise and issued only a recommendation that left the decision on
allowing fracking to the Member States.33 Especially, it is only recommended to
carry out a strategic environmental assessment or an environmental impact assess-
ment (EIA).
Concerning the duty to carry out an EIA with regard to fracking operations, there
is no explicit rule on such operations in the EIA Directive.34 Therefore, the judiciary
has been asked whether indirectly an EIA may be a precondition for drilling
operations. In 2015, the ECJ decided that in case of a test drilling with a test
extraction an EIA has to be carried out. While annex I no. 14 EIA Directive was
not applicable in the case at hand for not reaching the threshold for daily extractions,
the ECJ applied annex II no. 2 lit. d EIA Directive concerning deep drilling.35
Furthermore, cumulative impacts of other operations in the vicinity, not necessarily
of the same kind, have to be taken into account in the assessment.36 Otherwise a
danger would exist that relevant impacts on the environment would not be consid-
ered adequately.
Subsequently, several EU Member States have enacted fracking laws. In 2017, in
Germany specific provisions have been added to the Federal Water Act
(Wasserhaushaltsgesetz). They provide for broad prohibitions of fracking and lim-
itations concerning the use of fracking techniques.37 Especially unconventional
fracking operations for commercial reasons are not allowed. However, the economic
interests in fracking have diminished sharply because this complicated technique is
not cost-efficient in comparison to the low prices for mineral oil.
In Switzerland, the competence for regulating fracking lies primarily with the
cantons.38 But not all of them have enacted specific legislation with regard to the
utilization of the subsurface. Some cantons have opted for a prohibition or a
moratorium on fracking in general or on fracking for extraction of unconventional
31See for the perils Gassner and Buchholz (2013), p. 143 et seq.
32European Parliament (2013).
33Recommendation 2014/70/EU, OJ. EU 2014, L 39, p. 72.
34Directive 2011/92/EU, OJ. L 26, p. 1.
35ECJ, C-531/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:79—Marktgemeinde Straβwalchen.
36ECJ, C-531/13, n. 39, 43.
37Gesetz zur Änderung wasser- und naturschutzrechtlicher Vorschriften zur Untersagung und zur
Risikominimierung bei den Verfahren der Fracking-Technologie, German BGBl. 2016 I 1972.
38Schweizerische Energie-Stiftung, Fossile Energien, Fracking: Förderung unkonventioneller
fossiler Rohstoffe, available at https://www.energiestiftung.ch.
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gas.39 On the federal level, basic principles can be regulated.40 So, the Swiss
Federation could enact a general moratorium on fracking on the basis of Art.
74 and 76 FC.41 Notwithstanding the legal possibility, fracking in Switzerland is
not profitable from an economic point of view for the time being.
2.3 Renewable Energies
Concerning the promotion of renewable energies in the EU, two areas of action have
to be differentiated: on the one hand, defining national targets (for the promotion of
renewable energy in the Member States) and, on the other hand, controlling national
measures under EU competition and economic law (for the latter, see Sect. 4). With
regard to the development goals for renewable energies, the Renewable Energy
Directive 2009/28/EC of 2009 (RE Directive 2020) has set up a goal for 2020 of a
20% share of renewable energies in the gross final energy consumption in the EU.42
Since the potential in the Member States for promoting renewable energies varies
considerably, the RE Directive 2020 provides for specific goals for each Member
State.43 In 2016, the European Commission stated in a report that Member States are
likely to reach these goals by 2020.44 As a promoting measure, the Commission
recommended to streamline procedures for licensing. It took several years of intense
political debate to modify the RE Directive 2020 in 2019. In the new RE Directive
2030 (Directive (EU) 2018/200145), an overall goal of 32% of renewable energies in
2030 has been established.46 Furthermore, the electricity from renewable energies
shall be cost-efficient, market-based and facilitated by financial instruments.47 In
addition, administrative procedures should be streamlined, including so-called
one-stop shops,48 and the system of proof of origin has been optimized.49
In Switzerland, Art. 2 EnG does not provide percentages for the promotion of
renewable energies, but points of reference (“Richtwerte”). According to them, an
expansion of the average domestic production of electricity from hydropower to at
least 37,400 GWh in 2035 is envisaged. Concerning other renewable energies, the
39Federal Council (2017), p. 3.
40Federal Council (2017), p. 6 et seq.
41Federal Council (2017), p. 3.
42Directive 2009/28/EC, OJ. EU 2009, L 140, p. 16.
43Annex I Directive 2009/28/EC.
44European Commission (2015).
45OJ. EU 2018, L 328, p. 82.
46Art. 3 para. 1 (new) Directive (EU) 2018/2001.
47Art. 4 para. 3 (new) Directive (EU) 2018/2001.
48Art. 15 (new) Directive (EU) 2018/2001.
49Art. 19 (new) Directive (EU) 2018/2001.
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promotion target is set for 4400 GWh in 2020 and for 11,400 GWh in 2035. Targets
referring to reductions of energy consumption are established in Art. 3 EnG.
In 2018, the share of renewable energies in Swiss energy consumption amounted
to approximately 23%.50 The share of renewable energies in final energy consump-
tion for heat generation amounted to 22%. With respect to electricity consumption,
56% originated from renewable energies. With regard to national energy production,
a share of 58.7% relied on renewable energies in 2018 with the major part being
contributed by hydropower. The share of solar power, biomass, biogas, wind, and
waste usage amounted to only 6.1% of energy production.51 Not included in these
figures are electricity imports. Differentiating according to energy resources, espe-
cially solar power has gained weight.
Still, hydropower is the major contributor to the Swiss electricity supply and
according to the Energy Strategy 2050, it shall be further expanded. In 2035,
according to the reference value in the Energy Act hydropower should at least
produce on average 37,400 GWh.52 There is no reference value set for 2020. In
order to reach these targets, an average annual increase of 83 GWh will be necessary.
It is true that the reference value will be in reach based on the practice so far, but that
would mean to realize the whole potential of hydropower envisaged for 2050 in
Switzerland already by 2035.53
In 2020, the Federal Council announced even more ambitious targets. On 3 April
2020, it decided to modify the energy law. The public consultation was open until
12 July 2020. Some of the main modifications will include the following measures:
The already existing reference values (“Richtwerte”) for expanding hydropower and
other renewable energies for 2035 will be declared legally binding targets.54 Like-
wise investment contributions in solar power, biomass, and hydropower, today
limited until 2030, will be prolonged until the end of 2035. Further, another target
for 2050 shall be included in the energy law.55
50See Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019a), p. 5 et seq.
51Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019b), p. 16.
52Art. 2 para. 2 EnG.
53Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019b), p. 17.
54Federal Council (2020).
55The draft provision reads as follows (in German):
E-EnG Art. 2 Ziele für den Ausbau der Elektrizität aus erneuerbaren Energien
1. Die Produktion von Elektrizität aus erneuerbaren Energien, ausgenommen aus
Wasserkraft, hat im Jahr 2035 mindestens 11 400 GWh und im Jahr 2050 mindestens
24 200 GWh zu betragen.
2. Die Produktion von Elektrizität aus Wasserkraft hat im Jahr 2035 mindestens 37 400
GWh und im Jahr 2050 mindestens 38 600 GWh zu betragen. Bei
Pumpspeicherkraftwerken ist nur die Produktion aufgrund von natürlichen Zuflüssen
in diesen Werten enthalten.
3. Der Bundesrat kann gesamthaft oder für einzelne Technologien weitere Zwischenziele
festlegen.
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The overall situation for a decarbonized energy production in the EU and in
Switzerland is precarious. However, there are major differences with regard to
specific renewable energies like wind power, which has been strongly developed
in Germany but only plays a minor role in Switzerland. In many countries, nuclear
power is still relevant for the basic and consistent supply of energy. This also holds
true for Switzerland in the phase exiting out of this technology.
Attempts to make use of deep geothermal energy for producing electricity in
Switzerland have so far all been unsuccessful. Therefore, for both parties to a
possible bilateral electricity agreement there is a great interest in a stronger cooper-
ation in the energy and electricity sector because that would allow to more easily
balance the specific characteristics of individual energy resources in the overall
energy mix. In this scenario, the already existing function of Switzerland as an
electricity hub of Europe could be further strengthened. Instead, if the cooperation
diminished by not concluding the agreement, there would be a strong likelihood that
the debate on the use of nuclear power for a stable basic energy supply would
resurface in Switzerland. Otherwise, Switzerland would have to accept a stronger
dependency on its neighbouring countries.56
3 Security of Supply
The challenges faced by the specific energy resources raise the question of how to
secure energy supply with a new energy mix. For the time being, in Switzerland the
supply is estimated as sufficient.57 In this regard, many see a specific interest of the
EU in improving the technical side of security of supply by a strengthened cooper-
ation with Switzerland.58 This argument usually highlights the blackout in Italy of
2003 as well as the disruptions in parts of the Western European network system
in 2006.
More recently, a new peril for security of supply has emerged in the Eastern part
of the EU, in the gas sector. The political tensions between Russia and the Ukraine,
which is granted special conditions as a gas transit country, form the background to
this instable situation.59 Reductions in the volume of transported gas were used as an
instrument of political power in this dispute, leading to perils for the secure supply of
energy for the neighbouring EU Member States. This has been a driving factor
behind the German-Russian cooperation on establishing a second gas pipeline in the
Baltic Sea—the much disputed Nord Stream 2 project.
56For the latter alternative, see Hettich et al. (2015), p. 44 et seq.
57Breitenmoser and Weyenath (2014), n. 659; see Hettich et al. (2015), p. 44 et seq.
58Hettich et al. (2015), p. 6.
59For details, see Heselhaus and Knaul (2015), p. 253, 260.
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In 2019, the EU has responded to this challenge by enacting Regulation
(EU) 2019/941 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector.60 This regulation has
the objective to better protect the EU citizens from shortages of energy supply or
electricity blackouts. To this end, Member States have to set up national plans to
assess possible shortages,61 which must comprise measures for providing for a
regional crisis management. Therefore, regional crisis coordinators have to be
designated for assisting regional network operators.62 In addition, the governance
framework of the regulation includes the Electricity Coordination Group (ECG).63 In
case of a crisis, the European Commission and the other Member States have to be
informed immediately.64 The costs for assistance in case of a crisis have to be borne
by the Member State concerned.
From a Swiss point of view, this strengthening of the cooperation between EU
Member States has a positive effect, as it secures a stable supply in the neighbouring
states as well. However, by this measure of self-help the significance of Switzerland
for the security of supply in EU Member States will diminish. Therefore, Switzer-
land will lose an ace in the negotiation poker with the EU concerning the electricity
agreement, which it could have played earlier, if the negotiations had not been
delayed.
4 Competition
Assuring adequate competition is an important objective of the EU single market. In
the overall view, Switzerland is way behind in opening up the energy market, since
the second step in liberalising the electricity market for the private consumer has not
been accomplished so far.65 In consequence, competitors from the EU are excluded
from that part of the Swiss market. At the same time, Swiss enterprises can realize
additional gains in these areas. Although there are some limitations to transfer the
surplus to other parts of the electricity market,66 it might be used as a reserve to be
invested in renewable energies. From this point of view, it is of high interest to assess
the leeway for EU Member States under EU law in promoting renewable energies.
The same leeway could be demanded by Switzerland in a bilateral electricity
agreement.
60OJ. EU L 158, p. 1. For details, see Heselhaus and Becker (2019), p. 249, 254.
61Art. 7 Regulation (EU) 2019/941.
62Art. 12 Regulation (EU) 2019/941.
63Art. 3 para. 2 Regulation (EU) 2019/941.
64Art. 14 Regulation (EU) 2019/941.
65Schleiniger et al. (2019), p. 20.
66BGE 142 II 451, E. 5.2.4. and E. 5.2.8.
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4.1 Promoting the Decommissioning or Construction
of Nuclear Power Plants
In Germany, considerable payments have been made to compensate utility compa-
nies for the decision to phase out nuclear energy. From the viewpoint of the EU, this
situation has highlighted the problematic issue of decommissioning nuclear power
plants, which has long been foreseen. Deconstruction not only has a technical side,
but it has a competition law side as well. The existing funds for deconstruction in the
Member States are often not sufficient for bearing all of the costs. Therefore, in
Germany additional payments from the government have been provided, which
privilege this industry sector in comparison to other energy sectors.67 In this regard,
the European Commission only issued a communication, in which a framework for
measures by the Member States is set up, leaving them a broad margin for
appreciation.68
In Switzerland the decommissioning of nuclear power plants is regulated by Art.
26–29 KEG.69 In a specific chapter, the rules for securing the financial resources for
the decommissioning are laid down. (Art. 77–82 KEG). The notion of
decommissioning (“Stilllegung”) is rather broad in Swiss law and comprises all
measures after the operation of a plant from the stop of operations to the complete
deconstruction of the facility.70 The costs of decommissioning have to be borne by
the proprietor.71 A decomissioning fund (“Stilllegungsfonds”) has been established,
which secures the financing of the decommissioning, of the dismantling of obsolete
nuclear installations and of the disposal of the resulting waste material
(“Stilllegungskosten”).72 The costs of the decommissioning are governed by the
ordinance on the decommissioning and disposal funds (“Stilllegungs- und
Entsorgungsfondsverordnung”, SEFV [Decommissioning and Waste Disposal
Funds Ordinance]).73 According to Art. 2 SEFV, the cost of the decommissioning
comprises all costs which occur during the decommissioning of a power plant,
especially the costs for the technical preparation of the facility, for the maintenance,
for the decontamination and deconstruction of the site and the shredding of active
and contaminated pieces thereof, for the transport and the disposal of the radioactive
waste. These costs have to be differentiated from the disposal costs
67Heselhaus (2014), p. 201, 208 et seq.
68European Commission (2013).
69Nuclear Energy Act (Kernenergiegesetz KEG) of 21 March 2003, SR. 732.1.
70Hoppenbrock (2009), p. 157.
71Hoppenbrock (2009), p. 160.
72Art. 77 KEG.
73Ordinance of 7 December 2007 on the Decommissioning Fund and the Disposal Fund for Nuclear
Installations (Verordnung über den Stilllegungsfonds und den Entsorgungsfonds für Kernanlagen
[SEFV]), SR. 732.17.
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(“Entsorgungskosten”), which include all costs for the disposal of the radioactive
operation waste and of the spent nuclear fuel after the final shutdown.74
The fund has legal personality and is supervised by federal authorities.75 The
main task of the fund is to guarantee the necessary financial resources.76 According
to Art. 77 para. 3 KEG, the proprietors of nuclear installations are obliged to pay
contributions. The liability starts with the start of the operation and ends with the
completion of the decommissioning.77 The amount of the contributions is defined in
Art. 4 and 8a SEFV. Furthermore, every 5 years, the proprietors have to undertake a
study in order to review the predicted costs of decommissioning and disposal of
waste.78 Pursuant to Art. 8a SEFV, contributions have to be set at an amount which
is sufficient to bear all of the said costs. According to information by BKW, the firm
has already contributed around 40 million CHF to the costs by 2017 before the final
decommissioning of the nuclear power plant in Mühleberg.79 Therefore, financing
should be secured.80 In comparison to the EU, there are no relevant distortions of
competition.
In the EU, there are some Member States eager to promote nuclear energy and to
establish new facilities, like the United Kingdom and Hungary. In both countries,
over the last years, considerable amounts of aid were granted by the state, which had
to be checked by the European courts. The upgrading of the British nuclear power
plant at Hinkley Point has been subject to some claims, which all were lost before the
European courts. The European General Court (GC) accepted the state aid by the
United Kingdom as permissible under EU state aid law, thus backing the former
decision by the European Commission.81 In second instance, the ECJ upheld the
decision of the General Court.82
In Hungary, the construction of a new nuclear power plant has given rise to
several legal issues under EU public procurement law. First, the European Commis-
sion allowed Hungary to rely on an exemption clause concerning the direct award of
the contract to a Russian enterprise. Second, the Commission classified the financial
contribution by Hungary as a permissible state aid.83
74Art. 3 SEFV.
75Art. 81 para. 1 KEG.
76Hoppenbrock (2009), p. 163.
77Art. 7 para. 1 and 2 SEFV.
78Art. 4 para. 1 SEFV.
79BKW (2018), p. 14.
80BKW (2018), p. 14.
81GC, T-382/15, ECLI:EU:T:2016:589.
82ECJ, C-640/16 P, ECLI:EU:C:2017:752.
83European Commission (2017).
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4.2 Promoting Renewable Energies
When considering the EU rules for promoting renewable energies, one has to look
not only at the regulations, which provide for certain mechanisms, but also at the
jurisprudence, which controls national measures as well. The competence to promote
renewable energies is laid down in Art. 194 para. 1 lit. c TFEU under the Lisbon
Treaty of November 2009. Already at the beginning of 2009, and therefore still
based on the (predecessor) competences for the environment, Directive 2009/28/
EC84 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources was enacted. It
lays down the legal framework for the promotion of renewable energy until 2020
(RE Directive [2020]). These provisions have been complemented by Directive
(EU) 2018/200185 (RE Directive [2030]).
According to the RE Directives, Member States can enact their own measures for
the promotion of renewable energies in order to reach their development targets.86
Furthermore, Member States might cooperate with other Member States or third
states through “cooperation mechanisms”.87 This includes the “statistical transfer”,
by which renewable energies in one country could be used for the achievement of
development targets in another, if a compensatory payment has been disbursed.88
However, in practice this mechanism is hardly used, although renewable energies
would be promoted in a cost-efficient manner.
The RE Directive (2030) regulates the promotion of renewable energies in the EU
from 2021 until 2030. In addition to adopted contents of RE Directive (2020), it aims
at securing competition in promoting renewable energies and to avoid market
distortions.89 To this end, the promotion should be set up in an open, transparent,
non-discriminatory and cost-effective manner, which fosters competition.90 In the
literature, doubts have been raised whether the directive will reach these objectives.
Like the European Commission, the European Courts have qualified the national
promotion measures as state aids, which have to comply with the rules of EU
competition laws. Furthermore, of all the national promotion measures only the
German mechanism has not been qualified as an unjustified interference with the free
movement of goods because in this mechanism, the financial means of the contri-
bution always remained in the hands of private parties and never came under the
control by the state.91 In 2019, the ECJ has confirmed this view with regard to the
German so-called “EEG-Umlage” in German energy laws.92
84OJ. EU 2009, L 140, p. 16.
85OJ. EU 2018, L 328, p. 82.
86Art. 3 para. 3 lit. a RE Directive (2020); Art. 4 para. 1 RE Directive (2030).
87Art. 3 para. 3 lit. b RE Directive (2020); Art. 8–13 RE Directive (2030).
88Art. 6 RE Directive (2020); Art. 8 RE Directive (2030).
89Art. 1 and 4 RE Directive (2030).
90Art. 4 para. 4, Art. 6 RE Directive (2030).
91ECJ, C-379/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:160—PreussenElektra.
92ECJ, C-405/16 P, ECLI:EU:C:2019:268—Germany/Commission.
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In a case of 2015 with reference to Switzerland, the ECJ decided that the RE
Directive does not allow Member States to accept electricity from third countries as
green electricity in the framework of the national promotion mechanisms.93 Other-
wise, the objectives of the directive, especially the decarbonisation of the energy
supply, could be impaired.94
From the view of competition law, it has to be stressed that the ECJ interprets the
RE Directive to allow for a territorial/regional limitation of the promoting mea-
sures.95 These measures do interfere with the free movement of goods pursuant to
Art. 34 TFEU, but they could be legitimate, i.e. proportionate.96 On the one hand, the
ECJ points out that each of the Member States has taken on specific targets for the
production of electricity from renewable energies. Therefore, the Member States
should be competent to decide on the implementing measures. On the other hand, the
ECJ identified big differences in the potential for renewable energies of each
Member State, which would call for a national nature of the promoting measures.97
In 2017, the ECJ confirmed these principles, although reserving a strict test of
proportionality of the mechanisms in place in a certain case.98 An important element
of this test is that the financial advantages of the measure must be directly attributed
to the producers.99 The basic argument of the ECJ cannot be underestimated because
normally the ECJ rejects any attempt to justify a direct discrimination, i.e. a less
favourable treatment based on the origin of a good, in the framework of the free
movement of goods.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, it has to be noted that the EU and Switzerland face similar challenges
in the quest for the future energy mix. Without a reintroduction of nuclear energy,
the European energy market becomes even more important for Switzerland and a
secure energy supply. On the one hand, since the EU has set up new measures to
stabilize energy supply in the Member States, the function of Switzerland as an
energy reserve has been diminished. On the other hand, the function of Switzerland
as a European electricity interface has been strengthened because the increase in
renewable energies calls for a flexible cross-border balancing of supply. To this end,
a bilateral energy and electricity treaty between Switzerland and the EU would
establish a reliable legal framework. The price to pay for Switzerland would be the
93ECJ, C-66/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2399—Green Network SpA.
94ECJ, C-66/13, n. 59 et seq.
95ECJ, C-573/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037—Ålands Vindkraft.
96ECJ, C-573/12, n. 82.
97ECJ, C-573/12, n. 93 and 94.
98ECJ, C-492/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:732—Essent Belgium NV.
99ECJ, C-492/14, n 112.
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second step in the liberalisation of the energy market with regard to private con-
sumers. With regard to the Energy Strategy 2050 and the envisaged energy transi-
tion, the analysis has established that the EU gives its Member States considerable
leeway for regional/national promotion mechanisms. Therefore, the quest for secu-
rity of energy supply and the objective of fighting climate change can be flexibly
combined in a closer cooperation with the EU.
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Abstract This chapter explores the political influence of Switzerland as a non-EU
country in European electricity governance. We argue that the influence of non-EU
countries depends on their access to European governance institutions and their
structural power resources. We further posit that the type of structural power
resources circumscribes the specific areas of influence. The empirical analysis
assesses these variables qualitatively based on interview and other primary data.
First, it shows that Switzerland has relatively high access to important European
governance bodies. Second, it reveals that Switzerland possesses structural power in
serving as a European transit hub for electricity and an important source of technical
expertise. Third, it confirms our theoretical expectation that Switzerland acts as a
The chapter draws on previous findings published as: Hettich et al. (2020); Hofmann et al. (2019).
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shaper in European electricity governance. Swiss influence is especially seen in
matters related to grid management and cross-border electricity trade. Limitations to
Swiss influence are often rooted in the legal principles of the EU internal market. Our
findings qualify claims about a marginalization of Switzerland in European electric-
ity governance. At the same time, we highlight uncertainties resulting from the
present lack of an electricity agreement between Switzerland and the EU. Our
chapter recommends Swiss policy-makers to strive for viable forms of energy
cooperation with the EU and to strengthen the transit function and technical exper-
tise of the country.
1 Introduction
The Swiss energy transition takes place in a context of Europeanization.1 For non-EU
countries, Europeanization is often conceived of as a one-way street in which they are
forced to adopt EU rules.2 The EU’s regulatory dominance over non-members rests on
conditional infrastructure investments and its ability to grant or restrict access to its
large internal energy market.3 However, not all third countries are passive policy-
takers in energy governance. We reiterate the argument made elsewhere that third
countries can assume the roles of shapers, followers, outsiders, or challengers in
European energy governance.4 Switzerland is an interesting case in this respect
because it is probably more embedded in the European energy system than any
other non-member. This is especially true in the electricity sector whose importance
is set to grow as mobility and heating are increasingly electrified. At the same time, the
bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU still do not cover energy issues.
Although the two parties have been negotiating a comprehensive electricity agreement
since 2007, its conclusion remains blocked at the time of writing.
This chapter explores whether Switzerland currently acts as a shaper, follower,
outsider, or challenger in European electricity governance. We build on the argu-
ment that the role of non-EU countries like Switzerland depends on their access to
European governance institutions and their structural power resources.5 We refine
this argument by stressing that structural power characteristics of third countries
define the specific areas in which they can wield political influence. Our empirical
study shows that Switzerland has access to important European governance bodies.
It further reveals that Switzerland possesses structural power in serving as a
European transit hub and an important source of technical expertise. We probe the
1Hettich et al. (2020).
2Börzel (2011); Gawrich et al. (2010); Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005); Subotic (2011).
3Damro (2012), p. 695; Goldthau and Sitter (2015a); Lavenex (2004), p. 693.
4Hofmann et al. (2019).
5Ibid.
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resulting expectation that Switzerland acts as a shaper in European electricity
governance. In particular, it should be able to exert influence on European policies
that address technical aspects of grid management and cross-border electricity flows.
The empirical case study largely confirms these theoretical expectations while also
identifying limits to Swiss influence in Europe. The findings qualify claims about a
marginalization of Switzerland in European electricity governance.6
This chapter speaks to practitioners and scholars of Swiss and European energy
governance alike. For practitioners of the Swiss energy transition, European elec-
tricity policy constitutes an important contextual factor because of Switzerland’s
high interconnectedness and seasonal import dependence.7 For practitioners abroad,
the Swiss case provides potential lessons for energy relations between the EU and
other third countries, including post-Brexit EU-UK relations. For researchers, the
chapter sheds light on the conditions under which Europeanization is not a one-way
street and even non-members can shape EU policies.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines our
theoretical argument about the role of third countries in EU energy governance.
Section 3 briefly introduces the Swiss case and the empirical material we collected
and analyzed. Section 4 describes the access of Swiss actors to key institutions of
European electricity governance. Section 5 assesses the structural power resources of
Switzerland in the electricity sector in relation to the EU. Section 6 presents evidence
for a moderate shaper role of Switzerland in European electricity governance.
Section 7 discusses how the conclusion or failure of an electricity agreement with
the EU would change this role. Section 8 summarizes our findings and draws
conclusions for policy-makers and researchers.
2 Third Countries in EU Energy Governance
This section presents our theoretical argument on the possible roles and sources of
influence of third countries in EU energy governance. European integration in the
energy domain has made increasing progress since the late 1980s.8 EU institutions,
bodies, and Member States have created a comprehensive set of legislation, legal
acts, and court decisions relevant for the area of energy that is commonly known as
the EU’s energy acquis. Increasing supranationalization of the sector not only
shaped the internal energy market but soon resulted in growing external influence
beyond Union territory.9 In this respect, academic contributions have highlighted the
Europeanization of energy sectors of third countries, including Switzerland,10
6Van Baal and Finger (2019), p. 13.
7Ibid., 11; Hettich et al. (2015), p. 7.
8Buchan (2015); Thaler (2016).
9Cf. Thaler and Pakalkaite (2020).
10Van Baal and Finger (2019); Jegen (2009).
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Norway,11 and contracting parties of the Energy Community.12 A common argu-
ment is that European market and regulatory power pushes many of these countries
to approximate their domestic legislation to EU rules, taking over parts of or even the
entire EU energy acquis.13
We put this EU-centric approach into perspective by arguing that third countries
can play active roles in European energy governance. We understand governance
very basically as the capacity “to develop some means of making and implementing
collective choices”.14 Only few contributions have argued that third countries are not
mere passive takers of EU rules but—under certain conditions — can actively
influence EU energy policy.15 This chapter builds on the conceptual framework
developed by Hofmann et al.16 According to this framework, the ability of third
countries to upload their preferences to the EU level depends on two variables:
access to venues and actors of EU energy policy-making and structural power
resources.
Access—whether formal or informal—is a necessary precondition to generate
influence. The formal access of a third country to venues and actors of EU energy
policy-making is closely linked to its institutional arrangement with the
EU. Countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) and of the Energy Commu-
nity incorporate relevant parts of the energy acquis into their domestic legislation.
This intimate institutionalized relationship provides them with regular access to
bodies of EU energy governance. Switzerland, in contrast, has no institutionalized
energy relationship with the EU, even though the entanglement of the two energy
systems requires close cooperation. As this chapter will demonstrate, much of the
access Switzerland currently enjoys may become subject to the conclusion of an
electricity agreement with the EU that has been negotiated for several years. Finally,
third countries without a dedicated energy agreement typically lack access to venues
and actors of EU energy policy-making.
Structural power resources provide third countries with the political weight
necessary to turn access into influence. Following the conceptualization of Hofmann
et al., four different sources define the structural power of a country in the energy
domain.17 First, physical interdependencies with the EU can create political leverage
for third countries. This structural power resource is closely related to the EU’s
import dependency and is typically possessed by suppliers of oil, gas, and electric-
ity.18 Second, third countries gain structural power when they serve as transit
countries for energy supplies. The extent of political leverage depends on their
11Jevnaker (2016); Austvik (2019).
12Buschle (2014); Petrov (2012).
13Goldthau and Sitter (2015b, 2019).
14Peters and Pierre (2009), p. 91.
15Godzimirski (2019); Hofmann et al. (2019).
16Hofmann et al. (2019).
17Ibid., 154–155.
18Godzimirski (2019), pp. 106–107.
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geographical location, grid interconnectedness, and the availability of alternative
supply routes.19 Third, structural power can be a consequence of the surge in
renewable energies in the EU which requires flexible supply options. Non-EU
countries can serve as much-needed flexibility providers based on their installed
flexible generation and storage capacity, natural gas production,20 and sufficient grid
interconnectedness.21 Finally, third countries can gain leverage through technolog-
ical knowledge, regulatory expertise, and experience. Utilized in direct interactions
by state and non-state actors with their EU counterparts, these qualities can shape
discourses and create leadership.22
The combination of access and structural power determines the influence of a
third country. We understand influence as the ability of a country to shape EU
electricity policies along the lines of its own preferences. We assume that these
preferences primarily reflect the strategic energy objectives of a country. In this
chapter, we focus on the upload of third country preferences onto the EU energy
acquis.23 Third countries can assume four different roles in this respect.24 Shapers
have institutional access and make use of their high structural power to influence EU
policy formulation. Followers also have access but lack the structural power
resources to shape EU policies. Challengers lack formal access, but their high
structural power resources, often a result of supply or transit functions, still provide
them with influence on EU energy policy. Outsiders have neither access nor struc-
tural power and hence cannot exert any tangible influence.
We refine the initial argument by stressing that the type of structural power
resources circumscribes the specific areas of influence. For instance, a strong transit
function in an interconnected grid is a source of influence on matters related to
common grid management. In addition, first-mover domestic experiences in elec-
tricity market liberalization or in the expansion of renewables are an asset for
shaping EU policies on these issues. Finally, technical knowledge in the develop-
ment of trading platforms can be a source of influence on the terms of cross-border
electricity trading. The next section explains why and how we analyzed Switzerland
as a case of third country influence in European electricity governance.
19Casier (2011), p. 496; Haghighi (2007).
20Natural gas can be viewed as a flexible supply option where it temporarily bridges gaps in
electricity supply resulting from the phase-out of coal and nuclear power that cannot be filled by
renewable electricity generation or other flexibility options (e.g., batteries, pump storage, or
demand-side management).
21Lund et al. (2015), pp. 797–798.
22Bouwen (2004).
23Another form of influence not covered here is the customization of EU provisions when
implementing them into domestic legislation, cf. Thomann (2015).
24Hofmann et al. (2019), pp. 155–156.
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3 The Case: Switzerland in European Electricity
Governance
Switzerland constitutes a salient case for investigating the role of non-EU countries
in European electricity governance. On the one hand, Switzerland is an important
third country for the EU because of its central position in the European electricity
grid.25 Its strategic importance may be a source of Swiss influence in European
electricity governance. On the other hand, the institutional relationship between
Switzerland and the EU seems to be deteriorating. The existing bilateral treaties do
not cover electricity issues. Ad-hoc arrangements currently define Swiss participa-
tion in bodies of European electricity governance. The conclusion of a comprehen-
sive electricity agreement is still pending after more than a decade of negotiations.
Previous research has noted that, without an electricity agreement, Switzerland will
increasingly be excluded from European cooperation.26 It is thus not obvious that
Switzerland as a non-EU country can play an active role in European electricity
governance.
Our analysis follows a qualitative approach. First, we describe Swiss access to
five important institutions in European electricity governance: the European Com-
mission, the Council of Ministers, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy
Regulators (ACER), the European Network of Transmission System Operators for
Electricity (ENTSO-E), and the Pentalateral Energy Forum (PLEF). We also con-
sider other access points where relevant. Our description takes into account the
formal institutional status of Swiss representatives (e.g., voting rights, membership,
or observer status) as well as informal forms of access (e.g., loose contacts with
decision-makers). We obtained data on formal and informal access from 16 inter-
views conducted with Swiss and European governance actors between June 2018
and March 2019 (see Annex). We complemented this data with relevant legal
documents. We shared and reviewed our assessment with Swiss and European
governance actors during a workshop in May 2019.27
Second, we assess the four structural power resources for Switzerland in the realm
of electricity. For electricity supply, we analyze whether Switzerland has a positive
electricity trade balance with the EU, taking into account seasonal patterns as well as
emerging developments. For electricity transit, we consider whether Switzerland
occupies a strategic location in EU supply corridors, whether its grid is highly
interconnected with the EU grid, and whether alternative supply routes are scarce.
For flexibility provision, we examine whether Switzerland has large installed capac-
ities of hydropower or gas power plants, high storage capacities, and a high number
and capacity of grid interconnectors. For expertise, we assess to what extent Swiss
actors can contribute high levels of technical knowledge, governance experience,
25Hettich et al. (2015), p. 6.
26Van Baal and Finger (2019); Hettich et al. (2020); Jegen (2009).
27#REMforum 2019 Pre-Conference Workshop: “Swiss Energy Strategy 2050 and EU Clean
Energy Package: Stronger Together?” 23 May 2019, St. Gallen.
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and manpower to European governance processes. We collected data on these
structural power resources from primary sources, including Swiss electricity statis-
tics and interviews, as well as from relevant secondary sources.
Third, we provide and discuss anecdotal evidence for and against Swiss influence
in European electricity governance. In accordance with our theoretical framework,
we probe Swiss influence in areas where Switzerland has institutional access and
possesses structural power resources. As the first two parts of the empirical analysis
will suggest, these are primarily the areas of cross-border electricity flows and grid
management. Again, our interviews were the main data source on Swiss influence
activities, their success, and failure. We verified interview data on instances of Swiss
(non-)influence by reviewing relevant pieces of European electricity legislation.
Notably, we checked whether the legal provisions indeed seemed to (not) reflect
Swiss interests.
The case study of Switzerland is relevant in its own right, but it can also provide
lessons for energy relations between the EU and other non-members. The Swiss
experience may be particularly interesting for the future role of the UK in European
electricity governance after Brexit. Furthermore, it may be used for comparison to
non-EU countries that cooperate with the EU under different institutional models,
such as the EEA and Energy Community members. While acknowledging that our
single case study cannot be generalized easily, we hope it provides input for further
reflection and research.
4 Swiss Access to European Governance Institutions
This section describes Swiss access to European electricity governance. The gover-
nance of electricity in the EU is a complex process that involves various EU
institutions, bodies, and actors. Moreover, forums not directly linked to the EU’s
institutional hierarchy shape the EU energy acquis. We focus on five key institutions
and bodies to which Switzerland has varying degrees of access, as well as on some
additional access points. As the executive, the European Commission defines the
central lines of European energy policy. The Council of Ministers is one of the two
co-legislators and the main forum for coordinating EU Member State positions. The
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the European
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) carry impor-
tant functions in the elaboration of electricity regulation. In contrast to these four
forums, the Pentalateral Energy Forum (PLEF) is not linked to the EU’s institutional
structure but has evolved into an important regional governance body.
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4.1 European Commission
The European Commission is a central actor in EU energy governance. It develops
proposals for energy legislation for adoption by the European Parliament and the
Council. Concerning technical standards, it reviews network code proposals from
ACER and ENTSO-E before sending them to the comitology process.28 As Guard-
ian of the Treaty, the Commission also oversees the implementation of EU energy
law by the Member States and negotiates agreements with third countries such as
Switzerland. Within the European Commission, the Directorate-General for Energy
(DG ENER) is responsible for electricity-related matters. Furthermore, the Electric-
ity Coordination Group (ECG) is an important Commission expert group that
coordinates the implementation of electricity policies with cross-border impacts.
The ECG comprises energy authorities and national regulators of EU Member States
as well as representatives of ACER and ENTSO-E. A further venue for discussing
issues related to the EU’s internal market for electricity is the European Electricity
Regulatory Forum (EERF or Florence Forum). Participants in the EERF include
governmental and private actors from EU Member States and selected third
countries.29
The Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) represents Swiss interests vis-à-vis
the Commission and in the EERF but lacks access to the ECG. The SFOE cultivates
a regular exchange with DG ENER, which is perceived as recognizing the impor-
tance of Switzerland for the EU’s internal electricity market. For instance, Swiss
decision-makers are optimistic that DG ENER would find ways to accommodate
Swiss concerns in case of further integration.30 However, this constructive relation-
ship is instable for three reasons. First, the number of officials familiar with the Swiss
dossier within DG ENER is small and shrinking, rendering future exchanges vul-
nerable to personnel fluctuations.31 Second, the Commission is unwilling to com-
promise on the legal principles forming the basis for the EU internal market.32 Third,
the future institutional access of Switzerland will be decided upon on higher levels of
the Commission, implying a close connection between Brexit and the Swiss issue.33
This increasingly constrains the ability of the SFOE to find pragmatic solutions with
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4.2 Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers (Council) consists of the EU Member States and takes
important decisions on major parts of EU energy policy and legislation. Discussions
begin at the technical level of the Energy Working Party before continuing on the
political level of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The
final vote takes place in the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council
configuration (TTE). Regulations are discussed and adopted in the comitology
process in the Electricity Cross-Border Committee. Importantly, this procedure
applies to the so-called Network Codes. Network Codes are sets of rules which are
prepared by ENTSO-E, ACER, and the European Commission and contribute to
harmonizing the European electricity market.34 The Cross-Border Committee is
presided by the Commission and comprises representatives of the EU Member
States and the countries of the European Economic Area (EEA). The latter have an
observer status without the right to vote, but presence tends to be more relevant than
voting rights.35
Switzerland does not have formal access to any level of the Council hierarchy. It
also lacks access to meetings of the Cross-Border Committee. As a consequence,
Switzerland is excluded from many technical and political discussions that shape
future amendments to the EU energy acquis. Swiss access is limited to occasional
invitations to informal, technical meetings of energy attachés and informal meetings
of energy ministers. The latter are independent of the Council hierarchy but are
organized twice a year by the Council Presidency. Discussions in this setting have a
rather general, political character.36 Switzerland is represented by the federal coun-
cilor responsible for energy or a member of the SFOE. Overall, the scope for
uploading Swiss preferences on the level of the Council of Ministers is slim.
4.3 Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
(ACER)
The European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) is an EU
agency that formally brings together the energy regulators of the Member States.37
The agency was established in 2011 in Ljubljana, Slovenia. It is integrated into the
Union’s institutional hierarchy and possesses regulatory powers. It coordinates the
work of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and contributes to the creation of




37Regulation 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 establishing a
European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, OJ L 158, 14 June 2019, 22–53.
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in the organizational hierarchy. Discussions usually begin in informal ad-hoc task
forces and pass through one of the three working groups (electricity; gas; market
integrity and transparency) before a final decision is taken in the Board of
Regulators.38
The Swiss Federal Electricity Commission (ElCom) represents Switzerland in
some forums of ACER as an observer. Following the conclusion of a Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) in 2015,39 it participates in the electricity working group
and its task forces. This allows ElCom to contribute to technical discussions and
provides access to important information. For instance, Switzerland has been
involved in the development of the Network Codes, which are an important element
of European electricity regulation.40 At the same time, the observer status sets limits
in this respect. Unlike EU countries with full ACER membership, ElCom is
excluded from the Board of Regulators. It also lacks access to the Board of Appeal,
even when Switzerland is directly and adversely affected by ACER decisions.41
Thus, Swiss access to ACER is best described as partial.
4.4 European Network of Transmission System Operators
for Electricity (ENTSO-E)
The European Network of Transmission System operators for Electricity (ENTSO-
E) encompasses 42 transmission system operators (TSOs), including the Swiss TSO
Swissgrid.42 The primary role of ENTSO-E lies in facilitating technical cooperation
among European TSOs and in preparing secondary legislation for adoption in the
EU comitology process. More specifically, the legal mandate of ENTSO-E com-
prises promoting the internal electricity market, facilitating cross-border trade and
network development, and ensuring the secure and reliable operation of the
European transmission system.43 ENTSO-E consists of an Assembly, a Board, and
five committees.44 Its role in the development of Network Codes for cross-border
network and market integration is preparatory. Yet, many of its decisions endure the
38Interview 5, 7.
39ElCom (2015), p. 5; Recital 25 Regulation 2009/713 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, OJ L
211, 14 August 2008, 1–14 (no longer in force).
40Interview 2, 3, 5, 8.
41Interview 5, 7, 12, 13.
42ENTSO-E Member Companies, available at https://www.entsoe.eu/about/inside-entsoe/
members.
43Art. 28 Regulation 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the
internal market for electricity, OJ L 158, 14 June 2019, 54–124.
44ENTSO-E, Articles of Association, chap. III, available at https://www.entsoe.eu/about/inside-
entsoe/governance.
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subsequent regulatory process.45 The work of ENTSO-E affects Switzerland in
many ways. For instance, decisions on cross-border capacity allocation have an
impact on the amount of loop flows in the Swiss grid and on Swiss import capacity
(see Sect. 6).46 By planning the development of cross-border network infrastructure,
ENTSO-E also influences Switzerland’s role in the European electricity grid in the
long run.47
Swissgrid is a founding member of ENTSO-E, takes part in all of its relevant
bodies, and even holds a seat on the Board.48 However, Swissgrid does not have
voting rights in ENTSO-E.49 This is due to Switzerland’s third country status
towards the EU. Nevertheless, Swissgrid is reported to be one of the most involved
members in ENTSO-E50 and consequentially, Switzerland’s most important techni-
cal voice in Europe.51 Compensating for its lack of voting rights, Swissgrid seeks to
participate effectively with its extensive technical knowledge.52 Representing Swiss
interests in this way is further facilitated by the consensual decision-making prac-
ticed in ENTSO-E.53 Hence, ENTSO-E represents a major access point for Switzer-
land on the European level.
4.5 Pentalateral Energy Forum (PLEF)
The Pentalateral Energy Forum (PLEF) is a voluntary format for regional coopera-
tion on energy issues outside of the EU hierarchy. Established in 2005 by Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, it promotes cooperation in
electricity market integration and security of supply. Austria and Switzerland joined
the forum in 2011. The functioning of the PLEF is laid down in two Memorandums
of Understanding (MoU)54 and two Political Declarations.55 It consists of national
45Interview 15.
46Interview 13.
47Art. 48 Regulation 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the
internal market for electricity, OJ L 158, 14 June 2019, 54–124.
48Interview 14.
49Interview 12.
50Interview 1, 3, 12.
51Interview 16.
52Interview 12.
53Interview 8, 12, 13.
54PLEF (2007), Memorandum of Understanding of the Pentalateral Energy Forum on Market
Coupling and Security of Supply in Central Western Europe; PLEF (2017), Memorandum of
Understanding of the Pentalateral Energy Forum on Emergency Planning and Crisis Management
for the Power Sector. Both available at https://www.benelux.int/nl/kernthemas/holder/energie/
pentalateral-energy-forum/.
55PLEF (2013), Political Declaration of the Pentalateral Energy Forum; PLEF (2015), Second
Political Declaration of the Pentalateral Energy Forum of 8 June 2015. Both available at https://
www.benelux.int.
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ministries, NRAs, TSOs, power exchanges, and a Market Parties Platform from the
participating countries, with close involvement of the European Commission. The
significance and influence of the PLEF stems from this inclusive setup. This setup
facilitates dialogue and agreement on energy issues of concern among neighboring
countries, such as electricity cross-border flows. Indeed, many of the rules that
eventually become part of the EU’s energy acquis are first elaborated and tested
within the regional context of the PLEF. For example, PLEF cooperation and
discussions with the Commission have reportedly influenced parts of the Clean
Energy Package. This includes areas such as market coupling, generation adequacy
assessments, capacity mechanisms, risk preparedness, and flexible short-term
markets.56
Unlike all other participants, Switzerland is only an observer in PLEF. This status
is linked to its non-EU membership. Switzerland may not join certain discussions
reserved for the EU members but otherwise enjoys the same rights as full members.
The flexible institutional framework of the PLEF rewards active players. Switzerland
serves as the co-chair of a standing expert group and is represented in various ad hoc
groups.57 Furthermore, the focus of the PLEF on deliberation and decision-making
by consensus means that expertise and technical knowledge are valued. Participation
in the PLEF gives Switzerland access to first-hand information and to preparatory
negotiations of EU energy policy. Swiss representatives can also raise their concerns
in direct exchanges with influential EU Member States and the European Commis-
sion. Such opportunities are usually unavailable to non-members in formal EU
bodies.58 Therefore, the PLEF is another major access point of Switzerland in
European electricity governance.
4.6 Other Access Points
Swiss actors have additional access points to European electricity governance. One
of them are formal relations with the European Parliament. Swiss relations with the
European Parliament are cultivated by the Mission of Switzerland to the European
Union in Brussels. The mission is part of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
(FDFA). Moreover, delegations of the Swiss Federal Assembly and the European
Parliament have regular exchanges, for instance, through working group sessions.59
Besides this, most other Swiss access points on the European level are either
informal or independent of EU institutions. They include informal collaboration of
Switzerland with EUMember States, personal ties between energy attachés, contacts
56Interview 11.
57Interview 3, 11.
58Hofmann et al. (2019).
59Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (2019).
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between ElCom and other regulators as well as contracts between Swissgrid and
other TSOs.
Bilateral relations between Switzerland and EU Member States in the energy
policy domain have been most fruitful with two sets of countries. On the one hand,
neighbors like Austria or Italy share certain Swiss concerns because of their geo-
graphical proximity. On the other hand, small countries with limited resources, such
as Luxembourg, have advocated interests based on Swiss technical expertise.60 A
further channel of informal access lies in personal relationships between diplomats.
Reportedly, these contacts enable indirect access for Swiss attachés in the form of an
efficient flow of information.61 With respect to ElCom and other regulators, the
Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) is a forum for voluntary collabo-
ration outside of the EU institutional framework. The most relevant issues for
national regulators are usually discussed in ACER though.62 Last, TSOs can deepen
their cooperation through contracts under private law in the broader framework of
ENTSO-E. Swissgrid seeks to harness such contracts for finding solutions to tech-
nical problems resulting from political disagreements between Switzerland and the
EU.63 However, the compatibility of such arrangements with European law is
uncertain—an issue that is likely to be closely monitored by the European Commis-
sion.64 The importance of these additional channels of Swiss access varies
depending on the topic and context.
To sum up the preceding analysis, Switzerland has a relatively high level of
access to European governance institutions despite not being an EU member. Major
Swiss access points are ENTSO-E, the PLEF, and to some extent also the European
Commission. Access is partial in case of ACER and minimal with respect to the
Council of Ministers. Bilateral contacts with certain EU Member States, their
regulatory authorities, and TSOs complete the picture.
5 Swiss Structural Power
Our theoretical argument posits that only structural power allows third countries to
transform access to European governance bodies into influence. To what extent does
Switzerland possess structural power in the realm of electricity? A first power
resource to be assessed is electricity trade. In 2018, Switzerland exhibited an export
surplus of 1.6 TWh, whereas it had been a net importer in 2017.65 However, seasonal






65Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019b), p. 4.
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from the EU in winter. It usually roughly compensates this seasonal trade deficit with
exports in spring and summer by activating its hydropower resources. The phase-out
of all nuclear power plants in Switzerland foreseen in the Swiss Energy Strategy
205066 is likely to reinforce the import dependence in winter.67 This is due to the
higher contribution of non-seasonal nuclear energy to domestic power generation in
winter.68 Therefore, adequate Swiss import capacity is necessary for the implemen-
tation of the strategy. Also, given the vast scale of the European electricity market,
Swiss generation capacities only play a minor role for meeting European demand.
Switzerland thus yields little to no structural power stemming from electricity trade
balances with the EU.
A second conceivable resource of Swiss structural power is electricity transit.
Historically, the Swiss grid has been highly interconnected with neighboring coun-
tries’ power grids. A reason for this is Switzerland’s central geographic position in
between Germany in the North, France in the West, and Italy in the South. As a
consequence, the Swiss grid fulfills an important transit function. It carries 10% of
all cross-border electricity flows in continental Europe and accounts for one fifth of
the European interconnector capacity.69 Italy is particularly dependent on Switzer-
land for its integration into efficiency-enhancing market coupling mechanisms.70
Furthermore, up to 30% of the electricity traded between Germany and France flows
through the Swiss grid,71 putting considerable stress on Swiss infrastructure.72 In
recent years, the relative importance of Swiss transits has decreased somewhat
because of the expansion of the Continental Synchronous Area.73 However, the
EU plans to further increase cross-border electricity trade among its Member
States.74 Electricity transits through Switzerland thus continue to play a critical
role for the European internal market for electricity.
Constituting a third structural power resource, flexibility provision is crucial for
integrating volatile electricity generation from renewable energy sources. Flexibility
provision can be understood in two ways. Firstly, flexible generation or storage
capacities can be mobilized on demand for stabilizing grid operation and for
preventing supply shortages. With respect to gas, Switzerland depends heavily on
imports75 and a potential construction of gas power plant capacities is currently only
66Federal Council (2013), p. 7594.
67Schmid and Cheng (2019).
68Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019b), p. 14.
69Marcus et al. (2017), p. 43; Pattupara and Kannan (2016), p. 153.
70Interview 6, Interview 16 (VSE).
71ElCom (2017), p. 2.
72Interview 13.
73Interview 13.
74Art. 15 Regulation 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the
internal market for electricity, OJ L 158, 14 June 2019, 54–124.
75Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019a), p. 2.
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discussed for domestic use.76 More importantly, installed hydropower capacity in
Switzerland amounted to 16 GW77 in 2018, which accounts for 55.4% of total
domestic power generation.78 Despite the vital domestic role of Swiss hydropower,
the capacity of Swiss storage plants is small compared to the overall installed
capacity in the European internal market.79 Affordable alternatives for flexibility
provision are available for the EU.80 The use of Swiss storage capacity therefore
does not seem indispensable for the EU at the moment. It may become more
interesting though in conjunction with the phase-out of nuclear energy and coal in
Germany and the EU-wide efforts to decarbonize electricity generation.
Furthermore, Switzerland’s extensive grid infrastructure—including a total of
41 interconnectors at the borders—provides flexibility for EU countries. Flow-
based market coupling within the EU increases cross-border capacities and actual
cross-border electricity flows.81 This expands the import capacities of EU countries
and improves their ability to smoothen intermittent electricity flows. Although
Switzerland is excluded from flow-based market coupling, a substantial amount of
the additional electricity flows occurs in the Swiss grid. In that respect, the Swiss grid
is an important building block of a flexible European electricity grid.82
A fourth structural power resource is expertise. Expertise can be used strategically
to further national interests. Its use relies on access to the platforms where relevant
policy discussions take place. Additionally, the expertise of Swiss actors must be
judged in relation to the expertise of EU actors. In the domain of electricity trade,
Switzerland has been a latecomer in market liberalization.83 There is ample evi-
dence, however, that Swiss actors have led the way in designing cross-border market
platforms.84 Concerning transit, Swissgrid possesses high expertise in grid manage-
ment as demonstrated by its ability to maintain grid stability in spite of extensive
loop flows. According to accounts received, the expertise of the Swiss TSO has been
valued highly in ENTSO-E and the PLEF.85 With respect to flexibility and renew-
ables, the evidence is inconclusive. On the one hand, Switzerland co-chairs an expert
group on flexibility in the PLEF.86 Furthermore, Swiss regulations related to pro-
moting renewables and energy efficiency are monitored by other countries and the
76Stalder (2019).
77Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019c).
78Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019b), p. 14.
79Hettich et al. (2015), p. 6.
80Swissgrid (2015), p. 95.
81Interview 13.
82See Heselhaus (2021).
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European Commission.87 On the other hand, it is unclear how Swiss expertise in this
domain compares to the knowledge of EU experts.
In sum, Switzerland possesses a moderately high level of structural power
vis-à-vis the EU. Main sources of structural power are the transit function of its
transmission grid and the technical expertise in grid management. Swiss grid
elements also contribute to flexibility in the European electricity grid. By contrast,
flexibility from Swiss hydropower as well as seasonal electricity exports seem too
limited to make a difference.
6 Swiss Influence in European Electricity Governance
This section assesses the actual role of Switzerland in European electricity gover-
nance. The institutional access and structural power resources of Switzerland lead us
to expect that it can act as a shaper in European electricity governance. Especially,
Swiss actors should be able to influence issues related to grid management and cross-
border electricity flows. These expectations are empirically evaluated below.
At first sight, empirical evidence suggests that Switzerland has no influence in
European electricity governance. A prominent example in this respect is the exclu-
sion of Switzerland from European market coupling. Market coupling is a corner-
stone of the EU internal market for electricity. It increases efficiency by bringing
together formerly separate transactions—the cross-border trading of electricity and
the purchase of cross-border transmission rights.88 The EU pursues market coupling
for both day-ahead and intraday trading. In December 2014, the European Commis-
sion excluded Switzerland from day-ahead market coupling in Central Western
Europe. This prevents a more efficient allocation of capacities at the Swiss border
and thereby limits the country’s import capacity.89 In December 2016, the European
Commission excluded Switzerland from cross-border intraday market coupling
under the so-called XBID project. As an economic consequence, costs for intraday
trading increased and the Swiss intraday market collapsed.90 The main reason for the
exclusion of Switzerland is that it does not transpose the EU energy acquis. The
European Commission is unwilling to grant market access to any third country that
does not commit to the rules of the EU internal electricity market.91
An even more serious issue for Switzerland is that its grid elements are not
considered in the capacity calculation for cross-border electricity trade. The imple-
mentation of flow-based market coupling within parts of the EU has increased the
electricity volumes traded between Germany and France. This has markedly
87Interview 1.
88Pellini (2012), p. 323.
89Interview 13.
90ElCom (2019a), pp. 15–16.
91Interview 8.
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increased unscheduled electricity flows through the Swiss transmission grid.92 The
Swiss grid has only a limited physical capacity to deal with these so-called loop
flows. Regardless of these limitations, ACER decided in November 2016 that Swiss
grid elements would not be considered in the capacity calculation of the so-called
European Core region.93 This decision reflects the inferior observer status of ElCom
in ACER and its lack of rights of appeal.94 The Swiss grid is thus essentially treated
as a “copper plate” that is able to absorb almost unlimited electricity flows. The
resulting grid congestion and the limitations to import capacity threaten the security
of supply in Switzerland.
At closer inspection, however, we also find empirical evidence for Swiss influ-
ence in European electricity governance. Three aspects deserve mention. First, the
Electricity Balancing Guideline, which regulates access to European balancing
power, addresses Swiss concerns about unscheduled flows and grid stability. The
guideline states that “the European platforms for the exchange of standard products
for balancing energy may be opened to TSOs operating in Switzerland [. . .] if the
exclusion of Switzerland may lead to unscheduled physical power flows via Swit-
zerland endangering the system security of the region”.95 This provision was the
result of intense and coordinated lobbying by SFOE, Swissgrid, and ElCom in the
various European governance bodies.96 Its phrasing reflects the present physical
situation in which disruptions of Swiss grid stability would be likely to spill over to
the entire region, especially to Italy. Italian representatives have therefore been very
supportive of Swiss positions on the European level.97
Second, a “technical approach” seems to be emerging for the management of
unscheduled electricity flows through Switzerland.98 For the winter 2018/19, Swit-
zerland reached an interim solution with the NRAs of Central-West Europe. This
solution allowed for temporary capacity restrictions in electricity trading between
Central Europe and France if needed for ensuring Swiss grid stability.99 For the
future, the European Commission and ACER envisage that electricity flows through
non-EU states like Switzerland may be considered in capacity calculation.100 The
consideration of third countries is conditional on the conclusion of operational
agreements among the relevant TSOs. These agreements have to be in line with
EU law and should address cost-sharing of any remedial actions. The development
of this technical approach has been driven by the Swiss representation in the PLEF
92ElCom (2017); Swissgrid (2018), p. 10.
93ACER (2019), p. 24.
94Interview 5.
95Art. 1 para. 6 Commission Regulation 2017/2195 of 23 November 2017 establishing a guideline
on electricity balancing, OJ L 312, 28 November 2017, 6-53.
96Interview 3.
97Interview 1, 13, 16.
98Interview 13.
99ElCom (2019b), p. 1.
100ACER (2019), p. 7.
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and in ENTSO-E.101 Its emergence again reflects the considerable interdependencies
between the Swiss and EU electricity grids.
Third, Switzerland has also shaped other aspects of European energy governance.
In the technical realm, Swissgrid has contributed to the development of electricity
trading platforms and to outputs of ENTSO-E, such as the draft Network Codes.102
Swissgrid has had a say in the development of these technical products and regula-
tions because of its recognized expertise.103 In the political realm, the SFOE
provided inputs into the legislative process around the Clean Energy Package. It
contributed to preparatory policy discussions within the PLEF and injected Swiss
positions into EU negotiations via selected Member States.104 It is admittedly
difficult to identify the specific Swiss achievements in these complex and
multifaceted technical and political processes. However, an EU official involved in
high-level EU energy policy-making confirmed that “the de-facto power and repre-
sentation of Switzerland without voting rights is many times higher than that of a
small Eastern European Member State with voting rights”.105
Overall, despite not being an EU member, Switzerland is a moderate shaper in
European electricity governance. Swiss actors have mostly shaped technical policies
related to grid stability. This influence has been rooted in three factors: the good
access of Swiss actors to ENTSO-E and the PLEF; the physical interdependencies
between the electricity systems of Switzerland and the EU; and the technical
expertise of Swissgrid. Swiss influence has been more limited in the political
realm. Reasons for this have been: the weak access of Swiss actors to ACER and
EU legislative institutions; the reluctance of the EU to compromise on the legal
principles of its internal market; and the lack of Swiss bargaining chips in terms of
contributions to the EU electricity market beyond electricity transits and expertise. It
follows that while Switzerland can shape certain technical policies, tensions arise
when the legal or political foundations of the EU internal market are touched upon.
7 Outlook: A Swiss-EU Electricity Agreement?
This section provides an outlook on how the Swiss role in European electricity
governance may evolve in the future. At present, the lack of a legal framework for
Swiss-EU electricity cooperation threatens the moderate shaper role of Switzerland.
The critical question here is whether the electricity agreement between Switzerland
and the EU will be concluded or not. Negotiated since 2007, this agreement seeks to
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Switzerland full access to the EU electricity market. While the electricity agreement
is virtually ready for adoption, the current Swiss political context renders its con-
clusion unlikely. The main obstacle is that the EU has made the adoption of an
overarching institutional framework agreement a precondition for an electricity
agreement. However, the Swiss government is hesitant to conclude the institutional
framework agreement, which is highly controversial among the Swiss public and
risks being rejected in a referendum. At the same time, the scope for alternative
arrangements is limited. In the context of Brexit, the EU has adopted a principled
approach to defend the integrity of its internal market and prevent “cherry-picking”
by partners.106 Consequently, the future role of Switzerland in relation to the EU’s
electricity market is defined by two possible scenarios, i.e., with and without an
electricity agreement.
With an electricity agreement, Switzerland would be required to implement key
parts of the EU energy acquis. At the same time, this kind of top-down
Europeanization would be paralleled by new possibilities to shape European energy
governance from the bottom. The reason is that an electricity agreement would
consolidate and even expand access of Swiss actors to coordination forums of
European energy policy. An electricity agreement is likely to necessitate more
exchange and thus facilitate access of the SFOE to the Commission.107 Switzerland
may also gain access to the Electricity Coordination Group (ECG).108 In the Council,
a Swiss observer status at the technical level appears possible when changes to the
energy acquis are discussed that may affect Swiss energy legislation.109 An elec-
tricity agreement would also expand Switzerland’s current form of cooperation with
ACER, notably providing ElCom with access to discussions in all working groups
and task forces,110 as well as to the Board of Appeal and the dispute settlement
mechanism.111 In ENTSO-E, the electricity agreement would not only secure the
strong position of Swissgrid112 but possibly enhance it through voting rights.113
Since the PLEF is independent from the EU’s institutional framework, the role of
Switzerland therein would remain unaffected by the electricity agreement. Overall,
an electricity agreement would provide Switzerland with more formal access.
Conversely, without an electricity agreement, Switzerland is at risk of reduced
access to important bodies of European energy governance. While this process has
already started, its full extent remains uncertain. This is due to the fact that decisions
on access of third countries are highly political and dependent on developments in





110Interview 3, 4, 7, 8.
111Interview 5, 7.
112Interview 1, 8, 12.
113Interview 1, 13.
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and the Council will likely become more difficult. In addition, formal access points
may be put at risk, including ACER and forums under the European Commission.
Regarding the particularly important participation in ENTSO-E, an exclusion of
Swissgrid or a downgrade of its status are looming.114 Informal access points, such
as the PLEF, may gain in importance for Switzerland but will be unable to fully
compensate for the loss of formal access. Table 1 summarizes how the conclusion or
non-conclusion of an electricity agreement changes Swiss access to European
electricity governance (Annex).
Expected changes in Swiss access to European institutions have implications for
its future role in EU electricity governance. The increasing access under an electric-
ity agreement would strengthen Switzerland’s role as a shaper. By contrast, the loss
of formal access without an electricity agreement implies that Switzerland would
cease to be a moderate shaper. The future role of Switzerland would then mainly
depend on its structural power resources. If these power resources remained stable or
Table 1 Present and future Swiss access to European electricity governance. Source: authors’ own
data; Hettich et al. (2020), pp. 88–89
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grew, Switzerland could become a moderate challenger. For example, Switzerland
might choose to reduce cross-border capacities to secure the stability of its grid. Such
a decision would negatively affect electricity trade within the EU internal market. If
the structural power resources of Switzerland diminished, an outsider role would
appear most likely. Outsiders pursue their own policy directions while being unable
to shape EU energy policy. In an interconnected European grid, Switzerland would
continue to face loop flows and domestic grid congestion. This would endanger the
stability of the Swiss grid. Furthermore, it would reduce the import capacities that
Switzerland needs to meet electricity demand under increasing intermittent produc-
tion from renewables. The future Swiss role in European electricity governance thus
also has implications for the country’s ability to achieve the objectives of its Energy
Strategy 2050.115
8 Conclusion: Moderate Shaper with an Uncertain Future
This chapter asked what role Switzerland plays in European electricity governance.
We argued that the role of third countries depends on their access to European
governance bodies and their structural power resources. The empirical analysis has
shown that Switzerland has formal or informal access to important governance
bodies (especially ENTSO-E and the Pentalateral Energy Forum) and possesses
relevant structural power resources. The analysis has confirmed the resulting expec-
tation that, although not a member of the EU, Switzerland can shape certain aspects
of European electricity policy. We also argued that structural power characteristics
circumscribe the specific areas of third country influence. Switzerland serves as an
electricity transit hub and possesses considerable technical expertise in grid man-
agement and cross-border electricity trade. Our empirical analysis has confirmed the
expectation that Switzerland has been able to shape European electricity policy most
successfully in these areas. Examples are provisions in the Electricity Balancing
Guideline and the emerging “technical approach” to unscheduled flows in non-EU
countries that consider Swiss interests. However, Swiss influence usually ends
where its preferences conflict with legal principles of the EU internal market. The
exclusion of Switzerland from EU electricity market coupling illustrates this. More-
over, the future of Switzerland as a moderate shaper in European electricity gover-
nance is highly uncertain. The reason is the blocked electricity agreement and the
related risk of losing institutional access.
Our findings suggest three policy recommendations for Swiss practitioners. First,
to maintain its constructive voice in European electricity governance, Switzerland
needs to safeguard its continued access to governance institutions. The conclusion of
an electricity agreement with the EU would formalize and enhance the institutional
access of Switzerland. If the electricity agreement continues to be blocked, viable
115See also Heselhaus (2021).
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alternatives need to be developed. The European Green Deal announced by the
European Commission in December 2019 might create opportunities for new forms
of “softer” cooperation.116 Second, to secure its political influence in the long run,
Switzerland should value and expand its interconnection with the EU electricity grid.
The country’s high level of integration in the European grid is not only a necessity
for the implementation of the Energy Strategy 2050. It is also a source of structural
power vis-à-vis the EU as long as alternative electricity supply routes to Italy remain
scarce. Third, to consolidate its leading role in grid management and cross-border
electricity flows, Switzerland should further strengthen its expertise in these fields.
The EU values such expertise which is instrumental in developing its internal market
and reaching its climate and energy targets. The Swiss TSO, Swissgrid, is particu-
larly well placed to develop and provide this kind of technical expertise.
Our analysis also suggests lessons for practitioners abroad, especially in the
UK. At present, the UK remains less interconnected with the EU than Switzerland
and risks losing access to European governance bodies following Brexit.117
According to our framework, this may turn the UK into a real outsider in
European electricity governance. To avoid an outsider position, the UK would
need to increase its structural power resources and safeguard its institutional access.
Structural power can be increased by accelerating the implementation of planned
interconnectors.118 Institutional access can be safeguarded by concluding dedicated
agreements with the EU. Given that both UK-EU and Swiss-EU relations are
currently in flux, a model of future bilateral relations emerging in one case may
come to guide solutions in the other.
Finally, this chapter has implications for future research. Its findings underline
that the relationship between the EU and non-EU countries is multifaceted.
Europeanization is not necessarily a one-way street through which third countries
simply adopt centralized EU rules. Instead, it is a two-way street enabling even third
countries to occasionally shape European policies. A limitation of our study is its
exclusive focus on electricity. In reality, the political relations between the EU and
non-members like Switzerland are multidimensional. Swiss structural power
resources in one sector may be cancelled out by one-sided dependence on the EU
in other sectors. An analysis of energy relations in the broader context of the
institutional framework negotiations may help to overcome this barrier. Of course,
as our analysis relied on a single case, we also caution against hasty generalization of
our findings. Yet, previous short case studies of Norway and the members of the
Energy Community suggest that our theoretical argument may be applicable more
widely.119 We therefore encourage more research into the sources, channels, and
instances of third country influence in European energy governance and beyond.
116European Commission (2019), p. 20; Thaler (2020).
117Lockwood et al. (2017), pp. 139–142; Interview 8, 12.
118Ibid., 139.
119Hofmann et al. (2019).
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Abstract In light of climate change mitigation and the transformation of the energy
sector, many jurisdictions have adopted deployment policies for renewable energy
(RE) technologies. Several RE deployment policy instruments have diffused from
frontrunner countries to other jurisdictions. Switzerland implemented its first com-
prehensive RE support policy with the adoption of a cost-covering and technology-
specific feed-in tariff in 2009, following Germany’s example. Yet, policy designs
look very different in the two countries and, importantly, also result in different
policy outcomes. In this chapter, we examine the reasons for these policy design
differences. We unpack the design of the Swiss feed-in tariff and analyze which of
the policy’s elements were directly adopted from Germany and which were accom-
modated to the Swiss context and why. In particular, we compare the specific
instrument designs for two renewable power generation technologies, solar
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photovoltaics (PV) and biomass, and study the role of technology-related actors in
shaping these policy designs. We draw from the policy diffusion and policy transfer
literatures and offer important extensions to the literature by showing that, instead of
entire policies, it is possible that only certain design elements of a policy diffuse
from one jurisdiction to another. Additionally, we find that the composition of the
existing technology-related actor bases in the donor and recipient countries is
important in determining whether the accommodation of the design elements to
the domestic context occurs.
1 Introduction
Climate change mitigation requires the implementation of new policies to incentiv-
ize innovation in and the deployment of low-carbon energy technologies. Besides
carbon pricing (addressing the negative pollution externality), R&D support policies
and deployment policies for clean technologies should be part of this policy mix to
address the various positive innovation externalities.1 Frontrunner countries there-
fore started experimenting with technology deployment policies as early as the
1990s. These policy schemes have the goal of creating demand for novel technol-
ogies, such as renewable energy (RE) technologies, by increasing incentives for
investments in these technologies.2 For instance, the UK implemented the
Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation in 1990, which offered RE technologies the possibility
to compete for a premium price per unit of generated electricity.3 Another example is
RE standards, which were adopted by a number of US states in the 1990s and which
require electricity suppliers to source a specific quantity of electricity from RE
sources.4
Swiss policymakers did not remain dormant in this early phase of RE policy
support. In 1991, they implemented an early version of an RE feed-in tariff.5 A feed-
in tariff supports RE deployment by offering guaranteed grid access as well as long-
term and cost-covering remuneration of the generated electricity.6 Yet, the 1991
feed-in tariff in Switzerland only offered grid access and a tariff on the basis of the
avoided cost of conventional power plants rather than covering the cost incurred by
RE electricity generation. In doing so, the instrument was designed to promote the
deployment of small-scale hydropower and did so somewhat successfully. Other RE
1Jaffe et al. (2005); Van Benthem et al. (2008); Lehmann, Söderholm (2018).
2Schmidt et al. (2016).
3Mitchell (2000).
4Wiser et al. (2007); Carley et al. (2018).
5Haelg et al. (2020).
6Jacobs (2014).
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technologies did not experience substantial capacity additions under this early feed-
in tariff scheme.
Since the early 2000s, the number of jurisdictions that implemented RE deploy-
ment policies increased considerably. The most popular policy instrument at that
time was the feed-in tariff.7 The rise in policy support was followed by a surge in RE
investments.8 Germany, as one of the first countries to implement a comprehensive
feed-in tariff (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz EEG) in 2000, represents a frontrunner
in RE capacity additions, specifically for solar photovoltaics (PV). Given the
German policy’s high effectiveness, more jurisdictions followed suit and also
adopted feed-in tariffs. In Switzerland, where the development of non-hydro RE
technologies was still very limited in the early 2000s, the process of completely
revising the RE support policy was started in 2004 and finalized in 2009 with the
implementation of a cost-covering, technology-specific feed-in tariff
(kostendeckende Einspeisevergütung KEV) based on the German example.9
Even though many jurisdictions adopted the same RE support instrument, the
policy instrument designs between these jurisdictions featured important differences.
These design differences affected the respective policies’ outcomes regarding RE
deployment rates, which look very dissimilar in comparison. Particularly striking are
the differences between Switzerland and Germany, which both implemented a feed-
in tariff (see examples in Fig. 1). In Germany, biomass was already deployed before
the EEG adoption but subsequently saw an increase in the deployment rate, while
solar PV took off in terms of capacity additions after the EEG amendment in 2004,
Fig. 1 Share of gross annual electricity production of the two RE technologies, solar PV
(in yellow) and biomass (in green), in Germany (dashed line) and Switzerland (solid line). The
dotted lines and flags represent the implementation year of the comprehensive feed-in tariff in the
respective country. Data sources: BMWi (2019); Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019)
7REN21 (2005).
8REN21 (2012).
9Haelg et al. (2020); see also Heselhaus (2021).
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when generous tariffs for rooftop solar PV were introduced.10 Conversely, in
Switzerland, RE deployment could not keep up with the dynamics seen in Germany.
No new RE technology, including biomass and solar PV, could secure substantial
capacity additions. The same applies to onshore wind, where the difference between
the two countries is even more pronounced. In 2018, the onshore wind generation
amounted to 14.3% and 0.18% in Germany and Switzerland, respectively. Here, we
do not consider the case of onshore wind, as it is largely influenced by institutional
differences between the two countries: while wind farms experience opposition in
both countries,11 local citizens have many more and stronger possibilities to delay or
completely halt wind projects in Switzerland.
These diverging trends between the two countries find a theoretical underpinning
in the existing innovation literature, which argues that, more than the policy instru-
ment type itself, the specific instrument design is often decisive for a policy’s
effectiveness.12 Besides the instrument choice, the policy design includes specific
policy settings and instrument calibrations, which represent the specific formulation
and implementation of a policy.13 For instance, while the feed-in tariff is a policy
instrument, it includes specifications about which technologies are eligible to receive
the tariff as well as the tariff’s monetary value, which represent the policy’s more
specific design elements.14
In this chapter, we examine the reasons for the different policy designs in
Germany and Switzerland. To do so, we unpack the design of the Swiss feed-in
tariff and analyze which of the policy’s elements were directly adopted from
Germany and which were accommodated to the Swiss context and why. In partic-
ular, we compare the specific instrument designs for two renewable power genera-
tion technologies, solar PV and biomass, and study the role of technology-related
actors in shaping these policy outputs. We draw from the policy diffusion and policy
transfer literatures and offer important extensions to these literature streams by
showing that, instead of entire policies, it is possible that only certain elements of
a policy diffuse from one jurisdiction to another. We therefore invite policy diffusion
and policy transfer scholars to take a design perspective in future research. The
chapter also has direct implications for policymakers concerned with technology-
related policy designs. In Switzerland, where additional low-carbon technology
policies can be expected to be adopted soon in other sectors, such as mobility,
heating, and carbon-intensive industries, policymakers will likely draw from expe-
riences abroad. This chapter’s findings may help identify on a more general level
which type of design elements may be directly adopted and which are likely to be
accommodated to the specific context.
10Hoppmann et al. (2014).
11Ebers and Wüstenhagen (2017); Sonnberger and Ruddat (2017).
12E.g., Kemp and Pontoglio (2011); Haelg et al. (2018); Polzin et al. (2019).
13Cashore and Howlett (2007).
14Haelg et al. (2018).
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2 Review of the Policy Diffusion and Transfer Literatures
In this chapter, we draw from the policy diffusion and transfer literatures. The two
are closely related in that they both analyze how policies spread across jurisdic-
tions.15 The policy diffusion literature focuses on the quantitative analysis of the
drivers of policy spread across many jurisdictions, particularly studying structural
factors, such as domestic institutions, political systems, and economic circum-
stances.16 The policy transfer literature qualitatively analyzes the process by which
experiences of and knowledge about a policy in one jurisdiction influence
policymaking in another jurisdiction, mainly moderated by transnational or domestic
agents.17 The policy diffusion and transfer literatures overlap at the intersection of
the structural factors and the involved agents, which are interdependent and exert
influence on each other,18 as well as the mechanisms responsible for a policy being
adopted by many jurisdictions.19
With climate change and related environmental issues becoming more pressing,
the literature on environmental and energy policies and their diffusion has seen
substantial additions.20 These studies’main focus lies on macro-level characteristics
and processes, such as the type of diffusing instruments,21 the drivers for the
diffusion of specific instruments,22 and the instrument characteristics fostering
their diffusion.23 However, these studies remain unclear about the specific designs
of policy instruments.24 In other words, how micro-level policy instrument design
diffuses or is accommodated to the local context is underexplored.25 This is partic-
ularly surprising in light of the above outlined differences in policy outcomes
between jurisdictions and the literature pointing toward policy design as being
decisive in influencing these outcomes. Only Biesenbender and Tosun26 address
this gap by analyzing the adoption and subsequent modifications of NOx emission
standards in OECD countries. They find that different diffusion mechanisms are at
play when a policy is newly adopted and when it is subsequently accommodated to
the domestic context and that parliamentarians and their party affiliations have an
effect on the willingness to adopt a new policy.
15Newmark (2002); Marsh and Sharman (2009).
16Gilardi and Füglister (2008); Berry and Berry (2014); Jordan and Huitema (2014).
17Dolowitz and Marsh (1996); Benson and Jordan (2011).
18Matisoff (2008); Marsh and Sharman (2009).
19Braun and Gilardi (2006).
20E.g., Tews et al. (2003); Holzinger et al. (2011).
21Stoutenborough (2008); Stadelmann and Castro (2014).
22E.g., Strebel (2011); Matisoff and Edwards (2014); Schaffer and Bernauer (2014).
23Busch et al. (2005).
24Jordan and Huitema (2014).
25Biesbroek et al. (2010); Biesenbender and Tosun (2014).
26Biesenbender and Tosun (2014).
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We build on this finding but expand this understanding about the adoption and
accommodation processes regarding the specific design elements of a policy instru-
ment. Additionally, we include a perspective on the role of parliamentarians but also
of other actors active in the policymaking process, such as interest groups. We
follow Biesenbender and Tosun27 and define policy accommodation as “a process of
adapting a policy innovation to a domestic institutional and policy context”.28 While
the role of interest groups in policymaking, including the implementation of envi-
ronmental policies, comprises an entire branch of literature,29 their influence on the
specific instrument design30 as well as the role of policy diffusion is underexplored.
Here, we intend to fill this research gap by analyzing how and why the design of a
diffused policy instrument is accommodated upon and after its adoption with a
specific focus on the effects of local technology-related actors, namely technology
suppliers and technology users, on the process of designing the policy instrument.
We analyze technology deployment policies because they are a type of environmen-
tal policy considered greatly effective in incentivizing investments in RE technolo-
gies31 and because technology-related actors are highly important in this policy field
as well as for other sectors that need to be decarbonized, such as transport, heating,
and carbon-intensive industries.
3 The Case: Switzerland’s Feed-in Tariff
We use inductive qualitative case study research32 to unpack the design elements of
the Swiss feed-in tariff and to analyze how policy transfer and accommodation
played out.
3.1 Comparing the Swiss and German RE Policies
We conduct an in-depth analysis of the Swiss feed-in tariff (KEV), comparing the
cases of two renewable power generation technologies, solar PV and biomass.33
27Biesenbender and Tosun (2014).
28Biesenbender and Tosun (2014), p. 424.
29E.g., Cheon and Urpelainen (2013); Markard et al. (2016); Jacobsson and Lauber (2006); Dumas
et al. (2016).
30To our knowledge, Stokes (2013) and Haelg et al. (2020) are the only studies analyzing how
politics can influence policy instrument design.
31Couture and Gagnon (2010).
32Eisenhardt (1989).
33In our analysis, we only look at biomass power generation from resources such as wood,
agricultural waste, etc. Hence, we exclude the feed-in tariffs provided for power from waste
incineration and landfill and sewage gas. For Switzerland, the analyzed resource here is “other
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Specifically, we study how the feed-in tariff instrument has diffused from Germany
to Switzerland and how and why its design has undergone accommodations due to
the influence of technology-related actors. We limit the analysis to the revision of the
Energy Act (Energiegesetz EnG) adopted by the Swiss parliament in 2007 and
implemented in 2009 and the corresponding Energy Ordinance (Energieverordnung
EnV), which were superseded by a new act and a new ordinance in 2018, following
the parliamentary debate and the referendum on the Energy Strategy 2050 on May
21, 2017.
These cases are particularly suited for several reasons: First, the feed-in tariff is an
instrument type that can easily be tailored to differentiate between technologies or
applications by offering them different tariffs.34 By analyzing the feed-in tariff
design for different technologies, we can perform a comparative case study with
different actors involved in the policymaking process ceteris paribus.
Second, Germany was the first country to introduce a technology-specific feed-in
tariff in 2000. In the following, the instrument has diffused to many countries.35
Switzerland implemented its feed-in tariff only recently in 2009 and has largely
drawn from frontrunner countries, such as Germany. Moreover, both countries
already implemented a technology-neutral feed-in tariff in the 1990s,36 mainly to
trigger the construction of small hydropower plants, and therefore had equal oppor-
tunity to learn from this early version of the later policy instrument. Yet, besides
these similarities, the specific design of the technology-specific feed-in tariff has
proven to be different in Germany and Switzerland in terms of application specificity
and subtechnology specificity.
Third, the rationale for the technology selection is based on the different initial
industry and technology user environments in Germany and Switzerland, allowing
for the analysis of different actor bases. While in the field of biomass, the two
countries have shown similarities in terms of technology suppliers, fuel suppliers,
and the technological demand to employ agricultural residues even before the
policy’s implementation, this was different for solar PV. In the 1990s, several
firms were already active in solar PV cell production in Germany,37 leading to a
30% share of the solar PV cell production in Europe by 2000.38 Additionally,
German firms have also been highly active in solar PV module production. Swit-
zerland, conversely, has never been host to a substantial solar PV cell production
industry, and before the implementation of the feed-in tariff, only a few firms were
biomass” (übrige Biomasse) (EnV 2011). For Germany, resources included in the biomass feed-in
tariff are listed in the Biomass Ordinance (Biomasseverordnung).
34Schmidt et al. (2016); Haelg et al. (2018).
35Jacobs (2012); REN21 (2016).
36See Hettich (2021).
37Jacobsson and Lauber (2006).
38Schmela and Kreutzmann (2001).
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active in the market.39 Yet, these existing firms were predominantly manufacturers
of building-integrated PV (BIPV) modules.
Fourth, the policymaking process in Switzerland includes a public consultation
process (Vernehmlassungsverfahren) during which interested associations and inter-
est groups as well as individuals and firms may comment on the draft of every new
law or ordinance. The ministry in charge of the proposed policy then compiles a
report summarizing the participants’ concerns about and approval of the consultation
process. These documents are publicly available and add to the good availability of
data on the policymaking process in Switzerland.
3.2 Method and Sampling
We proceeded in two steps. First, we conducted comprehensive desk research,
scanning academic literature and policy documents, such as draft and final versions
of the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), the Swiss Energy Act (EnG),
and the corresponding Energy Ordinance (EnV), transcripts of parliamentary debates
and of meetings by the parliamentary energy commissions, statements on the public
consultation process, and public and technical reports cited during the parliamentary
debates.
Second, we conducted interviews with bureaucrats, parliamentarians, and repre-
sentatives of industry associations to gain insights into processes not publicly
available. We interviewed a sample of 17 persons who were involved in the Swiss
policymaking process. Two additional actors preferred to give a written statement by
e-mail rather than being interviewed. We used theoretical sampling to identify
relevant interview partners,40 who were then contacted via e-mail. The interviews
were conducted in person or by phone, lasted between 30 and 120 min, and were
transcribed.
4 Evolution of the Feed-In Tariff Design in Germany
and Switzerland
This section summarizes the results of this study. We start with a section (4.1) on the
implementation of the feed-in tariff as a policy instrument to support RE technolo-
gies in Switzerland and on the transfer of the instrument design from Germany. This
is followed by Sect. 4.2 presenting more detailed results on the two technologies
biomass and solar PV, respectively. All sections are subdivided into two parts
presenting how and why the feed-in tariff design came about.
39IEA (2009).
40Eisenhardt (1989).
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4.1 Feed-In Tariff Implementation
In 1999, the Swiss parliament implemented the EnG following the addition of the
Energy Article to the Swiss constitution after a popular vote. The Energy Article
requires the federal government to “establish principles on the use of local and RE
sources and on the economic and efficient use of energy”.41 The EnG replaced the
earlier Resolution on Energy Use, incorporating the principle of supporting RE with
guaranteed grid access and a tariff reflecting the cost of electricity from new
conventional power production plants. Requests by a minority of members of the
Social Democratic Party (SP) and the Green Party (GP) to offer a cost-covering
remuneration for solar PV and wind power were dismissed at that time.
In a referendum in 2002, the majority of Swiss voters rejected a framework law
for the liberalization of the Swiss electricity market against which the labor unions,
supported by French-speaking SP representatives, had taken the optional referen-
dum. After the vote, however, the European Union continued to push for electricity
market liberalization in Switzerland. A new draft was therefore elaborated by the
Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) and published by the Federal Council in
2004 and subsequently dealt with by the two chambers of parliament. In this context,
SP parliamentarians, backed by RE industry associations and the GP, seized the
window of opportunity opened by the first rejection of the market liberalization law
to push for an EnG revision including comprehensive support for RE. This had
become feasible because the left-wing parties threatened to relaunch a referendum
against market liberalization, aided by complementary developments, such as black-
outs in California and an increasing oil price, which caused many center and right-
wing parliamentarians to consider RE as a means of ensuring the security of supply.
Importantly, experiences in other countries where RE already received policy
support—specifically Germany—were also invoked to argue in favor of RE in
Switzerland. Supportive center and right-wing parliamentarians, particularly those
with relations to technology users or suppliers, were specifically concerned by the
Swiss industry losing market shares. Hansjörg Walter (National Councilor, Swiss
People’s Party [SVP], head of the Farmers’ Union) stated during the debate in 2005,
We have already lost a lot compared to Germany and Austria, where the support for
alternative energies, particularly for biomass, is strong.42
Yves Christen (National Councilor, Radical Democratic Party (FDP), President
of Swissolar) stated during the same debate,
In Germany, roughly 150,000 jobs have been created since the introduction of the cost-based
feed-in tariff. This is the last moment for us to enter this market by creating a domestic
market and by promoting access to renewable energies.43
41Federal Constitution of 18 April 1999 of the Swiss Confederation, Art. 89 para. 2.
42Walter, Plenary Session, OB NC 2005, 1091.
43Christen, Plenary Session, OB NC 2005, 1078.
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In the first draft of the new EnG, the SFOE and the Federal Council included a set
of different instruments to support RE, including voluntary quotas and competitive
auctions. However, the parliament finally opted, in principle, for the adoption of a
feed-in tariff in 2007 after many rounds of debates.44 The SP and GP parliamentary
groups, who unanimously voted in favor of the feed-in tariff, did not have a majority
in the parliament. Yet, they were supported by a great number of parliamentarians
from other parties who were, besides others, representatives of farmers and busi-
nesses and saw opportunities for their constituents in comprehensive RE support.
The KEV was thus adopted. The experience in Germany was invoked by many
proponents to support their choice. Specifically, they referred to Germany as an
example where the feed-in tariff proved to be effective in increasing RE deployment.
Two RE associations (Renewable Energy Agency (AEE) and Holzenergie Schweiz)
stated during the public consultation process,
The cost-based feed-in tariff is evidentially (see the example of Germany and others) the
only truly effective instrument for the promotion of renewable energies.45
Adrian Stiefel (Head of Climate and Energy Policy at WWF) stated in an
interview,
[We] had a look at Germany and some other countries to see what [instrument] they used,
how effective were the different instruments, where was [RE deployment] increased, where
did we see the desired development, and finally where could we see scalability. We soon
realized that the feed-in tariff was the right instrument for our situation.
Roger Nordmann (National Councilor, SP) stated in an interview,
Germany was a very important role model because it showed that this scheme could achieve
[broad RE deployment].
Martin Bäumle (National Councilor, Green Liberal Party [GLP]) stated during the
parliamentary debate,
The feed-in model is an internationally well-proven model, and the majority of our neigh-
boring countries and competitors in this technology sector have this model. RE capacity
additions, for instance, in Germany, prove that it is successful.46
Once the parliament had decided on the policy instrument, it discussed the
specificities of the feed-in tariff to be written into the EnG. One such discussion
emerged around the RE technologies to be included in the feed-tariff, specifically
around the question of whether solar PV should be removed from the scheme. On
this issue, the bill shuttled between the two chambers of parliament many times and
triggered heated debates. Finally, a compromise was achieved, linking the amount of
support for solar PV to its cost. This meant that solar PV would only receive little
support while its cost was still very high, but that this support could grow when the
cost fell below predefined thresholds. Specifically, the share of support for individual
44Haelg et al. (2020).
45AEE (2004); HES (2004).
46Bäumle, Plenary Session, OB NC 2005, 1089.
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technologies was limited to 50% for small hydropower and 30% for other technol-
ogies, while solar PV could receive between 5% and 30%.47 Interestingly, pro-
ponents of both opinions looked at Germany for arguments. On the one hand, actors
in favor of entirely excluding solar PV argued that the solar PV boom in Germany
was inefficient, as the technology’s cost was still quite high, and were thus afraid to
incur high costs. On the other hand, actors in favor of including solar PV argued that
the development in Germany had created many jobs in the solar PV industry and that
the cost for solar PV was declining at a high rate. David Stickelberger (Managing
Director of Swissolar) stated in an interview,
The opposite coalition certainly used [Germany as an example]. We used it, too. We pointed
out that in Germany, the market started to grow and the cost decreased. It started at 1 euro per
kWh or even more and then decreased considerably.
Yves Christen (National Councilor, FDP, President of Swissolar) stated in an
interview,
[To convince others to include solar PV], I talked a lot about the small and medium
enterprises. The idea was to show that in Germany they had created thousands of jobs.
Another discussion emerged around the surcharge imposed on electricity con-
sumers to finance the feed-in tariff. Unlike in Germany where the consumer sur-
charge was uncapped, that is, limited only by the number of installations applying
for the feed-in tariff, the Swiss parliamentarians decided very early on in the
policymaking process to cap the surcharge and thus set a limit to the number of
installations that could be supported. The main debate then emerged around the level
at which the surcharge should be capped. SP and GP parliamentarians supported a
high ceiling, while important representatives of the SVP, FDP, and CVP, especially
in the National Council, argued for a lower cap. Finally, the Council of States
compromised on a medium ceiling of 0.6 Rp./kWh, and the National Council
followed suit. Here, the proponents of a low cap used Germany as an example
where unlimited RE support had led to a high EEG charge and thus to high electricity
prices for consumers. Rolf Hegetschweiler (National Councilor, FDP) stated during
the debate,
We are ready to invest a lot of money in the RE deployment. The consumer will have to pay
for this. We should not be surprised if we experience the same as Germany, for instance: the
experience that [the electricity market] is liberalized, but that electricity prices finally rise
because we pass the surcharge on to the consumer.48
Related to the consumer surcharge ceiling, the parliament decided to substantially
exempt electricity-intensive businesses from the consumer surcharge. With the issue
being largely uncontested, the main discussion emerged around the question of
whether these businesses should be entirely or only substantially exempted and
thus around fairness. While other countries, including Germany, had implemented
47EnG Art. 7a (2009).
48Hegetschweiler, Plenary Session, OB NC 2006, 1784.
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a similar design element in their feed-in tariff schemes, they were not used as an
argument in favor of or against the exemption in parliament. Yet, SFOE represen-
tatives stated in a commission meeting that they had used the German exemption for
electricity-intensive businesses as a blueprint to formulate their proposal, which was
adopted by the parliament with few amendments.
Finally, the EnG amendment including a technology-specific feed-in tariff for RE
generation, as adopted by the federal parliament, was implemented in 2009. Further
design specificities of the instrument, such as the individual tariffs, were left to the
SFOE and the Federal Council, who defined them separately in the EnV.
4.2 Feed-In Tariff Designs Specific to Individual
Technologies
One of the key design elements of a feed-in tariff is how it supports specific
technologies and their applications in different markets.49 Here, we analyze the
two specific technologies biomass and solar PV to understand which design ele-
ments were transferred and which were accommodated.
While the new EnV was implemented along with the amended EnG in 2009,
preparatory work on it started much earlier, in 2006, in fact before the EnG was
approved by parliament. The subscription process for installations to receive the
feed-in tariff opened in April 2008, even though the feed-in tariff was not introduced
until January 2009. The surcharge cap was reached within 6 months, that is, before
the feed-in tariff had become active.50 The consumer surcharge has therefore been
increased several times since the EnG’s implementation in 2009 to reduce the
number of projects on the waiting list.
As parliament was pushing for a prompt implementation of the feed-in tariff, the
deadlines for the SFOE to draft the specific designs for the individual technologies
were short. For this reason and because Germany had already gained experience with
its feed-in tariff design, the policymakers at the SFOE analyzed with interest what
was working and what was not in the neighboring country, including design
elements related to specific technologies and applications. Michael Kaufmann
(Head of Renewable Energies, SFOE) stated in an interview,
We analyzed a lot and had many experts from Germany who showed us how things worked
and also did not work. We tried to avoid many misdirected incentives that were present in
Germany.
49Schmidt et al. (2016); Haelg et al. (2018).
50SFOE (2008).
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4.2.1 Specific Design of the Biomass Feed-In Tariff
Supporting biomass was never contested either in Switzerland or in Germany due to
the farmers’ strong lobby and the relatively centralized and dispatchable nature of
biomass power production. As Rudolf Rechsteiner (National Councilor, SP) stated
in an interview,
This may sound exotic today, but at that moment, biomass, biogas, and geothermal power
formed the majority in parliament [leading to the adoption of the feed-in tariff].
Work on the design of the Swiss biomass feed-in tariff started in 2006, with the
finalized tariffs implemented in the context of the EnV amendment in 2009. The
Swiss tariff structure was similar to the structure in place in Germany at the time (see
Fig. 2, below). It consisted of a base rate depending on the installation’s electric
capacity complemented by bonuses for more costly feedstocks, combined heat and
power technology, and the electrification of biogas. In Switzerland, the base rate
differentiated between capacities lower than 50 kW and capacities between 50 kW
and 100 kW. It was considerably higher than in Germany, where the base rate was
the same for all installations below 150 kW. The tariff structure persisted throughout
subsequent amendments of the EnV even though some actors made advances to add
a high bonus for entirely manure-based installations. Additionally, the biomass
installations supported by the feed-in tariff had to fulfill minimum energetic and
ecological requirements, such as the use of the process heat for feedstock drying and
the exclusion of primary renewable feedstock from the support.
Fig. 2 Design elements of the biomass feed-in tariff in Germany (top) and Switzerland (bottom).
The elements that only appear in one country’s design are colored in green. The vertical black lines
disclose the major amendments of the policies in Germany and Switzerland. aEnergy crops
(nachwachsende Rohstoffe [NaWaRo]) are crops specifically grown for power generation; bthe
total gross additions are limited to 100 MW, and the tariffs provided to biomass installations were
adapted to achieve this goal
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The design of the Swiss biomass feed-in tariff displays striking similarities to the
German design in place at the time when the Swiss version was drafted. As Bruno
Guggisberg (SFOE employee in charge of biomass) stated in an interview,
We said, ‘Let’s do something for biomass according to the [German] system, with a base rate
and bonuses.’
“The deadline was so short [. . .], we did not need to reinvent the wheel. So we looked
across the border [. . .] mainly to Germany.”
We looked at the EEG specifications [. . .] and decided to take [them] and see how they
can be adapted to Switzerland.
The design of the Swiss biomass feed-in tariff featured two minor deviations from
the German design. First, biomass installations needed to fulfill energetic and
ecological minimum requirements to be eligible for support. This was due to the
increasing number of installations directly using primary RE crops for electricity
production in Germany. Such installations led to decreasing social acceptance for
biomass installations in Germany and to the implementation of these minimum
requirements in Switzerland. As Bruno Guggisberg (SFOE employee in charge of
biomass) stated in an interview,
Those installations using energy crops, we did not want to support those. [. . .] We wanted to
introduce ecological minimum requirements to prevent these [installations] which do not
fulfill those requirements.
As Stefan Mutzner (Managing Director of Ökostrom Schweiz) stated in an
interview,
[Energy crop plants] do not make sense in Switzerland. In Germany, they served to avoid a
surplus of certain grains and to use fallow land to grow energy crops for biogas plants. We
don’t have that in Switzerland.51
Second, small installations receive considerably higher base rates. As Bruno
Guggisberg (SFOE employee in charge of biomass) stated in an interview,
The Germans had different classifications. They also had larger installations. We felt that
those did not fit for Switzerland.
According to the RE statistics, the existing installations were mostly 30 kW, 50 kW,
80 kW.
This is confirmed by an industry representative who, however, stated that small
plants expand their capacity nowadays and newly-built plants are all above 200 kW.
4.2.2 Specific Design of the Solar PV Feed-In Tariff
As outlined in Sect. 4.1, the support for solar PV was highly contested in the
parliamentary debate that led to the introduction of the feed-in tariff in Switzerland.
In 2009, the specific design of the solar PV feed-in tariff initially differentiated
between rooftop, open-space, and building-integrated solar PV and varied with the
51Swiss agriculture supplies only 64% of the country’s gross food consumption, Walser (2013).
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installed capacity. The tariffs were continuously adapted to the solar PV price
reductions. With the amendment of 2014, a one-off investment grant for small-
scale rooftop installations was introduced. Since then, installations below 10 kW no
longer obtain a feed-in tariff but a one-off investment grant consisting of a base rate
and a capacity-dependent rate. Owners of installations between 10 kW and 30 kW
have the choice between the feed-in tariff and the investment grant. Finally, the most
recent amendment in 2015 granted the same tariff for rooftop and open-space
installations.
Similar to the German solar PV feed-in tariff design, the Swiss design differen-
tiated between rooftop and open-space installations. This is intriguing since the
support for open-space installations was in fact disfavored. As David Stickelberger
(Managing Director of Swissolar) stated in an interview,
Even more than today, we saw open-space installations as compromising the reputation
[of solar PV].
We did not have special interest in the open-space installations. I remember that the
Federal Office [of Energy] introduced it, and we thought, do it if you want to.
In later amendments, both countries adapted the design to provide equal tariffs to
(large-scale) rooftop and open-space installations. In Switzerland, the distinction
between large- and small-scale was abolished in that very small-scale installations no
longer received a feed-in tariff. The rationale behind consolidating the two catego-
ries was the investment cost for the different installation types, which had largely
converged in previous years and therefore did not require further tariff
differentiation.52
Besides the similarities, the Swiss solar PV feed-in tariff design exhibits several
differences from the German case (Fig. 3). First, the small-scale investment grant
was introduced as a reaction to the high number of small-scale rooftop solar PV
installations on the waiting list to receive the feed-in tariff. The waiting list was a
direct result of the investment cap for solar PV.
Second, unlike the German feed-in tariff, the Swiss solar PV feed-in tariff has
always extensively supported BIPV installations. In fact, Switzerland was the home
of a small BIPV industry that emerged in the 1990s as a result of the strong research
and development support policies in this sector. This Jenny (State Councilor, SVP)
stated in a debate in 2007,
[The BIPV] market grows very quickly: the revenues increase every year by 45%. [. . .] But
sadly the [Swiss] products are only exported; sadly they only go abroad – we need a
domestic market.53
Urs Wolfer (SFOE employee in charge of solar PV) stated in an interview,
If you never start to push [building-integrated PV], nothing is ever going to be developed.
Therefore, we set this incentive.
52SFOE (2014).
53Jenny, Plenary Session, OB CoS 2007, 52.
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David Stickelberger (Managing Director of Swissolar) stated in an interview,
Our stance was always consistent in that we wanted the BIPV tariff. [BIPV] was the USP
[unique selling point] of the Swiss PV industry and even an export good in the initial period
of the feed-in tariff.
The other argument was the social acceptance. Our position was to fulfill higher aesthetic
standards, much higher than [those] abroad.
This design feature was introduced for two reasons. First, the Swiss PV industry
lobbied to include their main product, BIPV modules, in the policy scheme. There-
fore, this design element originated from domestic factors that influenced path-
dependent policymaking and therefore from emerging actors. Second, this design
feature was also introduced due to concerns about losing shares in the transnational
BIPV market.
Finally, even though revisions of the EnV and thus the tariffs for the individual
technologies and installations were decided upon only by the Federal Council, they
still underwent a public consultation process. Stakeholders opposing high tariffs for
solar PV even used Germany as an example to solicit for lower tariffs. Urs Näf (Head
of Energy Policy, Economiesuisse) stated in an interview,
[Germany] was the most important case for us to obtain reference prices. We always
analyzed whether the Swiss prices were far from their [Germany’s] prices. I remember
having noticed that solar PV received double the amount in Switzerland than in Germany at
one point. [. . .] We tried to pressure for lower tariffs, but it did not work. [. . .] Therefore,
solar PV was hopelessly overpaid for very long.
Fig. 3 Design elements of the solar PV feed-in tariff in Germany (top) and Switzerland (bottom).
The elements that only appear in one country’s design are colored in yellow. The vertical black lines
disclose the major amendments of the policies in Germany and Switzerland. aThe total gross
additions are limited to 2.5–3.5 GW (2012–2014) and 2.5 GW (since 2014), respectively, and the
tariffs provided to solar PV installations adapted to achieve this goal; bsince 2014, solar PV
installations below 10 kW no longer obtain a feed-in tariff but a one-off investment grant consisting
of a base rate and a capacity-dependent rate. Owners of installations between 10 kW and 30 kW
have the choice between the feed-in tariff and the investment grant
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5 Discussion and Conclusion
A considerable body of research has analyzed how policies are transferred from one
country to another. However, very few studies have examined how and why the
design of a transferred policy is accommodated upon adoption in the recipient
country. In this chapter, we have focused on the Swiss feed-in tariff policy instru-
ment and explored which of this instrument’s design elements were transferred and
which were accommodated upon adoption and how. We studied the evolution of the
Swiss feed-in tariff in general as well as its specific design for biomass and solar PV
technologies. We find that Swiss policymakers have drawn much from the experi-
ence with the feed-in tariff in Germany. On the instrument level, policymakers were
influenced by this experience and the resulting boom in RE installations and its
industry. For biomass, where similar technology users and suppliers exist in both
countries, the design of the feed-in tariff was adapted to the Swiss context only to a
limited extent. For solar PV, however, the design has been largely accommodated to
the Swiss context, on the one hand, due to learning from the German experience and,
on the other hand, due to the different industry base present in the two countries. We
hence find that technology-related actors take an important role in the policy transfer
process. This chapter thus complements the existing literature on policy diffusion
and transfer, with a focus on instrument design and its accommodation upon
adoption.
These findings have policy implications on a broader technology governance
level, especially given the increasing role of technology in both creating and solving
problems in various policy fields,54 specifically climate and energy policy. The
diffusion of policy instruments is more likely to happen without a specific design
accommodation between jurisdictions if they share the same technology-related
actor base. This finding allows us to speculate about other sectors in Switzerland
that need decarbonization. For instance, policy transfer without major accommoda-
tion is likely in the field of low-carbon heating technologies between the cantons in
Switzerland or between Switzerland and Austria. These jurisdictions not only share a
similar current technology stock and suppliers, they are also host to important
manufacturers of low-carbon heating technologies, such as heat pumps and wood-
fired heating devices. In contrast, the accommodation of design elements can be
expected between jurisdictions with different technology-related actor bases. For
instance, policy transfer with major accommodations between Switzerland and its
larger neighboring countries is likely regarding electric mobility, which will prob-
ably become relevant in the very near future. While France, Germany, and Italy are
all home to important automotive industries with their own interests regarding
electric mobility, such actors are lacking in Switzerland. These implications are
important for policymakers, as they may help them foresee technology-related
differences in the positions of their actor bases regarding policy design elements.
54Jaffe et al. (2002).
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This may help policymakers identify actors with similar interests as well as pinpoint
issues where resources may be bundled to obtain the desired policy output.
The contributions of our study are fourfold. First, we unpack and analyze the
policy design elements of a deployment policy and their diffusion from one country
to another and, hence, expand the focus of the policy diffusion and transfer litera-
tures to these micro-level elements. Second, we show the influence of technology-
related actors in policy adoption and accommodation. These actors initially only
emerge upon (early) technology deployment and therefore coevolve with policy.55
Third, we contribute to the literature on RE policies with an in-depth analysis of the
Swiss feed-in tariff, specifically for biomass and solar PV technologies. Fourth, and
more broadly, we contribute to discussions about designing policies that are effec-
tive in the long run, for example, by creating positive policy feedback from targeted
or nurtured actors.56
To test our results, future research should expand our approach to other cases, that
is, more RE technologies, other countries, or even other policy fields. Quantitative
studies could analyze to what extent our results are generalizable. This is however
tricky since comparatively measuring the dependent variable, policy design output,
is challenging57 and has only recently been tackled.58
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Abstract The energy sector has been subject to regulation since ancient times. The
mechanisms of regulatory activity in this sector run like a red thread through history.
New regulations are often born out of necessity (for example because of limited
energy resources or today because of climate objectives). Switzerland’s energy law
was originally a cantonal matter. Over the course of time, more and more compe-
tences have been transferred to the federal level. This, together with the increasing
complexity of the subject matter of regulation, has led to a conflicting legal
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framework that renders it nearly impossible, even for experts, to answer everyday
questions of competence with the necessary clarity and without much effort.
1 Introduction
The development of regulation in the Swiss energy sector has been and continues to
be a constant process, strongly driven by technical progress. In his fundamental work
“Energy Law” from 2005, Jagmetti identifies four successive priorities of regulation
for Switzerland, starting with industrialisation in the late nineteenth century: (1) secu-
rity aspects, (2) supply, (3) conservation of nature and landscape and finally (4) the
market.1 However, these domains have not evolved as separate fields. Rather, they
have complemented each other. This has been accompanied by an increase in
complexity and growing conflicts of interest and by a steady increase in the density
of regulation.2
Jagmetti’s observations also reveal another aspect: to support his remarks, he
refers primarily to laws enacted on the federal level. As will be shown below, in the
context of Switzerland’s federal structure and organisation, this means that regula-
tory activity has increasingly been transferred from the cantons to the federal level.
We are therefore dealing with a form of centralisation. At the same time, paradox-
ically, energy supply in Switzerland is—politically desired—developing (again) in
exactly the opposite direction, namely towards electricity that is largely produced on
a decentralised basis and as far as possible in a climate-friendly manner. This
primarily concerns photovoltaic systems.
With a view to the desired decarbonisation of energy supply, electricity is the key
energy source today, already accounting for 25% of Switzerland’s total final energy
consumption.3 This article therefore primarily focuses on the development of the
regulation of the electricity industry since the founding of the state, but not without
establishing cross-references to other areas of energy legislation and the time before
that, insofar as they appear to be useful for understanding the overall context. In the
following, the legislator’s approach to the challenges of regulating the electricity
industry in a federal context will be critically examined and finally illustrated with
examples. It will be demonstrated that the increasing complexity of the energy sector
has had an important impact on the evolution and quality of energy regulation in
Switzerland.
To present the development of Swiss energy law in a comprehensive manner
would go far beyond the scope of this contribution. In over 150 years of develop-
ment, there have been countless important events, technical, economic and political
1Jagmetti (2005), p. 11.
2Jagmetti (2005), p. 16.
3Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019b), p. 4.
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developments, from industrialisation and two world wars to the digital age. This is
also not a historical investigation, especially since I limit myself mainly to the
analysis of typical legal sources, namely the legislative materials, mainly produced
by the Federal Council, which automatically narrows the perspective. However,
since the focus is on the creation of federal competences and on the way in which
these competences were used by the legislator, this approach seems to be appropriate
here. From this perspective, the following are just a few of the highlights that I
believe have a certain significance for the electricity industry. The selected high-
lights also form a kind of temporal bracket around the entire Swiss energy law,
i.e. the basic regulation on the use of hydropower4 around 1900 on the one hand and
the electricity market regulation at the beginning of the twenty-first century on the
other.
2 Energy Law: Origins and Essence
2.1 Subject Matter of Energy Law
The term “energy law”—like the term “regulation of the energy sector”—cannot be
defined conclusively. However, for the purpose of this paper, it is necessary to
provide a consistent framework for the terms used.
From a material point of view, it would be quite justifiable to describe all law as
energy law that has a connection to the topic of energy production and use. The large
scope of this field is, however, demonstrated by the four main areas of regulation or
“tendencies”,5 as Jagmetti calls them (security, supply, conservation of nature and
landscape as well as the market). From a political point of view, this ranges from
climate and environmental policy (coping with climate change and the conservation
of natural resources) to economic policy (security of supply and competitiveness)
and social and structural policy (affordable energy supply and fair distribution of
revenues).
As already mentioned, this article deals with the regulation of the electricity
industry and there primarily with what I would like to call “nominal energy law”
or “energy law in the narrow sense”. I am referring to the law that “wants to be”
energy law, i.e. the law that directly regulates, for example, the use of hydropower.
Occasionally, however, cross-references are made to “functional energy law” or
“energy law in the broader sense”. This refers to norms that primarily have a
different focus, such as environmental law, including water protection, regional
planning law or antitrust and competition law, but which also have a material
connection to energy.
4Hydropower accounts for a good 55% of today’s domestic electricity production (Swiss Federal
Office of Energy 2019a, p. 2).
5Jagmetti (2005), p. 11.
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2.2 Energy Regulation as a Historical Constant
The topic of energy supply and use has already occupied our extinct ancestor Homo
Erectus since he learned to control fire about one million years ago.6 Regulation in
the broad sense of the term also began early on. For example, the use of wood was
already subject to antique regulations. In the third century, the Roman Emperor
Alexander Severus assigned forest management to the same institution that was
responsible for the administration of the public baths. Haas suspects that this was a
new regulation of the supply of firewood, which had previously been carried out via
intermediaries.7 It is possible that the excessive use of resources from the operation
of these same thermal baths had resulted in bottlenecks in the supply of wood, which
even then had a connection to ancient social and environmental policies.8
The use of water power to drive mills and saws can also be traced back to ancient
times.9 One example from the baroque era is Zurich, whose Grand Council made the
use of wood the subject of regulation by means of so-called “mandates”. This was
intended to guarantee both the supply of wood and the protection of wood as a
natural resource.10 In the Hoch-Obrigkeitliche[n] Mandat, Betreffend die Versorg-
und Beschirmung der Holz- und Waldungen from 1717, for example, the following
lines can be found (loosely translated from the original text formulated in old
German language):
To our great regret, we have had to learn that in many places of our territory the inhabitants
are robbing themselves of this treasure by excessive and unsustainable consumption and
extinction of the woods. It is time to understand that if this danger is not recognised, there is
reason to worry about such a general damage to the land, which our descendants would have
to pay a great deal for [. . .].11
Here, too, the close links with other areas of interest and policy, in particular the
aspect of intergenerational sustainability of natural resource use, are evident. Finally,
water rights that are still valid today and that recently occupied the Federal Supreme
Court of Switzerland also go back to the time of the so-called Ancien Régime.12
These arbitrarily selected examples show that since ancient times there seems to
6Berna et al. (2012), p. 1215 et seq.
7Haas (2006), p. 130, with a reference to a calculation of the consumption of firewood on page 244.
8Haas (2006), p. 244 et seq. and 252; he remains skeptical with regard to the link to environmental
considerations.
9Grewe (2009), p. 429 et seq.
10Schindler (2019), p. 279.
11Mandat (1717), p. 204 et seq.: “Weilen wir aber zu unserm nicht geringen Bedauern in Erfahrung
bringen müssen, wie dass an vielen Orten unserer Bottmässigkeit unsere Angehörige durch
übermässiges und landesverderbliches Geuden und Austoten der Hölzern sich dieses Kleinods
also berauben, dass wann hierwider nicht erforderliches Einsehen gethan wurde, nicht unzeitig zu
besorgen wäre, es möchte hieraus ein solcher allgemeiner Landsschaden erwachsen, dessen unsere
Nachkommen sich nicht wenig zu entgelten haben wurden.”
12BGE 145 II 145; Föhse (2019), p. 444 et seq.
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have been a need to establish rules for the use of energy sources for various motives.
This article will not go back too far in time. Rather, it begins with the founding of the
Swiss Confederation in 1848. In the following sections, the rough constitutional
lines will be delineated and compared with the regulatory priorities mentioned by
Jagmetti.
3 Milestones in the Regulation of the Electricity Industry
3.1 Levels of Government and Basic Jurisdiction
Switzerland (“the Swiss Confederation” [Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft]) has a
federal structure consisting of 26 cantons (Art. 1 BV).13 In accordance with the
Swiss system of federalism, the cantons are sovereign “except to the extent that their
sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution” (Art. 3 BV)—this norm is already
found with almost identical wording in the first constitution of 12 September 1848
(there also in Art. 3).14 With regard to the competences under constitutional law, this
means that the Confederation and the cantons must share “sovereignty”. Moreover, it
implies that the Confederation must (only) fulfil duties in those areas where limits to
cantonal sovereignty are provided by the Federal Constitution (Art. 42 BV). The
Confederation should only take on those tasks “that the Cantons are unable to
perform or which require uniform regulation by the Confederation” (Art. 43a para.
1 BV). In view of the history of modern Switzerland, which in 1848—apart from the
short period of the Helvetic Republic from 1798–1803—emerged from a federation
of sovereign states (the cantons) of strongly contrasting socio-cultural areas, this can
be regarded as an obvious decision.15
In the following sections, the tendency towards centralisation in energy law
regulation will be documented. For this purpose, it will be necessary to trace the
development of the relevant federal competences in the constitution. In the absence
of federal competence, the member states, i.e. the cantons, are entitled to legislate.
The following overview of the development of constitutional competences will be
based on the three federal constitutions since the founding of the Swiss Confeder-
ation, i.e. those of 1848, 1876 and 1999, and it will take the regulation of hydro-
power as its starting point. Moreover, the focus will be on the main areas of
regulation mentioned by Jagmetti. Cantonal law will only be included on a selective
basis where it seems appropriate.
13Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (“Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen
Eidgenossenschaft” vom 18. April 1999 [BV, SR 101]).
14However, the term “sovereignty”was subject to intensive debates in the so-called Tagsatzung, the
assembly that was responsible for drafting the first Swiss constitution (Kölz 1992, p. 578; Schweizer
2014, p. 83; Jaag 2015, p. 149).
15Tschannen (2016), p. 95.
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3.2 Hydropower
3.2.1 From Wood to Coal
Even at the time when the state was founded around 1850, wood was still the main
energy source in Switzerland, accounting for 88% of the total. This was followed by
peat (9%) and coal (3%). Hydropower accounted for only 1%.16 As far as the first
constitution of 1848 is concerned, one can be brief about energy law. There are no
competence norms that would concern nominal energy law, nor are there any that
would concern functional energy law. The constitution of the young nation (under-
standably) had other focal points, above all the question of the structure of the federal
parliament as a unicameral national representation, as a “Tagsatzung” or in a
bicameral system based on the model of the United States of America, the question
of the structure of electoral law and the three powers, or the fundamental relationship
between the Confederation and the cantons.17 Conversely, this means that “energy”
as a potential subject matter of regulation was entirely in the hands of the cantons.
Barely 26 years after the founding of the state, the totally revised constitution of
29 May 1874 was the second constitution to come into force in Switzerland. The
constitution of 1874 is a key enactment for energy law. At the beginning, however, it
was also free of energy law ballast (not considering Art. 24 BV 1874, which
provides for the supervision of the hydraulic engineering and forest police, which
for the time being was still limited to the high mountain areas, and the legislative
competence regarding fisheries according to Art. 25 BV 1874).
For various reasons,18 however, wood-based energy supply came to an end as
early as the 1860s. Wood and peat were increasingly replaced by coal. Swiss coal
consumption rose exponentially from this point on and flourished from the early
years of the twentieth century until the mid-1960s, when it disappeared just as
quickly and was replaced mainly by oil.19 The main consumers of coal were—
before electrification—initially the railways, gas works (for the production of
so-called “town gas” by coal gasification, especially for public lighting) and industry
(steam engines). From the beginning of the twentieth century, heating systems in
residential buildings were also added.20
16Kupper and Pallua (2016), p. 16; today the shares in total energy consumption are as follows:
petroleum fuels (13.9%), motor fuels (35.4%), electricity (25.0%), gas (13.5%), remainder (12.2%)
(Swiss Federal Office of Energy 2019b, p. 4).
17Kölz (1992), p. 554 et seq.
18Kupper and Pallua (2016), p. 16 et seq.
19Kupper and Pallua (2016), p. 22 et seq.; Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019b), p. 3.
20Kupper and Pallua (2016), p. 32 et seq.
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3.2.2 The Beginnings of Electrification: The Struggle for Water
Electrification began in the early 1880s.21 At that time, electricity was also generated
from hydropower in Switzerland for the first time. In contrast to coal, which had to
be imported, hydropower provided a domestic source for renewable energy. This
opened up completely new opportunities but also raised fundamental questions
about water sovereignty, the granting of rights of use and the distribution of the
revenues.22 The Federal Council’s comments from 1905 are illustrative of this:
As a mountainous country, Switzerland possesses a number of relatively easily exploitable
hydropower sources, which constitute a considerable part of the national wealth and whose
value has risen significantly since electricity has begun its global conquest and the technol-
ogy of converting hydropower into electrical energy has experienced a tremendous upswing.
Thanks to this progress, we in Switzerland are able to replace coal, which we have to
purchase from abroad, by hydropower as a source of power to a very significant extent. [. . .]
This means that the national authorities must also concern themselves more than before with
the issue of Swiss hydropower. Our primary responsibility is to ensure that, when Switzer-
land switches over to the electrical operation of its railways [. . .], the hydropower that is
necessary for this purpose will be available.23
In accordance with the basic constitutional order, the cantons were initially
competent for regulation. The enactment of a corresponding framework regulation
by the Confederation was politically complex and therefore difficult.24 It began with
a petition (Gesuch) from the “Central Executive Committee of the Swiss Frei-Land
Company” (Centralvorstand der schweizerischen Gesellschaft Frei-Land) in April
1891, whose main concern was to monopolise hydropower at the federal level and to
state, among other things, that the use of hydropower and the transmission of
electricity generated from hydropower should be a federal matter.25 The Federal
Council took this concern as an opportunity to have the subject examined in greater
depth in a report that appeared 3 years later (1894) and which, as it turned out
afterwards, provided guidance for the future organisation of water use in
21Kupper and Pallua (2016), p. 37 and 53; Föhse (2015), p. 126.
22See also Jagmetti (2005), p. 410 et seq.
23Federal Council (1905), p. 223: “Die Schweiz besitzt als Bergland eine Summe von
verhältnismässig leicht verwertbaren Wasserkräften, welche einen erheblichen Teil des
Nationalvermögens ausmachen und deren Wert bedeutend gestiegen ist, seitdem die Elektrizität
ihren Siegeszug durch die Welt angetreten und die Technik der Umwandlung der Wasserkraft in
elektrische Energie einen ungeheuren Aufschwung genommen hat. Durch diesen Fortschritt
erreichen wir in der Schweiz, dass in einem sehr bedeutenden Masse die Steinkohle, welche wir
aus dem Ausland beziehen müssen, als Krafterzeugerin durch die Wasserkraft ersetzt werden
kann. [...] Daraus ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit, dass sich auch die Landesbehörden mehr als
bisher mit der Angelegenheit der schweizerischen Wasserkräfte beschäftigen. Wir haben in erster
Linie dafür zu sorgen, dass, wenn die Schweiz zum elektrischen Betrieb ihrer Bahnen [...]
übergehen wird, die nötige Wasserkraft zu diesem Behufe zur Verfügung steht.”
24Federal Council (1905), p. 224.
25Federal Council (1894), p. 820.
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Switzerland,26 even though it took almost 25 years to draft the new regulation27
before it came into force with the Water Rights Act (WRA)28 on 1 January 1918.29
This includes the creation of the necessary constitutional basis in the form of the new
Art. 24bis BV 1874 (which was promoted by a popular initiative)30 and a mandatory
constitutional referendum on 25 October 1908.31
In the run-up to the vote, the Federal Council rejected a popular initiative, which
called for extensive centralisation at the federal level, and basically confirmed its
position, already formulated in the 1894 report, that water sovereignty and regula-
tory powers should essentially remain with the cantons.32 The parliament responded
to the initiative with a counter-proposal prepared by a commission of experts, which
was further adapted during the parliamentary debate. The initiative committee
subsequently withdrew its proposal.33 With Art. 24bis BV 1874, adopted on
25 October 1908, it was now laid down at constitutional level that the Confederation
should (at least) have basic legislative competence in the field of hydropower.34
Furthermore, the Confederation was supposed to act as the licensing authority in
intercantonal relations in the event of a dispute as well as in international relations. In
contrast, the fees and charges arising from water use were the responsibility of the
cantons (see Art. 24bis BV 1874).35 This is still the case today (Art. 76 para. 4 BV).
3.3 The Safety of Electrical Installations as a Milestone?
As is not uncommon, the work of the legislator was overtaken by events during the
discussions surrounding water sovereignty. The dangers of using electricity were
soon recognised. As early as 1902, the Federal Council therefore felt compelled36
(in my opinion without the necessary constitutional basis)37 to regulate the safety of
26Federal Council (1894), p. 820.
27Federal Council (1912), p. 669.
28Water Rights Act (Bundesgesetz vom 22. Dezember 1916 über die Nutzbarmachung der
Wasserkräfte, Wasserrechtsgesetz [WRG, SR 721.80]).
29See AS 1933 189.
30Federal Council (1907), p. 624.
31Federal Council (1912), p. 45.
32Federal Council (1894), p. 821.
33Federal Council (1908b), p. 475.
34Federal Council (1912), p. 672.
35Federal Council (1908a), p. 7 et seq.; Jagmetti (2005), p. 410 et seq.
36Federal Council (1899), p. 787.
37Federal Council (1899), p. 790. From a legal point of view, the reasons given in the Federal
Council dispatch for the legitimacy of the legislation do not seem very convincing (the dispatch
states that the Federal Assembly had already decided this beforehand and that, in the meantime,
legislation in civil and criminal matters had also become a federal competence). It goes without
saying that the Federal Assembly cannot give itself competences that it does not have under the
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electrical installations by means of a federal law (the EleG38)—an issue that may
have become more urgent after a fire had broken out in the Zurich telephone
exchange on 2 April 1898 due to a lack of safety precautions.39 As Jagmetti points
out,40 the fact that the issue of security was initially reflected in (centralised) federal
law was probably due in large part to the complexity of hydropower from a political
point of view and to coincidence, rather than to a deliberate strategy, although the
problem had been known for some time. The necessary constitutional basis was not
established until 1908, when the constitutional provision on hydropower was intro-
duced in Art. 24bis para. 9 BV 1874 (now Art. 91 para. 1 BV).
3.4 The Issue of Energy Supply as a Milestone?
Electricity began its triumphal advance after the First World War, after it had still
been considered a luxury good at the turn of the twentieth century. Initially, it was
used primarily for public lighting or the operation of trams in the cities.41 The lack of
fuel made the dependence on foreign countries obvious, so that industrial enterprises
also began to replace coal with electricity. Efforts to bring electricity into the home
also began in the 1920s. But it took until the 1950s and 1960s before electrification
was fully implemented.42 In 1945, for example, only 1% of households had a
vacuum cleaner or refrigerator; by 1970, these figures had risen to 86 and 82%
respectively (electric cookers and, in particular, electric irons had been quite com-
mon since the pre-war period).43
When the constitutional basis for the use of hydropower was created in 1908 and
the Federal WRA came into force in 1918, the focus was probably less on supplying
the general population with electricity (in the sense of a basic supply), but rather on
the use and expansion of hydropower itself and the hoped-for reduction of depen-
dence on hard coal imports from abroad.44 On the one hand, this picture emerges
from the Federal Council dispatch on the constitutional amendment, in which the
issue of supply is at best indirectly reflected (in particular in the form of the
obligation to obtain a permit for the transfer of electricity abroad and the probably
Constitution. To what extent the competence to legislate on civil and criminal law is relevant here is
difficult to see, unless one assumes an enormously broad concept, especially of civil law, under
which one could subsume almost any regulatory activity. It rather seems as if the matter has been
taken on by necessity—regardless of the division of competences defined in the constitution.
38Electricity Act (Bundesgesetz vom 24. Juni 1902 betreffend die elektrischen Schwach- und
Starkstromanlagen, Elektrizitätsgesetz [EleG, SR 734.0]).
39Federal Council (1899), p. 787.
40Jagmetti (2005), p. 11.
41Kupper and Pallua (2016), p. 42.
42Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019b), p. 3.
43Kupper, Pallua (2016), p. 44 et seq. and 53.
44Jagmetti (2005), p. 411.
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desired reduction of foreign dependency).45 On the other hand, there is the dispatch
on the WRA, where the Federal Council makes a pointed statement on what it
considers to be the central aspect of the “exploitation” of hydraulic power—namely
the “interest of the general public in this national resource”. Just as important—as
already in the debate on the constitutional provision—was the social and economic
component, the question of participation in the new resource as “national wealth”
and the prevention of price increases for fiscal purposes or through speculation.46
Finally, this is also in line with the state of technical development and the degree
of electrification at the time, which had not yet reached households. From the federal
government’s point of view, the focus was on railways as potential customers, as
well as cities for public lighting and trams and, increasingly, industry.47 At the time,
Switzerland was still a “coal country” and thus became increasingly dependent on
foreign countries at the turn of the twentieth century.48 Consistent energy supply
policy only began later, after the Second World War.49
However, it is interesting to note that Art. 55 let. d WRA stipulates that hydro-
power concessions can also contain provisions “on the tariffs for the supply of the
generated power, on the power to be supplied free of charge or at preferential prices,
on the reduction of electricity prices in case of increased profit, [and] on the supply
of power to a region”. The standard obviously aims at avoiding that fiscal objectives
of the state or speculative activities hinder the development of power plant capacity.
With approximately the same wording, it is still part of the WRA today (only the
term “power” was replaced by “electrical energy” as of 1 May 1997). Today,
however, it is obviously in conflict with the new electricity market regulation,
which has been in force since 2008. In the course of the drafting of the StromVG,50
the rule seems to have been overlooked. As a result, Parliament has made more or
less unsuccessful attempts to improve it. The rule should, however, have been
deleted.51
The topic of supply therefore came into focus later. From an energy history
perspective, the 1950s seem to have been a decisive turning point in this respect.
In step with strong economic growth, energy consumption also increased exponen-
tially,52 so that historians see these years as an epochal change or a threshold period
from industrial to consumer society.53 The Federal Council’s 1957 dispatch in
45Federal Council (1907), p. 624 et seq.
46Federal Council (1912), p. 674.
47Federal Council (1912), p. 676.
48Kupper and Pallua (2016), p. 24 (about coal extraction in Switzerland).
49Kupper and Pallua (2016), p. 64.
50Electricity Supply Act (Bundesgesetz vom 23. März 2007 über die Stromversorgung,
Stromversorgungsgesetz [StromVG, SR 734.7]).
51Kratz (2016), p. 434. Kratz sees the problem, but does not comment on it.
52Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019b), p. 3.
53Kupper and Pallua (2016), p. 55.
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favour of the creation of a constitutional provision on nuclear energy is a good
illustration of the new emphasis on “security of supply”.
Keeping pace with the development of nuclear research and technology has become crucial
for our country. Without its own oil and coal deposits, Switzerland has shifted to the
intensive exploitation of the country’s most important energy sources, namely hydropower.
However, our own energy sources are currently only able to satisfy about 33 percent of our
total raw energy requirements (hydropower 24, firewood 9), and we are dependent on
imported energy sources for the rest.54
After the creation of the constitutional basis on 24 November 195755 and with the
definition of exclusive federal competence, things moved quickly. On 23 December
1959 the Federal Assembly passed the Atomic Energy Act (Atomgesetz).56 In 1964,
for example, the energy supply company BKW announced that it was planning to
build a nuclear power plant in Mühleberg near Bern. Construction began just 3 years
later, in 1967. Test operations began in 1971, and the nuclear power plant was
connected to the grid in 1972 (the Beznau I nuclear power plant went into operation
in 1969).57 The Mühleberg power plant was taken off the grid at the end of 2019.
From a political point of view, nuclear energy remains controversial, and the
applicable law aims primarily at the protection of public policy interests, such as
public safety (the safe operation of power plants) and security (the protection of the
population) and public health. From a legal point of view, centralisation is less
problematic in this field, both from a federalist perspective and in view of the legal
challenges. On the contrary, it was the right choice.
Also in the 1950s (1958), the electricity networks of Germany, France and
Switzerland were connected at the substation in Laufenburg. This laid the founda-
tions for Switzerland’s international electricity trading and significantly increased
the volume of (already existing) cross-border electricity exchange, while at the same
time strengthening grid stability—and thus the security of supply.58 Electricity now
made its way into households, and coal was replaced by oil, which in the early
54Federal Council (1957), p. 1148: “Für unser Land ist es nachgerade zu einer Schicksalsfrage
geworden, mit der Entwicklung der Atomforschung und der Atomtechnik Schritt zu halten. Ohne
eigene Erdöl- und Kohlenvorkommen hat sich die Schweiz auf die intensive Auswertung der
wichtigsten landeseigenen Energiequellen, nämlich die Wasserkräfte, verlegt. Unsere eigenen
Energiequellen vermögen aber zur Zeit nur etwa 33 Prozent des gesamten Rohenergiebedarfs zu
befriedigen (Wasserkraft 24, Brennholz 9), und für den Rest sind wir auf importierte Energieträger
angewiesen.”
55See AS 1957 1027. Available at https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch.
56Atomic Energy Act (Bundesgesetz vom 23. Dezember 1959 über die friedliche Verwendung der
Atomenergie, Atomgesetz [AtG, AS 1960 541]). Available at https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.
admin.ch.
57Föhse and Drittenbass (2017), p. 169.
58Föhse (2014), p. 8; Kupper, Pallua (2016), p. 50 et seq.
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1970s, shortly before the oil crisis, accounted for around 80% of Switzerland’s total
energy consumption.59
3.5 Spatial Planning, Nature and Heritage Conservation
As far as nominal energy law is concerned, after the creation of the EleG and WRA,
the Confederation—apart from the legislation on nuclear energy—for a long time
abstained from the temptation to intervene in the electricity industry in a regulatory
manner. For the sake of completeness, only the constitutional provision for pipelines
for the transport of liquid or gaseous fuels (Rohrleitungsanlagen zur Beförderung
flüssiger oder gasförmiger Brenn- oder Treibstoffe) of 5 March 1961 and the
Pipelines Act (Rohrleitungsgesetz) that was based on this provision should be
mentioned as exceptions.60 Apart from this, the Confederation left the field to the
cantons, particularly with regard to electricity supply. The cantons usually consid-
ered the supply of electricity to be a public task and largely took charge of it
themselves.61 Today, the electricity industry is still cantonal and municipal,
i.e. state-dominated.62 The entire electricity supply in Switzerland was therefore
initially established and managed under cantonal and municipal aegis and responsi-
bility—in terms of legislation, supply and enforcement.
However, the strong economic growth from the 1950s onwards also had equally
strong external effects on the land requirements of settlements and urban areas, on
waste generation, pollution of the environment and the emission of greenhouse
gases. This brought spatial planning, nature conservation and environmental protec-
tion more and more into the focus and led to a series of constitutional and legislative
changes with varying degrees of centralisation, which are primarily attributable to
functional energy law and also affect the electricity industry.63 However, these
issues did not only gain relevance as late as the 1960s but already in the early
1950s with the creation of the constitutional provision for water protection in 1953,64
whereupon the Federal Assembly passed the Water Protection Act on 16 March
1955 (Gewässerschutzgesetz).65 This was followed by a constitutional amendment
on the protection of nature and heritage (27 May 1962), the basis for the Nature and
59Kupper and Pallua (2016), p. 55 and 59; Jagmetti (2005), p. 13; Swiss Federal Office of Energy
(2019b), p. 3.
60Federal Council (1960), p. 1581; Pipelines Act (Bundesgesetz vom 4. Oktober 1963 über
Rohrleitungsanlagen zur Beförderung flüssiger oder gasförmiger Brenn- oder Treibstoffe,
Rohrleitungsgesetz [RLG, SR 746.1]).
61Jagmetti (2005), p. 12.
62Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019a), p. 41 et seq.
63Jagmetti (2005), p. 14 and 32, provides a survey.
64Federal Council (1953), p. 240.
65Federal Council (1955), p. 552.
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Cultural Heritage Protection Act (Natur- und Heimatschutzgesetz66) of 1 July 1966,
and a constitutional amendment on spatial planning (14 September 1969),67 the basis
for the 1979 Spatial Planning Act (Raumplanungsgesetz, RPG68). Moreover, the
constitutional basis for the 1983 Environmental Protection Act
(Umweltschutzgesetz) was adopted by the people and the cantons already on
7 February 1971.69
It was not until 23 September 1990 that the Energy Article (after a first attempt in
1983 had failed)70 was adopted—again a constitutional provision that is part of
nominal energy law (Art. 24octies BV 1874), the predecessor of today’s Art.
89 BV.71 This was followed by the Decree on Energy Use
(Energienutzungsbeschluss)72 and in 1998/1999 finally by the first Federal Energy
Act (Energiegesetz),73 which has already been replaced by the current Energy Act
(EnG)74 that was passed by the Federal Assembly on 30 September 2016.
3.6 The Market
Around the turn of the millennium, market liberalisation increasingly became
the focus of electricity sector regulation. An initial attempt was made to open up
the electricity market by, among other things, granting everyone the right to use the
network of a third party—as had already been done in the gas sector.75 However, the
Electricity Market Act (Elektrizitätsmarktgesetz, EMG)76 did not survive the refer-
endum, so that this project was postponed.77 It was only in a second attempt—and
under the new title Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz, StromVG)—
66Nature and Cultural Heritage Protection Act (Bundesgesetz vom 1. Juli 1966 über den Natur- und
Heimatschutz [NHG, SR 451]).
67Federal Council (1969), p. 568.
68Spatial Planning Act (Bundesgesetz vom 22. Juni 1979 über die Raumplanung,
Raumplanungsgesetz [RPG, SR 700]).
69Federal Council (1970), p. 1609.
70Federal Council (1984), p. 902.
71Federal Council (1989), p. 902.
72Bundesbeschluss vom 14. Dezember 1990 für eine sparsame und rationelle Energienutzung. See
AS 1991 1018. Available at https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch.
73Energy Act (Energiegesetz vom 23. Juni 1998 [EnG, SR 730.0]). See AS 1999 197. Available at
https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch.
74Energy Act (Energiegesetz vom 30. September 2016 [EnG, SR 730.0]).
75As provided by the Pipelines Act (Bundesgesetz vom 4. Oktober 1963 über Rohrleitungsanlagen
zur Beförderung flüssiger oder gasförmiger Brenn- oder Treibstoffe, Rohrleitungsgesetz [RLG, SR
746.1]).
76Electricity Market Act, Elektrizitätsmarktgesetz, referendum proposal (Federal Council 2000,
p. 6189).
77Jagmetti (2005), p. 14 et seq.
Decentralisation of Energy Generation, Centralisation of Energy Lawmaking 129
that the rules on market opening made it into the official compilation of federal
legislation. However, the electricity market had already been partially opened up, as
the Federal Supreme Court decided by interpretation of the Cartel Act
(Kartellgesetz)78—that means by interpretation of functional energy law. One
might almost say that Switzerland has stumbled into the partial opening of the
electricity market. From a regulatory point of view, however, this StromVG is of
great significance. What was cantonal for decades has now been taken over by the
Confederation—in this long series of newly created federal competences, this is
probably the most significant encroachment on cantonal competences. At that point,
however, the regulatory environment had become much more complex than it had
been when the WRA or EleG was adopted. The StromVG was not only intended to
open up the electricity market. It also had to take into account the objectives of the
constitution for a “sufficient, diverse, safe, economic and environmentally sustain-
able energy supply” and an “economic and efficient use of energy” (Art. 89 para.
1 BV), as well as the standards on nature and heritage protection and those on spatial
planning. As if this were not enough, the provisions of the European Union were
now also to be taken into account. The interconnection of energy systems means that
EU regulation is also having an increasing influence on Swiss energy law.79 The
problems this has caused will be examined in the following overview.
3.7 Conclusion
The development of regulatory activity on the basis of the constitutions shows that,
during the first 150 years of its existence, the Confederation has acquired more and
more regulatory powers in nominal and functional energy law. The use of these
powers has resulted in more or less far-reaching federal interventions. However,
particularly in the area of hydropower, which is crucial to the electricity industry, the
federal government has been reluctant to encroach on cantonal competences. Sim-
ilarly, electricity supply remained firmly in cantonal and municipal hands until the
StromVG was created. Since the new constitution of 18 April 1999 came into force
on 1 January 2000, no new federal powers have been added, but the federal
legislature has nevertheless intervened massively in the historically evolved struc-
ture of cantonal regulation of electricity supply.80
Overall, viewed from a distance, the development seems to have been less driven
by political and strategic action, but rather by the needs of the times. This is
illustrated beautifully by the example of the safety of electrical installations, which
would probably not have got onto the political agenda so quickly without certain
78BGE 129 II 497, Cartel Act (Bundesgesetz über Kartelle und andere
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen vom 6. Oktober 1995, Kartellgesetz [KG, SR 251]).
79Hettich et al. (2020), p. 7 et seq. and 49 et seq.
80Föhse (2015), p. 131 et seq.
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accidents, by impending supply shortages in the 1950s or environmental pollution
later on, both of which were also countered by regulatory means. Interestingly, the
same pattern can already be seen in the examples of ancient Rome and of Zurich
during the Ancien Régime mentioned at the beginning. The same is true if we look at
the recent total revision of the Energy Act and the ensuing decision to phase out
nuclear power, which originated in a submarine earthquake followed by a tsunami in
Japan that resulted in a nuclear disaster.81
4 Centralised Regulation of Electricity Supply
4.1 Three Perspectives on Centralisation
As explained above, the StromVG is the most severe form of intervention in cantonal
competences by the federal legislator to date. As a consequence, important regula-
tory competences have been transferred to the federal level. The following section
illustrates how the legislature of the Swiss Confederation has dealt with the com-
plexity of the subject of energy in historically grown federal structures. This will be
done by analysing three topics that can be regarded as challenges: (1) the past,
(2) legal doctrine and (3) federal structures.
4.2 The Challenge of the Past
Historical developments show that electricity supply was traditionally based on a
monopolistic structure with vertically integrated companies, while at the same time it
was understood as a public task already early on.82 Even today, the Swiss electricity
industry is almost exclusively state-owned. Even though more and more players are
now dressed up in the guise of stock companies, the state remains the dominant
shareholder in most cases.83
From a legal point of view, this raises some fundamental questions, most notably
that of state responsibility in this context. Art. 6 para. 2 EnG (heading: Concept and
responsibility), states that it is for the energy industry to ensure the production,
transformation, supply and distribution of energy. However, this very “energy
industry” is under state control or the actors are either themselves “states” or shares
of energy suppliers are state property. If one puts this in the context of the principle
of legality (which is related to the rule of law), according to which “all activities of
the state are based on and limited by law” (Art. 5 para. 1 BV), i.e. all state action
81Föhse (2014), p. 6.
82Föhse (2014); Föhse (2015), p. 4 and 126; Jagmetti (2005), p. 19.
83Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019a), p. 41.
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requires a legal basis, this means that electricity supply is a task that is ascribed to the
state (here the cantons and, if applicable, the municipalities) and that is a state
responsibility.
This role of the state has now been strengthened by the StromVG, Article 6 of
which stipulates an obligation for grid operators to provide a basic supply, i.e. to
supply the desired quantity of electricity of the required quality at all times. This also
seems to imply that the state has a responsibility to ensure the supply of electricity
(in German “Gewährleistungsverantwortung”), if not to say that the state is directly
responsible to fulfil this task, i.e. to supply electricity (in German
“Erfüllungsverantwortung”).84 The new federal energy law does not provide a
clear answer with regard to the role of the state in electricity supply; so far the
issue has not even been discussed. This is despite the fact that the question would be
both fundamental for the future of energy supply and also entails certain legal
consequences, which will be briefly discussed below.
4.3 The Challenge of the Legal Doctrine
Legal doctrine distinguishes between public and civil law. Whereas in civil law
relationships one basically assumes structures in which contracting parties meet on
an equal footing and can in principle freely regulate their legal relationships in the
form of contracts, the situation is different in public law. Public law is characterised
by unilateral and binding action by public authorities, primarily in the form of
rulings85 (Verfügungen). While civil law disputes are decided by a civil court, in
administrative law, state authorities decide in the first instance, after which the legal
dispute goes to specialised administrative courts.
It is precisely the typical power gap in public law (the relationship between the
state and its citizens) that calls for special mechanisms for legal protection. Thus,
Art. 35 para. 2 BV states that “[w]hoever acts on behalf of the state is bound by
fundamental rights and is under a duty to contribute to their implementation”. With
regards to electricity supply, the situation is such that the supplier is usually state-
controlled or directly state-owned and has a monopoly on supply.86 Accordingly, the
old Energy Act of the Canton of Bern, for example, expressly assigned the legal
relationships in the supply of electricity to public law (Art. 32 para. 2 of the old EnG
BE) and, if necessary, made the municipalities responsible for supply (Art. 8 para.
2 of the old EnG BE). According to Bernese practice, the electricity suppliers also
had the right to decide certain aspects by ruling.
84Föhse (2015), p. 142.
85Art. 5 para. 1 of the Federal Act on Administrative Procedure (Bundesgesetz vom 20. Dezember
1968 über das Verwaltungsverfahren, Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz [VwVG, SR 172.021]).
86Föhse (2015), p. 140 et seq.; Jagmetti (2005), p. 20, also considers legal relations under civil law
to be a valid option.
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Swiss electricity supply law now suffers from the fact that the legislator has failed
to make a statement concerning the role of the state in the context of the new
regulation, not to mention the missing clarification of the classification as civil law
or public law. In the meantime, the Federal Court also had to deal with the matter—
and correctly assigned the basic supply of electricity to public law under the
StromVG.87 However, a number of elementary issues remain unsatisfactorily
resolved, including that of jurisdiction over disputes arising from the electricity
supply relationship.88 When centralising regulatory responsibilities, the Confedera-
tion has thus simply ignored legal doctrine in important areas, which leads to
problems in legal practice.89
4.4 The Challenge of Federal State Structures
The principle of sovereignty of the cantons in Switzerland, insofar as it “is not
limited by the Federal Constitution” (Art. 3 BV), creates a further challenge because
it results in a complex system of overlapping responsibilities of the Confederation,
the cantons and even the municipalities. The wide variety of federal competences
that have accumulated over the years in the constitution has led over time, via the
implementing legislation, to an increasingly dense federal legal network of nominal
and functional energy law, which in part consciously or unconsciously overlaps with
cantonal law. The cantons, in turn, also have the option of delegating certain
regulatory powers to the third level, the municipalities (Art. 50 para. 1 BV).
The current rules regarding the allocation of grid costs are a good example for
uncertainty arising from the complex distribution of competences. In itself, one
could assume that the StromVG, which aims to increase competition in electricity
markets, conclusively regulates this essential question. However, a closer look
reveals that there are massive uncertainties concerning the allocation of grid costs
in the context of the connection of properties to the electricity grid, both with regard
to the competence to issue rules and with regard to the rules themselves or their
implementation. This is due, among other things, to the fact that this topic in the
StromVG overlaps with spatial planning law, where we have primarily cantonal or
even municipal responsibilities (Art. 75 para. 1 BV), and, on top of that, with another
federal competence in the area of promoting home ownership (Art. 108 para. 1 BV)
and the relevant law (WEG90).91
87BGE 144 III 111 E. 5.2; Föhse (2018), p. 1235 et seq.
88Föhse (2018), p. 1242.
89Föhse (2018), p. 1245.
90Federal Act of 4 October 1974 on the Promotion of Housing Construction and Home Ownership
(Wohnbau- und Eigentumsförderungsgesetz vom 4. Oktober 1974 [WEG, SR 834]).
91Föhse (2018), p. 1230.
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The problem here is that these norm conflicts were not resolved by federal
legislation in the course of centralisation. What remains is a chaos of norms and
responsibilities which renders it nearly impossible, even for experts, to answer
everyday questions of competence with the necessary clarity and without much
effort.92
5 Conclusion
It is precisely the historically grown responsibilities, the constant increase in federal
competences and the simultaneous increase in regulatory complexity that make
electricity market regulation an extremely demanding task. Unfortunately, the Con-
federation has not been entirely successful in managing this challenge. Federal law is
now similar to “a worn-out old carpet that covers some parts of cantonal law, but that
can’t prevent other parts from shining through or from (intentionally or
unintentionally) coming to light”.93
Regulation of the electricity market would have required a prudent approach and,
first and foremost, a review of the initial situation, along the lines of the questions of
responsibilities, competences, legal spheres and tasks. Looking back in history, an
interesting pattern can be detected: in many cases, the interventions of federal law to
date have been born out of necessity or a situation of distress, so to speak. As a rule,
legislation of the Confederation has been relatively cautious, and the cantons have
retained considerable powers (except in the case of environmental protection or
regulations that primarily aim at the protection of public policy interests, such as the
EleG or the Atomic Energy Act). The StromVG is different—a necessity was and is
not apparent here. Rather, it appears as if a situation of distress has been created
without a necessity.
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Abstract The Swiss government, through its Energy Strategy 2050, is engaged on a
path to transition Switzerland to become a carbon-neutral country by the year 2050.
In this chapter, we look at the impact that the electorate can have on this transition
and on the Swiss electricity market. This is done using hybrid agent-based model-
ling. We model the Swiss electricity market and we add to this a model of the policy-
making process. This allows us to study which policy instruments are more likely to
be implemented depending on the Swiss electricity market progression and on the
policy actors’ interests. The results have shown that the electorate has a limited
impact on the policy chosen and on the electricity market. Overall, an environmen-
tally conscious electorate leads policy actors to select the carbon tax as a policy more
often. This, however, has the adverse effect to increase the electricity price and
increase import dependency in winter. In high demand growth scenarios, the carbon
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tax policy is not sufficient to stem the construction of gas turbine power plants. We
also show that because the electricity model does not consider an extended demand
response option or technology advancement, the knowledge gained from this model
is limited. This drives the behaviour of the model into scenarios which are unlikely to
happen, such as a large increase of the gas turbine power plants. Overall, we
conclude that, in their current form, even with an environmentally conscious elec-
torate, the electricity market conditions do not allow Switzerland to reach its
emissions targets.
1 Introduction
On 21 May 2017, the Swiss population voted for the revised Federal Energy Act,
also dubbed Energy Strategy 2050 (ES2050).1 With the ES2050, the government
pledged to shut down all nuclear power plants, to increase the amount of investment
in renewable energy such as solar, wind and geothermal, and to increase electricity
efficiency throughout the economy. Beyond this, in August 2019, the government
also set the goal for Switzerland to be carbon-neutral by 2050.2 In Switzerland, most
of the electricity production is already low-carbon. In 2018, a majority of 55% of the
electricity was produced by hydropower plants. The rest was produced by nuclear
power plants (36%) and a mix of solar, wind, biomass and thermal power plants
(9%).3 However, the rest of the energy sector is powered mostly by fossil fuels.
The Swiss electricity mix is bound to change in the coming years. Nuclear power
plants are to be shut down relatively soon. Promoted by the government, efficiency
measures and investments in renewable energy sources are meant to bridge the gap
in electricity production. Additionally, more imports of electricity from
neighbouring countries could also be used if that were to be needed. The current
goals of the government are to see the renewable energy supply reach 40% by 2050,
on top of existing hydropower production.4 These targets were designed to achieve
goals set by the Federal Council that wants to see Switzerland carbon-neutral by
2050.5 Reaching these targets would require a drastic increase in the amount of solar
and wind production, along with the wide-scale adoption of geothermal power
wherever it is possible.
Additionally, when it comes to electricity production, Switzerland has strong
seasonal variations in electricity supply. The demand in winter is higher than the
supply; therefore, imports are often needed from neighbouring countries.
1Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018a).
2RTS (2019).
3Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018b).
4Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019).
5Wuthrich (2019).
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Meanwhile, there is a surplus of electricity in the summer leading to the export of the
Swiss electricity production. A lot of this is driven by the behaviour of hydroelectric
plants. In the future, with the current renewable energy production goals, this
seasonal imbalance could be further reinforced with a higher deficit in winter,
rendering Switzerland more dependent on its neighbours for its security of supply
for parts of the year.
Future electricity demand scenarios also need to take into account the electrifi-
cation of the energy system with a potential growth in demand in the electricity
system due to a shift in energy sources in the heating and mobility sectors. At the
moment, the electricity production sector accounts for only one third of total Swiss
energy consumption, with another third of the energy used for heating and the last
third used for mobility. A large shift of energy sources in both these sectors is needed
to achieve the carbon neutrality goals set by the government. But this could lead to
significant electricity demand growth even if there is an increase in efficiency
measures.
So far, the population has been keen on a sustainable transition, but politicians
have been slower to follow. Recent parliamentary elections in 2019 have shown that
the composition of the Swiss parliament has been affected by this upswell in voters’
environmental concerns. However, it remains unclear how this will affect
policymaking within the country in the future. More importantly, it is unclear what
impact a change in the belief of the policymakers will have on the Swiss electricity
sector considering the current policies that are available. This chapter aims at
understanding exactly this: What impact can the Swiss electorate have on the
Swiss electricity system and its transition?
A hybrid model is used to answer this question. This model is a combination of a
Swiss electricity market model and a model of the policy-making process. Each of
these models is based on previous work with the Swiss electricity market model
being a converted existing system dynamics model6 and the policy-making process
model taking inspiration from a forthcoming paper by Klein.7 This hybrid modelling
approach enables the endogenisation of the policy-making process in a socio-
technical system simulation for the first time.
In this chapter, the research that has been performed when it comes to the
modelling and simulation of electricity markets and of the policy-making process
is presented in Sect. 2. A description is then provided of the hybrid model in Sect. 3.
In Sect. 4, an outline of the experiments that were performed with the model is given
and the results of the simulations are presented. Section 5 discusses the implications
of the results and the conclusions that can be drawn from them. Finally, in Sect. 6,
the paper is concluded and an outline of the work that remains to be done in the
future is given.
6Van Baal (2016, 2019a)
7Klein et al. (forthcoming).
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2 The Research Up to Now
The hybrid approach that is pursued in this chapter is novel; however, the study of
electricity markets using simulation and the study of the policy-making process are
each not new developments in the literature. A high number of electricity market
models are present throughout the literature. They were built with the aim to answer
specific research questions and are often tailored to their geographic specificities. As
for the policy-making process, policy theories have been developed and detailed
over the past decades to study this process. A forthcoming paper by Klein has also
presented an approach where the theories of the policy process can be used to
establish a common language for simulation modellers that can in turn be used to
craft models of the policy-making process.8 These are all detailed in this section.
2.1 Modelling Electricity Markets
Studies of electricity markets using simulation are common throughout the literature.
As early as the late 90’s, Ford9 looked at the construction cycles in the western US
electricity market using system dynamics.10 This study concluded that the construc-
tion cycles can lead to major changes in market prices. It also highlighted how such
problems could be dealt with using a constant capacity alongside the market clearing
price.
Since then, studies have varied in focus, geographical region, scope, and
methods. This includes looking at fuel mix diversification incentives using a
mean-variance portfolio optimisation approach.11 It also includes looking at nuclear
energy policy in Belgium after the Fukushima nuclear accident using system
dynamics.12 Other models focused on capacity mechanisms.13 In the case of
Bhagwat et al.,14 EM-Lab, an agent-based model, was used to investigate a number
of different research questions including those related to capacity mechanisms.15
Finally some models were part of much larger projects looking at transitions in
general. In the case of Trutnevyte et al.,16 the hybrid model studied was built from a
8Klein et al. (forthcoming).
9Ford (1999).
10Sterman (2001).
11Roques et al. (2008).
12Kunsch and Friesewinkel (2014).
13Bhagwat et al. (2014); Bhagwat (2016); Bhagwat et al. (2016); Chao and Lawrence (2009); De
Vries and Heijnen (2008).
14Bhagwat et al. (2014).
15De Vries et al. (2013).
16Trutnevyte et al. (2014).
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number of other models. The model was used to study storylines within the transition
of the UK power system.
In a lot of cases, these models are built for the purpose of exploring current or
future policies and they assess their impact individually. In the case of Kunsch and
Friesewinkel,17 for example, policies were embedded directly into the system
dynamics model and tested for a set of alternative policies. These policies were
tested against one another and the results were compared to see what outcomes were
obtained for each of the policies. A similar approach was used in Fagiani et al.,18
where the dynamic interactions between two different policies were tested. In this
case, the policies were adaptive, therefore taking information from the system to
adjust themselves.
The Swiss electricity market has also been studied using a number of different
simulation methods. Densing et al.19 have looked at a number of these studies and
compared the resulting scenarios. In their paper, results from a number of different
studies from various organisations that have used a variety of modelling approaches
were compared. The goal was for stakeholders to better understand the impact of
their modelling assumptions. One of the results of this paper was to show that,
overall, the different studies that have been used over the years result in a wide array
of scenarios that are deeply influenced by their underlying assumptions.
In separate studies, Ochoa and Van Ackere, Van Ackere and Ochoa, and Osorio
and Van Ackere20 have also studied the Swiss electricity market using system
dynamics models. Ochoa and Van Ackere21 focused on the need for policies to
limit the dependence on imports and to foster capacity expansion. This was illus-
trated for a number of different scenarios, some of which have now come to pass.
Van Ackere and Ochoa22 modelled the Swiss hydroelectric power plants using
system dynamics to better study how different production policies impact production
and price patterns. This is important as Switzerland is heavily influenced by its
hydroelectric power plant park. Finally, Osorio and Van Ackere23 looked at the
impact of the nuclear phase-out and the addition of renewable energy sources into
the market on the electricity mix. The outcomes showed that the removal of nuclear
energy is mostly replaced by solar production and imports, along with a rise of the
electricity price.
Separate studies have also been ongoing at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI).24 The
model used in this case is the Swiss TIMES25 model. This model is a large linear
17Kunsch and Friesewinkel (2014).
18Fagiani et al. (2014).
19Densing et al. (2016).
20Ochoa and Van Ackere (2009); Van Ackere and Ochoa (2010); Osorio and Van Ackere (2016).
21Ochoa and Van Ackere (2009).
22Van Ackere and Ochoa (2010).
23Osorio and Van Ackere (2016).
24Kannan and Turton (2011, 2012, 2013); Paul Scherrer Institute (2012).
25The Integrated MARKAL EFOM System.
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programming optimisation model made of a number of modules. It was used to study
the electricity system, but was not limited to it, also looking at the different sector
couplings. Within this model for example, Kannan and Turton studied different
technological pathways and their impacts on the overall market.26
Overall, simulation and modelling has been an approach that has been used
extensively to study electricity markets, including the Swiss market in particular.
And for the most part, the use of policies is exogenous within these models, that is,
the policy selection process is not integrated within the electricity market models. In
the present chapter, we propose to extend this body of literature by looking at a
model that considers the electricity market but also the policy-making process that is
followed to select the policies to be implemented.
2.2 Policy Process Theories
There are a large number of theories of the policy process within the literature.27
These theories help provide insights into all aspects of the policy process, whether it
concerns the actors and their behaviours, the steps that are followed within the
process, or the differences that can be found upon implementation of policies. One
of the strengths of these theories is that each theory looks at a different part of the
process. For example, the theory of the policy cycle focuses on the steps that the
policy process follows.28
In a forthcoming paper, Klein has presented a common language based on a
number of theories that can be used to model and simulate the policy-making
process.29 The paper argues why such a model can be useful and the present chapter
is one such example. Because of the disparities in the focus of the different theories,
it is impossible to use one theory to simulate the entire policy process. It is not
possible to combine all of the theories for simulation either, as the theories can
sometimes be incoherent, overlapping or lack specifics on how certain parts of the
policy process work. The common language is meant to remedy these issues by
providing a specific language to model these theories. This language is suggested by
the authors, but it is in no way the only approach possible. It is based on the theory of
the policy cycle,30 the multiple streams framework,31 and the advocacy coalition
framework.32 It is organised along four main elements which are: time, the policy
arena, the agents and the interactions. These are detailed below.
26Kannan and Turton (2013).
27Sabatier (2007).
28Jann and Wegrich (2007).
29Klein et al. (forthcoming).
30Jann and Wegrich (2007).
31Zahariadis (2007).
32Sabatier (1987).
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Time is the first key element considered. It is required to define a sequence for the
policy process. This is needed for the simulation. A computer requires a sequence of
steps to perform a simulation. It cannot operate events that happen at the same time.
One process that can be considered is one that follows the theory of the policy cycle
for example. This would include steps like the agenda setting, the policy formula-
tion, the policy implementation and the policy evaluation.
The policy arena is the second key element. The policy arena defines boundaries
for the model that is studied. The selection of a policy arena leads to the selection of
the broader topic of the simulation. The policy arena also defines geographical
boundaries. From this, the modeller can select the appropriate agents but also the
policies and issues that should be discussed by the agents within the model.
The agents and their specific roles come next. Different roles can be considered
within the policy-making process. For example, the policymaker’s role is always
included as it selects the policy instruments. But other roles like the media, the
electorate or policy entrepreneurs can sometimes be omitted depending on the
research questions that the model is used for. Different policy arenas might also
call for specific and more detailed roles for the agents. Beyond their roles, agents also
have a belief system. This belief system is a representation of the environment for the
agents. It is what the agents use to choose the policy instruments to be implemented.
Finally, the fourth and last key element is related to interactions. First, there are
interactions between the agents and the environment. The environment informs the
agents on their beliefs. The flip side is that the policymakers can affect the environ-
ment by implementing policies. Beyond this, agents can also influence one another
on their beliefs in the hope to advance their respective interests. According to the
theories, they can also assemble into coalitions to further advance their interests. A
wide array of strategies and behaviours can be included within the modelling of the
policy process.
3 The Hybrid Electricity Model
To study the impact of policymaking on the Swiss electricity market, a hybrid
modelling approach is used. This approach uses an already verified and validated
electricity model along with a model of the policy process that has been demon-
strated and tested through a theoretical approach. In this section, we detail how the
hybrid model that uses both models was constructed. We first detail each of the
models separately, before outlining how they were connected to one another.
3.1 The Electricity Model
Numerous electricity models have already been built, tested and used over the years.
This is also the case for the study of the Swiss electricity market: van Baal has built
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one of these models using a system dynamics modelling approach.33 The model was
upgraded to a hybrid agent-based/system dynamics model to better consider the
investment portion of the electricity market and to study the potential for a strategic
reserve in Switzerland.34
For the purpose of this chapter, we re-use the same modelling formalisation and
assumptions. The model that was built is one that was entirely based on the one
presented in van Baal35 but that was implemented into an agent-based modelling
paradigm. Similarly, the inputs that are used to initialise and historically validate the
model are the same. The main reason for this new implementation of the same model
was to simplify the connection of this model to the policy-making process model
which is also an agent-based model. Additionally, this also leads to a more modular
model allowing for easier reusability and the potential for extensions. Finally, the
new implementation was made in Python, which is an open source programming
language, thus making the model more accessible.36
The model is composed of two main modules: the spot market module, where
supply is matched to demand, and the investor module, where investors can manage
their existing assets and invest in new production assets.
3.1.1 The Spot Market Module
The spot market is responsible for matching supply and demand. Demand is
comprised of two parts: inelastic demand, which is an input of the model and
which represents the Swiss domestic electricity consumption, and elastic demand,
which relates to the variable demand that can arise from imports, exports, and from
hydroelectric power pumping plants.
The supply is provided by the power plants that are present in the system, the
model being initialised with the Swiss electric generation park from 2016 that
includes hydroelectric, hydroelectric-pumping, solar, wind, Combined Cycle Gas
Turbines (CCGT), waste incineration, run-of-river, and nuclear power plants. Each
power plant is instantiated as a separate agent. To participate in the spot market, each
asset has a certain bidding price. This calculation is different for all technology
types. For wind, solar and run-of-river power plants, the price is equal to the variable
costs. For waste incineration, nuclear and CCGT power plants, the fuel costs are
added to the variable costs. Depending on the policies, emissions can also add to the
costs of the CCGT power plants.
The bidding costs for the hydroelectric and hydroelectric pumping power plants




36The model can be found on Github: https://github.com/kleinrap/SwissElectricityMarket.
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costs of water. These are referred to as opportunity costs, and the equation that is
used to calculate them is based on the work in Van Baal.37 It is given by:
Pbid ¼ 1 fð Þ  Pref MC
 þMC ð1Þ
where f represents the amount of energy left in the reservoir, Pref is the reference
price that the investor uses to bid and MC are the marginal costs of the installation
(which include the variable costs for a hydroelectric power plant).
This equation was designed in such a way that assets will have some water left in
their reservoirs at all times for periods of very high electricity prices. When the
reservoir is full, the investor is likely to bid for a lower price and vice versa.
The imports and exports are also an important part of the spot market. First,
Switzerland has long-term contracts with France. This consists of options that
Switzerland can exercise depending on the spot market price and which are intro-
duced into the model through historical inputs. Beyond this, Switzerland has a
certain number of connections with its neighbours that allow it to import or export
electricity. Within the model, each country is considered as an agent of its own, and
countries can bid on the spot market. That bid is dependent on the net transfer
capacity between the two countries and the price is set by the price of electricity in
the neighbouring country, which is itself based on a historical yearly profile. Note
that these interconnections are also used by the long-term contract for the case of
France, an element that can further limit the capacity available for other suppliers.
The spot market, where supply is matched to demand, is operated using a merit-
order dispatch algorithm. A graphical illustration of this algorithm is shown in Fig. 1.
This algorithm makes sure that there is as much supply as there is demand. The
Fig. 1 Merit-order dispatch of the spot market, reproduced with authorisation from Van Baal
(2019a)
37Van Baal (2016).
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maximum price allowed is the Value of Lost Load (VoLL) and it is set at 3000 CHF/
MWh. If the demand cannot be met, then blackouts can occur. Otherwise, supply is
added from the lowest bidding price to the highest until the demand and the supply
curves intersect. The intersection determines the price of electricity every hour, and it
determines the supply that is needed. The price can be determined by demand or
supply, depending on how the curves cross. This intersection also helps assign
revenues and electricity production to the assets.
3.1.2 The Investor Module
The investor module is composed of two main parts: a part where the investors can
manage their current assets and a part where investments in new assets can be made.
These investments are limited to the solar, wind and CCGT technologies. The
assumption is that these are the only viable technological options for Switzerland.
The country is planning to retire its nuclear power generation, and, in the current
political climate, coal power plants are out of the question.
Investment analyses are performed by the agents on a regular basis. These are
done on discrete power plants for each of the three technologies. The investment
decision is based on a profitability index, with the assumption that the investors have
access to the general market prices along with their respective asset-level data. The





n¼0Cn 1þ rð Þn
IC
ð2Þ
where Cn is the cash flow at time step n, r is the discount rate and IC are the
investment costs.
After the initial decision to invest, the planned assets go through a number of
steps that include planning time, re-assessment of the profitability index, and
construction of the asset. These steps can delay the introduction of a new power
plant significantly.
Investors can also manage their assets. This happens mostly towards the end of
life of the assets. Investors periodically re-assess the profitability of their assets, so
they can decide whether they should mothball the asset or keep it online. In cases
where the asset is close to its end of life, the investors can also decide on whether to
retire and decommission the asset or extend its life, an action that is limited in
number.
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3.2 The Policy Emergence Model
The policy process model is specified according to the four key elements that were
outlined earlier: time, policy arena, agents and interactions. The main choice that is
left to the modeller is to decide how much complexity needs to be integrated into
each of these elements to answer the research question. In the present case, only a
limited amount of complexity is required. This leads to a relatively simple policy-
making process model. It is detailed in this section.
For the time element, we consider a two-step policy-making process consisting of
an agenda-setting and a policy formulation step. The agenda-setting step is the first
step and consists of the agents selecting an issue to place on the agenda to narrow
down further discussions. This agenda is then used to limit the policy instruments
that can be evaluated for implementation. During the policy formulation step, the
policymakers select a policy instrument and implement it with the aim of affecting
the outcomes of the electricity model.
The policy arena is the Swiss electricity market model. This policy arena helps
define the issues that can be considered within the belief system of the agents. It
further limits the agents that can be considered to policymakers that are related to the
electricity market. It also helps define the policy instruments that can be considered
within this model. The policy core issues that are selected are the environment and
the economy, following insights gained from Markard et al.38 The secondary issues
are extracted directly from the electricity model, along with the policy instruments,
which are derived from exogenous parameters. These are detailed in the next section.
For the agents, only two roles are introduced: the policymakers and the electorate.
The policymakers are agents that decide what should go on the agenda and what
policies should be implemented. They base their decisions on their preferred states
and their beliefs for each issue in the belief tree. They focus on the issues that they
consider to be the most urgent to deal with, which means issues that have the largest
gap between preferred state and belief. The electorate on the other hand can only
perform one action: they influence the preferred states of the policy makers. This is a
progressive influence that can vary in strength based on the parameters defined by
the modeller.
When it comes to the interactions, only three are considered. As outlined in the
previous paragraph, the first interaction is the electorate influencing the
policymakers. The second and third interactions are then inherent in the construction
of the hybrid model: the environment—in the electricity market model—influences
the beliefs of the policymakers, and the policymakers influence the electricity market
through policy instruments.
38Markard et al. (2016).
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3.3 The Hybrid Model
To study the impact of the policy process on the electricity market, we need to
connect both models. How this is done conceptually is illustrated in Fig. 2. The
models are connected through one link in each direction. After the electricity model
has been simulated for a pre-defined amount of time, a number of key indicators are
extracted from the electricity model and used to inform the beliefs of the
policymakers. These are indicators that will help policymakers make a decision on
what, if any, policy instrument should be implemented such that their preferred states
are reached for all their issues. The policy instrument implementation is the second
connection linking the policy-making model to the electricity model. Each policy
instrument corresponds to a change of a set of exogenous parameters within the
electricity model. These changes in turn affect the outcome of the electricity model.
Overall, this forms a loop that includes the two models, thus creating a hybrid model.
In the present case, the indicators that are taken from the electricity model to
inform the policymakers’ beliefs are the following:
• KPI1—The total renewable energy production [MWh]
• KPI2—The year averaged electricity price [CHF/MWh]
• KPI3—The total renewable energy investments as a percentage of the overall
investments [%]
• KPI4—The total domestic emissions [ton]
• KPI5—The total imported emissions [ton]
The policymakers can act through policy instruments that can change the follow-
ing exogenous parameters:
• Ex1—Solar subsidy [CHF/MWh]
• Ex2—Wind turbine subsidy [CHF/MWh]
• Ex3—Investor’s hurdle rate [%]
• Ex4—Carbon tax on domestic emissions [CHF/ton]
• Ex5—Carbon tax on imported emissions [CHF/ton]
Fig. 2 Conceptual representation of the hybrid model and the interaction between the two models
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4 Experiments, Simulations and Results
The simulation of the model is used to answer the research question. The scenarios
are designed with this in mind. In this section, we also present the results obtained,
including main metrics from the electricity market model and the policy selected by
the policymakers in the policy emergence model. The results are then analysed to
better understand what the impact of the electorate is on the policy makers and
whether that influence leads to policy change.
4.1 Scenarios
For the construction of the scenarios, we look at varying only two parameters, one in
each model: the influence rate of the electorate and the electricity demand growth.
Depending on how strong the electorate influence is, the beliefs of the
policymakers will vary at a slower or quicker pace. Varying the strength of the
influence can help illustrate a sense of urgency in the general public as we are
currently witnessing in the context of climate change for example. We select
scenarios where the electorate has zero influence and therefore the policymakers
do not change their beliefs, a scenario where the policymakers’ beliefs change
towards the beliefs of the electorate by 5% of the difference in both agents’ beliefs
every round, and a scenario where this change is 50%. This helps represent a range
of scenarios with a very weak and a very strong electorate.
The second parameter, the electricity demand growth, is part of the Swiss
electricity market model. The demand growth for the electricity sector is so far
predicted to be stable or negative in the coming years.39 This can be attributed to an
increase in efficiency in the heating sector and in general appliances. However, in the
future and to meet the carbon neutrality pledge of the confederation, there is an
expectation of the electrification of society. This includes the mobility sector using
electricity as its main energy source and the building sector. We therefore assume
that the growth will remain non-negative. To take into account these scenarios, we
look at three scenarios of electricity demand growth: 0%, 1.5% and 3%.
4.2 Model Initialization
Both models are initialised following a different approach related to their use. The
Swiss electricity market model is initialised with data used previously by van Baal
et al. in their work.40 This consists of mostly historical data including data on the
39Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2013).
40Van Baal (2019a).
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import and export capacity and prices, the demand, and the technology costs. This
data was compiled for several years, from 2015 to 2017. The model simulation itself
is run from the year 2016 onwards. Furthermore, it is also important to note that this
model was historically validated using this same data.
For the policy-making process model, only the preferred states of the
policymakers and the electorate have to be initialised. The number of agents
considered does not make a difference regarding the complexity. For the preferred
states of the electorate, it was decided to select preferred states that reflect the targets
of the Swiss government in 2050, which means carbon neutrality, investments
limited only to renewable energy sources and affordable electricity prices. For the
policymakers, their initial preferred states were set to the current levels in the model.
This assumes that the agents are content with the current levels of the indicators.
4.3 Model Simulation
The models are simulated in series in a loop. The electricity model runs on an hourly
time step while the policy-making process model is simulated every three years. This
means that every 3 years, the electricity model simulation is halted and the policy
emergence model is simulated. Once this is done, the policy selected is implemented
and the electricity model resumes. This is done for a period of thirty years starting in
the year 2016—due to the availability of historical data to initialise the model.
Furthermore, for each combination of scenarios, the hybrid model is repeated fifty
times to obtain results from which conclusions can be drawn.
4.4 Results
We present the results based on three main figures. In Fig. 3, the monthly averaged
electricity price for all of the scenario combinations considered is plotted. Each of
the three demand growth scenarios is plotted for each of the electorate influence
parameter values. Figure 4 presents the electricity supplied by solar, wind and CCGT
power plants. The results are split per growth demand scenario. The demand is also
plotted as a reference. Finally, the third figure presents the sum of policies
implemented across 50 simulations for the three different electorate influence rates
for a demand growth of 3%. This is presented in Fig. 5.
Figure 3 shows that prices are bound to go up over time, regardless of the
scenario, though this increase is less pronounced for smaller demand growth sce-
narios. This shows that the price rise is linked to demand growth and not so much to
electorate influence. The highest growth in prices is related to the 3% demand
growth scenario as could be expected. In this scenario, Switzerland’s demand
would roughly double from 10 to 20 GW, an additional demand that would have
to be fulfilled by a combination of new investments and additional imports from
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neighbouring countries as shown in Fig. 4. This would imply electrification of a
significant share, if not of the entire energy sector. We can conclude from this that
prices of electricity across the country will depend heavily on the speed of the
electrification in Switzerland and, in some respect, on the speed of efficiency
increases as well.
Figure 4 outlines the supply from solar, wind and CCGT, and therefore, by proxy,
the investments in those technologies over time. One can see that the difference in
the energy mix is mostly driven by demand growth and not so much by electorate
influence. In fact, the electorate influence has so little impact on the results that it is
difficult to even differentiate the different electorate influence scenarios in the plots.
For the scenario with 0% growth, most of the investments are limited to wind and
solar. Note that, within the electricity model, solar and wind each have a cap of
installed capacity based on numbers from the Swiss Federal Office of Energy
(SFOE), for wind at 2282 MW and for solar at 19,702 MW. It was also assumed
that there is no growth in import and export capacity as this would have a large
impact on the security of supply and the introduction of CCGT power plants.41 There
is some investment in CCGT for this scenario, but overall gas plants are not
considered financially viable and are therefore avoided. The electricity prices are
Fig. 3 Monthly averaged electricity prices, split according to the three electorate influence rates
and for the three demand growth scenarios
41Van Baal (2019b).
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too low. Things change in the case of the 1.5% and the 3% demand growth scenarios.
For the 1.5% scenario, there is a clear investment in CCGT capacity around the time
when solar and wind are maxed out. This is justified by an increasing demand and
rising prices. For the 3% scenario, the rise in prices is so quick that investments in
CCGT occur early on, even before solar and wind have been maxed out. CCGT is
viable early on and is seen as the only possible technology able to bridge the demand
gap considering that only a limited increase in imports and exports is possible and
considering the other boundaries of the model.
Finally, Fig. 5 is the only figure that describes the outcome of the policy-making
process model. The figure was made by summing, for each time step, the policy
instrument implemented by the policymakers. This allows us to see what policy
instruments are favoured by the policymakers and at which time steps. Only the 3%
demand growth scenario results are presented here because these results provide the
most insights. The results for the other scenarios are similar in nature. One can
observe that actors overall prefer the use of the carbon tax policy, may it be domestic
or foreign. This is the case for all growth scenarios with one difference between
them: the timing at which the taxes are imposed. In the case where the electorate has
an important influence on the policymakers, the taxes are implemented very early
on. In fact, it is the only scenario where the tax is imposed in the second step in 2021.
This happens for forty of the fifty simulations. For the other scenarios, where the
Fig. 4 Overall demand with the electricity supplied by solar, wind and CCGT sources for all
scenarios
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electorate has less or no influence on the policymakers, it takes more time for the tax
to be considered. Note that the introduction of the carbon tax is also the main driver
for the electricity price increase that is clearly reflected in Fig. 3. All other policies
are implemented at a much slower rate throughout the simulations, and when agents
implement a subsidy or a change in the investment hurdle rate, it is often balanced
out later by an opposite change in that policy, having little long-term impact on the
overall simulation. Only the carbon tax is implemented and not removed for all
simulations considered.
5 Discussion
The main research question of this paper concerned the impact of the electorate on
the Swiss electricity system and its transition. The results have shown that the
electorate indeed has a large impact on the policymakers. However, its impact on
the electricity system as a whole is much more questionable. As shown throughout
the results, demand growth has a much higher impact on the outcome of the
electricity mix than the electorate. In fact, it seems that the only impact the electorate
has is on the prices. The electorate influences policymakers to be more environmen-
tally friendly, which in turn implies the sustained implementation of a carbon tax.
However, because of the electricity model's assumptions—a cap on the amount of
solar and wind and a maximum net transfer capacity—this cannot result in an
increase in solar and wind power plants. It results instead in the additional construc-
tion of CCGT plants regardless of the carbon price because of the lack of other
possible options. Therefore, an enormous growth in the emissions can be observed.
Overall, this suggests that Switzerland would not be able to meet its obligations
when it comes to a reduction in emissions if those limits remained firmly in place. In
fact, it is possible and likely that Switzerland will have more emissions in 2050 than
it has right now if its electricity demand is allowed to grow exponentially.
These results should be put into the broader context of the simplistic approach
used for the electricity model. The electricity model is limited to a conventional
approach of the electricity market. It does not consider the technological innovation
that would accompany the electrification assumed for the high demand growth
scenario. This includes the introduction of batteries, demand side management and
other innovations that will come as a result of an increased digitalisation. When
considered, such innovation could greatly affect the demand curve, even if the
demand growth were to reach 3% annually as is postulated in the most extreme
scenario in this paper.
On the other hand, the results are optimistic. They show a large adoption of wind
turbines, on the scale that the SFOE has predicted. The current situation has shown
that wind turbines currently face strong local opposition in Switzerland and that the
goals are not currently met. The results therefore show a situation that would be
optimal for the adoption of wind power; but this remains unlikely without more
social acceptance, accompanied by significant regulatory and legal change.
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Besides the optimistic increase of wind turbines, the model suggests that a large
number of CCGT power plants will be constructed in Switzerland. These results are
purely based on economics and do not reflect the politics, or acceptance, of such
technology. In fact, it is likely that proposals for the construction of a CCGT power
plant would face the same amount of rejection as a wind turbine, if not more.
Highlighting this issue, and especially in a 1.5% or 3% demand growth scenario, it
is important to note that the production stemming from CCGT power plants would
need to be filled by other electricity sources. From the results of this model, it is
unclear what that could be.
The results also depict Switzerland as a country that is even more dependent,
seasonally, on its neighbours. The decrease in nuclear power production, accompa-
nied by more solar power and the potential of demand growth means that Switzer-
land will be even less able to supply its entire electricity in the winter period and will
further depend on its neighbours for its security of supply. This is an issue that is
politically sensitive considering the current negotiations between Switzerland and
the European Union.42 Nonetheless, it is an issue that will become more important as
time passes as the results suggest.
Elements related to the policy-making process model have also affected the
results. Within the policy-making process model, the policymakers are only able
to select one policy instrument at a time. This is an assumption that is made based on
insights gained from punctuated equilibrium theory.43 A different implementation
could have seen policymakers negotiating to introduce a policy package that would
include a number of different policy instruments. This might affect the results as it
could include the introduction of subsidies for solar power plants and an increase of
carbon taxes by policymakers. However, considering the net difference between the
amount of times the carbon tax policy instruments are selected and the other
instruments, it is unlikely that considering such a policy package would make a
large difference.
Beyond the potential for policy packages, the policy-making process model used
within this paper is inherently simple. In fact, most of the model could have been
replaced by one agent whose preferred states change over time and who tests policy
instruments, selecting the best and implementing it. One of the reasons for the use of
this model was to present a novel approach for the study of socio-technical system
simulations. The other reason was the research question. The policy-making model
used is sufficient to answer the question.
For other research questions and more policy-focused research questions, the
policy-making model can be made to incorporate more complexity. For example,
Markard et al. (2016) have shown that coalitions play an important role in the
shaping of the electricity market policies. To investigate the impact of coalitions
on the electricity system, the policy-making process model would need to incorpo-
rate aspects such as coalitions, policy entrepreneurs, agent on agent interactions, and
42Van Baal and Finger (2019).
43Baumgartner et al. (2014).
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potential additional elements such as imperfect knowledge transfer. The approach
presented here allows for that when needed. However, this complexity increase
would bring limitations of its own but would allow for answering many more
research questions.
Overall, the study presented here was the first time that such an approach was
utilised. This has allowed us to gain a better understanding of the feedback effects
between the policy-making process and the electricity system, despite the simplicity
of both models. It has also shown that there is room for improvement, mostly
through an increase in complexity in either model. Increasing complexity in the
electricity model would allow for more insightful results and could help guide the
design of new regulations. A more complex policy-making process would allow for
more insights on the dynamics between the different coalitions that are present in the
Swiss electricity market and for a better understanding of how this might impact
policy selection.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a novel approach to study the Swiss electricity
market by also considering the policy-making process. We have presented a hybrid
model that combines two agent-based models: one of the electricity market and
another of the policy-making process. By connecting these two models we were able
to study the impact that the electorate has on the Swiss electricity market through the
policy-making process.
Overall, the results show that the electorate has an impact on the electricity market
though not necessarily along its goals—or preferred states as they are named in the
model. The results also show that despite using a simple policy-making process
model, it is the simplicity of the electricity market model that constrains the possible
results. The results highlight the fact that the electorate only has a finite amount of
influence and that, without the presence of new innovative technologies and the
accompanying regulations, the current course is unlikely to allow Switzerland to
fulfil its emissions obligations. Moreover, the model demonstrates that the confed-
eration is likely to be seasonally highly dependent on its neighbours.
Within the scope of this model, the policymakers opted in the majority of time for
a carbon tax to achieve their goals, may it be on domestic energy supply or on
imports. This had the perverse effect to push the prices up. We have shown that the
main reason why the actors chose the carbon tax policy instrument was the fact that
there were no other good alternatives provided to them—the electricity model does
not allow for more effective policy instruments.
In future work, complexity will be added to the electricity market model to allow
for the possibility of demand side management and prosumers and to take into
account the potential for more batteries within the electrical system. Future work
will also expand the research questions that can be answered using this hybrid
approach by exploring the impact of coalitions on the Swiss electricity market.
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Abstract Against the backdrop of an energy system moving from vertically inte-
grated monopolies towards a decentral system with a multitude of actors in ever-
changing roles, we observe a gradual strengthening of central governance mecha-
nisms on the nation-state and on the European level. Such a top-down approach to
the governance of the energy system might have been necessary to open up energy
markets to competitive processes and innovation. With social goals shifting and
security of supply and environmental concerns gaining importance, the governance
of the energy system has to be reshaped anew, enabling, e.g., the optimization of
regional energy systems by local actors. In particular, strict unbundling rules may
hinder or preclude system-serving behavior, to the detriment of all market partici-
pants and consumers. Lawmakers and regulators should provide some leeway to
cooperative approaches, such as the empowerment of local actors to devise their own
energy regimes.
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The design of a country’s electricity supply system can be centralized or
decentralized. In Switzerland, discussions on this subject began at the turn of the
nineteenth century, with the advent of electrification.1 For the understanding of the
present paper, it is important that the different designs of the supply systems in
individual countries are not the result of a search and discovery process initiated by
market competition, but the result of a deliberative political decision of intervention
or non-intervention. In Switzerland, a decision of non-intervention by the federal
authorities gave rise to a mostly centralized electricity supply system governed by
the cantons; this system is slowly becoming more decentralized, mostly driven by
federal and European regulation. Thus, the central governance mechanisms inherent
in federal and European regulations have provided important boosters to transform
the energy system. However, central governance may also frustrate local initiatives
and take away opportunities to modify and optimize the performance of local energy
systems. Thus, decision-making at a higher level may help to steer communities
towards a common goal, but it might come with losses of efficacy and efficiency.
Consequently, this chapter explores frictions, sometimes quite hidden, at the
interfaces of the European, federal, cantonal, and communal level, which affect the
behavior of participants in the energy market. While the current shift towards a
decentralized and more renewable electricity supply would not have been possible
without a kickstart on the European and federal level, this author argues that rigid
legislation on the central level hinders—somewhat counterintuitively—further pro-
gress towards an environmentally sustainable electricity supply.
At first, we will look at the development of a more interventionist approach at the
central levels of government before we discuss the obstacles which the current set of
rules and regulations pose for a more sustainable electricity system. We conclude
with proposals that could lift these obstacles, providing more leeway for local actors
while safeguarding the public interests that might be seen threatened by a less
interventionist approach.
2 Decentralization of the Swiss Energy System
2.1 Vertically Integrated State-Owned Monopolies
Theoretically, competitive markets realize the economic welfare optimum. In reality,
however, particularly looking at grid-bound energy supply, various plausible rea-
sons for market failure and other “market imperfections” exist. These market
imperfections may justify economic policy interventions.
1Walther (2014), p. 31.
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Network effects in energy markets give rise to natural monopolies, which tend to
form vertically integrated energy suppliers. These suppliers extend the reach of their
grid monopolies into upstream and downstream markets (i.e., into the markets for
energy production and energy distribution).
Further, the long-term nature of investment decisions gives rise to concerns as to
whether the private markets create sufficient incentives for investments. In particu-
lar, prices in electricity markets are linked to short-term marginal costs of production
due to the lack of storage. Consequently, the fixed costs of production are considered
as “sunk” and as not relevant to the decision on the use of a power plant. The
recovery of the full costs of a power plant in the electricity market is only achieved
by temporary price peaks; these peak prices are the most important refinancing
source for power plant investments. If such phases with higher prices do not occur
or if such phases are counteracted by regulation, incentives for new investments are
strongly reduced. This so-called “missing money problem”may trigger interventions
by the state to encourage new investments. Indeed, the public sector (in Switzerland
the cantons and municipalities) provides for a large share of the capital of the
electricity and the gas industry. Even compared with institutional investors, the
public sector has a high capacity to bear the long-term risks associated with
investments in the energy sector.2 Still, there are concerns regarding the survival
of the Swiss hydropower plants: Because of its historically large profits, this
backbone of the Swiss electricity supply does not profit so much from subsidies
but is rather subject to taxation (fees for water rights, “Wasserzins”); efforts to
change this or to adapt the current system of taxation have not made much progress,
so far.
The Swiss Confederation enacted legislation on the electricity sector already in
1902 (Electricity Act, Elektrizitätsgesetz); legislation on the oil and gas sector was
enacted in 1963 (Pipelines Act, Rohrleitungsgesetz). However, these legislative acts
are mainly concerned with the planning and safety of electricity lines and pipelines.
Consequently, most issues that are relevant to the organization of the energy markets
have been left to cantonal legislation. For the reasons stated above, the cantons and
municipalities were invested heavily in the energy markets; they had little interest in
regulating the energy sector, since this would only serve to limit the entrepreneurial
leeway that their state-owned monopoly enterprises had so far enjoyed. The market
structure resulting from this non-intervention policy was shaped by nearly
800 municipal and cantonal energy suppliers, which enjoyed local and regional
monopoly powers. These state-owned enterprises were deeply enmeshed in politics,
which resulted in moderated pricing. Since there was no competition for consumers,
horizontal cooperation was abundant, resulting, for example, in many joint electric-
ity power plants in the Swiss alps (mostly pump storage power plants).
2Hettich et al. (2017), p. 26 et seq.
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2.2 Gradual Strengthening of Decentral Producers
The Resolution on Energy Use of 1990 (Energienutzungsbeschluss) forced grid
operators to purchase the electricity offered by small producers. The provision
significantly strengthened the position of renewable electricity producers, since
suppliers had to purchase “energy not produced on a regular basis” as well. Small
hydroelectric power plants as well as producers using new renewable energies (solar
energy, biomass including biogas, geothermal energy, wind, etc.), waste energy, and
combined heat and power generation were able to benefit from the provision. The
Federal Council held that these producers would help to secure and to diversify
energy supply, in particular in times of crisis. The remuneration that had to be paid
was not intended to subsidize renewable energy producers; nevertheless, these pro-
ducers were compensated (initially) with 0.16 CHF/kWh.3 This first timid step
towards decentralization was enshrined in permanent law with the Energy Act of
1998 (Energiegesetz); since then, independent producers have a legal right to feed
their electricity into the grids. Starting 2005, grid operators were allowed to ask for a
surcharge on the transmission costs of their grids in order to finance the remuneration
of the independent producers (Additional Cost Financing,Mehrkostenfinanzierung).
By implementing this change, a proto-system to decentralize electricity supply was
put in place.
While the European Union enabled electricity consumers to freely choose their
electricity supplier, the first attempt of the Swiss Confederation to liberalize its
markets failed. In order to overcome the resistance of the socialist party and the
trade unions, the Swiss legislator significantly enhanced the feed-in rights of inde-
pendent suppliers. In contrast to the situation in 1990, the enhanced feed-in rights
were meant to increase the share of renewable energy in the electricity system; the
reliability of the energy infrastructure and the ability of energy providers to meet
current and future demand were less a concern. The improved prospect for renew-
able energy providers was enough to secure the political acceptance necessary to
liberalize the electricity markets for large consumers. Since then, a plethora of
subsidies have been paid out not only to small but also to large renewable energy
producers. Nevertheless, in 2020, the share of decentral producers in electricity
generation was still timid: 3.97% photovoltaics, 0.22% wind, and 0.87% biomass.4
The share of new renewables in primary energy consumption is negligible.5 In fact,
the decarbonisation of the energy supply has not even really started yet. Despite the
energy system mostly producing in central power plants at this point in time, we
acknowledge that the buildup of photovoltaic capacity has been impressive during
the last years; electricity generation by photovoltaics constitutes the main driver for
the decentralization of the energy system.
3Federal Council (1988), p. 515 et seq.
4Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2021), p. 6.
5Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2021), p. 5.
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This being said, decentralization is not a goal per se, but rather seen as an
instrument to maintain a carbon-free (mostly renewable) electricity supply in Swit-
zerland, even after the phaseout of the nuclear energy plants. A mix of mostly legal
factors, which are explained below in more detail, contributes to the rapid expansion
of photovoltaics: a provision of direct subsidies, even for large electricity suppliers; a
secure legal status for independent prosumers (feed-in rights); as well as
consumption-based grid charges that benefit prosumers (consumption-based grid
charges generate a cross-subsidy that is paid by normal households; the depressing
effects on profits of the utilities are also known as the “utility death spiral”).6 Of
course, other factors—declining costs of generation, increasing social acceptance,
utilities located in progressive cities investing in new renewables, etc.—have con-
tributed to this development as well.
3 Centralization of Swiss Energy Governance
The shift towards decentralization, although still timid, is enabled by regulation,
mostly enacted on the federal level. In addition, European regulation is strongly
influencing the shape of federal regulation, despite the fact that Switzerland is not a
member of the European Union.
3.1 Energy Governance on the Federal Level
Federal regulation sets the most important parameters for decentralization: The law
defines decentral producers by setting a cap on capacity and power generation.
Decentral producers below this cap have an unrestricted right to feed their energy
into the grid for free, regardless of actual electricity demand and regardless of
production by other producers (priority of dispatch).7 The basic compensation that
the grid operator is required to pay to decentral producers is fixed by law as well;8
although the basic compensation is not intended to subsidize decentral producers,
some “progressive” utilities set a higher basic rate in order to incentivize decentral
production. For decentral producers participating in the Swiss support scheme, a
subsidy is paid out to cover the actual costs of production and to alleviate market
risks; today, the subsidy takes the form of a one-off contribution or of a sliding
market premium (replacing the earlier fixed feed-in premium model).9
6Hettich and Walther (2015), p. 24 et seq.
7Art. 15 para. 1 and 2 Energy Act (Energiegesetz).
8Art. 15 para. 3 Energy Act (Energiegesetz).
9Art. 19 and 25 Energy Act (Energiegesetz).
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Since the subsidies are declining and, if the government keeps its promise, due to
be phased out, other factors have become important for decentral producers. In
particular, the number of prosumers (mostly decentral solar electricity generators
making use of their right for self-consumption) has risen due to the structure of grid
tariffs for low-voltage households. Federal law holds that grid charges for house-
holds shall predominantly be consumption-based.10 Consequently, prosumers par-
ticipate only to a partial extent in the effective costs they cause to the distribution
network, since these effective costs are mainly caused by installed capacity. Hence,
prosumers benefit from an (indirect) subsidy that can be regarded as a cross-
subsidization by other users of the distribution network (i.e., people who do not
own real estate).11
Last but not least, many decentral producers are households that profit from legal
provisions protecting “vulnerable consumers”. The tariff for electricity supply as
well as the grid charges are cost-based and, in principle, fixed for the duration of a
whole year.12 The law basically bans discriminating tariffs between normal house-
holds and prosumers. Households and small businesses have a legal right to purchase
all the electricity they need, thereby rendering demand-side management of house-
holds virtually impossible.13
3.2 Energy Governance on the European Level
At the time of writing, Switzerland is neither a member of the European Union
(EU) nor is it bound to adhere to EU law due to bilateral cooperation agreements.
Nevertheless, EU law deeply affects the shape of Swiss energy regulation due to
effects of indirect “Europeanization”.14 Since 2007, Switzerland and the EU have
been negotiating an electricity agreement that would allow Switzerland to participate
in the mechanisms of European energy governance and to trade electricity on an
equal footing with its European competitors. With only a few points of the electricity
agreement remaining controversial, the main obstacle to conclude the agreement are
open institutional questions. Negotiations on an institutional agreement have been
ongoing since 2012; their successful conclusion, farther away than ever, is a
precondition for any new agreement on market access.15
During the negotiations, the EU’s internal energy market has evolved consider-
ably, having reached a high degree of formalization of its institutions and
10Art. 14 para. 3 Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz) and Art. 18 para. 3 Electricity
Supply Ordinance (Stromversorgungsverordnung).
11Hettich and Walther (2015), p. 24 et seq.
12Art. 6 para. 3 and 4 Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz).
13Art. 6 para. 1 Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz).
14See for mechanisms of “Europeanization” Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002), p. 255 et seq.
15Hettich et al. (2020), p. 92.
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regulations. In November 2016, the European Commission brought forward a
package of legislative proposals (“Clean Energy for all Europeans”), which was
adopted by the European Parliament and Council and entered into force in 2018 and
2019. In contrast, Switzerland has not yet fully implemented the 3rd package on the
internal energy market, which was adopted by the EU already in 2009. Although the
draft electricity agreement has never been published, it may reasonably be expected
that Switzerland would have to adapt its energy governance to the one of the EU.
An electricity agreement would contain rules on state aid, as required by the draft
institutional agreement.16 However, the recast renewable energy directive still
allows for subsidy schemes for electricity generation from renewable sources, as
long as these subsidy schemes are as non-distortive as possible for the functioning of
the electricity markets. In particular, the directive exempts small (decentral) instal-
lations from market-based allocations of subsidies in order to support their rollout.17
Despite the fact that most support schemes fall within the scope of the European state
aid rules,18 the Guidelines of the European Commission on State aid for environ-
mental protection and energy for the years 2014–202019 provide for ample scope
when designing subsidy schemes (the adoption of new Guidelines is foreseen for the
end of 2021). Further and somewhat unexpected, the European Court of Justice, in a
landmark decision issued on 28 March 2019, has ruled that the German promotion
scheme does not constitute “state aid” according to European law.20 Since Switzer-
land has modeled its own subsidy scheme on Germany’s promotion scheme, it might
retain considerable autonomy when supporting renewable energy generators.21
With regard to the indirect support of decentral producers through the exemption
from grid charges, the Commission recognizes the wide variety of tariff structures
across the EU; so far, the EU has refrained from harmonizing distribution tariff
structures and methodologies.22 A proposal to empower the European Commission
to adopt delegated acts concerning the establishment of network codes in the area of
harmonized transmission and distribution tariff structures and connection charges
has been dropped in the course of the negotiations on the Electricity Regulation.
However, after trilogue negotiations, the Commission and the Council agreed that
the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) “shall provide a best
practice report on transmission and distribution tariff methodologies while taking
account of national specificities”; the Agency’s recommendation shall be taken duly
into consideration by regulatory authorities when approving or fixing transmission
16Art. 8A–8C Draft Institutional Agreement between Switzerland and the EU.
17Recital 17 et seq. Directive 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L
328, 21 December 2018, 82–209.
18Art. 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
19OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, 1–55.
20Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Europäische Kommission, ECJ C-405/16 of 28 March 2019.
21Hettich et al. (2020), p. 8.
22European Commission (2016), p. 164 and 171.
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or distribution tariffs.23 Although this indicates some move towards more central
governance, the impact of the new electricity regulation on grid charges in the EU
member states as well as in Switzerland seems rather small.24
4 Obstacles and Frictions
The specific regulations mentioned above do not touch on cross-border trade with
electricity. Looking at small electricity generators, the new European regulations in
this area are hardly required to guarantee the functioning of the EU’s internal
electricity market. Thus, while indeed providing a strong boost to the rollout and
deployment of decentral renewable energy infrastructures, we also need to analyze
the drawbacks that come with increased central—i.e., European—governance of the
electricity markets. In order to identify legal obstacles and frictions towards the
transformation of a carbon-free energy system (the Swiss electricity system is mostly
carbon-free already), our institute has participated in a field test of the Swiss Federal
Office of Energy, the results of which will be discussed in detail in this chapter.25
4.1 Field Test “aliunid”
The enterprise “aliunid” is a joint venture of several energy providers, grid operators
and energy producers; as a white-label-product, it provides smart home and smart
business solutions to households and SMEs. For utilities, aliunid analyzes energy
flows in households, boroughs, municipalities as well as larger regions. Based on
real-time data, aliunid helps to optimize local and regional energy supply and
consumption, thereby saving grid costs and electricity for balancing.
Aliunid tries to exploit a weakness of a predominantly renewable energy system.
Looking at electricity supply, renewable energy systems rely on many small,
decentral electricity producers, which mainly make use of solar and wind energy.
This renders the energy system highly dependent on the weather. Since production
can no longer easily be adjusted to demand, flexibilities on the demand side and
storage options become more important.
Households, in particular prosumers with photovoltaic arrays and storage devices
(at-home batteries, electric vehicles, heat pumps, electric water boilers), dispose of
many small but—if aggregated—significant flexibilities. At best, these flexibilities
23Art. 18 para. 9 et seq. Regulation 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity, OJ L 158, 14 June 2019, 54–124.
24Hettich et al. (2020), p. 27.
25See Moeller, press release of 7 May 2019, available at https://energeiaplus.com/2019/05/07/
aliunid-startet-feldtest-mit-iot-plattform.
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are used to optimize the household’s electricity or overall energy consumption. By
using its flexibility options, a household may save on electricity and grid costs.
However, such an optimization does not necessarily reduce system costs. The
electricity cost of the supplier depends on system-wide demand, with prices rising
sharply during peak times; peak times on the system level do not necessarily
correlate with peak demand on the household level. Furthermore, grid costs of
households depend on the maximum capacity that is provided; an optimization of
electricity demand on the household level focusing on saving individual grid costs
does not necessarily reduce the peak capacity—maybe required just once a year—of
a specific household. That households are left indifferent to situations of peak
demand constitutes a negative externality. Thus, incentives for households to include
system costs into their optimization efforts are needed.
One purpose of aliunid is to bundle a large number of flexibility options. This
enables internal offsetting of flexibilities (e.g., by using the battery storage of a
household to reduce peak demand in a certain region); bundling also reduces
transaction costs, enabling aliunid to market its flexibilities on a wholesale basis
and to generate revenues. Taking into account the needs of households, municipal-
ities and regions at the same time, aliunid may indeed help to save on grid costs, at
least in the long run. With many smart devices connected to the home’s smart meter,
aliunid generates an additional revenue flow by providing smart home solutions.
Needless to say, this business model is heavily dependent on real time data; in an
ideal world, this data would update every 1–5 s.
4.2 Possible (Legal) Obstacles to Implement the Business
Model
There are several obstacles to overcome in order to turn aliunid into a sweeping
success; unfortunately, many of these obstacles are “self-inflicted”, unnecessary
regulatory burdens.
4.2.1 Low Market Value of Flexibility
First of all, the efficient marketing of flexibility options may help the transformation
of the energy system, but the financial rewards are limited at this point in time, for
several reasons. Flexibility options compete with the costs of generating additional
electricity, which are, despite recent price hikes, still quite low throughout Europe;
generation from wind and solar plants has risen sharply while fossil power plants, in
particular coal power plants, are still operating. Consequently, looking at Switzer-
land, the purchase price for flexibility options is capped by the costs of importing
additional electricity from neighboring countries. In a peculiar way, the abstention of
Switzerland from the EU’s common market in energy helps to make flexibility
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options more profitable, since transaction costs for cross-border trade of electricity
remain high.26
4.2.2 Postage Stamp Principle for Grid Charges
Another reason for the low value of flexibility lies with the structure of the grid
charges: The law requires grid operators to apply the “postage stamp principle” on
their tariffs, meaning that network usage tariffs are to be calculated independently of
the distance between entry and exit point of the electricity.27 The “postage stamp
principle” is sensible for a centralized energy system because it protects captured
consumers from monopolistic suppliers that purchase electricity from afar; against
this backdrop, the “postage stamp principle” embodies considerations of equity and
fairness. The cantons may even choose to establish a fund to compensate for unequal
grid charges, though no canton has taken such measures so far.28 In a decentral
energy system, however, uniform grid charges provide no incentives to optimize the
energy system on a local or regional level. Given the fact that local electricity
producers indeed may help to obviate expansions of the electricity grid, the “postage
stamp principle” does not reward investments in local electricity generation, thereby
rendering local consumers of electricity indifferent to the costs of “their” electricity
network.
In 2019, the independent regulatory agency for the electricity markets (ElCom—
Electricity Commission) issued a notice on “innovative and dynamic grid usage and
energy supply tariffs”.29 It held that consumers may be offered a choice of grid
tariffs; however, these tariffs need to fulfill the legal requirements, somewhat
limiting the range of possible choices. It also held that dynamic tariffs are “not per
se illegal”, but need to adhere to the (inherently static) principles set by the law.
“Smart Grid Ready” tariffs need to observe a range of requirements, which gives rise
to legal risks when they are used. There are no incentives to optimize the local
energy system, since—according to ElCom—it is illegal to reward such optimization
by reimbursing consumers with parts of the avoided grid costs.30 At least, network-
serving and system-serving behavior of consumers using smart control systems may
be rewarded by providing financial incentives.31 Finally, the Electricity Commission
held that dynamic electricity pricing might be illegal in light of universal service
26For a detailed description of cross-border trade with the European Union and the mechanism of
“market coupling”, see Hettich et al. (2015), p. 21 et seq. See for cost estimates Van Baal et al.
(2019), p. 38.
27Art. 14 para. 3 lit. b Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz).
28See for the structure of grid charges Federal Council (2005), p. 1652 et seq.
29ElCom (2019), p. 3 et seq.
30ElCom (2019), p. 5.
31Art. 8c para. 2 Electricity Supply Ordinance (Stromversorgungsverordnung).
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obligations.32 A flat rate for electricity supply, however, is in line with the legal
requirements; of course, such a flat rate provides no incentives to adapt electricity
consumption at all.33
4.2.3 Restrictive Use of Smart Meter Data
Smart energy and smart home services require data. Accumulating and processing
the data enables the effective and efficient functioning of the smart grid. In order to
provide its energy services, aliunid needs data about actual electricity consumption,
actual electricity production, as well as a home’s potential for additional electricity
consumption and additional production; due to privacy concerns, this data only is
available to aliunid in a condensed and aggregated form. In order to provide
additional smart home and smart business services, aliunid further needs smart
meter data from all smart devices and home appliances, as well as from additional
sensors and security systems; for the same privacy concerns, most of this data will
only be stored and analyzed locally.
Nevertheless, the gathering of data touches on sensitive issues: On the one hand,
data is collected from end consumers, whose personal rights must be protected; on
the other hand, information on the operation of the power supply system is
exchanged, which can be critical for system stability. Data protection, in the sense
of protecting personal data against misuse, and data security, in the sense of
protecting data against loss, falsification, damage or deletion by organizational and
technical measures and by software, must therefore be guaranteed.34 Furthermore,
the law states that economically sensitive information obtained from the operation of
the electricity grids shall be treated confidentially by the electricity supply compa-
nies, subject only to statutory disclosure obligations; hence, this data must not be
used for other areas of economic activity (so-called “informational unbundling”).35
As a basic principle, the use of intelligent control systems requires the consent of
the affected final consumers, producers and storage facilities.36 Network operators
may process the data gathered from intelligent control systems without consent for
the management of the grid: First, they may legally use personality profiles and
personal data in pseudonymized form, including load profiles of fifteen minutes and
more, for the measurement of electricity flows, for the control and regulation of the
grid, for the use of tariff systems, and for the operation, balancing and planning of
32See for this interpretation of Art. 6 para. 3 Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz);
ElCom (2019), p. 8.
33ElCom (2019), p. 7 et seq.
34A consortium with participation of the University of St. Gallen has conducted two studies on data
protection and data security of the smart grid, the results of which are summarized in Hettich and
Rechsteiner (2014), n. 1.
35Art. 10 para. 2 Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz); see also Hettich and Rechsteiner
(2014), n. 5.
36Art. 17b para. 3 Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz).
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the network. Second, they may also use personality profiles and personal data in
non-pseudonymized form, including load profile values of fifteen minutes or more,
for billing purposes (billing for energy supply, grid usage and remuneration for the
use of the control systems).37 According to a recent draft amendment for the
Electricity Supply Act, all processing of smart meter data, which is not necessary
for fulfilling the task of electricity supply, may only be carried out with the express
consent of the persons concerned.38
Against the backdrop of these restrictions, the express consent seems required for
all personal data with a higher granularity than fifteen minutes (if available at all), as
well as for all data that is not required for billing purposes or for grid management.39
Such a regime is even more rigid than the general data protection laws, which also
allow for data processing if a legitimate interest of the concerned business is
involved.40 Thus, it is reasonable to say that network operators and other players
in the smart grid may not be able to easily tap the huge potential of data from
intelligent systems, e.g., for smart home and security services or for personalized
advertising.41 Such enhanced services, however, may be necessary to generate a
reasonable return on the investments of the utilities in the smart grid. Looking
generally at the current regime of data protection, a move towards a more risk-
based approach and a holistic system of information governance might be required to
enhance many of the information-based services provided today.
4.3 Workarounds and Legal Recommendations
Aliunid is one of many smart energy providers that have developed business models
to support the transformation towards a carbon-free energy system.42 Because of
current policies, this transformation is accompanied by a decentralization of the
energy system. This move towards a decentral energy system is not reflected in the
current regulatory framework. There is no specific incentive to optimize local grid
usage: Because of the “postage stamp principle”, transporting electricity over long
distances costs the same as using local production. There is no specific incentive to
adapt consumption to current demand because the reward for flexibility is so low.
37Art. 8d para. 1 Electricity Supply Ordinance (Stromversorgungsverordnung).
38Draft Amendment of 18 June 2021 for Art. 17bquater and 17c Electricity Supply Act; see also,
more clearly, the earlier Draft Amendment of 17 October 2018 for Art. 17bter Electricity Supply Act
(Stromversorgungsgesetz).
39Federal Council (2018), p. 70; Federal Council (2021), p. 102.
40See Rechsteiner and Steiner (2018), n. 56 et seq., arguing for a more expansive application of
the law.
41Rechsteiner and Steiner (2018), n. 42.
42Looking at Switzerland, the electricity system is mostly carbon-free at this point in time, thanks to
large generation capacities that make use of nuclear and hydro energy. The challenge will be to
maintain this environmentally friendly status despite the planned nuclear phaseout.
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There are rather weak incentives for small prosumers to adapt electricity generation
to current demand because their subsidies are mostly fixed and their marginal costs
of production are very low. There are no specific provisions on storage (e.g.,
batteries, Power2X), making it difficult to distinguish self-serving and system-
serving storage devices; without such distinction, rewarding the flexibility provided
by storage is hardly feasible. Last but not least, the commercial use of smart meter
data is very much dependent on consent, which needs to be freely given on an
informed basis.
On the upside, the current regulatory framework does not preclude innovative
business models in the energy sector. Financial incentives to reward system-serving
behavior via dynamic grid charges and electricity tariffs are possible, although quite
limited because of the legal requirements that have to be adhered to. Available
flexibilities of consumers and prosumers may be harnessed by using contractual
arrangements.
The legal requirements for informational unbundling are more challenging to
meet: Economically sensitive information obtained from the operation of the elec-
tricity grids may not be used for other areas of commercial activity. Aliunid,
however, does not qualify as a grid operator; it obtains the required data via an
open interface of the smart meter (offered on a non-discriminatory basis by the
network operator to all interested parties). Consequently, obtaining consent is the
most important obstacle for the use of smart meter data. If the required consent may
be obtained, smart meter data may be used to provide smart home and security
services as well as enhanced commercial offers (e.g., personalized advertisements).
5 Concluding Remarks
Current electricity market regulation makes use of a plethora of instruments that
deal—each on its own—with different aspects of the energy and electricity market
design. There is a law on electricity market regulation, on the promotion of renew-
able energy, on the use of hydropower, on the mitigation of greenhouse gas
emissions; soon, there will also be a law on the gas market. The transformation
path envisioned by the federal government, however, makes it necessary that these
instruments operate as one system, enabling easy conversions from one form of
energy into another. Although there are no legal impediments to conduct these
conversions, there are no legal norms to facilitate conversions, either.
Current electricity market design focuses on breaking up vertically integrated
monopoly structures by strict unbundling rules. As a matter of principle, these rules
may take different forms: the incumbents either may be broken up along the value
chain, or they may be forced to provide access to their networks. Successfully
implemented in telecommunication markets, unbundling regulation helps competi-
tors to enter the markets which are upstream and downstream to a network (i.e., the
electricity grid). Unbundling, however, raises transaction costs (cost of regulation
and enforcement, cost of lost synergies, etc.). In contrast to telecommunication
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markets, the electricity grid and electricity generation are not only complements but
also substitutes: A lack of electricity in a certain area may be countered by ramping
up generation or by adding grid capacity. Consequently, unbundling electricity
markets requires procedures to coordinate the buildup of grid and generation capac-
ity; these procedures need to replace the internal coordination within the integrated
energy supplier. Since such outside coordination is costly, there is a vast literature
that indicates that unbundling may not be so efficient, after all.43 Thus, efficient
coordination of the participants in the electricity market may be difficult to achieve in
a centralized energy system. In a decentralized energy system with many participants
in ever-changing roles, efficient coordination may be impossible to obtain, in
particular when using traditional command-and-control regulation. New instruments
and procedures for adjudication and dispute settlement are needed but not within
reach.
Many regulatory principles that govern energy and electricity markets have been
developed for other infrastructure sectors—sectors that are also prone to network
effects. The “postage stamp principle” that governs grid charges, e.g., has an obvious
predecessor in postal markets; unbundling network access services from other
services has been implemented in the telecommunication markets. These principles
had their use when the monopolies in these network industries had to be broken up
and when room had to be made for some competition. Today, other social goals have
taken preeminence, such as security of supply and the mitigation effort regarding
greenhouse gases. As the case study “aliunid” shows clearly, some of the old
instruments hinder the transformation of the energy industry.
In the past, the energy industry was often not able to position itself at the forefront
of innovation. This has changed, as the industry enters unchartered waters. To find
effective and efficient solutions for the energy transformation, difficult first-order
problems have to be solved: Centralized command-and-control regulation, on the
national or on the European level, may not be suited to seek, find, and implement the
most efficient solutions. To optimize a local “energy environment”, locally adapted
regimes might be needed.44 Research pioneered by Elinor Ostrom shows that local
actors that are responsible for a localized resource may also solve second-order
problems: They are able to develop and implement local rules and regimes that
effectively and efficiently manage their resources, e.g., their local energy system.45
Today, such voluntary regimes, e.g., concluded by contracts or devised in communal
regulation, are easily frustrated by the current top-down approach to the regulation of
the energy system.46 Of course, fair access to these localized systems and appropri-
ate protection of captive consumers will remain important and will remain a task for
43Hettich (2020), n. 38; Föhse (2014), n. 504.
44Ostrom (2005), p. 255 et seq.; see also Ostrom, Stein Rokkan Lecture, “Protecting Institutional
Diversity”, St. Gallen, 16 April 2011.
45See, e.g., Ostrom (1998), p. 2; Schlager (2002), p. 804.
46Ostrom (1990), p. 21 et seq.; see also Ostrom, Stein Rokkan Lecture, “Protecting Institutional
Diversity”, St. Gallen, 16 April 2011.
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central governance regimes. However, such goals also may be enforced by perfor-
mance benchmarks and by processes to replace failing local regimes.47
Not every problem of the energy sector requires a European solution. But what is
sure: The regulatory innovation needed to manage a rapidly transforming energy
system may not be found by sticking to traditional bureaucratic processes and
procedures.48 We need approaches that are systemic, that provide leeway for learn-
ing as well as trial and error processes, and that are quickly able to identify and scale
successful experiments as well as to shut down the ineffective ones.
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Abstract Innovation plays an important role in the transition towards a more
sustainable energy system. The law is often thought of as an inhibiting factor for
innovation. However, legal provisions may also serve to promote innovation. Laws
which stipulate favourable conditions for renewable energy sources are an obvious
example. Finally, existing laws will often not be suited to accommodate a new
technology or business model, and the legislator may be slow in reacting to these
new challenges. This increases the importance of government agencies as well as
non-state governance.
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Therefore, a closer look at the governance of innovations in the energy sector
seems warranted. This chapter will investigate how the legislator, regulatory agen-
cies and private standard-setting bodies are responding to three different energy
innovations: new renewable energy sources, new storage systems and smart grids.
This chapter will serve not only to analyse commonalities and differences in the
approach, but also to identify best practices.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
A successful energy transition as envisaged by the Swiss Federal Government’s
Energy Strategy 20501 will not only require major changes in behaviour, but also the
market introduction of innovative technologies. The law is often thought to inhibit
innovation.2 In a survey for the German-speaking countries Germany, Austria and
Switzerland among energy utility companies, 74% named “regulation” as the biggest
obstacle to innovation, closely followed by “political framework” with 71%, making
these two by far the most often named factors.3
However, the law may also function as a catalyst of innovation. An example are
legal provisions that promote renewable energy sources, e.g. by implementing
quotas, subsidies or other privileges. Either way, no innovation will succeed if the
legal framework discourages its use.4 The governance5 of energy innovation not
only involves legislative measures, but also those taken by regulatory bodies. These
include both governmental regulatory agencies as well as private regulatory bodies,
such as industry associations.
This chapter will provide an overview of how the different governing actors in
Switzerland have dealt with and are dealing with energy-related innovation. Past
treatment of innovation will be explained by a short look at the first electrification as
well as the innovation of nuclear energy. Current developments which will be
assessed are new renewable energy sources, new storage systems and smart grids.
But first, it seems appropriate to provide a concise overview of the different
functions the law may serve in relation to (primarily technological) innovation.
1Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018).
2For a discussion of the term “innovation” in a legal context, see Schreiber (2019), p. 12 et seq.
3BDEW, Ernst & Young GmbH (2015), p. 38. Also cf. Schreiber (2019), p. 1.
4For a general discussion of the topic, see Schreiber (2019).
5For a discussion on the governance of innovation from a legal perspective, see Hoffmann-Riem
(2011a). For a general description of the term, see Schuppert (2008). Concerning the difficulties
which legal scholars encounter in dealing with the governance concept, cf. Trute et al. (2008),
p. 173, 178 (who are otherwise optimistic); also see the opportunities described by Kötter (2008).
176 M. Schreiber
1.2 Law and Innovation
The interrelation between law and technological innovation has been investigated at
least as early as the 1970s.6 However, especially in Germany starting in the mid-to-
late 1990s, a broader research interest in law and innovation has taken hold.7 This
“jurisprudential innovation research”8 distinguishes between different functions that
the law serves in relation to innovation.
First, the law has to enable innovation.9 This means that the legal framework does
not prohibit the innovation and allows all of the actions which are necessary to
implement the innovation.10 In energy law, the introduction of the Atomic Energy
Act (Atomgesetz, current title: Kernenergiegesetz, SR 732.1) first enabled the inno-
vation of nuclear energy production in Switzerland. Before, the trade restrictions in
nuclear fuels made this impossible.11
In addition, the law may stimulate innovation.12 This means that the law not only
enables the innovation but also incentivizes it.13 Energy-related examples are legal
privileges for renewable energy sources such as quotas, feed-in tariffs etc.14
I have argued that when the law prescribes the innovation (or at least a certain
level of innovation) in a binding way, it is no longer adequate to refer to this as a
mere stimulating function. Instead, I have suggested that one may refer to this as an
enforcement function.15 An example of this is technology forcing, where the law
stipulates requirements which cannot be fulfilled by the existing technologies.16 This
happened when new energy efficiency requirements for lamps effectively outlawed
traditional light bulbs in the EU and subsequently in Switzerland.17
The law also serves to protect society from undesired incidental effects associated
with an innovation.18 This limiting function19 has traditionally been served by safety
regulations and is one of law’s traditional functions.20
6Schreiber (2019), p. 3 et seq. See for example OTA (1979), p. 45; Stewart (1981).
7Hoffmann-Riem and Schmidt-Assmann (1994); Hoffmann-Riem and Schneider (1998); Eifert and
Hoffmann-Riem (2002); Hoffmann-Riem (2011a); Gattermann (2012); Hoffmann-Riem (2016).
8
“Rechtswissenschaftliche Innovationsforschung” in German.
9The enabling function or “Ermöglichungsfunktion” in German.
10Cf. Schreiber (2002), p. 235; Schreiber (2019), p. 90 et seq.
11Schreiber (2019), p. 91.
12The stimulating function or “Stimulierungsfunktion” in German.
13Schreiber (2002), p. 242; Hoffmann-Riem and Schneider (1998a, b), p. 396; Schreiber (2019),
p. 92 et seq. Also cf. Ashford and Hall (2011), p. 272, who call for “legal interventions”.
14Cf. Schreiber (2019), p. 92.
15Schreiber (2019), p. 93 et seq. (“Durchsetzungsfunktion” in German).
16Gerard, Lave (2005).
17Hettich (2015); Nusser (2010); Schreiber (2019), p. 93.
18Schreiber (2002), p. 249.
19
“Nebenfolgenbegrenzungsfunktion” in German.
20Murswiek (1990), p. 208 et seq.; Schreiber (2019), p. 95 et seq.
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The undesired effects of an innovation may be so far-reaching that the legislator
decides to ban the innovation altogether. I have argued that this constitutes a new
category, the blocking function.21 An example from the energy industry is the ban of
nuclear energy in Austria, which never introduced the technology.22
Finally, the law’s main function is to resolve conflicts. The conflict resolution
function also becomes relevant with regards to innovation.23 For example, the new
Swiss Energy Act (Energiegesetz, SR 730.0) stipulates a national interest in the use
of renewable energies in Article 12, which may help to address conflicts with other
public interests (such as the environment or landscape conservation).24
2 History of Swiss Energy Innovation Governance
A short review of Switzerland’s past regulatory responses to innovation will show
how the government’s approach has changed since the late nineteenth century.
2.1 First Electrification
The first electrification in Switzerland started in the late 1870s and progressed
quickly in the 1890s, driven by hydropower plants.25 However, the legislator
remained passive for a long time, only enacting legislation to resolve conflicts
between the new power lines and existing telegraph lines (in the latter’s favour).26
This passivity was a conscious choice, as “the final word” on the new technology
had not yet been spoken and regulation would therefore have to wait.27
Thus, the regulation of the new (and dangerous) technology fell upon private
organisations. The Swiss Electrotechnical Association (Schweizerischer
Elektrotechnischer Verein, SEV) created safety rules for high-voltage installations
in 1896.28 The same association later founded a technical auditing body (Technical
Inspectorate, Technisches Inspektorat) that even offered inspections of private
21
“Blockierungsfunktion” in German, Schreiber (2019), p. 97 et seq.
22At the time when the “Atomsperrgesetz” (Federal Act on the ban of using nuclear fission for
Austria’s energy supply) was introduced in 1978, the Austrian people had already voted against the
commissioning of an already-built nuclear power plant in Zwentendorf.
23Hoffmann-Riem and Schneider (1998a, b), p. 397; Schreiber (2019), p. 98 et seq.
24For a discussion of Article 12 Energy Act, see Gerber (2019).
25For an overview of Switzerland’s early electrification, see Gugerli (1994a, 1996); Wyssling
(1946); see also Föhse (2021).
26Wyssling (1946), p. 120, 276; Schreiber (2019), p. 98 et seq.
27Sten. Bull 1894 S 321, 327; see also Gugerli (1994b), p. 14; Schreiber (2019), p. 436.
28Wyssling (1946), p. 279; Schreiber (2019), p. 436 et seq.
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household installations for a fee.29 Thus, in the absence of government regulation,
the private economy supplied its own regulatory system. This also shows that private
governance is by no means a new phenomenon.30 The Swiss Electricity Act
(Elektrizitätsgesetz, SR 734.0) only entered into force in 1903, two decades after
the corresponding British Act was introduced.31
The formerly private Technical Inspectorate has now become the Federal Inspec-
torate for Heavy Current Installations (Eidgenössisches Starkstrominspektorat,
ESTI). This body is still operated by Electrosuisse, but it has been endowed with a
public mandate and can issue administrative decisions (Verfügungen, cf. Article
16 para. 2 lit. a Electricity Act).
2.2 Nuclear Energy
In stark contrast to the first electrification, the introduction of nuclear energy was not
passively observed by the legislator. As mentioned in Sect. 1.2 above, there could
not have been an introduction of this innovation without the legislator’s initiative,
since trade restrictions on nuclear fuels hindered the private market participants.
As nuclear energy was heralded as the solution to the world’s energy problems,
the Swiss legislator was poised to move quickly. The legislator intervened at the
earliest possible stage by promoting research in nuclear energy.32 The constitution
was amended to allow for rules at the federal level, since the topic of nuclear energy
was deemed to be of national significance.33 Also, regulatory oversight had to take
place at the federal level, since in the early stages of the technology, not enough
experts would have been available to staff a large number of cantonal authorities.34
On the basis of this new federal legislative power, the Atomic Energy Act entered
into force in 1960.
The initial intent of the new law was to promote nuclear energy, corresponding
with the enabling and stimulating function of innovation-related law (see Sect. 1.2
29Wyssling (1946), p. 280; Schreiber (2019), p. 437.
30Contrary to the apparent opinion of Benz (2004a), p. 13 et seq., who seems to emphasize actual
changes in the governance responsibilities between government and private actors as one of the
reasons for the popularity of the term “governance”.
31Electric Lighting Act 1882, 45&46 Vict c 56. See Gugerli (1994b), p. 13 et seq.; Schreiber
(2019), p. 437.
32The legislative materials for the necessary changes to the Swiss constitution concluded that
without significant public involvement, even research into the new technology would be doomed
to failure. See Federal Council (1957), p. 1159 et seq.; Schreiber (2019), p. 438.
33Art. 24quinquies of the former (1874–2000) constitution was adopted to grant legislative powers
regarding nuclear energy to the federation. See Federal Council (1957), p. 1139; Schreiber (2019),
p. 438 et seq. The same content is now found in Art. 90 Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung der
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft).
34Federal Council (1957), p. 1139.
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above). Thus, rules on the procurement of nuclear fuels provided a legal framework
in which, for the first time, nuclear energy could be exploited in Switzerland
(enabling function).35 Also, massive public investments into nuclear energy research
and development were made possible under the new legal provisions (stimulating
function).
However, the new laws were not only intended to promote this innovation.
Instead, the potential risks of nuclear energy were already well-known. Hence, the
new legislative framework was also created to reduce these risks as much as
possible.36 This corresponds with the limiting function of the law. For example,
the construction of nuclear energy installations was made subject to a detailed
approval procedure.37 The Atomic Energy Act also introduced liability provisions.38
Still, even here the promotion of the new technology was part of the focus, since the
liability was limited.39
In addition, the Atomic Energy Act established the supervision of all nuclear
energy installations at the federal level. Therefore, there was no need for industry
associations to establish their own regulatory bodies.
Finally, it is interesting to note that some hesitance by the federal legislator to
regulate a completely new technology can be noticed as well. For example, the
legislator saw the problems of having to use exact legal definitions at a time when
much of the relevant terminology was still in flux.40 This problem was diminished by
defining several technical terms at the ordinance level, which made it easier to
quickly make amendments as they became necessary.41 This is a legislative tech-
nique that is still used frequently today when regulating innovative technologies42
and that was also part of the regulation during the first electrification.43 At the same
time, it also raises questions as to which parts of the regulation are so important that
under constitutional law, they must be implemented in a formal (parliamentary)
law.44 In general, however, the Swiss legislator was much more willing to regulate
nuclear energy in its infancy, compared to the “wait-and-see” approach favoured
during the first electrification.
The Atomic Energy Act has been replaced by the Nuclear Energy Act, which
entered into force in 2005. The regulatory oversight is currently exercised by the
Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (Eidgenössisches
35Schreiber (2019), p. 439.
36Federal Council (1957), p. 1139, 1141 et seq.; Federal Council (1958), p. 1522 et seq.
37In Articles 4–7, see Federal Council (1958), p. 1538 et seq.
38In Article 11, see Federal Council (1958), p. 1544 et seq.
39Federal Council (1958), p. 1544 et seq.
40Federal Council (1958), p. 1535 et seq.
41Federal Council (1958), p. 1535 et seq.
42Schreiber (2019), p. 79, 392.
43Schreiber (2019), p. 393.
44Regarding the general question of which rules may be implemented in an ordinance, see Müller
(2020), p. 48 et seq.
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Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat, ENSI). This demonstrates the importance of regula-
tory agencies not only for competition-oriented market regulation, but also for safety
regulation (cf. the ESTI discussed in Sect. 2.1 above).
2.3 Interim Conclusions
The comparison between the regulatory approaches to the first electrification and the
introduction of nuclear energy has shown remarkable differences. During the first
electrification, the legislator remained largely passive. The regulation of high-
voltage installations was therefore first implemented by the private sector through
industry associations. These associations later played an important part in the
preparation of the first electricity-specific laws.45
In contrast, the peaceful use of nuclear energy was accompanied by the legislator
from the very beginning. This included provisions to support research and develop-
ment. The regulation and supervision took place at the federal level from the start,
due to the significance of the innovation and the potential risks involved. The public
sector was thus deeply involved in the new industry, and there was little room for
private self-regulatory46 governance.
What is the reason for the difference in these two approaches? The first electri-
fication did not collide with many legal provisions since the overall “regulatory
density”47 was not nearly as high in the late nineteenth century as it is today. Thus,
the private market participants were able to employ the new technology without
facing prohibitory restrictions.
On the contrary, nuclear energy faced a prohibitory legal framework that
prevented the private industry from ever implementing the new technology without
government intervention. Since even the trade of nuclear fuels was prohibited, a
completely new legal framework was necessary in order to enable the innovation.
It may be presumed that, given the ever-increasing regulatory density especially
in the energy sector, current innovations will rather fall into a similar category as
nuclear energy. This would mean that the legislator would interfere at an early stage,
maybe even before the innovation has entered the market. The following discussion
of current innovation governance in the energy sector will, among other things, shed
light on this question.
45Wyssling (1946), p. 281 et seq.; Schreiber (2019), p. 437.
46For discussion of self-regulation, see Hettich (2014), p. 269 et seq.
47For a discussion of this term, see Citi, Justesen (2014), p. 713 et seq., 716 et seq.
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3 Governance of Current Energy Innovations
3.1 New Renewable Energy Sources
The term “new renewable energy sources” is used in Switzerland to designate all
renewable energies other than the long-established hydropower.48 Increasing the
production from new renewable energy sources has been one of the main focuses of
the Swiss Energy Strategy 2050.49 Several options exist to promote renewable
energy production, including quotas50 and auctions.51 The Swiss legislator opted
for a feed-in tariff system, the “feed-in remuneration at cost” (Kostendeckende
Einspeisevergütung, KEV).52 In recent years and with the introduction of the
completely revised Energy Act in 2018, the system has taken on a more market-
oriented approach. Under the new feed-in tariff system (Einspeisevergütungssystem,
EVS), renewable energy producers, as a basic principle, have to directly market the
electricity they produce (Article 21 Energy Act).53
Thus, the federal legislator has played a crucial role in the promotion of (new)
renewable energy sources. This is complemented by cantonal and municipal subsi-
dies for renewable energy installations, especially for solar heating in households.54
However, the multi-level governance55 of renewable energy not only extends to
provisions that promote this innovation. Often, authorities at the cantonal or munic-
ipal level will be tasked with the implementation of other provisions that interfere
with renewable energy projects. With regards to solar installations, for example, the
federal legislator has introduced Article 18a of the Spatial Planning Act
(Raumplanungsgesetz, SR 700). In its current version, the provision stipulates that
certain well-integrated rooftop solar systems do not need a building permit. This—
constitutionally controversial56—provision was partly a response to the strict appli-
cation of cantonal and municipal rules for listed historic buildings and townscape
protection (Denkmal- und Ortsbildschutz). The tensions between the federal legis-
lator’s intent to promote solar energy and the cantons’ and municipalities’ wish to
48Cf. Article 2 para. 1 Energy Act (Energiegesetz), which does not use the term “new renewable
energy” but still only applies to all renewable energy sources “except for hydropower”.
49Federal Council (2013), p. 7594.
50Which have notably been used in the UK for a long time under the “renewables obligation”
scheme.
51Such as those now used in Germany under the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz—EEG 2017).
52For a critical assessment of the KEV system, see Hettich and Walther (2011).
53For a detailed discussion of the Swiss feed-in tariff system, see Haelg et al. (2021).
54A list of the available support schemes can be found on the website https://www.energie-
experten.ch/de/energiefranken.html.
55For a general discussion of this concept, see Benz (2004b). In the context of the energy transition,
see Thaler et al. (2019).
56Cf. Hettich and Peng (2015). For a more general discussion, see Müller and Vogel (2012).
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protect their townscapes are a good example of problems inherent in multi-level
governance.57
3.2 New Storage Systems
With the rising share of variable renewable energy sources, at some point in the
future, storage capacity may be needed.58 Until recently, the only large-scale storage
technologies were pump hydropower storage systems. With the increasing need for
storage capacity and the lack of suitable locations for new pump hydropower plants,
new energy storage technologies (e.g. batteries, compressed air storage or even
Power-to-Gas)59 will become more relevant.
Compared to some other countries and the EU,60 the Swiss legislator has so far
remained relatively passive in the governance of new storage systems.61 One
important obstacle for new storage technologies is the existing legal framework for
pump hydropower storage. Pump hydropower is exempted from the final consumer
status under Article 4 para. 1 lit. b Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz,
SR 734.7). This, most importantly, means that pump hydropower plants do not have
to pay grid fees under Article 14 Electricity Supply Act. If—as I have argued62—this
exemption did not apply to new storage technologies, that would be a major
impediment to the diffusion of new storage systems.
The Federal Council had originally planned to clarify that all storage systems with
the exception of pump hydropower plants are final consumers.63 This provision was
later removed from the draft ordinance due to negative responses in the consulta-
tion.64 Since the executive level of governance therefore refrained from clarifying
the legal status of storage systems, this burden now falls back on the legislator.
Meanwhile, the private Swiss Association of Electric Power Producers and
Distributors (Verband Schweizerischer Elektrizitätsunternehmen, VSE) has
published a “Handbook Storage”, which stipulates that storage systems that take
electricity from the public grid and later feed electricity back into the grid at the same
57Also cf. Thaler et al. (2019), p. 3.
58See Schreiber (2019), p. 167 et seq. Only a long-term need for storage is seen by Hewicker et al.
(2013). For a detailed discussion of storage-related governance, see Walther (2019).
59For a detailed description of new storage technologies, see Sterner and Stadler (2017).
60Cf. Schreiber (2019), p. 276 et seq., 409, 427 et seq.
61Also cf. Kratz (2018); Walther (2019).
62Schreiber (2019), p. 234 et seq. But cf. Kratz (2018), p. 73, 94 et seq.; Walther (2019), p. 30.
63In a revised Article 2 para. 3 Electricity Supply Ordinance (Stromversorgungsverordnung), see
Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (2018), p. 6.
64Schreiber (2019), p. 276. For the statements from the consultation, see “Strategie Stromnetze:
Änderungen auf Verordnungsstufe”, available at https://www.admin.ch.
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location should be exempt from paying grid fees.65 This is particularly noteworthy as
under the Swiss principle of subsidiarity, private industry associations play an
important role in energy governance (Article 3 Electricity Supply Act). It may
therefore be argued that, where the legislator does not provide clear stipulations,
the industry association’s interpretation of the law should prevail.66 The regulatory
agency ElCom has recently confirmed the VSE’s interpretation,67 while the Federal
Council still pursues plans to explicitly state in the law that only pump hydropower
plants are exempt from grid fees.68
Regardless of how binding the industry association’s rules are, they are another
good example of private (self-regulatory) governance in the absence of specific
legislation.
In addition, regulatory authorities may become important for storage systems as
well. If grid operators were allowed to install their own storage systems (which is
currently unclear under unbundling rules),69 the question would arise whether the
costs could be recovered under the Swiss “cost-plus” regulation (Art. 15 Electricity
Supply Act). The regulatory agency ElCom has in the past refused to accept costs for
certain innovative measures as they were not seen as “currently” necessary.70 The
same problem may arise with investments in storage capacity that may only be truly
needed in the future. This shows that a conservative approach by regulatory agencies
may inhibit innovation in regulated industries.
3.3 Smart Grids
In a new, more sustainable energy industry with decentralised, variable renewable
energy sources, storage systems and “prosumers” that produce as well as consume
electricity, digital technology may help to connect all these different market actors.
In such a “smart grid”, information on energy demand and production, the current
grid situation and other important data could be used, inter alia, to match electricity
production and consumption despite the variability of renewables.71
However, the vast amount of data necessary for such a smart grid has led to data
protection concerns.72 The governance of smart grids must therefore take into
65Verband Schweizerischer Elektrizitätsunternehmen (2017), p. 8.
66See Walther (2019), p. 30. But cf. Schreiber (2019), p. 266 et seq.
67Electricity Commission (2020), p. 17 et seq.
68Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2020), p. 5.
69Kratz (2018), p. 96 et seq.; Walther (2019), p. 11 et seq.; Schreiber (2019), p. 361 et seq.
70See Electricity Commission (2011) for smart grid technology. Also cf. Walther (2014), p. 171
et seq.; Schreiber (2019), p. 381 et seq.
71For the potential uses of smart grid technologies in Switzerland, see BET Dynamo Suisse (2014).
72See McKenna et al. (2012).
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account both the stimulating as well as the limiting functions of innovation-
related law.
The Swiss federal legislator has chosen exactly this two-pronged approach. On
the one hand, the law stimulates and, to a significant extent, even enforces the
implementation of smart grid technology. The latter aspect especially applies to
smart meters. Here, the law enforces a smart meter rollout, according to which grid
operators have to replace 80% of the meters in their grid area with smart meters by
January 1, 2028 (Article 17a para. 2 Electricity Supply Act, Articles 8a, 31e and 31l
Electricity Supply Ordinance).
On the other hand, the law also fulfils a limiting role with regards to the potential
dangers that a smart grid poses for data protection. Real-time electricity consumption
data could be used to learn about a household’s income, the number and age of
people in the household and the times at which a house is left empty.73 For this
reason, Article 17c Electricity Supply Act declares that the federal Data Protection
Act is applicable to all smart metering data.74
In addition, Article 8b Electricity Supply Ordinance demands that all smart
metering systems have been successfully tested for their data security by the Federal
Institute of Metrology. Article 8d Electricity Supply Ordinance stipulates in which
manner the data may be used. Inter alia, the time resolution may only be fifteen
minutes or more (para. 1) and personal data may generally only be used in
pseudonymised or aggregated form (para. 2). However, such data usage does not
require the respective person’s consent. This makes large-scale use of smart
metering data practically feasible and thus serves a stimulating function.
3.4 Interim Conclusions
The survey of current energy innovations has shown two different approaches: With
new renewable energy sources and smart grids, the legislator has played an early role
in promoting these technologies. This is reminiscent of the historic approach to
nuclear energy. For smart meters, the federal law has even implemented a mandatory
roll-out. This shows that the law has partially evolved from a mere stimulating tool
for innovation to an enforcer of innovation.
However, in the case of new energy storage systems, the Swiss legislator has
taken a much more cautious approach. So far and unlike in some neighbouring
73Newing et al. (2015); Anderson et al. (2017).
74This is relevant since the number of privately organised but publicly (often at the cantonal level)
dominated energy utility companies leads to the question whether cantonal or federal data protec-
tion laws are applicable. The federal law only applies to data handled by private persons or federal
authorities, Article 2 para. 1 Data Protection Act (Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz). Therefore, it
does not apply to data handled by cantonal authorities. The latter are governed by the cantonal data
protection laws.
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countries,75 no storage-specific supportive legislation has been implemented. As has
been shown, the first (and ultimately aborted) attempt to regulate storage systems
was intended to cement the existing special status of the incumbent technology,
pump hydropower storage. In the absence of legal provisions, a private industry
association has introduced rules on storage systems in a technical document. This
legislative passivity, coupled with an increased governance role of private institu-
tions, is similar to the first introduction of electricity in Switzerland.
4 Best Practices of Innovation Governance
The different historic and current governance approaches to innovation lead to the
question whether best practices can be identified. While more research seems
warranted, the following section will highlight some key factors.
4.1 Analysis of the Existing Framework
When deciding on whether a proactive or a passive legislative approach should be
chosen, the existing legal framework must be taken into account. A passive approach
will only work if the existing framework allows the innovation to be implemented. If
the existing rules prohibit the innovative solution or render it economically unat-
tractive, a passive approach will likely prevent the innovation’s widespread adop-
tion. Hence, the first electrification of Switzerland was possible despite the
legislator’s passivity, since no existing laws prevented the innovation from being
implemented.
Contrary to this, a similar approach would not have been possible with nuclear
energy, since existing international rules prevented fuels from being obtained by
private market actors. Therefore, the existing legal framework must be analysed as to
its impact on the innovation. If the innovation seems desirable but the existing
framework would severely hinder its implementation, a passive approach is not a
feasible option.76
In this context, it should also be noted that minor changes to the existing
framework which remove the legal obstacles might be preferable to specific support
schemes or other legal privileges for the innovation.77
75See § 111 para. 3 of the Austrian Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und -organisationsgesetz 2010; §
118 para. 6 of the German Energiewirtschaftsgesetz.
76Cf. Schreiber (2019), p. 441 et seq.
77Schreiber (2019), p. 389 et seq.
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4.2 Technology-Neutral Rules
When a decision is made to enact legislation to support (or, in the case of negative
effects, limit) the innovation, the exact design of the new rules is critical. For
example, if legal privileges are introduced for a narrowly defined innovation, other
(potentially better) technologies may not benefit from these. This would grant an
unfair advantage to the innovation supported by the legislator. The rules should
therefore be technology-neutral to ensure fair competition that leads to the best
market outcome.78
That is why, for example, legal definitions should be broad enough to include not
just the specific innovation but also other innovative options. This is also important
since new technologies may be invented faster than the legislator can react. This is
commonly referred to as “legal lag”.79 The rules should thus also take into account
potential new inventions that are not yet available when the rules are drafted. One
could call these “technology-open” rules.80
4.3 Flexibility
The “legal lag” problem just described above is often coupled with another phe-
nomenon: the lack of knowledge on the legislator’s part. The legislator cannot know
in advance whether an innovation will be successful or whether new, even better
technologies or processes will be introduced in the future.81 For this reason, the
legislator will often prefer flexible rules at the ordinance level that can be quickly
adapted to changing circumstances.82 Despite the advantages that ordinances offer in
terms of flexibility, the principle of legality demands, inter alia, that the basic
stipulations are contained in a formal (parliamentary) enactment (Gesetz im
formellen Sinne).83 The ordinance’s comparative lack of democratic legitimation
may also become a political burden when compared with parliamentary enactments.
78Cf. Kratz (2018), p. 46, 228 et seq.; Hettich et al. (2017), p. 177 et seq.; Schreiber (2019), p. 391.
79This term has been used, inter alia, in the context of product liability rules concerning innovative
products; Zech (2016), p. 15 et seq.; Vieweg (2011), p. 337.
80Sailer and Reuter (2014), p. 13; Schreiber (2019), p. 390.
81Stewart (1981), p. 1275; Hoffmann-Riem (2011b), p. 316; Schreiber (2019), p. 75 et seq.
82Schreiber (2019), p. 392 et seq.
83For a discussion of the principle of legality in the context of energy law, see Jagmetti (2005),
p. 108 et seq.; Petrik-Haltiner (2017), p. 14 et seq. In the context of innovation, see Schreiber
(2019), p. 101 et seq.
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4.4 Multi-Level Governance
Another important decision is whether the innovation should be regulated at the
federal, cantonal or municipal level. Often, this decision will be shaped by the
constitutional definition of competencies and responsibilities. However, some
ground-breaking innovations may even justify changes to the constitutional frame-
work, as was the case with nuclear energy in Switzerland. Where competing federal
and cantonal competencies exist, the federal legislator must decide whether to act on
its powers and therefore preclude conflicting cantonal rules.
One advantage of federal laws may be that the innovation will face the same legal
framework in the entire country. This might help with standardisation and could
increase investors’ confidence. However, cantonal or municipal laws may have the
benefit that several legal frameworks could compete with one another. “First-mover”
cantons or municipalities would be able to implement new rules, which could then be
observed by the others. This might enable a competition to see which rules best aid
the innovation’s implementation.
Cities are often especially interested in innovations and offer the advantage of
many potential users who might adopt the innovation, as well as an advanced
infrastructure. They thus seem like a well-suited “playground” for new innovations.
It may therefore be desirable to allow cities to adopt specific rules to help with a new
innovative project. This is only possible where federal and cantonal laws provide
enough room for municipal enactments.
Despite the potential advantages of multi-level governance with regards to
innovation, the Swiss energy sector has seen a steady development towards more
centralised rules at the federal level in recent decades.84 This calls into question to
which degree these potential advantages may actually be exploited.
4.5 Public or Private Governing Bodies
In the absence of legislation, private bodies may offer a good alternative to imple-
ment rules on the innovation. Private governing bodies such as industry associations
often have more information on the innovation than the legislator and they under-
stand better how it might be implemented. They can therefore draft rules which fit
the innovation very well.
However, the involvement of private governing bodies may also have disadvan-
tages. For example, established industry associations may seek to hinder innovations
that they regard as threatening to their business models.85 For a simple thought
experiment to illustrate this, just imagine the taxi drivers’ union drafting rules on
84See Föhse (2021).
85Cf. Schreiber (2019), p. 86.
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Uber.86 The problem of incentives is exacerbated where private associations do not
represent all market actors.87
In addition, private rule-making may raise questions as to the rules’ validity. The
existing legislation may be unclear on the subject of the innovation. When private
associations implement rules, it becomes difficult to judge whether the law does
indeed make stipulations on the innovation or whether there was sufficient room for
the private body to create its own rules. This is the case for storage technology,
where it seems questionable whether the VSE’s rules are compatible with the
existing laws.88
It is also worth noting that there is no strict dichotomy between private and public
governing bodies. An example of this, which has been discussed here, is the safety
regulatory agency for the electricity market, the ESTI, which was originally founded
as part of a private technical association but which has now been granted powers
similar to those of a government institution.
5 Conclusions
The governance perspective draws attention to the interplay of state and non-state
actors at multiple vertical and horizontal levels. The discussion has shown that these
factors also affect the relationship between law and innovation in the energy sector.
While some energy innovations were driven by legislation early on, others met a
mostly passive legislator. In these cases, private governing bodies such as industry
associations have played an important role in shaping the innovation’s regulatory
environment. The interplay between private and public actors becomes especially
apparent when formerly private institutions are endowed with regulatory powers by
the state, as was the case with the ESTI.
Innovation may be governed effectively at multiple vertical levels, which could
lead to a competition between different cantons and municipalities as to the most
innovation-friendly legal framework. However, a disadvantage is the potential
patchwork of laws that might deter investments. Also, different priorities between
the federal, cantonal and municipal level may cause problems, as was the case with
photovoltaic installations. In recent years, the energy sector has witnessed a devel-
opment towards more laws at the federal level, with less and less room for
cantonal laws.
The “regulatory density” in the energy industry has increased significantly in the
last few decades. For this reason, a legislative “wait-and-see” approach as favoured
86Regarding the regulatory environment for Uber in Switzerland, see Abegg and Bernauer (2018);
Meier (2018); Riemer-Kafka and Studer (2017); Sieber-Gasser (2017).
87Cf. Schreiber (2019), p. 273 et seq.
88See Walther (2019), p. 30, on the one hand and Schreiber (2019), p. 267 et seq., 275, on the
other hand.
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during the early electrification may no longer be feasible. Where innovative tech-
nologies and business models meet legal provisions that were never intended to
govern them, changes to the legal framework may be inevitable in order for the
innovation to succeed.
Despite this apparent need for regulatory intervention, it is crucial to design
technology-neutral rules that do not favour any specific innovation over another
and that are open to future developments. Otherwise, laws and regulations may drive
an inferior solution’s success while blocking more innovative approaches.
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Abstract Smart second-generation policies for energy transition governance have
been less studied and reviewed in the literature. They are also difficult to compare or
measure in terms of their effectiveness with regard to the energy transition, not only
because each country’s objectives and underlying drivers for an energy transition are
different. Technological innovation and new technology deployment are only the tip
of the iceberg. Understanding how to redesign energy governance to allow for
business model reconfiguration among incumbents and how to stimulate business
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model innovation by start-ups and new entrants is key for an effective and sustain-
able energy transition in the long term. However, beyond this, countries must
address the underlying driving forces such as consumption patterns and the financial
system. Therefore, business model transformation is not the only solution, but it is an
important one and it requires well-designed policies. It also requires the involvement
of all stakeholders at all levels of the economic fabric of each region and country. At
the same time, we continue to measure progress on energy transitions in a superficial
and extremely limited way. Policies must now be smarter, not just more ambitious in
terms of appearances, and the measurement of energy transition progress must
evolve as well. We discuss the full story of an energy transition to the extent possible
in a single chapter. For example, we will review business models in different
sub-sectors, policies that either block or promote such changes in each sub-sector
chosen, and the elements that are necessary for energy transitions to become
successful and sustainable without long-term government intervention and financial
support. Finally, we also provide insights from an expert workshop held in 2019 and
we outline our upcoming work on an Energy Transition Preparedness Index.
1 Introduction
There is no commonly accepted conceptual framework or unambiguous definition of
energy transition and different timeframes and transition paths can be observed in
different countries. It encompasses the political and increasingly social willingness
to gradually phase out fossil energy resources in favor of low-emission sources,
while putting in place measures for energy efficiency across all application sectors.
However, besides these overarching objectives, there is no consensus on crucial
aspects such as the time schedule of such a transition and its phasing, the role of state
authorities, and the level of regulation. There is also no consensus on the very
technologies that will indeed lead to the desired change. Addressing consumption
patterns is also part of the solution but has not been a popular solution as countries
continually seek economic growth and increasing purchasing power for their con-
stituents. The place of natural gas and nuclear energy within the energy transition is
vehemently disputed, within a broader discussion that also involves the need to
decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while satisfying expectations for con-
tinuous increases of purchasing power—a difficult nut to crack in any country.
A large number of studies have delved into the analysis of the conditions that
could sustain the energy transition, covering a broad spectrum of possibilities from
emerging technologies—e.g., in the field of energy storage or even new energy
vectors such as hydrogen or methanol—to social behavior.1 As is the case with any
major change, the energy transition will not happen if it does not involve all the
1Rieple et al. (2019).
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stakeholders at all levels of the economic fabric of each region and country. While
certain measures can be sustained for a given period of time by state subsidies and
policies—as has been the case in almost all industrialized countries with respect to
renewable energy sources such as PV—, eventually the transition and its choices will
gravitate towards clear market opportunities, those prospering without financial
support mechanisms. Perhaps new, robust business models,2 combined with inno-
vative regulations, tariff structures and market design, and reductions in consump-
tion can lead to a true transition and sustain it over time.
Creative uses of technological innovations, innovative business models, and
proactive corporate sustainability strategies can sustain the energy transition.
These tools apply to the supply side but also to the demand side, addressing
consumption as much as possible. Research conducted in the past has shown that
the success of the energy transition relies more on other factors (social or business-
related) and not just on technological innovation.3 The successful implementation of
the energy turnaround thus requires business model innovation as one of the key
drivers.4 In the energy sector, business model innovation has increasingly become a
priority for the long-term profitability of utilities.5
Various recent scientific works have looked at the role of business model
innovation in supporting fundamental value propositions and value creation changes
to promote the energy transition. Loock used choice experiments with investment
managers for renewable energy to identify which business models could succeed in
the market.6 This work has provided some evidence that business models that focus
on customers and that propose high-quality services are more attractive than busi-
ness models oriented to low prices and state-of-the-art technologies. Richter
explored existing business model approaches adopted by utilities with regard to
renewable energy and found that utilities have developed viable business models for
large-scale renewable energy generation but should invest further to take advantage
of forthcoming business opportunities related to smaller distributed generation
projects.7
Still business model innovation alone will have limited power to change things
without corresponding policies that increase the potential for change among incum-
bents and the impetus for change from start-ups and new entrants. There is a chicken-
and-egg problem where policies are needed to support decision-making on business
model reconfiguration (among incumbents mostly); meanwhile, new business
2The most widely used definition is the one given by Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), p. 14: “A
business model describes the rationale of how an organization creates, delivers, and captures value”.
3Boo et al. (2016).
4Boo et al. (2017).
5Castaneda et al. (2017) demonstrate the potential impact of renewable energy sources (RES) on
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models are needed first to stimulate such policy developments. Often these new
business models come from start-ups and new entrants, but they themselves struggle
with the lack of clear policy frameworks because they often rely heavily on strategic
partnerships with incumbent energy players to succeed.
The more important step to support the change process seems to be to create the
right policy frameworks that support business model change.
In interviews that were conducted with utilities and other key energy sector
corporate players throughout the last 5 years, executives agreed across the board
that new business models are needed for the energy transition but that these new
models will not gain momentum unless new policies and measures that support and
partly guarantee their success are also implemented. This is especially true when we
speak about business model reconfiguration (when a company changes its existing
business model to a new one). The energy sector is very dependent on regulatory
frameworks. Some authors have looked at the entire spectrum of regulatory frame-
works for supporting renewable energy.8 Others have analyzed specific technologies
that could enable the energy transition, like storage technologies.9 Finally, the fact
that new business models will have to be backed by supporting regulatory frame-
works has been confirmed by other research, such as by Facchinetti et al.10
In our continuing work on the energy transition, we aim at measuring the
preparedness level of countries and key economic actors with respect to the energy
transition. We assume that a successful energy transition will require both business
model reconfiguration and business model innovation. Both incumbents (existing
players like utilities) and new stakeholders such as innovative start-ups exploring
new technologies and approaches are among the actors that will shape the transition.
In this chapter, we review new business models coming from start-ups and new
entrants as well as areas where business model reconfiguration is happening among
incumbents.
Some work already exists to categorize business models by sub-sector.11 How-
ever, little work has tried to categorize business models by types of players. We will
start this process by looking at business models that are most relevant to large
incumbents on the one hand and business models that are more relevant to start-
ups and new entrants on the other hand.
We then provide examples of policies or legislation that are either blocking
business model developments or supporting such changes. The chapter is not able
to provide a fully comprehensive view of all sub-sectors. Therefore, only a few
8Rubino et al. (2016).
9Broeckx et al. (2019).
10Facchinetti et al. identified favorable business conditions (that spurred investment in comprehen-
sive business models) such as supportive policy scenarios, a growing economy, new development
projects involving multiple energy carriers in areas characterized by a high building density, and
target customers with a high willingness to pay (Facchinetti et al. 2016, p. 11).
11E. g. Burger and Luke (2016) review business models for Distributed Energy Resources (DER)
and define business model archetypes for the three largest DER categories: demand response
(DR) and energy management systems (EMS), electrical and thermal storage, and solar PV.
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sub-sectors are explored, with some focus on the power sector and innovative
solutions in this sector allowing for decentralized energy systems, increased flexi-
bility, and optimization of such systems, e.g., via different options for storage or
“smart” energy management.
This chapter also reviews the existing literature to understand what drives busi-
ness model transformation in the energy sector. We are assuming that an energy
transition of a country or region (at least for the average OECD or European country)
typically requires both: (1) business model reconfiguration among incumbents and
(2) business model innovation among start-ups and new entrants. Both kinds of
business model change require sustainability strategies combined with business
model innovation that can vary from reactive to proactive strategies. Schaltegger
et al. review such reactive to proactive sustainability strategies and identify sustain-
ability strategies that must be combined with business model innovation.12 In order
to better analyze business model changes in the context of the energy transition and
understand what the antecedents for each kind of change are, we decided early in our
research that it was important to obtain indicators for change related to two separate
phenomena—business model reconfiguration and business model innovation.13 We
suppose that for an energy transition to happen rapidly and with economic success,
we need policies and support mechanisms that stimulate and allow both kinds of
business model change to occur and that enable synergies between the two.14
A good business environment for entrepreneurship and innovation of course
supports business model innovation among start-ups and new entrants, but it also
requires specific push factors relevant to the energy sector and the dynamics of each
sub-sector where the business models apply. One of the key conditions is the right
set of policies for a given country (regulations and new legislation), as well as on the
regional level, and this is the focus of our work funded by the SCCER CREST, a
consortium for socio-economic research on the energy transition in Switzerland.
Why is it important to look at this subject? We know a lot about technological
innovation, but we know less about business model innovation. We are
experimenting with it today—in real-time fashion. Many companies are even afraid
of it, or at least very reluctant to engage in innovative market frameworks, especially
12Schaltegger et al. present three options for companies to combine strategic sustainability choices
with business model innovation (Schaltegger et al. 2012, p. 110): “Defensive strategies with slight
degrees of business model adjustment or adoption protect the current business model. . .; [a]
ccommodative strategies go along with a change and some improvement of the business model,
thus exerting some influence on business case drivers by experimenting within the current
model. . .; [and] proactive strategies leading to (actual) business model redesign address many
business case drivers strongly and continuously, with the effect of regular creations of business
cases for sustainability.”
13For definitions see Massa and Tucci (2014).
14For example, government support of start-ups with new business models can have a variety of
effects: (i) incumbents can be encouraged to innovate and develop similar solutions, (ii) incentives
can be created for incumbents to acquire innovative companies and internalize the innovation in
their already existing business models, or (iii) innovation can inspire business model
reconfiguration among incumbents.
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in countries with uncertain and evolving regulatory conditions. They are afraid of
how it may impact their business, which until today has been very stable and
lucrative because of regulations that supported the “historical” business model
based on maximizing the number of kWh of power or cubic meters of natural gas
sold to final customers, while decreasing both CAPEX (capital expenditure) and
OPEX (operating expenses) as far as possible.
1.1 Barriers for New Energy Transition Business Models
The energy system must confront several barriers (market and social, financial,
regulatory, and innovation barriers) that slow down implementation towards a
more sustainable energy structure. These barriers are explained in a report by Boo
et al.15 They explain that market and social barriers include the lack of knowledge,
consumer engagement, and trust. The current system structure does not provide
enough data to encourage consumers to change their behaviors. Innovative technol-
ogies such as smart meters and distributed generation can, however, enable cus-
tomers to manage their own energy consumption. Another barrier is insufficient
reference cases on new business models and approaches. Companies have a hard
time to react when there are several new trends appearing at the same time and when
uncertainty about the prospects of technologies or business models is high. Boo et al.
also note that new business models face a difficulty in fitting the existing systems.
There is a need for supporting infrastructures and technological changes. Internal
management structures of large incumbent energy firms could add to the challenge.
The implementation of new business models requires the collaboration of a number
of different departments within a company that are likely to have different perspec-
tives on change and to pursue their own objectives. There can be divisions between
product and service developers or divisions between those who make investment
decisions and those who supervise operations.
Financial barriers also hamper the transition. New financial models are therefore
needed to meet investor needs and open up new pools of low-cost funds for energy
projects. Other barriers mentioned in the literature are high upfront costs, especially
for most energy efficiency measures that require more investment than conventional
technologies. Decision-makers, including consumers such as private homeowners,
might not be able or willing to make large upfront investments. In addition, it is
difficult to access the necessary capital. A low return on investment is another barrier
for new business models, especially for renewable technologies. Customers do not
invest in renewable energy projects when the payback time is too long. Then,
cumbersome regulation (and lack of clear legislation) is a clear barrier. The report
by Boo et al. also describes restrictive rules that prevent companies from taking new
approaches. In addition, permits for renewable energy installations are difficult to
15Boo et al. (2017).
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obtain. In particular wind energy project developers in Switzerland face a significant
policy risk premium in the pre-construction stage that obstructs investments.16
Finally, there are innovation barriers, and with so many barriers to the innovation
process, companies sometimes lose focus on market needs and the evolving needs of
clients. Managements may have a historical bias and try to stick to the traditional
business model for too long.17
1.2 Review of the Literature on the Energy Transition
Progress
A recent report by the IEA on Energy Transition Indicators provides an overview of
global energy investments and a comprehensive analysis that can be used for future
work to develop an index showing the relative preparedness of countries for an
energy transition. One point clearly made in this framework by the IEA is that one
must look at data for the five underlying sectoral drivers (power generation, energy
integration, industry, buildings, and transport) as well as both energy supply and
energy demand indicators in order to assess the readiness of a country for an energy
transition.18 Focusing mainly on one part of the energy system, for example only the
oil and gas sector, would be insufficient and could be misleading.
Furthermore, before trying to learn from existing assessments of energy transition
progress, it is important to note that we must distinguish between developed markets
that have substantial infrastructure lock-in to overcome and emerging markets,
especially Sub-Saharan Africa, where technology leapfrogging is a distinct possi-
bility.19 Here we focus on the case of developed markets, those having infrastructure
lock-in to overcome and entrenched business models supported by stable regulatory
frameworks that have long existed. Indeed, energy transitions for countries where
leapfrogging is possible require another focus and other policy frameworks. More
research is needed in that area as well. In fact, an energy transition preparedness
index is needed for such countries as well, but it is necessary to consider them
separately. Mixing their energy transition analysis with that for developed countries
could prove to be too challenging and lead to unsatisfactory results for all country
types.
With regards to the energy transitions that most countries in developed markets
are experiencing today, most work in the literature seems to focus on the transfor-
mation of markets in the short term. For example, Schleicher-Tappeser looks at how
renewable energy will change the electricity markets in the next 5 years.20 The
16Ebers Broughel and Wüstenhagen (2021).
17Boo et al. (2017).
18IEA (2019a).
19This difference is also emphasized by Smil (2010).
20Schleicher-Tappeser (2012).
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author notes that increasing autonomy and flexibility of consumers challenge the
top-down control logic of traditional power supply and push for a more decentralized
and multi-layered system. The author explains that how rapidly and smoothly this
transformation occurs depends largely on the adaptation speed of the regulatory
framework and on the ability of market players to develop appropriate business
models. Other pieces of work, such as Cross et al., have looked at progress in
renewable energy and how this relates to targets in Europe.21 Finally, some pieces
of work have focused on specific market niches or specific applications and the
opportunities they offer for increasing flexibility. Such developments could either
create momentum towards a different type of energy system or simply allow our
existing systems to operate more efficiently. The flexibility that “aggregators” offer
to the existing system is an example for this.22
On the macro-level, energy transition assessments (and indicators) are now
available from various international institutions like the IEA,23 IRENA,24 and the
World Economic Forum.25,26 Furthermore, other related indexes are valuable
sources of energy- and policy-related indicators, such as the UN SDSN’s SDG
Index27 and the 2019 SDG Index and Dashboards Report for European Cities.28
However, individual institutes around the world also develop their own pieces of
work evaluating countries’ progress on the energy transition. It is important to
provide a deeper analysis of countries’ progress and movements towards an energy
transition, sometimes with a smaller set of countries, and not just global assessments
that tend to overlook important details and over-use aggregated data. An example of
a deeper analysis undertaken with fewer countries is the work of the German
Forschungsstelle für Energiewirtschaft (FfE) for a project called eXtremOS.29
Researchers, of course, must accept a trade-off each time they start a project of
21Cross et al. (2015).
22An aggregator (also called a “virtual power plant”) can create a sizable capacity similar to that of a
conventional generator and it can operate many distributed renewable energy sources together.
Aggregators can sell electricity or ancillary services in the wholesale market or in the system
operator’s ancillary services procurement. An aggregator contributes to the system’s flexibility
because it enables smoother integration of distributed energy resources into the power system
(IRENA 2019a, p. 49).
23IEA (2019a).
24IRENA (2019a, b).
25The 2019 Energy Transition Index (ETI) “provides scores for 115 countries spanning the many
dimensions of energy transition performance and enablers”. The Index aggregates 40 energy
transition indicators over these dimensions; this includes integrating information from data sources
that describe country levels of energy pollution, prices, supply chains, infrastructure, political
institutions, financial systems, human capital and more. “Country-specific scores are derived by
normalizing the individual indicators and applying a weighting framework” (WEF 2019a, p. 9).
26Singh et al. (2019).
27Sachs et al. (2019).
28Lafortune et al. (2019).
29The main objective of this project was to investigate the value of flexibility related to European
electricity market coupling (FFE 2020).
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this type, between comprehensive treatment of countries, markets, and technology
options as opposed to the deeper understanding brought by a focus on fewer
elements.
There are various energy transition assessments that have a special focus, such as
policy or climate pledge assessments. When it comes to policy reviews, the Regu-
latory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (RISE) benchmarks national policies and
regulatory frameworks on energy access, energy efficiency, and renewable energy.
Other pieces of work come from the IEA, PBL, and the Climate Action Tracker.30
What we found, however, is that few studies assess the capacity of countries for
business model innovation (especially not as related to the energy sector). This is of
course difficult to do with existing available indicators and data, but we must
develop new approaches to take into account qualitative aspects that are so important
for energy transitions, such as the ability to support business model change. One
realization as we attempted to develop our own index to measure countries’ progress
on the energy transition and their preparedness for an energy transition is that just
because an aspect cannot be easily tracked by available data and measured, this does
not mean it should not be part of an assessment. Otherwise, if this were the case,
countries (and companies) might tend to focus only on areas where measurement is
possible, even if investing in other avenues would finally be more transformative.
This dilemma is already hurting the reputation of Environmental, Social and Gov-
ernance (ESG) reporting and other corporate sustainability reporting schemes.31 The
potentially negative influence of simplification (for communication purposes) on
good decision-making does not only risk leading policy dialogues towards “quick
fixes” that do not address the core problems of the system, but it also allows for an
imbalanced importance of the media for consensus building and increases their
power to influence the direction of political decisions, whether they are aware of it
or not. The importance of the media and the need to manage governments’ commu-
nications about their climate strategies ahead of time was demonstrated in Duygan
et al.32 Adding the needed complexity to existing index projects around the world,
30The IEA Policy and Measures databases offer access to information on energy-related policies
and measures taken or planned to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve energy efficiency, and
support renewable energy development and deployment. The PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency provides the Climate Pledge Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)
tool, which projects country-level emissions to 2030, under the scenario of full implementation
of Paris Agreement NDCs and under the trajectory of current national climate and energy policies.
Finally, the Climate Action Tracker tracks the emission commitments and actions of countries and
provides an assessment of individual national pledges, targets and NDCs as well as currently
implemented policies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions (WEF 2018).
31Over the last years, many papers (e.g., Pojasek and Toolbox 2010; Hedstrom 2019) have looked
at the counter-productive impacts of reporting schemes used today to measure corporate sustain-
ability. Also, ESG reporting is shown to be taken-up by companies more due to a herding
phenomenon, which means that companies that report are not driven to report for value creation
purposes (Przychodzen et al. 2016). One could learn from this experience and avoid developing
energy transition reporting tools that do not create real value for stakeholders.
32Duygan et al. (2021).
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speaking about business model innovation as a key input for leadership, and not
simply accepting an assessment just because it achieved consensus in a given
industry setting is part of creating the appropriate dialogue needed for good
policy-making around the energy transition.
1.2.1 Oil and Gas
According to the IEA’s World Energy Investment Report of 2018, the oil and gas
sector is changing for a number of reasons. The report states, for example, that there
has been a broad shift in favor of projects with shorter construction times that limit
capital at risk. In addition, the oil and gas sector is changing because people and
investors are requesting it to change. The Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI),
which brings together 13 of the world’s top oil and gas companies, has pledged to
reach its methane intensity target of 20% by 2025, and energy companies are
increasingly shifting towards producing gas.33 Power-to-X technology innovations
also open up new opportunities for the oil and gas sector to integrate with the power
sector and allow for business model change.
In the future, one could also imagine self-consumption communities or industrial
parks working as microgrids and potentially producing excess energy that can be
stored and traded. Hydrogen can store such excess electricity, for example. This
would allow for revenue generation, even in the context of social housing projects if
they operated on a renewable-based microgrid, using technologies to control and
optimize demand and supply curves locally.34
The California Energy Commission (CEC) speaks about the experiences of
several microgrid projects around the world. One of them is the ENGIE “Center of
Excellence” microgrid in Singapore, where the most innovative aspect is probably
the integration or use of hydrogen as an energy storage medium.35 The report
explains that the system is targeting off-grid customers.36 Therefore, there are no
opportunities for traditional revenue streams that are tied to the grid. However, the
project proved the ability to use excess renewable energy to create hydrogen fuel for
transportation. Of course, for any future microgrid project, stored hydrogen could be
a potential revenue stream for other applications in the local, or regional, economy.
Selling hydrogen for local ground or marine transportation could be one revenue
stream. In terms of other areas of transition, energy efficiency has changed the game
33Bousso (2018).
34Cases and business models for microgrid projects, sometimes integrating the production of
hydrogen or other products, have been studied by several research projects. One was conducted
for the State of California in 2018 (CEC 2018), and more cases have emerged more recently around
the world such as in Sweden (Ali 2019).
35Excess renewable energy generated from wind and solar is converted into hydrogen via electrol-
ysis. Some of this hydrogen is diverted to motor vehicles, with the residual hydrogen combusted in a
fuel cell.
36CEC (2018).
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too. Prices for some efficient goods have continued to fall, and many energy efficient
investments are already cost-effective with relatively short payback periods.
More innovative business model changes are also happening in this sector, and a
transition from oil to gas is apparent in many countries around the world, having an
important impact on carbon emissions; however, critics say the industry is not doing
enough.37 Some examples of more innovative business models being explored at
least by certain companies are: (in the mobility business) capturing value by
switching to a services model as opposed to today’s traditional model of selling
fuel for transportation, for example, by charging customers per kilometer,
irrespective of the type of energy supplied.38
Some companies are exploring the possibility of “independent retailers”. Such
companies will not necessarily be involved in production activities, but they might
engage in new activities including commercializing fuels, LPG and/or electricity.39
Different business models will emerge. The authors of a recent report on the future of
oil companies predict that many of the International Oil Companies (IOCs) will
move in the direction of “energy holding” companies, while some large National Oil
Companies (NOCs) may try to prolong their existence through scale advantages in
the model of an “XXL oil company”.40 The report also notes that IOCs with limited
access to fossil resources and high exposure to environmental topics and customer
preferences will lead the “surpassing petroleum” trend.41
37Bousso (2018).
38Monzon et al. (2019), p. 68.
39They can also increasingly commercialize these fuels together with non-energy products and
services. In fact, the value of an international brand for fuel retailing may be limited today (Monzon
et al. 2019, p. 66). This is due to competitive barriers to capturing margins from new products and
services at petrol stations that are largely owned by third parties. These factors represent major
challenges for players that aspire to maintain their growth rates and levels of return on the capital
employed. To remain competitive, a strong innovation capability is therefore needed in the sector to
develop differentiated and viable customer-centric solutions.
40Monzon et al. (2019), p. 66.
41Monzon et al. (2019), p. 59.
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The Coronavirus and the Impacts of the Oil Shock of 2020 As we are
writing this chapter in March 2020, the coronavirus is rampaging country by
country, and many analysts are trying to understand what could be the
implications of the virus on the global economy. One of the sectors that is
already affected is the energy sector. At first the renewable energy sector was
affected (China holds elevated weight in the industry’s supply chain), but the
oil and gas markets were affected via the impact on demand for transport fuels,
too. This worsened due to uncoordinated supply management among the
largest oil producing countries. Some fear that meeting energy transition
goals will become even more challenging all around the world, and especially
in continents like Africa, if oil prices remain low. On the other hand, it is
difficult to predict what will happen. Lower oil prices also could lead countries
to undertake fossil fuel subsidy reforms more easily.42 Nevertheless, after the
coronavirus became a global pandemic in March 2020, some started to predict
that the oil shock of 2020 would lead to further challenges with regard to
meeting countries’ energy transition goals.43
New business models for cleaner energy systems will help, but if oil is very
cheap, even the best efforts to support business model innovation for clean
energy sources will have a limited impact. The only way out of this problem is
strict policies to support such business models for the energy transition, but
this can hardly be expected in many developing countries, especially after a
coronavirus pandemic and the various economic fallouts related to it. On the
other hand, in certain countries some smaller markets may still boom. For
example, today the off-grid solar market is booming around the world.
600 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa are currently without power.44
Lease models or what are called “pay-as-you-go” models for stand-alone
systems and other new business models combined with such technologies
will most likely still have a market in Africa. Energy efficiency and business
models for energy savings may have less uptake, but they will be valid in all
cases, no matter which fuels dominate markets in the future. However, issues
like transportation will become increasingly difficult to address all around the
world if fuel prices are too low. The key to transportation is indeed to reduce
the need for transportation or lower consumption, but we have seen how
(continued)
42Merrill et al. explain that it became easier to reform fossil fuel subsidies in the past when oil prices
were low (IISD 2017, p. 2).
43Montgomery (2020).
44Sioshansi (2018).
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countries have responded to low oil prices in terms of consumption patterns
and choice of vehicle (e.g., the rise in SUV sales in the United States after the
oil price collapse of 1986).45 As we are writing this, we also hope that COVID-
19 will not lead to a global economic downturn, resulting in job losses and
potentially political and social unrest. We know that during economic down-
turns people can develop attitudes that help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even
war.46 The energy transition will be more than a second priority under such
scenarios.
1.2.2 Power Generation and Flexibility Markets
While there are many aspects that we cannot cover in one chapter, it is clear that in
almost any energy transition the power sector integrates a high amount of renewable
energy. In a report by IRENA, the importance of power system flexibility is
highlighted.47 The Association for Renewable Energy & Clean Technology (REA)
evaluates a select number of countries regarding their flexibility services and other
related transition factors.48 These are specifically transition factors regarding flexi-
bility that can predict readiness for an energy transition at least for power generation
in a given country. The transition factors considered by REA are market access,
socio-political support, and technology potential. Regarding market access one
aspect that REA attempts to measure is whether regulation enables fair access for
all providers. With regard to socio-political support, REA looks at whether flexibility
needs are recognized but also if there is a supportive political and public consensus
and if public policy and regulation are aligned. Finally, regarding technology
potential, REA takes into account if the country enables grid accessibility, EV
infrastructure deployment, digitalization, and innovation.
According to REA, power systems must be able to operate in circumstances
where renewable energy output may vary significantly from hour to hour. As
generators are replaced by renewable energy generation with more volatile outputs,
45Gately (1986).
46Liu (2018).
47The report (IRENA 2018, p. 23) notes: “A power system can be considered flexible if it can cost-
effectively, reliably and across all time scales: (1) Meet the peak loads and peak net loads, avoiding
loss of load. (2) Maintain the balance of supply and demand at all times, and ensure the availability
of sufficient capability to ramp up and down, the availability of sufficient fast-starting capacity and
the capability to operate during low net loads. (3) Have sufficient storage capacity . . . to balance
periods of high VRE generation and periods of high demand but low VRE generation. (4) Incorpo-
rate capabilities to adjust demand to respond to periods of supply shortages or over generation.”
48REA (2019). REA is the Association for Renewable Energy and Clean Technology in the UK. It
is a not-for-profit trade association established in 2001 and a coalition built to be the voice for
renewable energy and clean technology in the UK, with 550 member organizations representing
every type of renewable energy.
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new providers of flexibility services are emerging, including distributed generation,
energy storage, and demand response.49 However, providers face barriers such as
limitations to access flexible power markets.
1.2.3 Coal
To measure any energy transition progress, it is key to look at how coal-fired power
generation is phasing out or continuing. The IEA tracks coal-fired power and reports
on trends.50 It found that coal generation in Asia—particularly China and India—
increased significantly, but it fell elsewhere, including in the United States and
Europe. Coal remains the largest source of electricity generation worldwide, with a
share of 38%.
The report notes that coal-fired power generation in the United States continued to
drop in 2018 (by 60 TWh) despite strong electricity demand growth, as 15 GW of
coal capacity were retired. As for Europe, coal generation also decreased
(by 20 TWh), mainly because of strong renewables-based expansion. Some coun-
tries have announced coal phase-outs: Germany, the largest coal consumer in
Europe, plans to be coal-free by 2038. However, many believe this is too late.
Despite the complexity of the situation, involving job losses in parts of the country,
the German public approves of the way the government has decided to deal with the
coal and nuclear phase-out.51
In this book chapter, we consider business model change opportunities and
policies to support these changes for different sub-sectors. For coal, the best option
is perhaps not to innovate the business model that makes coal investments work but
to rather slowly phase out of coal; but every country will have its strategy on what to
do and how to do this. In the future, geopolitical changes may even make coal
investments more attractive for some countries. As for those that are phasing out of
coal, there are different strategies for dealing with such phase-outs.
Historically, the traditional utility business model of selling electricity from large-
scale thermal power plants and expanding grids to meet rising demand has supported
strong balance sheets. In many markets, utilities serve as reliable purchasers of
power, and this facilitates investments by independent power producers. However,
today, as we face other priorities including climate change, air pollution, and the
energy transition, such investment decisions are becoming more complex. The
business model is simply less attractive than in the past. However, regulatory
frameworks can sometimes maintain business models which would otherwise
49REA (2019), p. 4.
50IEA (2019b).
51A look at the public approval of the energy transition law in Germany provides interesting
insights. Referring to a study by the Potsdam Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies
(IASS), Wehrmann and Wettengel (2019) point out that “a surprising finding was that support for
coal phase-out now enjoyed similar support as a nuclear phase-out, with approval by 63 percent of
the population.”
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phase out on their own for economic reasons. How the business models of utilities
interact with policies and market designs (including those that are now finally
changing) will have huge implications on a country’s energy and climate change
goals, especially when it comes to large-scale investment decisions like whether to
invest in and build new coal-fired power plants or not.
Decades ago, Europe started with the unbundling of vertically integrated compa-
nies and the establishment of wholesale markets and retail competition. In recent
years, the success of energy efficiency contributed to weaker electricity demand,
policies supporting renewables prompted competition from independent power
companies, and other challenges emerged. In short, these changes have weakened
price signals for investment in traditional energy projects (from energy-only mar-
kets) and reduced the profitability of existing generation assets that are dependent on
wholesale market revenues.52
Today, innovations in the energy sector, such as virtual power plants allowing
bilateral power exchange and increased roles for consumers and third parties to
provide energy, capacity and flexibility services, facilitate new business models and
allow for the reconfiguration of existing business models in the sector. New ways of
trading energy are also emerging. For example, peer-to-peer (P2P) trading encour-
ages more renewable energy distributed generation installations and increased local
use of energy resources. However, the regulatory treatment—for example, regarding
grid usage charges—must still evolve strongly before large-scale implementation of
P2P trading would be likely to provide any benefits to consumers.53 If P2P trading of
energy were allowed and self-consumption communities were further developed,
increasingly one could imagine a scenario where central thermal power plants will be
humanity’s energy solution of the past. Such thermal generation will have
completely new economics in the case of increased carbon pricing and once the
power market and its mechanisms evolve over time. New technologies, such as
battery storage even for on-grid storage, electric vehicles offering opportunities for
distributed storage, and other electrification trends have the potential to change
investment needs and approaches, thus opening up new opportunities but also
creating a completely different system to work with. These factors raise a number
of uncertainties for thermal power plants. However, today experiments with alter-
native systems are still not sufficient, and only a few countries54 are experimenting
with the latest technologies such as P2P trading for the time being.
52IEA (2017).
53IRENA (2019a), p. 49.
54For example, countries where P2P projects are in place include: Bangladesh (SOLShare),
Germany (Lumenaza, sonnenCommunity), the Netherlands (Vandebron, Powerpeers), the UK
(Piclo – Open Utility), and the United States (TransActive Grid) (IRENA 2019a, p. 49).
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1.3 The Impact of Digitalization
Digitalization is transforming every sector of the economy. Energy is no different.
However, the way energy will be transformed by digitalization is likely to be more
thought-through. The energy system requires reliable systems that have been well
tested due to its high importance to all the sectors of any economy. In Bürer, de
Lapparent, Pallotta et al., we elaborated on the risks that applying blockchain to the
energy sector could impose on the electricity system and the caution needed as the
reliability of service is so important for this sector. Meanwhile, there are many
benefits to the energy transition if we increasingly take advantage of digitalization,
for example with regard to energy efficiency. A range of challenging issues must be
addressed if the world is to harness digitalization for greater energy efficiency.
1.3.1 Business Model Change Due to Digitalization in the Power Sector
Digitalization can convert data into value for the power sector. The application of
digital monitoring and control technologies in the power generation and transmis-
sion domains has been an important trend for several decades. Switzerland aims to
modernize its economy and society by embracing digitalization and plans to take a
leading role in this domain. The Swiss digitalization action plan resonates with the
Energy Strategy 2050, which supports (i) the optimization of the power system as
opposed to only investing in traditional grid enforcement and (ii) the electrification
and decentralization of the energy system through digitalization.
Wider usage of smart meters and sensors, the application of the Internet of Things
and the use of large amounts of data with artificial intelligence have created
opportunities to provide new services to the system. Digital technologies support
the transformation of the power sector in several ways, including better monitoring
of assets and their performance, operations that are more refined and control closer to
real time, the implementation of new market designs, and the emergence of new
business models.55
Several recent reports have put the grid in the center of the power system and
discussed the issue of digitalization. Digital technologies can provide solutions for
the energy transition because they can be used to (1) allow for better flexibility in
energy systems, but also (2) to reduce energy intensity. For example, two reports
from IRENA and the World Economic Forum (WEF) have recently underlined these
aspects. IRENA indicates digitalization as a major driver for innovation and as a
solution to energy sector challenges.56 Meanwhile, a WEF report57 calls for attention
to the interconnectivity of the power system, in terms of both grid elements and
55IRENA (2019a), p. 31.
56IRENA (2019a).
57WEF (2019b).
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associated stakeholders. It also brings to light what impact a breach in the grid,
physical or cyber, can have on an entire economy and society.
Digital technologies like those used for communications, smart meters, and IT
systems are considered as enabling technologies for flexibility markets and therefore
for the integration of renewables into the energy system. In a report by REA, experts
were asked about various aspects supporting energy transition preparedness in nine
European flexible power markets. The report comes to the following conclusion:
In high scoring countries, digital technologies i.e. communications, dispatch, smart meters,
data standards, and IT systems across markets, are a key enabler for flexibility markets. In
lower scoring markets not all this digital infrastructure is in place.58
The IEA believes digitalization will also impact energy intensity. IEA’s “Energy
Efficiency 2019” provides an overview of where every country stands and how well
countries have done with regard to energy intensity.59 Beyond that, their emphasis
on digitalization as an enabler is of special interest to us. There is a benefit from
digitalization; however, it must be said that there can also be a cost to digitalization
in that digital technologies also consume energy. The report looks at various reasons
for the recent deceleration in energy efficiency progress, including the increasing use
of digital technologies around the world. However, the authors mostly focus on ways
in which digitalization is transforming energy efficiency and increasing its value.
The report explains that, through multiplying the interconnections between systems,
digitalization enables benefits from such interconnections (among buildings, appli-
ances, equipment and transport systems) to be tracked and efficiency gains to be
measured and valued more quickly and accurately than before.
Finally, the IEA has identified a set of critical policy considerations within its new
Readiness for Digital Energy Efficiency policy framework. This policy framework is
designed to ensure that the benefits of digital energy efficiency are realized through
policies that address a range of issues. These range from balancing data accessibility
with data privacy to helping remove regulatory barriers to innovation. The frame-
work also mentions policies to “encourage technology and business model
innovation”.60
Advancements in the decentralization of energy systems and electrification have
made digitalization more relevant over the last years. The many new assets (such as
many small generators on the supply side and many new loads from the electrifica-
tion of heat and transport on the demand side) have an impact on the power system
and make management and control very important for the energy transition and its
success. Digitalization can therefore enable the management of large amounts of
data and optimize systems with many small generation units.61
58REA (2019), p. 5.
59IEA (2019c).
60IEA (2019c).
61IRENA (2019c), p. 16.
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According to the report by IRENA, digitalization allows for enhanced commu-
nication, control and eventually automated smart contracts based on blockchain
technology62 that will allow distributed energy resources to be bundled by
“aggregators”.63 The authors say that digitalization will also enable enhanced
controllability—if assets could be controlled remotely and used for demand
response—, behind-the-meter generation, home energy management, and electric
vehicles (EVs). Finally, the authors believe that digitalization can increase flexibility
and enhance the ability to accommodate the intermittency of renewables. The report
also explains that digital technologies unlock the flexibility from different sources.
For example, the cost of grid integration can be cut by better managing various
devices such as EVs, battery management systems, demand response, and other
devices that intelligently control solar generation for daytime loads and storage for
night-time uses.64
The Internet of Things (IoT) also allows for data hub developments to support
electricity retail markets and other innovations.65 The IoT enables real-time com-
munication through the Internet, across the grid, and facilitates information gather-
ing and exchange. It also facilitates exchange of information among devices in
electricity demand centers (such as homes or commercial and industry facilities).
According to IRENA, the IoT, together with optimization algorithms, could increase
system flexibility by enabling remotely managed and/or rapid automatic changes in
distributed resources and demand.66 IoT can also allow for improved renewable
energy forecasting and trading and decreasing uncertainty.67
In this area of digitalization and with regards to new business models, it is
possible that the combination of new technologies (like blockchain) and new
policies such as those that allow the trading of energy savings can lead to new
business model opportunities.
Otherwise, in terms of trading energy, digital solutions, such as those based on
blockchain, can also be applied. Currently, the most uncertain application for energy
is peer-to-peer energy trading. However, business models that enable distributed
energy resources to provide services to the grid are much stronger so far.68 As for
62Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology that can be used to securely record all transactions
taking place on a given network. Blockchain potentially allows: (1) increased direct trading and
sharing of verifiable information, removing the need for the middleman and enabling newer / lower-
cost operating models on a smaller scale; (2) flexibility in the system, enabling decentralized
flexible energy sources to provide services to the electricity grid; (3) new markets and transactions
with products with a certified and trustable energy footprint; and (4) potential cyber security
benefits, IRENA (2019a), p. 46.
63IRENA (2019c), p. 16.
64IRENA (2019a), p. 45.
65NordREG (2018).
66IRENA (2019a), p. 45.
67IRENA (2019a), p. 45.
68Bürer et al. (2019) look at different use cases for blockchain in the energy sector and provide
insights on the key risks and opportunities for blockchain in light of the energy transition.
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peer-to-peer energy trading, blockchain technology allows transactions to be facil-
itated differently. Today they are facilitated by third parties, suppliers and system
operators, whose main tasks are centrally compiling information on loads and
generation or contracting supply and distribution services. Blockchain technology
enables new ways of organizing decentralized persons without the immediate need
for one centrally connecting entity, as explained in Diestelmeier.69 However, this
implies profound legal and policy consequences. Meanwhile, more research is
needed and a better understanding is required regarding the potential of blockchain
to enable a very different management system for electrical energy.70 Diestelmeier
identifies those main policy implications for EU electricity law and thereby adds to
the discussion on how blockchain technology could facilitate “prosumers” to
develop as independent market participants in the electricity sector from an energy
law perspective.71
Finally, digitalization leading to more streaming, data centers, data networks, and
other uses such as bitcoin also brings questions about increasing energy consump-
tion from digitalization, and it must be managed properly in order for a country to be
a leader in the energy transition.72
Digitalization offers some hope to companies that struggle (or will struggle) with
the economic threats that come from potentially too rapid scenarios for the energy
transition. This is explained in a WEFWhite Paper that provides examples of sectors
and specific firms that suffered major losses after disruptions (e.g., GE that lost
two-thirds of its capitalization in 2018 after it had to take a major write-down of its
turbines division).73 Digitalization has provided hope to such firms in some cases:
“[R]ecent history has also shown that many incumbents, especially in the electricity
sector, have been able to change business models and investment strategies to take
advantage of new opportunities centered more around energy services to customer,
renewables and the digitalization of energy.”74
1.3.2 Business Model Change Due to Digitalization in the Mobility
Sector
In Europe, data is available on electric vehicle charging points,75 electrified rail
lines,76 private expenditure in R&D in transport,77 the share of renewable energy in
69Diestelmeier (2019), p. 189.
70Bürer et al. (2019).
71Diestelmeier (2019), p. 194.
72Nouyrigat (2019).
73WEF (2019c).
74WEF (2019c), p. 24.
75The Netherlands being the leader in this area, followed closely by Denmark.
76Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria being leaders.
77Germany being a clear leader here.
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transport fuel consumption and the market share of electric passenger cars78 and
more. You can easily evaluate countries based on many indicators for which data is
currently collected.79 However, the mobility sector is quickly changing, pushed by
new technologies, including digital technologies, new business models and a young
generation that does not necessarily see the value in owning a car. Meanwhile, it is
more difficult to measure and track business model innovation by country for this
sector. One could track the uptake of digital technologies for the transportation
sector, but it is more difficult to track new business models.
Navigant has put out a white paper that explains the concept of “value stacking”
where business models are combined for innovative mobility concepts.80 In this
report, different business model options are reviewed from “infrastructure devel-
oper”, “charging service provider” and “load orchestrator” to “mobility provider”.
The report comes to the conclusion that in the near term, data sharing between
policymakers, utilities, and fleet operators could help anticipate needs for charging
infrastructure as mobility service fleets electrify.81 In terms of new business models
facilitated by digital technologies or smart-grid control systems, several options and
related business models are being conceived to support vehicle-to-grid (V2G)
concepts, where EVs are integrated intelligently into microgrids and sometimes
even used for distributed storage.82
Finally, a recent report by the European Joint Research Center (JRC) looks at the
role of Distribution System Operators (DSOs) in Europe in the development of smart
grid solutions.83 This study looks at the charging stations implemented by DSOs. As
the report says, remarkably, the vast majority of the DSOs in the dataset are not
owners of the charging points.
10% of the DSOs with charging points in their territory have mentioned that they own a
percentage of them. More than half of these DSOs operate less than the 9% of the charging
points. It is expected that the number of charging points will increase in the close future with
the expected increase of EVs. So far, the trend has been increasing.84
78Sweden being a clear leader in these two areas.
79European Commission (2019).
80Navigant (2019).
81This report and a report by the IEA (IEA 2019d) also speak about the intensive and distinct use
patterns of shared and/or automated fleets. These use patterns imply higher (and different) needs for
charging compared to private EVs. The availability and coverage of public and fast chargers could
be a critical factor in how quickly these fleets become electric and how business models evolve
around shared and/or automated mobility.
82It may also be worth mentioning that HEIG-VD is currently involved in a collaborative project
with Planair, an energy consulting company. HEIG-VD has been charged to study and help industry
stakeholders develop new business models in the context of V2G for a microgrid consisting of an
innovation park where solar PV installations on the buildings provide power and EVs could provide
distributed storage capacity to manage the microgrid.
83Prettico et al. (2019).
84Prettico et al. (2019), p. 56.
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The fact that the charging points are mostly owned by other entities shows that
business model change is potentially driven by forces outside the DSOs’ own
innovation ecosystem. Policies to support new business models using digital tech-
nologies from start-ups and new entrants in the mobility sector could be an important
policy strategy to pursue at this time, at least in the short term. In addition, policies
and funding programs allowing for experimentation (sandboxes) for the application
of digital technologies in the mobility sector, preferably programs matching incum-
bents with start-ups, could allow for further exploitation of potential gains from
digital technologies in the mobility sector.
2 Exploring the Regulatory Framework for Business Model
Change
Policy framework conditions to achieve business model reconfiguration—i.e.,
changes in the business models of Distribution System Operators (DSOs), Distribu-
tion Network Operators (DNOs), and Transmission System Operators (TSOs)—are
going to be different from the policy framework conditions that support business
model innovation by start-ups, spin-offs, and new entrants. The same is the case for
incumbents of the transportation sector (automakers, oil and gas distributors,
retailers of vehicles, and traditional firms in public transport) versus start-ups with
new business models in this field (e.g., start-ups offering car sharing with or without
electric vehicles and charging infrastructure, regional bus companies offering new
mobility services).
Furthermore, it is a combination of policies that is needed and a well coordinated
set of policies so that there are no extensive unintended impacts on other innova-
tions. One of the ways to block business model reconfiguration or innovation beyond
local or individual developments is via uncoordinated policy frameworks for indi-
vidual sub-sectors, as is currently the case for biomethane because each country has
different biogas regulations and agreements are missing.85 Meanwhile, each country
must develop policies that match local needs and that correspond to the level of
awareness of consumers.
The energy transition simply requires the participation of all stakeholders and this
is why new approaches are needed to address this challenge, such as design thinking,
co-creation, and systems thinking. This also means moving well beyond just carbon
pricing, although carbon pricing has created important incentives to move away
from fossil fuel energy sources and reduce consumption. In June 2019, 57 carbon
pricing initiatives were implemented or scheduled for implementation.86 Such
developments are helpful as indirect market-pull measures; however, more direct
85Mediavilla et al. (2013).
86This consists of 28 emission trading systems (ETS) in regional, national and subnational
jurisdictions and 29 carbon taxes, primarily applied on a national level. In total, these carbon
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market-push and market-pull measures are needed now, especially those supporting
business model innovation that has the potential to transform the industry while
creating opportunities for growth.
We divide our discussion into examples of policies blocking business model
developments and policies promoting business model developments for both actors
(incumbents and start-ups or new entrants). Due to the limited space of this book
chapter, we focus more on power generation and in particular on renewable energy.
Therefore, an in-depth assessment including all sub-sectors cannot be provided. An
overview of some business model innovation successes (and failures) in the trans-
portation sector can be found in a paper by Wells.87 In this paper, we explore
progress with regard to business model changes in the area of electric vehicle
charging.
Finally, we will discuss the results from our workshop and conclude with findings
relevant to our ongoing work—the development of an Energy Transition Prepared-
ness Index (the first version of which will be launched in 2021).
2.1 The Context for Business Model Change for DSOs
in Europe
According to the IEA, electricity sector investments have a strong relationship with
government policies. Furthermore, according to the IEA, around three-quarters of
utility earnings now stem from segments that offer more stable and predictable cash
flows, such as networks and generation (e.g., renewables, co-generation, and some
thermal power plants) that benefit from contracted or regulated pricing.88 European
utilities are strategically re-orienting their businesses to adapt to the situation. Utility
planning now emphasizes themes around business model transformation, enhanced
operational efficiency, and improved financial management.
The European electricity industry association has also called for a new strategic
vision for the sector. However, this ongoing change has not yet resulted in an
earnings boost, according to the IEA. They explain that one reason is that business
models for grids and renewables are capital-intensive, requiring continuous invest-
ment over time to expand revenues.89 Some EU member countries also have trouble
meeting their renewable energy targets because support levels offered for renewable
energy sources are too low and may be below long-term marginal costs. Also, there
pricing initiatives cover 11 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2 e) or about 20% of global
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is sometimes insufficient electricity grid capacity to integrate renewable energy
sources.90
Meanwhile, as for investment capabilities, European utilities are increasing their
expenditures. In November 2017, six utilities collectively called on the European
Union to support a strengthened renewable energy target of 35% by 2030, compared
with an originally proposed target of 27%.91 At the same time, the electricity sector
has also witnessed rapid growth in new, less capital-intensive business models that
leverage digital technologies to provide system and consumer services.92 However,
current regulations do not necessarily provide the incentives for such investments
and the value proposition for utilities, developers, and system operators is still not
clear.
A report by the European Joint Research Center (JRC) also provides an overview
of the situation of DSOs in Europe.93 The context for business model transformation
in the energy sector is very complex and different in each country. Some DSOs have
the capacity for lower transaction costs under certain new business model scenarios,
while others will have clearly higher transaction costs for certain technological
innovations and business model opportunities until the framework conditions
change. Others can benefit from scale and from their scope (and importance) in the
country, allowing for creativity to develop into new business opportunities. Some
countries allow sandboxes for experimentation. Other DSOs can more easily utilize
synergies with network investments. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to devel-
oping regulations (and legislation) for business model innovation, but experiences in
one country can be used in another to allow for increasingly intelligent policy-
making over time. Some policies will open up opportunities for new entrants to play
a role in offering services to individual communities, and perhaps other countries
will develop policies allowing for start-ups to bring in new technologies and
business models where incumbents continue to maintain their connection to the
customer.
90Ali et al. (2017).
91Reuters (2017).
92One model is the Virtual Power Plant (VPP) model that aggregates and trades small-scale energy
resources on wholesale markets and provides coordinated balancing and ancillary services to grid
operators. Asset-light business models of this kind can limit the network size to meet peak demand
and have the potential to defer expensive future capital upgrades; see IEA (2017).
93See Prettico et al. (2019).
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2.2 Policies Blocking Business Model Developments
2.2.1 For the Electric Power Sector
The electric power sector includes many sub-sectors where important innovation is
happening with regard to the energy transition and where policies can support, or
block, innovations including business model innovation.
The Case of Microgrids and Local Energy Ownership Models
Many types of barriers exist for microgrids, from infrastructure to technical barriers,
to public acceptance and environmental issues, to economic, market and financial
barriers. But it is the regulatory and administrative barriers that remain the over-
arching issue for microgrids. Administrative issues can arise from the length,
complexity and non-transparency of permitting procedures or from the lack of
clear responsibilities and skills within the local and national authorities. In many
countries, microgrids as energy distribution systems are still within a grey area in
terms of regulation and legal status.
[T]here are no specific policies and regulations formulated for distributed generation
(DG) and microgrid (MG) systems in the European Union. Each EU member state trans-
poses the mentioned directives following the particularities of their national energy policies
and regulatory frameworks for the promotion and development of renewable energies and
microgrid systems.94
In Europe, managing a local distribution grid is a regulated activity. There are
specific rules about who is allowed to deal with these configurations and in which
cases. Completely islanded or grid-connected microgrids both represent a new
development for energy regulators because they will entail updating the rules of
the game. At the same time, regulators will need to completely reform the electricity
tariff system that was established years ago for very centralized systems.
In a report by Gancheva et al. for the EC, lessons for local energy ownership
models and an analysis of key barriers are also provided. The report explains that the
first barrier relates to the legal standing of community energy, i.e., the constraints
imposed by national legal frameworks that limit the conditions under which an
energy community can be formed and operate. For example, securing access to the
national electricity grid is vital for community energy projects. Examples showed
that the costs, delays, and uncertainty associated with connection to the grid repre-
sent major barriers for groups developing community energy projects. Rules about
the operation and connection of renewable energy sources and their systems in
general affect the development of RE communities. As was shown in Germany,
granting powers to local authorities by the national law helped the success of
community energy in the federal states (Bundesländer). Therefore, the report
94Ali et al. (2017), p. 6.
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concludes that clear definitions and rules are needed while keeping some flexibility
in order to allow the various models of local energy ownership to flourish.95
The Case of Storage
Regulatory support for storage can be expected to vary around the world, but many
feel it is a game changer for renewables and should be supported by specific policy
frameworks. In a report by STORY, a Horizon 2020 funded project,96 the authors
explain that our energy system will have to tap into much-needed sources of
flexibility if the EU’s ambitious target of 32% renewables by 2030 is to be met.
Energy storage will be a part of the mix to ensure the effective integration of
intermittent renewable energy sources while maintaining grid stability. Energy
storage can play a role in several areas: in the wholesale, the balancing, or the
ancillary services market. However, for all areas, it is essential that barriers to entry
be removed. The report explains that although market design changes may help to
overcome certain obstacles, they are not enough to make the business case for energy
storage viable. Similarly, appropriate tariffs are needed, but they are not sufficient by
themselves. The report also explains that the EU has subsidized renewables, but it is
not inclined to do the same for storage, where the EU seems to be banking on R&D
support programs. The hope is that innovation alone will help to further reduce the
costs of storage technologies. Meanwhile, the United States did not wait for the costs
of storage to drop. It has set targets for energy storage, granting subsidies to support
those targets, similarly to its policy on renewables. Several states have already
imposed energy storage deployment targets and in other states, target processes are
underway. An order by the US Federal Energy Regulation Commission FERC
(issued in February 2018)97 requires the creation of participation models for energy
storage across the country in order to remove barriers to the participation of electric
storage resources in the capacity, energy and ancillary services markets operated by
regional transmission organizations and independent system operators. In specific
states, different needs for storage have different regulatory implications. For exam-
ple, in California, PG&E’s landmark energy storage solicitation where batteries were
to replace fossil fuel generation on the power grid attracted attention in past years.98
It was the first time a utility and its regulators have sought to directly replace multiple
95Gancheva et al. (2018), p. 25.
96Broeckx et al. (2019), p. 18.
97Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (2018): Electric Storage Participation in Markets Oper-
ated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, Order
No. 841, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127, available at https://www.ferc.gov.
98Switching to batteries can lead to decreased reliance on gas. In the case of California, state
regulators were already planning for three fossil fuel power plants to retire. They ordered PG&E to
seek alternatives to the generators.
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major power plants via battery storage. The request was approved by US federal
regulators (FERC).99
In Switzerland there is also a legal framework supporting storage, but it is likely
to evolve to facilitate the energy transition. Schreiber (2021) goes into more details
about the current legal framework related to storage in Switzerland that exempts
pump hydropower plants from paying grid fees but does not provide a clear
framework for new storage technologies yet. He also explains the interesting role
of private industry associations in the absence of a specific legislation on the other
storage technologies. It is interesting to note that companies are driving the devel-
opments in this area probably because they see the potential for new business models
related to other storage options in Switzerland.100 A good overview of the political
frameworks in place today, the legislation that is being introduced, and other
developments is provided by Global Legal Insights.101 Beyond federal legislation
and regulation, since 1990, all cantons have drawn up their own energy legislation
and regulations. In the Canton of Vaud, for example, one of the strategic axis areas in
terms of infrastructure to support the energy vision of the Canton is to develop
infrastructure for the storage of energy and to favor the convergence of grids.102 New
IT tools that are being developed and new management strategies and technologies
will increasingly also allow the convergence of grids, including gas and power grids.
Oversizing both networks is not the best solution when alternative approaches are
apparent.103 As tools continue to be developed to help cantons, cities, and individual
companies better manage their grids and the existing infrastructure, innovations in
business models will emerge together with new technological options (storage-
related or other), and subsequently policy frameworks will be called to evolve in
order to become better suited to energy transition strategies on the local, regional,
and national levels.
Regarding the question whether Switzerland will follow or diverge from the EU
on storage, the relationship between Swiss and EU legislation has to be analyzed.
The recast Electricity Market Design Directive, part of the EU’s Clean Energy for
All legislative package, includes measures to adapt the EU electricity policy
99Bade (2018).
100The Swiss Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung), the Energy Act (Energiegesetz), the CO2
Act (CO2-Gesetz), the Nuclear Energy Act (Kernenergiegesetz) and the Electricity Supply Act
(Stromversorgungsgesetz) are all integral parts of the instruments defining a sustainable and modern
Swiss energy policy. In addition, energy policies at the cantonal level as well as the federal level are
also based on the presentation of energy perspectives as well as on strategies, implementation
programs, and the evaluation of measures at the municipal, cantonal and federal levels. Therefore,
policies in Switzerland will evolve to facilitate the transition in each canton.
101GLI (2020).
102DIREN (2019).
103We developed a software tool under a project supported by the H2020 (the Horizon 2020
European funding program) called IntegrCiTy for the optimized development and management
of gas and power grids, see: http://iese.heig-vd.ch/projets/integrcity. For this project, we worked
with industry stakeholders to develop business model options for the software in a design thinking
workshop held with local gas and power industry stakeholders in 2018.
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framework for the clean energy transition, including measures to enhance flexibility
and enable consumer participation in energy markets.104 Furthermore, energy stor-
age is also recognized as a distinct asset class in the directive, separate from
generation. The measures are expected to facilitate energy storage investments.
However, individual Member States still need to implement this directive into
national law, and Switzerland will pursue this direction as well. The consulting
company Norton Rose Fulbright has produced a report about the situation for
storage, including an analysis of the regulatory environment. They mention that
“the provisions of the directive entitling transmission system operators (TSOs) and
distribution system operators (DSOs) to own and operate storage assets under certain
circumstances may result in narrower or broader markets for storage services offered
by independent storage operators in different Member States.” Member States can
now make strategic decisions to enable consumers to shift their demand, to allow
self-consumption (like in Switzerland) and storage, and to enable dynamic time-of-
use tariffs as part of their implementation of this directive. The authors explain that
the same is true for the role of aggregators and local energy communities addressed
by the directive. Finally, the authors expect the rollout of smart meters to become
increasingly important to enable the intended flexibility.105
Norton Rose Fulbright explore other examples of legal barriers for storage in their
report.106 For example, the report explains the current situation in France, where,
except for pumped storage, energy storage remains limited, but a forecast recently
published by CRE, the French energy regulator, reports a potential for energy
storage of between 1 and 4 GW by 2030. The report covers several legal and
commercial challenges for energy storage projects in France. Moreover, the French
feed-in tariffs regime for electricity production favored the direct injection of
electricity into the grid rather than its storage. Therefore, the report comes to the
conclusion that multiple factors have hindered the emergence of an energy storage
market in France.
2.2.2 For the Heating and Cooling Sector
In this section, we explore under which circumstances policies are blocking
(or otherwise promoting) new business models and technologies in the heating and
cooling sector, but also how sometimes other policies can cause unintended effects
and reduce the incentives for such developments. According to a recent report on
cities, two key elements are necessary for the sustainable energy transition to
104The directive aims to reduce the barriers to energy storage. It mandates fair rules in relation to
network access and charging. It also mandates non-discriminatory and competitive procurement of
balancing services. A wide definition of “energy storage” was chosen in the directive. That
definition encompasses both reconversion to electricity and conversion into another energy carrier,
like hydrogen gas; see NRF (2019).
105NRF (2019).
106NRF (2019).
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succeed: first a more rapid deployment of renewables in the sector and second
widespread electrification in all economic sectors. The report explains that cities
have a unique role to play in this mission. First, the heating and cooling sectors are
local markets. Second, cities have an influence at a local level, and they can
encourage their residents and other citizens to support the energy transition. For
heating and cooling systems, the development of urban renewable heating and
cooling markets is key to decarbonizing these sectors, the report explains.107
The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) of the EU108 outlines
specific measures for the building sector, updating and amending many provisions
from the 2010 EPBD. In Switzerland, many provisions exist to improve energy
efficiency in buildings, but at present, approximately 50% of Switzerland’s primary
energy consumption is attributable to buildings: 30% for heating, air-conditioning
and hot water, 14% for electricity and around 6% for construction and mainte-
nance.109 New business models, e.g., combining business models for renewable
energy with investment models for energy efficiency improvements, could incite
investors to invest more in insulation, refurbishments, etc. New business models for
buildings are also tracked in a report by Boo et al.110 and another review of business
models for renewable energy in the built environment was conducted by
Würtenberger and Bleyl.111 Indeed business innovation in the building sector is
occurring all along the industry value chain, starting with the re-design of project
delivery models and energy performance solutions and including deep renovation.
Service-oriented business models are leading the way towards a greener building
industry, in which there is considerable cross-sectoral collaboration.112
Affordable and reliable options to decarbonize the provision of heating and
cooling in urban areas now include solar thermal, bio-heat and geothermal technol-
ogies. Renewables combined with energy efficiency improvements in cities have
enabled the development of “net zero” buildings and districts. Solar thermal systems
on building façades and rooftops as well as modern biomass stoves and boilers are
also stand-alone solutions now available in many cities.113 A report prepared by the
IEA about the German energy transition states that the government is still in the
process of formulating a decarburization plan for the heating sector—which
accounts for over 50% of final energy consumption.114
Nevertheless, in terms of energy efficiency, legal measures are starting to drive
improvements in both Switzerland and Germany. In Germany, the Climate Action
107REN21 (2019b), p. 13.
108Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the
energy performance of buildings, Official Journal L153, 13–35.
109Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019).
110Boo et al. (2017).
111Würtenberger and Bleyl (2012).
112Boo et al. (2017).
113REN21 (2019a), p. 22.
114IEA (2020).
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Programme 2030 contains important measures for the heating sector.115 However,
policies and innovative measures that push for business model changes in the heating
sector should be further explored in future research work. For example, there may be
opportunities where new business models combined with innovative policy-making
create incentives for energy efficiency improvements in existing buildings at the
same time that investors invest in eco-villages or self-consumption communities,
and this could be backed by specific policies and measures, locally or on the regional
level.
2.3 Policies Promoting Business Model Developments
When we interviewed executives at the start of the SCCER CREST project, all
executives across the board from technology providing firms to energy distribution
companies to ICT firms in the energy business said that in order to have a successful
energy transition, we need new business models, but in order to see these new
business models emerge in the energy sector, we need new regulatory frame-
works.116 Indeed, according to the IEA, across all power sector investments, more
than 95% of investment is now based on regulation or contracts for remuneration.117
Investment in energy efficiency is particularly linked to government policy, often
through energy performance standards. Likewise, it is clear and well-known that
business models in the energy sector can only be successful if supported by
regulatory frameworks and good legislation. Some examples of how policies support
business model innovations are provided in this section.
2.3.1 For the Transportation Sector
Beyond the measures that are applied today (e.g., taxes for fuel, incentives for clean
vehicles, and funding for public transportation), governments can also play a role in
more directly creating business model change in the transportation sector in specific
115This includes measures such as tax relief for energy-efficient refurbishment of buildings. It also
includes a premium for exchanging oil heaters for new, efficient heating systems. Finally, it includes
the expansion of heat grids and district heating with a view to integrating renewable energy sources
into heating networks (especially in densely populated areas). This strategy is also pursued in
Switzerland in some regions. As for Germany, as the intended carbon tax will also apply to heating
emissions, it is expected to bolster existing energy efficiency efforts in the sector (IEA 2020).
116Structured interviews were held with executives (or middle-managers) at ten major corporate
entities in the energy sector, with interviews held from 2014 to 2016 and in different locations
(Zurich, London, Lausanne, and on the phone with several other firms). For confidentiality, we have
decided to withhold the names of the firms. They comprise firms in the energy technology business
and the ICT business as well as utilities companies active in both distribution and production. We
also interviewed two major auto manufacturers.
117IEA (2018a).
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areas. Governments can transform their transportation concepts and promote elec-
trification. Such electrification is a new type of power demand for utilities and helps
to drive innovation and decarbonization.
Governments, particularly municipalities, can provide their communities with
access to greater transportation and fueling options through the T2G (Transporta-
tion-to-Grid) platform. However, today this is not a full reality yet in many cities.
Most cities are still experimenting with such concepts and platforms. These efforts
could support municipality goals such as addressing climate change. More simply,
municipalities could provide more and more charging points for the public in cities,
as is being done on a pilot basis today in Basel.118 Novel types of public-private
partnerships with innovative financing schemes can be explored by cities, together
with their local stakeholders. Another area for work to be done is defining new city
planning rules to allow for both improved livability in a city and reduced emissions.
Design thinking and co-creation workshops with urban dwellers could help develop
solutions adapted to various specific sets of users. Comparing a city’s status and
accomplishments to general guidance and best practices for urban planners could be
a starting point for deciding on where a city needs the most help and ideation inputs
from inhabitants. Some guidelines are reviewed by Kodukula.119
In the transportation sector, standards for new vehicles sold or taxes to change the
purchasing behavior of people with regard to vehicles help. However, they do not
create special opportunities for business model developments or business model
innovation. Policies in the transportation sector must start to become more strategic.
First, they must aim to decarbonize energy carriers and fuels, vehicles, and
infrastructure. Second, incentives for such investments in infrastructure together
with innovative local policies are needed. Furthermore, integrating public transport
investments with private (passenger) transport business models needs to be further
explored. If demonstrations prove these integrated concepts to be of interest to
private investors, perhaps driven by prosumer-led business models intended for
city inhabitants, then policies and specific programs could be developed to specif-
ically promote such integration. For example, one idea is to use the DC network of
public transport for the integration of Photovoltaics (PV) and as a charging point for
electric vehicles (EV). The aim of this integration is to stabilize the DC network of
public transport and to offer new services and modes of supply. Such a configuration
and its potential is studied in the framework of a project conducted at our school
(HES-SO) called Projet InterHubEN.120 Third, policy frameworks can support
strategic value chains and create conditions for new business models in terms of
118Some of these charging points are available in covered parking structures. Today just 10 parking
places in the blue zone areas in the city are available with one hour more of parking than normally is
the case in this blue parking zone and free unlimited parking during the night and the weekend. Each
parking spot reserved for electric vehicles is equipped with a sensor so that users can use an
application to know where public charging stations are available in the city.
119For cities that are revising their land-use plans or transport plans several recommendations such
as linking land use and transport planning are made and summarized in Kodukula (2018).
120https://heig-vd.ch/rad/groupes-transversaux/hub-mobilit%C3%A9/ra-d/projet-interhuben.
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supply chains. Policies can help reduce investment risks for the development of
battery industry value chains, for example. Strengthened funding for battery
manufacturing can be coupled with requirements regarding the sustainability of
battery cell manufacturing and therefore improve the transparency of the raw
material supply chains.121 Such innovations are on the level of sustainable innova-
tive supply chain management, but they could also integrate new commercial
business models. Finally, policies could also be developed to support utilities and
energy providers that wish to redefine themselves. Utilities as electric distribution
providers have the opportunity to enter the transportation business by delivering
electricity to plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) and extending their networks to
support PEV charging infrastructure. Transportation electrification is an opportunity
for utilities to proactively redefine the nature of customer engagement in a new
scenario where customers will increasingly have access to distributed renewables
and energy storage and opportunities to engage with third-party energy service
providers, thus threatening the utility business model.
2.3.2 For the Electric Power Sector
The basic context for DSOs in Europe and the changes they are experiencing
regarding their business models were already discussed in the introduction to this
section. We have also reviewed good governance frameworks for renewable
energy,122 although good governance of the electric power sector is much wider
than just good governance regarding renewables. In IRENA’s report on power
system flexibility, the fact that flexibility in the system must respond according to
the time scales that are relevant to renewable resources is explained. Many policies
that support renewable energy, such as policies allowing for technologies adding
flexibility in the market, were already reviewed in earlier sections of this chapter. Via
the IRENA Knowledge Framework for power sector transition, IRENA has devel-
oped over twenty indicators allocated in the following macro-sectors (which indicate
readiness for the energy transition): flexibility, transmission, demand response and
storage, interconnectors, operation, and markets. More work is needed in each area
to understand how new business models can apply in each case and which policies
can be developed to support them.123
121IEA (2019e).
122Some elements of a good renewable energy governance for the electric power sector are
highlighted in a report by IEA (2018b). According to the report, good governance of the energy
transition should include: (1) renewable energy policies on end-use sectors, not just power gener-
ation, (2) support for heating and cooling applications of renewables by dedicated targets, technol-
ogy mandates, financial incentives, generation-based incentives and carbon and energy taxes,
(3) evolved policies in the power sector to address new challenges, (4) measures supporting the
integration of variable renewable energy, and (5) consideration of holistic policies considering
factors beyond the energy sector itself.
123IEA (2018b).
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There is also a need to consider reforming the basic model that allows for
investments in the grid. This is also important to keep renewable energy sources,
which may be produced at distance, connected to the grid. Some countries are better
prepared for increasing renewables integration in their grids and others less. One of
the ways to better adapt a regulatory framework in the energy sector for renewables
is to adapt the cost allocation schemes of a country, sometimes allowing for very
shallow cost allocation schemes for cost allocation structures associated with
connecting renewable generation to the existing transmission network. Madrigal
and Stoft review various structures already implemented in some European
countries.124
3 Insights from our Expert Workshop
On 20 January 2020, we conducted a workshop with experts from different parts of
the energy sector—in equal numbers with regard to the type of stakeholder—from
start-ups to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to DSOs to academics and
consultants in the energy sector. In order to facilitate the workshop and allow for an
open discussion of the results, 15 participants were invited to the workshop and
finally 12 participants and two organizers were present. The ideation workshop took
place over three hours and was comprised of a quick introduction to our work
followed quickly by four break-out working sessions. In these sessions, the partic-
ipants worked on different tasks. First, they worked on what they individually
thought were the conditions for an energy transition in general and shared this
with their group. Second, they identified (using post-its) the conditions in the short
term versus the long term as well as conditions necessary for Switzerland versus
other countries—organizing the thoughts from the first brainstorming session and
categorizing them on the chart we drew on the white board. In these first two break-
out groups, both groups followed the same task and their results were combined later
on. Then groups were asked to mix again and work together to discuss the conditions
for incumbents to create business model reconfiguration in a more detailed manner
(in one group). The other group was asked to consider the conditions for start-ups,
SMEs, and new entrants to bring new business models or business model innovation
to the sector. Participants were also asked to provide measurable indicators that
could be used in our research work for the building of our Energy Transition
Preparedness Index.
The participants always worked in two groups with participants mixing each time
a new task was started to form a new group dynamic and in order to mix expertise
and create a maximum level of creative potential for each of the topics addressed.
Finally, they were asked to divide again into new groups in order to provide their
inputs on new sources of data that we can use for developing measurements or
124Madrigal and Stoft (2012).
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indicators. Another group discussed methodologies that could be used to advance
the research framework that had already been prepared by the research group.
The results of this workshop clearly showed that participants from across the
value chain or ecosystem and across industries believed that policies were a key
condition for driving business model change. Many policy options were suggested in
the first and second brainstorming sessions. Both groups generated a diversity of
policy suggestions to drive an energy transition. However, the most important
findings for our research work concerned the conditions for business model
reconfiguration versus business model innovation for start-ups and new entrants.
These inputs will serve to inform the development of the Energy Transition Pre-
paredness Index that we are building at HEIG-VD.
3.1 Energy Transition Pre-Requisites Based on Time
and Country/Region Context
Time elements (such as the short term versus the long term) and space elements
(such as geographical space considered) affect the assumptions one makes when
considering what is needed for any given energy transition. From the workshop
session on the time versus space perspective, Table 1 presents the combined results
based on the time elements and space elements. We asked participants to note what
were elements creating preparedness for an energy transition in each context and to
try to indicate aspects that could be measured (as well as propose real indicators that
could be used in our index).
3.2 Changes Needed to Support Business Model
Reconfiguration
The key elements that participants viewed as important in terms of impacting
business model reconfiguration were:
• lobbies (size, power, motivation)
• R&D investments
• country energy mix (production)
• organizational structure and impacts of companies (aspects such as culture,
turnover, organizational structure, energy footprint, environmental impacts of
plants and production)
What we learned from this was that especially a measure for lobbies in a country
had not been taken into account in our preparation of the Energy Transition
Preparedness Index. We will have to find a value or proxy for measuring the
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power of lobbies eventually, but in the meantime, we could use the SDG Index to
obtain measures for good governance.
3.3 Changes Needed to Support Business Model Innovation
The key changes that participants viewed as important for creating the conditions for
business model innovation (for start-ups, SMEs and new entrants) were:
• grants and funds available for start-ups
• good universities ¼ universities that produce a lot of entrepreneurs
• number of organizations that bridge start-ups and industry
• number of start-ups met by incumbent companies
• number/value of angel investors in energy
Table 1 Elements important for an energy transitiona
Selected elements important for Switzerland
Elements important in the short term:
• pilot projects with new tech & business
models
• spending on renewable research
• consciousness of people
• financial incentives
• cheaper rail travel
• technology to limit reinforcement of the
electricity grid (maximize assets)
• legal framework
Elements important in the long term:
• preventing PV cannibalization (maintaining long-
term profitability)
• geopolitical independence
• recycling infrastructure for PV
• personal energy management conducted by resi-
dential consumers in the same way as financial
management (user-friendly)
• the financial sustainability of the energy transition
model
Elements important for all countries
Elements important in the short term:
• policies to push renewables
• regulation on the use of gas
• push full EVs (not plug-in hybrids)
• EU regulation for charging infrastruc-
ture at home
• road tax for EVs not before 2026
• CO2 standards for new vehicles sold
• battery-powered trains
• country-level investments in Distributed
Energy Resources (DER) roll-out
• digitalization vision at country level
• change management inside of firms
• consumer evolution towards prosumers
• political consensus to move away from
“dirty” production
Elements important in the long term:
• get out of fossil fuel energies (coal, fuel)
• lower CO2 everywhere with incentives
• competitive pressure on energy distributors (create
urgency to act)
Things that can be measured:
• renewable installed capacity (power and heat gen-
eration)
• tech innovation around energy production,
exchange, local consumption
• availability of new technologies for production and
distribution
• legal and regulatory framework (e.g., updated
norms, incentives for housing refurbishment . . .)
• charging infrastructure and other key infrastructure
investments
• education to raise awareness and social
responsibility
aBased on the initial brainstorming by workshop participants on January 20, 2020 at HEIG-VD in
Yverdon-les-Bains, Switzerland
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• funded mentors
• number of policies promoting innovation and helping to add urgency
Participants strongly believed that SMEs and start-ups must receive support to
bridge the gap towards incumbents and that rather simple solutions such as increased
numbers of mentors to link start-ups to incumbents could help in this respect. With
regards to quantification and measurement of preparedness, the quality of mentor-
ship (and other) programs will, however, be difficult to estimate.
In any case, the full results of this session combined with the knowledge we have
gained from our ongoing database development will help us develop three
sub-indexes of the Energy Transition Preparedness Index:
• Sub-Index 1: Comparing countries by their general infrastructure and investments
• Sub-Index 2: Comparing countries by antecedents for business model
reconfiguration (for incumbents)
• Sub-Index 3: Comparing countries by antecedents for business model innovation
(for start-ups, SMEs, and new entrants)
Fig. 1 Elements of an energy transition and its interacting systems
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4 Additional Considerations for Good Governance of an
Energy Transition
4.1 The Contribution of the Finance Sector
Between the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2016 and the end of 2018,
cumulative bank finance for fossil fuels amounted to $1.9 trillion. Global subsidies
for fossil fuel consumption reached an estimated $300 billion in 2017, an 11%
increase from the $270 billion in the year before and about double the estimated
support for renewable power generation.125 In addition, one estimate places the true
cost of fossil fuels at upwards of $5.2 trillion.126 Meanwhile, rich developed
countries, including European countries, continue to invest in dirty energy projects
around the world via export credit agencies. According to a review on financing for
dirty energy projects, export credit agencies (ECAs) from G20 countries were
responsible for $5.6 billion in annual support for coal projects between 2013 and
2015 or 57% of all public finance for coal.127
With regard to carbon pricing, the report explains in some detail that recognizing
the cost of carbon emissions, governments are working on pricing carbon so that the
market internalizes this cost and investment decisions are made accordingly. Mean-
while, public finance for the production of fossil fuels effectively acts as a negative
price on carbon emissions. This is why reforming ECAs should happen in parallel to
putting in place carbon pricing schemes around the world.
According to the WEF, the “rapid approach” to the energy transition does not
deny that fossil fuels will continue to play a major role in energy markets for decades
to come.128 Growth in the core markets of major energy players may turn to decline
and the effects may be priced by financial markets even before supply peaks.
Moreover, the report explains that once a tipping point is reached, financial markets
will tend to speed up the pace of change by constraining capital to declining
industries and reallocating it to those that are growing. Moreover, regulations will
most likely eventually change to reduce the lawsuits of companies and even state-
owned companies against countries for their abrupt legal decisions regarding the
energy transition.129 But, of course, these effects do not happen alone. They happen
125IISD (2017).
126REN21 (2019a).
127According to Doukas et al. (2017), p. 4, a few country actors are responsible for the majority of
this financing, with Japan and China in particular standing out along with South Korea and the
United States. The report states that “Japan is the largest provider of public finance for fossil fuels –
for both oil and gas, and coal – with $16.5 billion annually in support between 2013 and 2015
compared to $2.7 billion annually in support for clean energy.”
128WEF (2019c).
129In a blog by IISD, the Energy Charter Treaty and its implications on countries wishing to change
laws affecting investments in the nuclear or coal sector are explained (IISD 2019).
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because of a concerted effort to get to the root of the problem—the way fossil fuels
are financed and the level of investments in this sector.
Today countries can instead invest in green bonds and other green financial
instruments with public money, while they reduce their investments in dirty energy
projects. Green finance centers are emerging everywhere in the world from
New York to London originally and to countries like South Africa, Morocco,
Kazakhstan, and others today. Africa is expected to attract significant green invest-
ment as it starts to build up solar and wind power, taking advantage of the oppor-
tunity to leapfrog outdated fossil fuel energy systems. International banks are also
moving ahead with green finance such as France’s Credit Agricole that has surpassed
Spain’s Banco Santander recently for being the top underwriter of green bonds this
year. France and China are contending as the biggest backers of green bonds in 2019
and 2020. As countries are increasingly decarbonizing their investments and at the
same time shifting to green finance and allowing local finance centers to emerge to
finance infrastructure projects at the local level, things will start to change.130
4.2 Consumption Patterns
The role of European countries’ production and consumption patterns in contribut-
ing to the current state of planetary boundary131 processes is a starting point to
measure and assess how countries, or a given country, are doing with regard to their
current state of production and consumption and how they are doing with regard to
addressing this issue seriously. Input-output analyses combined with life-cycle
analyses are another method to understand the contribution of production and
consumption patterns of a country to various environmental issues. The level of
consumption in Switzerland is already high compared to other countries in the
world. The Swiss government is fully aware of this problem. The Swiss Federal
Office for the Environment (FOEN) notes that the global impacts of Swiss con-
sumption are primarily at the expense of the climate and biodiversity.132 In terms of
climate change, Switzerland’s per-capita greenhouse gas footprint is currently
around 14 tonnes of CO2-equivalents per capita, well above the globally sustainable
level, which scientific estimates place at 0.6 tonnes per capita for 2015.133 If one also
counts the impact of the financial sector, one of the country’s biggest economic
engines, one can calculate an even bigger footprint for Switzerland, compared to
other countries. The point, however, is not to criticize Switzerland but rather to
underline that any country’s energy transition goals cannot be achieved (no matter
130Bloomberg (2019).
131Rockström et al. (2009).
132Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (2019).
133FOEN website (accessed in February 2020): https://www.bafu.admin.ch/bafu/fr/home/themes/
economie-consommation/dossiers/impact-environnemental-du-commerce-international.html.
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what technologies and business models are applied) without significant changes in
consumption patterns.134
Population growth, economic growth, and the fact that Swiss consumption has
risen disproportionately to population growth are among the key drivers and trends
responsible for the situation. The Swiss Federal Office for the Environment explains
that between 2000 and 2016, household consumption spending increased by 31%,
almost twice as much as the population. At the same time, consumption patterns
have worsened due to open market policies.135
Work reviewing transport consumption patterns for cities and urban areas is also
available for various countries, and from this work it is clear that emissions from
transport continue to be a major problem for most countries, in particular growth in
emissions from passenger vehicles. To solve this problem, countries can consider
recommendations for city planners to reduce emissions while making cities more
livable for citizens. This is one way to deal with this type of consumption pattern,
although one that is very challenging. For example, a set of recommendations is
available in Kodukula (2018).136
More efficient, cost-deflated energy unlocks new consumption patterns. In the
past, when a new energy source entered the global energy mix, there was an
acceleration of energy demand.137 In the future, it would be interesting to understand
how new business models could help reduce energy demand along with revolutions
on the supply side. Which business models offer benefits on both sides of the
equation and what are the key policy-making solutions that would push such
business models to become commonplace?
Also, while a country can reduce its consumption based on business-as-usual
consumption patterns, policymakers must be aware that new scenarios can also lead
to some increases in consumption due to new consumption patterns. In fact, some
new business models may even lead to higher consumption, while others lead to
unexpected changes in consumption behavior. More research would be needed to
understand what the potential effects could be of various new business models. For
example, blockchain-based business models in the energy sector could be overall
beneficial in one way, but they could increase emissions on the other hand (perhaps
emissions generated elsewhere) because of the architecture choices for blockchain
(e.g., proof of work being the most energy-intensive choice).138
134Cassoret (2018).
135The environmental impact of opening up the market was reviewed by the Swiss Federal Office
for the Environment (see Frischknecht et al. 2018). It mentions that in the context of international
trade, the environmental impact of consumption is felt throughout the production and marketing
chains, as shown by the example of Switzerland, which generates the largest part of its impact (more
than 70%) abroad. The Swiss Federal Office for the Environment explains that for trade to be
genuinely sustainable from an ecological point of view, producing countries should have environ-
mental laws comparable to those of Switzerland—and respect them.
136Kodukula (2018).
137Fattouh et al. (2019).
138Bürer et al. (2019).
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4.3 Building an Energy Transition Preparedness Index
Based on our own work on the Energy Transition Preparedness Index,139 we have
defined the following key areas that we want to cover in our index. They are grouped
by interacting systems (Table 2).
Using this basic framework, an Energy Transition Preparedness Index can be
prepared with a variety of data sources and indicators from existing indexes around
the world to compare countries on their energy transition progress to date. For each
of the areas above, data and indicators can be aggregated with regard to different
aspects such as clean energy, energy efficiency, mobility, climate and energy data,
fossil fuels/nuclear power, and general economic or industrial policy indicators. A
“country scorecard” is envisioned, which can provide an explanation of a country’s
ranking and suggestions on how it can improve. As for companies, a “company
Table 2 Components of the energy transition preparedness index and interacting systems
Groups of elements Components for the development of indicators
Tip of the Iceberg (elements
often tracked already)
• energy efficiency progress (for various sub-sectors)
• renewable energy progress (for various sub-sectors and
using various indicators)
• digitalization preparedness and management of digitalization
trends
Energy-Economy System • capital and investment
• trade: exports (net exports of CO2, but also embodied CO2 in
exports) and also indicators for importsa
• institutions and governance with a focus on innovative
activities and programs for both industry and start-ups
together
Energy-Tech/Business System • corporate commitment
• innovative business environment supported for both busi-
ness model innovation and business model reconfiguration
• energy system structure including production (e.g., storage
and flexibility of system for renewable energy)
Energy-Society System • consumer participation
• human capital
• regulation and political commitment (including whether they
address systemic issues)
aToday, markets are eerily interdependent. The international trade of oil and gas is an area where
one country’s self-interested strategy can have dramatic impacts on the entire world economy and
the environment in general
139This work commenced in 2014 and it is ongoing. It includes (1) semi-structured interviews with
executives and middle managers in the energy sector; (2) our own case study analysis of sub-sectors
like on-grid storage, smart grid technologies, and microgrids; (3) an analysis of what we have
discovered from existing energy transition assessment work and our literature review; (4) data
collection and initial development of the index; and (5) an analysis of workshop results (one
workshop on blockchain use cases in the energy sector held in June 2019 and another workshop
on the index held in January 2020).
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scorecard” can also be used to compare how prepared a company is compared to
others in the given industry segment. Such scorecards could help both countries and
companies monitor their progress on the energy transition and provide an incentive
to improve over time. They can also be used to evaluate weaknesses in any given
system and to understand how changes in one system might also influence other
elements in the same interacting system or in another interacting system, or another
country altogether. The emphasis of our scorecards will, however, be on business
model transformation elements, meaning that part of the data collected and used for
the work will have to be qualitative, not only quantitative or based on existing data
and indicators from well-known sources.
For each country, each interacting system should be evaluated using all available
data to the greatest extent possible. Once the results are available, weaknesses in any
interacting system can be identified. How these weaknesses may influence other
interacting systems can also be discussed. The objective of the index will be to create
an open discussion about countries’ key energy transition choices, based on scien-
tific evidence.
Based on our analysis until now, we can say at least that top ranked countries in
such an assessment should ideally have the following characteristics:
1. The country has effective governance of the energy transition—for example, the
governance is transparent, participatory and resilient from (or less affected by)
lobbying pressures. The country feels free to change its decisions on energy
without fearing legal challenges. It has already made important capital and R&D
investments towards supporting clean energy and transport and demonstrates a
low carbon energy system compared to others. The country also shows constant
improvement and verifiable action plans to move towards zero emissions in all
areas and in cooperation with various stakeholders.
2. The country (and participating companies) actively invests in creating an inno-
vative business environment in all sub-sector areas with a focus on innovation
for a purpose, as opposed to innovation only for economic growth. Purpose-led
missions are a means towards meeting economic objectives as well as environ-
mental or social objectives of a country. The country has shown to be innovative
in its governance framework conditions, and policies are made to evolve rapidly
with technological and new business model opportunities. For example, the
country allows sandboxes or specific temporary measures (aimed at supporting
the emergence of innovative business models) in its regulatory framework.140
3. The country is not only investing in support mechanisms and programs for new
business models and innovative technologies in the area of clean or low-carbon
energy production, but also in the areas of energy productivity of industrial
processes and buildings performance.
140An example is the co-ownership law scheme in Switzerland (RCP in French and ZEV in
German) that provides a legal basis for self-consumption communities and allows for different
tariff structures inside the community (from the normal regulated tariff structures).
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4. The country already has a flexible energy system and is working to make it more
flexible to allow for the increasing inclusion of renewables while fostering
energy efficiency in all application domains in parallel with efforts to encourage
the implementation of network convergence and sector coupling solutions.
5. The country is also active in addressing systemic roots of the problem, including
consumption patterns of the population and the impact of financial institutions’
investment decisions (especially for countries where the financial sector is
important, like Switzerland). This means that the country has demonstrated its
intentions through deeds and actions and it has displayed good governance in
these two areas.
6. The country displays a high level of corporate engagement either via its private
sector associations and/or via individual corporate leadership actions. Corporate
commitment is demonstrated via indicators and data gathered by neutral parties.
7. The country also displays a high level of local leadership from cantons, cities,
communes, and even schools with their individual activities and programs to
include and involve citizens in the energy transition.
8. The country displays evidence of investing in human capital to address the
energy transition, with a focus on supporting start-ups and entrepreneurs not
only with technological innovations but also with business model innovations
for the energy sector. The number of events that connect start-ups to incumbents
is one indicator. Investments in programs that connect start-ups with incumbents
in the energy sector and allow for mentoring start-ups that are introducing new
business models and technologies, including digital innovations, are also
important.
9. The country has a sufficient level of digital competitiveness, and it has plans and
programs for the use of digital technologies towards strategic energy transition
goals. At the same time, it is addressing increasing energy use from data centers,
data networks, etc.
10. The country’s spending on public transportation is sufficient and public satis-
faction with public transport is high. Important investments such as electrified
railway lines or other low-carbon means of transportation have been realized.
Planning also integrates the interaction between transport and land use. The
country also continues to support innovative concepts and business models for
mobility.
The underlying systems represented in this figure are:
1. Energy-economy system: investment, trade and institutions/existing governance
2. Energy-technology/business system: corporate, business model innovation and
reconfiguration, and flexibility of the energy system
3. Energy-society system: consumer participation, human capital, and regulatory
and political commitment (including regulating and using the financial system
appropriately)
These three systems and the underlying indicators and data sources for each will
be compiled in the three sub-indexes explained earlier, allowing primarily for the
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above elements to be combined appropriately depending on which stakeholder the
elements apply to (incumbents or start-ups, SMEs, and new entrants).
Metrics for each of the areas above now need to be developed based on available
qualitative and quantitative data and integrated in a meaningful way. One way is
using systems thinking which can then be used later for stakeholder value network
analysis and other useful tools for the development of strategies. It is also important
to understand which systems different players have control over in order to change
them. In the World Economic Forum’s work on the energy transition, three
co-evolving and interacting systems were defined: (1) energy-economy,
(2) energy-technology, and (3) energy-society.141
One could imagine an index developed for each system so that we can compare
countries by interacting systems as well as elements relevant to each type of business
model change. The results can then be compiled into one index for a general
comparison. What is important to remember, however, is that the elements we will
be measuring are not independent; they are interdependent, and this adds another
challenge when building such an index.
However, if successful with such an approach, we can at least begin the process of
uncovering all the elements hidden under the “tip of the iceberg” of energy transition
assessments. Eventually specific companies’ strategic responses to the energy tran-
sition can be analyzed using this tool as well.
5 Conclusions on Governing the Energy Transition via
Business Model Change
In our research work conducted over the past years, we have aimed to understand
business model transformation in the energy sector via a mix of methods. All
governments must start working closely together with their business community
members in innovative and transparent ways towards developing necessary regula-
tory frameworks and other means to promote and take the maximum advantage from
new business models and new technologies. Each country (and community) will
have its own pathway to finding the most appropriate solutions and investing in
them. For an effective energy transition, new business models should be supported in
the area of renewable energy integration but also in the areas of energy productivity
of industrial processes and buildings performance. New or reconfigured business
models must also address the problem of consumption patterns.
141WEF (2019a), p. 23, covers the three co-evolving and interacting systems above. For example, in
the energy-society system the focus is on the collection of energy policies related to efficiency,
security and energy equity/justice. The key players identified for this system are policymakers,
consumers, and workers. The challenges identified for this system comprise competing priorities
within different political parties and governments and changes in priorities over different time
frames.
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Indeed, this chapter shows that alternative business models are moving away
from energy as a commodity (the push model) to energy as a service, where an
end-customer can partner with (or replace) the provider. However, not all countries’
energy sectors will evolve rapidly towards such business model transformation.
Countries will proceed at different paces and should proceed at different paces,
due to varying priorities. Apart from those higher-level insights, from our analysis of
data and our workshop findings we have found that for an energy transition to
happen many elements need to be put in place. In all areas, business model
innovation and reconfiguration can play a huge role in creating the transition towards
cleaner sources of energy. From our analysis, technological innovation, such as from
digitalization, is also shown to provide future value to energy transitions, providing
new opportunities for energy efficiency, new ways to trade and manage energy, and
new strategies for a better management of the grid.
However, we also discussed that new technologies and business model transfor-
mation are not enough. Consumption patterns need to change as well and perhaps
business models can help in that respect, but not on their own. New educational
programs could be envisaged, youth could be more empowered to find innovative
solutions through specific design thinking challenges and similar initiatives. These
events could be co-sponsored by universities, companies, and other groups such as
investors. However, whatever funding is available should require concrete results as
well. The focus of such events should not only be on technological solutions, but
mentors and coaches are needed to orient students, entrepreneurs, and professional
participants towards thinking about how to use technologies in existing systems or
how to combine multiple sources of energy. Design thinking sprints should not stop
at the ideation stage, but they should allow for sufficient product demonstration and
testing, or business model development and testing. Eventually the best ideas can
then move on to deployment and testing in the market.
We have also learned that good energy transition governance is not only about
pushing forward renewable energy investments and deployment of renewable
energy to its maximum or about applying taxes, but it requires smart integrated
policies and policies that address the systemic problems, such as the financial
system, and consumption patterns. The latter are a kind of third generation of energy
transition policies. New strategies for policy-making, participatory methods for
policy development, and innovation with a purpose are required. Strategies must
be increasingly developed by multiple stakeholders of society, and progress
(or setbacks) and commitments by both the public and the private sectors should
be monitored in a transparent and unbiased manner. That calls for new approaches
based on open governance, co-creation, design thinking, and agile innovation on the
part of governments, among incumbents, between institutions, and not only among
start-ups.
Meanwhile, there is no perfect scenario and there is no perfect pathway to the
energy transition of a country, just as there is no perfect country comparison.
However, it is clear that more research and a better understanding are needed with
regard to what governance frameworks inspire business model reconfiguration
among incumbents on the one hand and business model innovation from start-ups
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and new entrants on the other hand and how these two phenomena influence each
other. Dealing with the energy transition is extremely complex for a number of
reasons. However, this complexity should not bar us from trying. A saying says: “Do
not fear failure but rather fear not trying” (Roy T. Bennett).
6 Ideas for Future Research
Some ideas for future research that would appear to be valuable given our analysis of
what is available today and what is missing are:
• Understand the systemic impacts of recent events on the energy transition and
how far the power of new business model innovation can go in driving us towards
an energy transition in each country context.
• Evaluate alternative ways to compile and compress all the relevant energy
transition indicators into one measurement tool and allow the tool to generate
different results based on the users’ own opinions about each possible input to
avoid bias.
• Look at what people are doing in each country: How are social movements
affecting the energy transitions of different countries and how can the energy
transition be managed in a democratic way, helping to increase the sense of
cohesion of societies in a time of potential global unrest?
• Look into what people want from their energy transition (how this is different in
countries), perhaps clustering countries by people’s expectations for their energy
transition.
• Produce more case studies to understand business model changes per sub-sector
and the way policies are barring or promoting such developments in each case.
• Do more research on which business models offer benefits on both sides of the
equation (the demand side as well as the supply side) and on the key policy-
making solutions that would push such business models to become
commonplace.
• How can public sector entities develop new business models themselves, and how
can unprecedented changes be imagined by local leaders to significantly change
business models on the local level?
• Carry out more interviews with executives to understand what makes their
companies able to change their existing business models and what they think
about regulations and legislation which could support business model develop-
ments for the energy transition, despite external shock factors such as a global oil
price shock.
• Analyze the impact of energy transition pathways on people and how people in
turn may impact the pathways, e.g., consider how young people are changing
their consumption habits or modes of transport and how this will impact different
sub-sectors and scenarios.
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• Hold more design thinking workshops between different players—government,
businesses, and even consumers—to work together on these issues and find
solutions community by community.
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Abstract On the one hand, energy utility companies (EUCs) fulfill public tasks
assigned to them by the state. On the other hand, they are also often active as
entrepreneurs in the free market. For example, they supply electricity products to
major customers, install photovoltaic and e-mobility systems and provide services in
the areas of building technology, metering and telecommunications. In such private
sector activities, energy utility companies potentially enjoy unjustified advantages
due to the fact that they are publicly controlled and perform public tasks: they receive
particularly good financing conditions, are taxed on a privileged basis and benefit
from economies of scope and information advantages when public and private sector
tasks are carried out in parallel. Such privileges may distort competition or prevent
companies from entering a market. This chapter examines the legal requirements for
dealing with this issue and proposes specific measures with which legislators and
authorities can avoid harmful effects of private sector activities by EUCs.
1 Introduction
In Switzerland, almost 90% of the electricity utility companies (EUCs) are public
sector utilities and therefore belong to the state.1 In the course of the partial opening
of the electricity market that has already taken place and the intended complete
opening thereof, these public utilities are faced with the challenge of compensating
for revenue losses from traditional “monopoly” areas.2 At the same time, energy
supply companies are expected to make their contribution to increasing energy
efficiency and expanding renewable energies within the framework of the federal
Energy Strategy 2050.3
This is the backdrop against which EUCs are expanding their business activities
by moving from their public service sectors into private markets and thus becoming
hybrid operators. In Switzerland, state activity in the private sector is permitted in
principle, in accordance with legal doctrine and case law.4 However, EUCs’
increased activities in the private sector are regularly the subject of controversial
public debate.5 The attention has been in particular on accusations of EUCs reaping
unjustified competitive advantages and thus benefiting from an “unequal playing
field” in competition with private providers.
1Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018a), p. 1.
2See Graf and Waldmeier (2016), p. 12.
3See, e.g., Vettori et al. (2018), p. 4.
4BGE 138 I 378, E. 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. In particular, the Swiss Electricity Supply Act
(Stromversorgungsgesetz) does not explicitly prohibit EUCs from carrying out certain private
sector activities (Kratz 2018, p. 97).
5See for example Enz (2018), p. 1 et seq. and 11; Müller (2017), p. 19; Vonplon (2019), p. 13; see
further Schneider (2016), p. 647 et seq.; see also the campaign “Fair ist anders!” of the Berne SME
trade association, which is aimed in particular at BKW’s private sector activities. Available at www.
fair-ist-anders.ch.
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The issue of competition distortions arising from private sector activities is not
limited to the corresponding entrepreneurial activities of EUCs; it is a problem that
occurs generally when state activities press into the private sector.6 So far, however,
a sector-specific analysis of the private sector activities of EUCs has not been
conducted. In particular, it is unclear which private sector activities are being carried
out by EUCs. In addition, the public discussion focuses on allegedly competition-
distorting behavior of a particular EUC, while there is a lack of comprehensive
analysis of the whole field.
This chapter aims to fill these gaps. The first step is to explain what the private
sector activities of EUCs are all about and what motivates them (Sect. 2). In a second
step, the chapter describes the distortions of competition that can potentially arise
from EUCs’ private sector activities. The individual distortions are illustrated with
concrete examples from the field of activity of the EUCs (Sect. 3). In a third step, it is
examined to what extent legal requirements exist for EUCs to avoid distortions of
competition (Sect. 4). Finally, a fourth and last step illustrates the possible measures
which can be taken by EUCs and their owners’ associations over and above the legal
requirements to avoid distortions of competition and ward off accusations thereof
(Sect. 5).
2 Private Sector Activities of EUCs
2.1 Distinction from Public Tasks of EUCs
Public tasks are undertakings defined by the legislator to be fulfilled on its behalf.7
The opposite case is when EUCs become active in the private sector by carrying out
entrepreneurial activities outside the fulfillment of public tasks.8
There are about 630 EUCs in Switzerland. Their fields of activity differ greatly.
For example, several EUCs are organized as multi-utility companies and operate not
solely electricity networks but also water, gas, district heating or telecommunica-
tions networks.9 Some EUCs produce their own electricity, while others obtain all
their electricity requirements from upstream suppliers.10 While the business
6See Baumann (2019), p. 85 et seq. and 137 et seq. for a comprehensive overview.
7Rütsche (2013), p. 157 et seq.; Rütsche (2016), p. 79; similar also the definition in Federal Council
(2017a), p. 1895, according to which public tasks are all those tasks which the state has to fulfill on
the basis of a legal statute.
8This reflects our understanding. In contrast to this, the prevailing doctrine contrasts private sector
state activity with entrepreneurial state activity in the monopoly sector (see Krähenmann 1987,
p. 122; Reich 2009, n. 909; Rhinow et al. 2011, § 18, n. 38; Vogel 2000, p. 22 and 75).
9For a summary history of EUCs, see Reich (2009), p. 205 et seq.
10Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018b), p. 15 et seq.
Electricity Utility Companies Entering Private Sector Markets 247
activities of EUCs differ in detail, the common feature of EUCs is that they generally
operate their own distribution network and supply electricity to end consumers.11
Distribution network operation includes the obligation to connect end consumers
in the respective network area to the electricity network and to ensure its mainte-
nance and renewal.12 Distribution network operators thus perform a public task that
has been assigned to them by the respective canton on the basis of federal law.13
Under current legislation, electricity supply, i.e. the delivery of electricity, can be
divided into the universal service and the free market. In the universal service
pursuant to Art. 6 of the Swiss Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz),
customers whose annual consumption is below the threshold of 100 MWh per year
(so-called “fixed end consumers”) and who are therefore not free to choose their
provider are supplied with electricity at “reasonable tariffs” by the state-designated
local distribution network operator. In the free market, on the other hand, end
consumers who exceed the above-mentioned consumption threshold are free to
choose their electricity provider (Art. 6 para. 2 and para. 6 Swiss Electricity Supply
Act). End consumers who would in principle be entitled to a free choice of provider
but do not claim market access remain in the universal service with the fixed end
consumers.14 Since Art. 6 para. 1 of the Electricity Supply Act stipulates that the
local distribution network operator has a supply obligation vis-à-vis the fixed end
consumers and the consumers who renounce market access, the universal service of
electricity is correctly qualified as a public task by legal doctrine and case law.15
In addition to operating the distribution network and providing the basic electric-
ity supply, some utility companies also fulfill other public tasks. Examples include
waste disposal, water and gas supply, maintenance of public lighting and operation
of fiber optic networks.16
For example, the Werke Fehraltorf utilities are responsible not only for
electricity supply and distribution network operation but also for water supply,
waste disposal and road maintenance in the municipality of Fehraltorf.17 In
(continued)
11Electricity Commission (2018), p. 28; Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018b), p. 12.
12Jäger and Scheidegger (2016), Art. 5 para. 1–4, Electricity Supply Act, n. 8.
13Föhse (2018), p. 1242; see also Stöckli (2016), p. 184 and 192.
14See Föhse (2018), p. 1236; Scholl (2015), n. 13.24.
15BGE 144 III 111, E. 5.2; VGer BE 100.2017.247 of 12 January 2018, E. 3.3; Diebold and Ludin
(2018), n. 85; Föhse (2015), p. 142; see further Rütsche (2013), p. 160.
16Whether the construction and operation of fiber optic networks are public tasks to be performed
by an EUC or an activity that should be carried out by the EUC, is to be examined according to
applicable legal provisions.
17See http://www.fehraltorf.ch/werke/dokumente/?navid¼119623119623.
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turn, the City of Zurich’s electricity utility ewz was given the task of building
and operating a fiber optic network by the city council under a performance
mandate.18
2.2 Examples of Private Sector Services Provided by EUCs
In addition to operating the distribution network and fulfilling other public tasks,
utility companies are economically active in areas that do not constitute public
tasks.19 The extent to which such private sector services are offered varies consid-
erably from one EUC to another.20
Numerous utility companies offer homeowners comprehensive services in the
planning, installation and maintenance of photovoltaic systems.
For example, Stadtwerk Winterthur offers an “all-round carefree package”
which includes planning, financing, installation of the solar system and
obtaining the necessary permits.21
Many EUCs also offer e-mobility solutions, such as the installation of home
charging stations for electric vehicles. This service is also offered along with the
assembly of photovoltaic systems.22
The revised Energy Act created the regulatory framework for “prosumer” con-
sumption of solar power, whereby prosumer consortia were made possible.23 How-
ever, the accounting for the electricity consumption and production by the respective
18See Resolution by the Municipal Council Zurich of 20 December 2006 (Nr. 2006/200). See for
another example the EUC Eniwa, which has been mandated by the city of Aarau with the supply of
water, electricity, gas and heating/cooling (City Council Aarau 2000, p. 1 et seq.).
19See Sect. 2.1.
20See also the examples mentioned in Vaterlaus et al. (2017), p. 35.
21See https://stadtwerk.winterthur.ch/privatkundschaft/angebote/fotovoltaik. Similar services are
being offered by Industrielle Werke Basel (IWB) (available at https://www.iwb.ch/Fuer-Zuhause/
E-Mobilitaet/Laden-mit-Solarstrom.html), Romande Energie (available at https://www.romande-
energie.ch/particuliers/habitat-et-services-energetiques/panneaux-solaires-photovoltaiques) or
BKW (available at https://www.bkw.ch/unsere-kompetenzen/building-solutions/solarenergie).
22See for example the offers by IWB (available at https://www.iwb.ch) and Romande Energie
(available at https://www.romande-energie.ch).
23See Art. 16 and 17 Energy Act (Energiegesetz).
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users is associated with difficulties. Numerous utility companies compete with
private providers to offer billing solutions for self-consumption of solar power.24
A wide range of offers in the field of building services engineering represents a
broad private sector field of activity for EUCs. Building services engineering
consists of all the technical installations in a building and thus includes in particular
the sanitary, heating, air conditioning, ventilation, high and low voltage systems. In
this context, utility companies offer electrical and plumbing services as well as
heating installations, lighting solutions and alarm systems.25
Several utilities offer so-called energy contracting solutions. In this case, the EUC
assumes responsibility for the planning, construction, operation and maintenance of
the heating system or heating network. The customer undertakes to purchase a
certain amount of energy annually at a calculable price. He does not become the
owner of the heating system and does not have to worry about its maintenance.26
A particularly illustrative case of private sector activity is when utilities sell
household and electrical appliances.
For example, Groupe E advertises a “wide range” of household appliances,
including refrigerators, dishwashers, irons, coffee machines, grills, steam
cleaners and vacuum cleaners.27
The construction and operation of a fiber optic network may be a public task. On
the other hand, utilities become private sector operators when they offer their own
data network products.
24See for a detailed analysis Probst et al. (2019), p. 7 et seq.
25Illustrative in this regard is the owner strategy for Stadtwerk Winterthur (Stadtwerk Winterthur
2013), p. 5, which obliges Stadtwerk Winterthur to provide services in the areas of heating,
plumbing and electricity installations and to offer a 24-hour service hotline for these services; see
further the respective services offered by CKW (available at https://www.ckw.ch) and by EKZ
(available at https://www.ekz.ch).
26See the respective services offered by EKZ (available at https://www.ekz.ch/contracting), SAK
(available at https://www.sak.ch/private/prosumer/energiecontracting) or Stadtwerk Winterthur
(available at https://stadtwerk.winterthur.ch/geschaeftskundschaft/angebote/energie-contracting).
27See https://shop.groupe-e.ch/de/.
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For example, various EUCs offer their own internet services, which can be
obtained with additional options for TV and telecommunications.28
Elektrizitätswerk Altdorf in turn offers its own cloud solution for data
storage.29
It is hardly surprising that EUCs also offer electricity products for the already
liberalized electricity market.30 Larger EUCs, such as Canton of Zurich’s EKZ, also
offer smaller utilities support services for electricity procurement.31
2.3 Why Do EUCs Become Active in the Private Sector?
One of the main reasons for the private sector activities of EUCs is the partial market
liberalization that has already taken place and the intention to fully open the
electricity market. The partial liberalization of the market has put the EUCs in a
difficult position between private sector activity and the fulfillment of public tasks.
As distribution network operators, energy utility companies must continue to operate
the network and provide the basic energy supply as part of their public tasks.32 At the
same time, however, they face private competition with regard to large customers
who make use of free market access. Liberalization has also put pressure on the
margins for electricity prices charged by EUCs.33 As electricity as a product is
difficult to differentiate, price adjustments are necessary to keep and win customers
in the liberalized environment.34 Against this background, the establishment of new
business areas in private sector markets is considered strategically necessary in order
to compensate for the loss of income from traditional fields of activity and to secure
the company’s existence in the long term.35
28See the respective services offered by IWB (available at https://www.iwb.ch/Fuer-Zuhause/
Telekom/IWB-Internet.html), Eniwa (available at https://www.eniwa.ch/de/internet.html) or
Groupe E (available at https://www.groupe-e.ch/de/intelligente-loesungen/multimedia/
privatkunden).
29See https://www.ewa.ch/privatkunden/daten-produkte/urcloud.




33See Graf and Waldmeier (2016), p. 13; Sonderegger (2014), p. 27.
34See Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018b), p. 42. 67% of the customers with free market access
(which, however, account for 80% of the electricity consumed by free customers) have left the
universal service (Swiss Federal Office of Energy 2018b, p. 62).
35Baumann (2019), n. 91; Vaterlaus et al. (2017), p. 35; see further Vogel (2000), p. 7, and Bürer
et al. (2021), p. 219.
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In addition, the Energy Strategy 2050 has shifted the focus of the energy
business.36 Alongside the classic universal service, new services such as energy
consulting or contracting offers for photovoltaic systems and heat pumps are coming
to the fore. Owner communities are expected to give their utilities a leading role in
improving energy efficiency and implementing renewable energies.37 The efforts of
energy supply companies in this respect are considered38 essential for the imple-
mentation of the Energy Strategy 2050 and are therefore receiving special attention.
For example, in a benchmarking project of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy
(SFOE), contracting services for PV systems and heat pumps by utilities are
considered to make a positive contribution to energy efficiency and the
promotion of renewables.39 In this respect, there is also political pressure for
EUCs to move into business areas such as electromobility, for example, whose
profitability prospects are negative or difficult to predict.40
In addition, imminent liberalization and advancing technology are opening up
new business fields that overlap the areas of public service and the free market. The
focus is on offers under the overarching theme “smart energy”, which coordinate
energy production, energy consumption and energy infrastructure according to
demand.41
Furthermore, within the framework of the liberalization of the electricity market,
the utilities and their management have been granted greater autonomy by their
public owners.42 Against the backdrop of declining earnings in the traditional
business area, it makes sense for the managers of utility companies to take advantage
of this additional entrepreneurial scope in private sector markets. There are also
incentives for managers of public enterprises to expand the scope of activities of the
public enterprise, as the size of the enterprise is sometimes seen to reflect on the
capabilities of the management.43
Finally, the granting of additional entrepreneurial leeway is likely to take place
against the background that the public owners hope that this will secure long-term
36Vaterlaus et al. (2017), p. 35.
37See for example Municipal Council Bern (2017), p. 1, according to which ewb must position itself
as an implementer of renewable energies; see further Enz (2018), p. 1 et seq. and 11, according to
whom the canton’s ownership strategy requires SAK to take action in the field of efficient
energy use.
38EY (2017), p. 2.
39See Vettori et al. (2018), p. 4 and 60.
40See with regard to the profitability of charging stations State Council Basel-Stadt (2019), p. 11
and 25, where it is noted that private operators are not currently setting up charging infrastructures,
as the high investment costs cannot be recouped.
41See with regard to “smart energy systems” Lund et al. (2017), p. 560.
42See Sonderegger (2012), p. 16; see also Vaterlaus et al. (2017), p. 29.
43Sappington and Sidak (2003), p. 500.
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revenues for the public sector. The profits of EUCs can be of considerable impor-
tance for the budget of the community concerned.44 If the revenues of EUCs fall,
unpopular budget cuts or tax increases might become inevitable.45 Certain commu-
nities thus explicitly expect their EUCs to become active in private sector markets.46
3 Distortions of Competition
From an economic point of view, it is problematic if public companies—utility
companies in particular—are unjustifiably privileged in the private sector compared
to private providers. Unjustified competitive advantages can significantly impair the
allocative efficiency in the market economy and thus reduce the welfare of society as
a whole.47 In particular, there is a risk that, as a result of unjustifiably privileged
EUCs, efficient private operators will be forced out of the market or privately owned
companies will be deterred from entering it.48
Unjustified competitive advantages are those that are not attributable to the
EUCs’ own contributions but that rather result from the fact that EUCs are controlled
by the public authorities and/or perform public tasks. In this context, the term “state-
related competitive advantages” is also aptly used.49 The following provides an
overview of the state-related competitive advantages that can be expected from
private sector activities of EUCs.
3.1 Financial Advantages
EUCs may have lower financing costs for their private sector activities compared to
private providers. There are potential advantages in both borrowing and raising
equity.
EUCs benefit from lower borrowing costs if they are granted low-interest loans at
non-market conditions by the community or state-controlled institutions.
44Illustrative in this regard are the comments made by a politician of the city council in Bern with
regard to the ownership strategy of ewb. The politician states that ewb delivers great profits of over
CHF 30 million to the city treasury every year and that without this contribution the City of Bern
would not be able to fulfill its public tasks (Council Secretariat City of Bern 2006, p. 681).
45For instance, the City of Bern had to compensate for budget shortfalls resulting from lower
distributions by ewb (Municipal Council Bern 2016).
46The State Council of the Canton of Basel-Stadt explicitly expects IWB to become entrepreneur-
ially active outside its public tasks (State Council Basel-Stadt 2018, p. 4).
47See Baumann (2019), n. 252 et seq.; Friederiszick (2008), p. 652 et seq.
48See Friederiszick (2008), p. 653; Geddes (2004), p. 29; Sappington and Sidak (2004), p. 14.
49See Diebold (2014), p. 221; Federal Council (2017b), p. 9.
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For example, the City of Bern raises capital on the financial market to the
benefit of its utility Energie Wasser Bern (ewb). Due to the city’s positive
rating, ewb benefits from favorable interest rate conditions. In principle, ewb
must compensate the risk imposed on the City of Bern by the raising of capital
and the more favorable interest conditions in the form of an interest margin to
the City of Bern. However, due to the tense market environment, the City of
Bern recently decided not to charge the interest margin, which resulted in a
competitive advantage for ewb.50
In addition, EUCs are granted more favorable conditions for borrowing if lenders
assign them a higher credit rating due to their proximity to the state. For example, a
higher creditworthiness may result from the fact that income or assets from the
EUC’s public tasks serve as collateral.51 In addition, existing explicit or implicit state
guarantees have a positive effect on the creditworthiness of EUCs.52
Not only in terms of borrowing costs but also in terms of equity capital costs,
EUCs can have state-related competitive advantages. Private competitors have to
pay interest on the equity provided to them by their owners to cover the investment
risk. Private providers must generate a profit to pay such interest on equity. Conse-
quently, they include a corresponding profit mark-up in their prices. If the public
owners, on the other hand, do not demand an adequate return on equity, the EUC can
offer its goods and services without the necessary profit component and thus at
potentially lower prices than its private competitors.53
Sometimes the regulations by the public owners explicitly allow the waiver of a
profit component.54 It is similarly problematic if the public owners do not specify
profit, dividend or return on equity targets for the utility company.55 In this case,
there is a risk that EUCs will not include a (sufficient) profit margin in their private
sector offers.
50See Municipal Council Bern (2016).
51For instance, electricity distribution networks or utilities could be pledged. However, certain
EUCs are not allowed to pledge their distribution networks (see Art. 3 para. 1 ewz regulation
[Verordnung über ewz]).
52Geddes (2004), p. 30 et seq.; Nielsen (1981), p. 58; see also Waldmeier (2018), n. 538. Explicit
state guarantees in favor of EUCs exist if the liability of the community for the EUC is stipulated by
law. According to a study by Vaterlaus et al. (2017), p. 37, 30% of urban EUCs have an explicit
state guarantee. In the case of implicit state guarantees, in contrast to explicit state guarantees, there
is no legal liability of the community, but it can be concluded from the specific circumstances that
the state will accept responsibility for the debts of the EUC.
53See Baumann (2019), n. 198 et seq.; Herrmann (2014), p. 413; see with regard to the relevance of
the profit margin in public sector transportation Abegg, Seferovic (2018), n. 9 et seq.
54For instance, ewb must set cost-covering prices for its private sector services (Art. 13 ewb
regulation [ewb-Reglement]).
55See Baumann (2019), n. 200.
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Finally, there may be financing advantages from hybrid activity if EUCs can use
the income from public service activities to make investments in their private sector
activities. This is particularly problematic if the margins in the private sector do not
allow the private providers to make corresponding investments and if the borrowing
and equity capital required for this would also be too expensive at a risk-adjusted
interest rate.56
It is argued, for example, that without the income from the monopoly business
of Bern’s power supplier, Bernische Kraftwerke (BKW) would not have had
the necessary financial resources and stability to acquire various companies in
the building technology sector.57
3.2 Tax and Regulatory Advantages
Private sector activities of EUCs may be unjustifiably favored by lower or no
taxation.58 A low tax burden on EUCs’ private sector activities may result mainly
from their legal form. The Confederation, the cantons and the communes, as well as
the public institutions of these communities, are exempt from both direct federal
taxes and, usually, from cantonal and communal taxes.59 This means that dependent
EUCs in particular, but also EUCs with the legal form of a legally independent
institution, are not taxable, even if they carry out private business activities.60 This
unacceptable competitive advantage can be reduced by a provision in the organiza-
tional decree according to which the utility is liable to pay tax on its private
economic activities.61
In addition to tax advantages, regulatory advantages for EUCs’ private sector
activities mainly offer benefits in the form of simplified licensing procedures, legal
exemptions, specific bankruptcy decrees or special rights.62
56Baumann (2019), n. 201 et seq.
57Schneider (2016), p. 647 et seq.
58See Capobianco, Christiansen (2011), p. 5; see further Flatt and Zindel (2017), p. 1 et seq.
59Art. 56 let. a-c Federal Act on Direct Federal Taxation (Bundesgesetz über die direkte
Bundessteuer).
60See Mayoraz (2018), n. 556. 17% of EUCs that have their own legal personality are constituted in
the form of a public institution (Swiss Federal Office of Energy 2018b, p. 17 et seq.). On the other
hand, tax exemptions for EUCs with a legal form under private law are only possible under strict
conditions (see BGer 2C_206/2018 of 23 July 2019, E. 4.4).
61See Baumann (2019), n. 210.
62OECD (2016), p. 30.
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3.3 Cross-Subsidies
In the case of EUCs with hybrid activities, there is a risk that the private sector
activities of the EUC will be cross-subsidized. This involves shifting costs or
revenues within the EUC to the benefit of the private sector activities and to the
detriment of the public sector.63
EUCs operating hybrid systems can cross-subsidize the private sector mainly by
misallocating costs.64 The public sector has to bear costs that were actually incurred
in the private sector. Such a cost shift occurs directly when the EUC’s public service
remit covers the deficit of its private sector activities at the end of the accounting
period. On the other hand, it is more difficult to trace cross-subsidies that are
implemented by means of common costs misallocation. Common costs are those
that cannot be directly allocated to a product.65 An example of this is the cost of an
EUC’s head office building, which serves both areas of activity. A clear allocation of
common costs to the respective market segments is not possible in many cases and is
difficult for the regulatory authority to verify.66 This may provide a certain incentive
for EUCs to charge too low a share of common costs to the private sector, thus cross-
subsidizing it.67
3.4 Economies of Scope
EUCs operating hybrid systems are able to realize considerable economies of scope.
These are savings in the average total costs that arise when different goods are
provided together by one company. Where economies of scope exist, it is cheaper to
produce two or more products together in a single company rather than separately in
different companies.68
In perfect markets, economies of scope do not pose a problem because compet-
itors could also enter the respective markets and thus benefit from the resulting cost
savings. In contrast, economies of scope resulting from the hybrid activity of an
EUC are problematic. As a rule, private competitors cannot enter the public domain
due to legal restrictions, as the fulfillment of public tasks is regularly reserved for
certain public EUCs. Private competitors are thus not in a position to realize the same
63Baumann (2019), n. 215 et seq. and 219.
64See European Commission (2010), p. 28.
65See with regard to common costs Fritsch (2018), p. 216.
66Brennan (1990), p. 40; Fritsch (2018), p. 216; Weber (1986), p. 420 et seq.
67See Geddes (2004), p. 30.
68See Fritsch (2018), p. 171 et seq.; Ghazarian (2018), p. 22; Peeperkorn and Verouden (2014),
n. 1.49.
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economies of scope and are consequently exposed to higher costs than their hybrid
competitors.69
In principle, utilities can realize economies of scope across their entire value
chain. If the private and public sectors need the same inputs, cost savings can be
achieved through joint purchasing. Examples include volume discounts on the
purchase of computers or vehicles or discounts in connection with joint office
space rentals.70
Furthermore, an EUC can realize economies of scope if infrastructures, means of
production or services can be used jointly by its private and public sectors.71
Examples of this are the shared use of websites, vehicles, tools, software programs,
HR departments or warehouses.
Economies of scope also result from the bundled offer of products from the
private and public sectors. A bundled offer of several products by one utility
company may well meet a customer need to obtain all services from one single
source (so-called “one-stop shopping”).72 Cost advantages arise for the utility, for
example through the joint use of sales staff or joint invoicing. The cost savings can
then be (partially) returned to the customers for acquisition purposes.
For example, Lucerne’s utility Energie Wasser Luzern (ewl) announced a new
type of combined product at the end of 2017, which encompasses internet
products and electricity that can be purchased for a monthly flat rate. A
combination discount is granted, whereby customers pay CHF 150 less per
year on a cumulative basis.73
This last example highlights the issue of economies of scope in hybrid activities
of EUCs, since private competitors cannot make a corresponding combined offer
(with the basic supply of electricity plus internet) to fixed end consumers.
Finally, economies of scope for EUCs can also derive from the joint use of
intangible assets. An EUC can use its brand, which was initially created and
strengthened in the public sector, for products and services in the private market
(so-called “umbrella branding”).74 Umbrella branding has the advantage for EUCs
that they do not have to build a new brand for their products offered in the private
sector. This makes it easier for EUCs to enter private sector markets. Similarly,
EUCs can use umbrella branding to transfer their high image recognition and trust
values from the public sector to their private sector offerings.75 It has been found that
69See Ghazarian (2018), p. 52 et seq.; Sappington and Sidak (2004), p. 13.
70See Baumann (2019), n. 232.
71See Barney and Hesterly (2015), p. 217.
72See Baumann (2019), n. 235 and 238.
73Ewl (2017).
74See for a detailed discussion of umbrella branding Baumann (2019), n. 234.
75See Scheda (2014), p. 34.
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although “independent customers” often show a willingness to switch from the
universal service to the market offer, they often remain with their incumbent EUC
as it enjoys a high degree of credibility.76
3.5 Information Advantages
A further competitive advantage resulting from proximity to the state can come in
the form of information advantages for EUCs. Due to their closeness to the state,
their obligation to fulfill public tasks and personnel interrelations, EUCs have access
to business-relevant information that is not available to private providers.77 In
particular, EUCs can potentially access customer data from the public sector,
which allows them to tailor their own private sector offerings to specific customer
needs.
For example, employees of the utility Elektrizitätswerk Schaffhausen used
customer addresses from the monopoly sector for a marketing campaign for
solar systems.78
Significant information advantages can result for EUCs from their function as
(distribution) network operators. As distribution network operators, EUCs are given
exclusive insights into the functioning and future development of the electricity
system. They may therefore have an information advantage over private competitors,
for example in the areas of storage requirements and flexibility.79 In addition,
network operators may obtain data from the customers’ network connection,
which can be used for new business models.80 These include customized products,
the sale of data to third parties (e.g. insurance companies) and new services.81
As a result of information advantages, an EUC can also give preference to its own
private sector activities over private competitors.
For example, Energie Wasser Bern (ewb), in its function as a distribution
network operator, must periodically request the owners of electrical
(continued)
76Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018b), p. 62 et seq.
77See for a detailed discussion Baumann (2019), n. 247 et seq.
78The employees were subsequently fined by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy for this miscon-
duct (see Vonplon 2019, p. 13).
79Kratz (2018), p. 158 et seq.
80Kratz (2018), p. 159.
81Beyeler (2017), p. 59.
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installations to have their installations inspected. In principle, the owners may
entrust inspections to any company authorized to do so. Unless the owners had
previously decided on a particular inspection company, ewb passed on almost
all inspection assignments to its own subsidiary. ewb also expressly referred
on its website to the inspection offers of its own subsidiary but not to offers
from other private suppliers.82
4 Legal Requirements for EUCs to Avoid Distortions
of Competition
4.1 Constitutional Requirements
According to prevailing legal doctrine and case law, the private sector activities of
state-owned companies and thus also especially those of EUCs must be conducted in
a manner that is neutral to competition, respectively in a manner that does not distort
competition.83 The requirement of competitive neutrality results from the interaction
of Art. 27 and 94 of the Swiss Federal Constitution (Bundesverfassung).84 The
private sector activities of the EUCs may be considered in compliance with the
requirement of competitive neutrality if they have to face the same competitive
conditions as private competitors do. Distortions of competition in the form of legal
and de facto privileges for the private sector activities of EUCs must therefore be
avoided. In particular, legal advantages such as the exemption from tax and insur-
ance obligations, the granting of explicit state guarantees or exemptions from the
relevant economic supervision and competition law are problematic.85 Furthermore,
de facto privileges such as the preferential provision of infrastructure, implicit state
guarantees and cross-subsidization also conflict with the requirement of competitive
neutrality.86
Although the requirement of competition neutrality is thus generally easy to
understand, its concrete implementation and enforcement is much more difficult:
82See Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq, n. 156 et seq., ewb.
83See for an overview of the requirements for private sector activities by the state Hangartner
(2007), p. 241 et seq.; Hänni and Stöckli (2013), n. 1717 et seq.; Krähenmann (1987), p. 209 et seq.;
Reich (2013), p. 1410; Rhinow et al. (2011), § 18 n.53 et seq.; Tschannen et al. (2014), § 10 n. 24
et seq.; Vogel (2000), p. 109 et seq., 116 and 125; BGE 138 I 378, E. 7-9.
84Schönbächler (1998), n. 86; Vogel (2000), p. 123; BGE 143 II 425, E. 4.2.
85See Hangartner (2007), p. 245 et seq.; Hänni, Stöckli (2013), n. 1720; Vogel (2000), p. 208 et seq.
86Rhinow et al. (2011), § 18 n. 106; Hangartner (2007), 245 et seq.; Uhlmann (1997), p. 213 et seq.;
BGE 138 I 378, E. 9.1.
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Firstly, it is apparent from case law that certain distortions of competition are not
considered at all, or only to a certain extent, to be a violation of competitive
neutrality. In fact, the case law on this matter does not always appear to be entirely
consistent.87 In the Glarnersach decision, the Federal Supreme Court classified
factual competitive advantages, such as access to customer data in the monopoly
sector or the possibility of offering combination products, as modest at best—which
is why a significant distortion of competition was not considered to exist.88 In
contrast, in a more recent decision the Federal Supreme Court rightly assumed that
the synergy effects resulting from the parallel fulfillment of a public task and the
provision of private sector services constitute a distortion of competition to the
detriment of competitors operating purely in the private sector.89
Secondly, it is difficult to conclusively derive from the condition of competitive
neutrality what concrete measures are to be taken to avoid the respective distortions
of competition. The handling of cross-subsidization provides an example of this.
According to the Federal Supreme Court in the Glarnersach decision, the financial
separation of the (public) monopoly sector from private sector services was sufficient
for the enforcement of the ban on cross-subsidies.90 In this context, the Supreme
Court considered cross-subsidies via common cost allocation to be “hardly plausi-
ble” if the allocation keys are based on realistic cost estimates.91 On the other hand,
purely financial or accounting separation is considered insufficient in legal doctrine,
which indeed postulates that, due to the uncertainties in cost allocation, a strict
organizational separation of the two areas would also be required in order to
effectively prevent cross-subsidies.92
Overall, the requirement of competitive neutrality so far results in only a few
specific requirements for how EUCs organize their private sector activities. Clearly
inadmissible are cross-subsidies, which means that the public service remit must be
financially separated from the EUC’s private sector activities. Tax, financing, econ-
omies of scope and information advantages are problematic in light of the require-
ment of competitive neutrality. However, concrete and consistent requirements for
dealing with them cannot yet be derived from the existing case law.
87See Baumann (2019), n. 342 et seq.
88BGE 138 I 378, E. 9.4; see for critical discussions of this decision Hangartner (2012), p. 1821;
Kraemer and Stöckli (2013), p. 29; Reich (2013), p. 1411 et seq.; see further Weber and Volz
(2013), n. 2.650. It is, however, important to note that in the Glarnersach decision, the Federal
Court only subjected the statute in question to a very broad review (so-called abstract norm review,
in German “abstrakte Normenkontrolle”).
89See BGer 2C_1007/2015 of 10 May 2016, E. 5.2.
90BGE 138 I 378, E. 9.2.
91BGE 138 I 378, E. 9.3.3.
92Abegg and Frei (2018), p. 152; Kraemer and Stöckli (2013), p. 38 et seq.; Stoffel and Murith
(2019), p. 34.
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4.2 Antitrust Law
Electricity utilities, irrespective of their legal form, are subject to antitrust law if they
carry out private sector activities outside their monopoly areas.93 In the case of
EUCs, it can be assumed in general that they have a dominant position on the market
because of their public tasks and any monopoly rights associated with them. In this
context, dominant companies behave unlawfully if, by abusing their dominant
position in the market, they hinder other companies from starting or continuing to
compete or disadvantage trading partners.94 According to the practice of the com-
petition authorities, this dominant position can also be abused in upstream or
downstream or neighboring private markets.95 If EUCs have a dominant position
in the market, it must be examined to what extent the distortions of competition
(described in Sect. 3 above) are to be qualified as abuse of a dominant position within
the meaning of Art. 7 of the Swiss Cartel Act (Kartellgesetz).96
In the case of cross-subsidization, the discrimination of trading partners (Art.
7 para. 2 let. b Swiss Cartel Act) as well as the unlawful practice of price undercut-
ting (Art. 7 para. 2 let. d Swiss Cartel Act) may be of relevance.97
In the case of discrimination of trading partners (Art. 7 para. 2 let. b Swiss Cartel
Act), the EUC’s own private sector division is given preference over its private
competitors. The private sector division purchases services from the EUC at cross-
subsidized conditions, while private providers have to pay the full price. However,
this abuse presupposes that the cross-subsidized services in question are actually
offered to or demanded by private competitors. This will often not be the case,
particularly with respect to typical internal group or company services in the areas of
IT, personnel administration, marketing or accounting.98
By contrast, in the case of price undercutting (Art. 7 para. 2 let. d Swiss Cartel
Act), cross-subsidization is used to undercut prices or other trading conditions in
order to weaken or drive current competitors out of the market or to prevent potential
competitors from entering the market.99 Abusive price undercutting is to be assumed
if the revenues generated are not sufficient to cover the company’s own costs in the
93Art. 2 para. 1 Swiss Cartel Act. See Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 22 et seq.,
ewb; see also BGE 138 I 378, E. 9.3.3 and 9.4; see further Ducrey (2009), p. 76.
94Art. 7 para. 1 Swiss Cartel Act.
95Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 66 et seq., ewb; Stäuble and Schraner (2018a),
Art. 7 n. 239.
96See Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 81, ewb.
97Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 88 and 91. ewb; Borer (2011), Art. 7, n. 18.
According to Amstutz, Carron (2010), Art. 7 n. 242, cross-subsidization may also constitute a form
of unfair conditions of trade within the meaning of Art. 7 para. 2 let. c Swiss Cartel Act.
98See Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 88 et seq., ewb; Stäuble and Schraner
(2018b), Art. 7 n. 324.
99Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 91, ewb; Zäch (2005), n. 684.
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long term.100 After successfully forcing the competitors from the market, the utility
can then raise prices above the competitive level and compensate for losses
(so-called “recoupment”).101 In addition to recoupment, abusive undercutting also
requires that an undercutting strategy is implemented and that there are no justifica-
tions for the undercutting. Cross-subsidization on its own, however, does not
constitute a requirement for price undercutting in the sense of Art. 7 para. 2 let. d
Swiss Cartel Act. But it does make undercutting financially more bearable for the
EUC employing the strategy, especially if funds from the public sector are used for
cross-subsidization.102
According to the existing practice of the Secretariat of the Swiss Competition
Commission (Sekretariat der Wettbewerbskommission WEKO), there are indications
of abusive cross-subsidization, as can occur in the case of unequal treatment of
trading partners or price undercutting, if (i) the private sector activities of EUC
receive services from that EUC at non-market conditions, (ii) the EUC obtains
services from the private sector at too high a price or without justification by not
complying with public procurement law, or (iii) structural deficits of the private
sector activities are covered with funds from the public task remit of the EUC.103
An abuse of market power within the meaning of Art. 7 Swiss Cartel Act can also
exist when information advantages are being exploited by the EUC. In the case of
hybrid activities, the transfer of information from the public sector activities to the
private sector activities is problematic because the EUC has the relevant information
due to its obligation to fulfill a public task and not due to its own economic
capabilities. If the transfer of information within the EUC is based on an obstruc-
tionist strategy aimed at forcing competitors from a market or keeping them out of
the private market, an abuse of a dominant position is likely to be assumed.104
According to the Secretariat of the Competition Commission, an impermissible data
exchange can also consist of an EUC recommending its own private sector services
to its customers in the public sector.105
EUCs may unlawfully impede competitors in the meaning of Art. 7 para. 2 let. f
Swiss Cartel Act if they couple private sector offers with services from the public
sector. Such “coupling” can also be achieved by means of positive incentives, in
particular discounts. In the case of hybrid EUCs, the abusive nature of coupling
arises from the special legal status of the public service area.106 Against this
100In determining whether prices are cost-covering, it must be examined whether the company is
able to cover average variable costs during the period of price undercutting (Amstutz and Carron
2010, Art. 7 n. 377).
101Amstutz, Carron (2010), Art. 7 n. 322; Borer (2011), Art 7 n. 24; Stäuble and Schraner (2018b),
Art. 7 n. 436.
102See Amstutz and Carron (2010), Art. 7 n. 365 and 372; Zäch (2005), n. 684.
103Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 85 et seq. and 127 et seq., ewb.
104See Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 145 et seq., ewb.
105See Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 156 et seq., ewb.
106See Borer (2011), Art. 7 n. 27; Vogel (2000), p. 197 et seq.; Zäch (2005), n. 702; see further
Competition Commission (2011b), p. 483 et seq., n. 159, Gebäudeversicherung Bern (GVB).
262 A. Abegg and P. Baumann
background, a combined product for the purchase of electricity and internet services
would be problematic, especially if a combined discount is granted.107 However,
combined products from private sector activities and public tasks are hardly
unobjectionable from an antitrust point of view, even without the granting of
discounts, as private suppliers are unable to make an equivalent offer.108
In contrast, in an older decision from the year 2011 the Secretariat of the
Competition Commission had considered it unproblematic under antitrust law for
a hybrid company to apply umbrella branding. In accordance with the Secretariat’s
practice, the use of a common umbrella brand as well as the uniform design and
reciprocal linking of the group’s own websites in particular are to be classified as
permissible conduct.109 However, joint advertising campaigns for products of pri-
vate sector activities and public services should be avoided.110
It follows from the above that the problematic practices punishable under antitrust
law cover a subset of possible distortions of competition by EUCs. Distortions of
competition such as cross-subsidization, information advantages and, to a lesser
extent, economies of scope may form part of abusive practices, provided that the
other elements of the relevant exclusionary conduct are given.111 Moreover, it is
necessary that the distortions of competition do not result in an obstructive effect that
is merely minor in nature.112 However, competitive advantages of EUCs that are due
to state regulations, such as tax advantages and financing advantages, hardly fall
within the scope of Art. 7 Swiss Cartel Act.113
107See Sect. 3.4 above with regard to a corresponding combination product intended to be launched
by ewl.
108Against this background, Gebäudeversicherung Bern has undertaken not to offer any combina-
tion products (see Competition Commission 2011b, p. 483 et seq., n. 166 et seq.,
Gebäudeversicherung Bern [GVB]).
109Competition Commission (2011a), p. 87 et seq., n. 35, Switch/Switchplus; Competition Com-
mission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 167 et seq., ewb; Competition Commission (2011b), p. 483 et seq.,
n. 165, Gebäudeversicherung Bern (GVB). Stoffel and Graber (2013), p. 853, on the other hand,
consider the joint use of a website or a customer magazine to be actions in the grey area of
competition law.
110For example, Gebäudeversicherung Bern has undertaken not to conduct any joint advertising
campaigns for the compulsory buildings insurance and the private insurance offered (Competition
Commission 2011b, p. 483 et seq., n. 167, Gebäudeversicherung Bern ([GVB]).
111Otherwise, the distortions of competition may still be subsumed under the general clause of Art.
7 para. 1 Swiss Cartel Act. According to Stoffel and Murith (2019), p. 45, cross-subsidizations are
per se prohibited under antitrust law.
112Competition Commission (2011a), p. 87 et seq., n. 51, Switch/Switchplus.
113See Vogel (2000), p. 208 et seq.
Electricity Utility Companies Entering Private Sector Markets 263
4.3 Electricity Supply Law
The Swiss Electricity Supply Act (Stromversorgungsgesetz) addresses the risk of
EUCs transferring their market power resulting from distribution network operation
to competitive areas of activity with the following unbundling requirements.114
According to Art. 10 para. 1 Swiss Electricity Supply Act, EUCs must ensure the
independence of distribution network operation. To this end, the distribution net-
work operations are to be unbundled from the other areas of activity, at least in
accounting terms (Art. 10 para. 3 Swiss Electricity Supply Act).115 In addition, Art.
10 para. 2 Swiss Electricity Supply Act provides for informational unbundling,
according to which economically sensitive information obtained from network
operation may not be used by EUCs for other areas of activity. Finally, cross-
subsidization between network operation and the other areas of activity is explicitly
prohibited.116 The Federal Electricity Commission (ElCom) monitors compliance
with these provisions.117 Failure to comply with the requirements for accounting
unbundling and the prohibition of use of sensitive information could result in fines of
up to CHF 100,000.118
Art. 10 para. 1 Swiss Electricity Supply Act expressly prohibits cross-
subsidization between distribution network operation and other areas of activity.
The provision aims to ensure that revenues from the network sector are not used to
cross-subsidize competitive activities.119 However, the prohibition of cross-
subsidization is largely unspecified. Due to the heterogeneity of the utilities, it was
decided not to make specific regulatory requirements for the allocation of common
costs.120 However, according to Art. 7 para. 5 Electricity Supply Ordinance
(Stromversorgungsverordnung), the cost allocation keys used must be appropriate,
comprehensible and recorded in writing, and they must comply with the principle of
consistency.121
Informational unbundling shall prevent that EUCs have a competitive advantage
over their competitors arising from the knowledge of distribution network opera-
tion.122 Economically sensitive information according to Art. 10 para. 2 Swiss
Electricity Supply Act is information from the operation of electricity networks
which is suitable for providing the EUC with a competitive advantage in the private
114Federal Council (2004), p. 1648.
115See also Art. 6 para. 3 and Art. 12 para. 2 Electricity Supply Act.
116Art. 10 para. 1 Electricity Supply Act.
117Art. 22 para. 1 Electricity Supply Act.
118Art. 29 para. 1 and 2 Electricity Supply Act. Accordingly, the Swiss Federal Office of Energy
fined employees of Elektrizitätswerke Schaffhausen for misusing addresses from the monopoly
sector for a marketing campaign for private sector activities (see Vonplon 2019, p. 13).
119See Federal Council (2004), p. 1648.
120See D’Arcy and Burri (2009), p. 133.
121See also VSE (2018), p. 10.
122Federal Council (2004), p. 1649; see also VSE (2018), p. 17.
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sector.123 An unjustified competitive advantage may arise if the information from the
operation of the network leads, for example, to a reduction in costs, an advantage in
time, an increase in revenue or an improvement in the product in the private sector
activities of the utility.124 The prohibition of use of economically sensitive informa-
tion includes in particular the master data (name, address, etc.) and consumption data
of network users as well as related meta and structural data.125 Informational
unbundling has gained in importance as a result of progressive digitalization and
the introduction of intelligent metering systems.126 In this context, the issue has also
increasingly moved into the focus of ElCom’s attention.127
The accounting unbundling of the distribution network operations from the other
areas of activity serves to make the cost structure of network operations transparent
to the regulator and thus preclude inadmissible cross-subsidization.128 However, the
legislator has left EUCs considerable leeway with regard to the systemic implemen-
tation of accounting unbundling.129
The provisions of the Swiss Electricity Supply Act described above are hardly
sufficient to comprehensively avoid cross-subsidization and information advantages.
Because the legislator has deliberately refrained from organizational unbundling of
the distribution network business,130 it remains permissible, for example, for the
same persons to hold management positions in both the distribution network and
competitive areas.131 Economically relevant information flows between the areas of
activity can therefore hardly be avoided. In the case of accounting unbundling, there
are considerable differences in the EUC’s overhead cost allocations. This makes it
more difficult to monitor the ban on cross-subsidization. Finally, economies of scope
are only addressed indirectly, namely via information unbundling and the ban on
cross-subsidization. Ultimately, the Swiss Electricity Supply Act does not contain
any provisions on the financing of and tax advantages for energy supply companies.
123Orelli and Thomann (2016), Art. 10 n. 9.
124Orelli and Thomann (2016), Art. 10 n. 9; VSE (2019), p. 17.
125VSE (2019), p. 18; see also for a detailed list of economically sensitive data Bundesnetzagentur
(2007), p. 15.
126Lang (2019), p. 3.
127Electricity Commission (2018), p. 28; Lang (2019), p. 3.
128D’Arcy and Burri (2009), p. 130; Orelli and Thomann (2016), Art. 10 n. 18; VSE (2018), p. 9.
129Orelli and Thomann (2016), Art. 10 n. 20; see further D’Arcy, Burri (2009), p. 130 et seq.;
Stillfried (2010), p. 182.
130Federal Council (2004), p. 1649.
131Orelli, Thomann (2016), p. 16.
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5 Measures to Avoid Distortions of Competition
There are only few concrete guidelines for EUCs on how to deal with potential
distortions of competition in their private sector activities (Sect. 4 above). This
regulatory deficit weighs heavily, as on the one hand it is hardly to be expected
that the private sector activities of EUCs will lose importance in the future.132 On the
other hand, many of the measures proposed here may become relevant regardless,
particularly with a view to a possible electricity agreement with the EU. It is to be
expected that Switzerland will have to adopt the requirements of EU state aid law
and the electricity acquis to the greatest extent possible in order to participate in the
EU’s internal electricity market.133 Distortions of competition, in particular tax and
financing advantages, are incompatible with the EU ban on state aid in principle.134
The following lays out de lege ferenda measures to avoid the distortions of
competition described above.135 For EUCs that want to pro-actively ensure the
competitive neutrality of their private sector activities, this catalogue of measures
also offers a corresponding recommendation for action already today. This is not an
exhaustive list. Depending on the area of activity of the utility, there are further
distortions of competition which may result in an additional need for action.
5.1 Organizational Requirements
Avoiding distortions of competition effectively requires a structural separation
between the public tasks and the private sector activities of the EUC. Structural
separation can be carried out in different gradations. It may take the form of
accounting, functional, organizational or even ownership unbundling.136 At the
time when the Swiss Electricity Supply Act was enacted, distribution networks
were not organizationally separated due to the restrictions of smaller EUCs.137
However, the distortions of competition described above are favored by the lack
of organizational separation. If the private sector activities of an EUC are consider-
able, legal provisions to ensure the organizational outsourcing of these activities to a
132See Sect. 2.3.
133Federal Council (2013) p. 7582; see also Mayoraz (2018), n. 547; Hofmann et al. (2021), p. 85.
134Mayoraz (2018), n. 551 and 553 et seq.; Ziegler, Moser (2019), n. 58 and 77.
135In doing so, reference is made in particular to some of the relevant EU requirements.
136See OECD (2015), p. 46 et seq.; Petrik-Haltiner (2017), p. 44.
137Federal Council (2004), p. 1649; Orelli, Thomann (2016), Art. 10 n. 8. In contrast, Art. 26 para.
1 of Directive 2009/72 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, OJ L
211, 14 August 2009, 55-93, requires distribution network operation to be carried out by a separate
company. However, Art. 26 para. 4 of the Directive 2009/72/EC allows exemptions for vertically
integrated EUCs with fewer than 100,000 customers.
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separate company are necessary. In order to avoid tax advantages, the legal form of a
private-law company limited by shares should be chosen in principle.138
However, in the case of EUCs with limited private sector activities, organiza-
tional separation may not be appropriate. In this case, the EUC should be required by
law to separate the two sectors by function. To this end, the public sector and private
sector activities must be managed as separate business units.139 In order to meet the
requirements of the Federal Supreme Court and Electricity Supply Act regarding the
financial separation of public and private sector activities, at least the accounts of the
two sectors must be kept separately.140
In any case, the separation of public tasks and private sector activities requires
that the public tasks to be performed by the EUC are clearly defined. In particular,
expansions that are not worthwhile from an entrepreneurial point of view but
politically desired by the EUC’s public owners must be defined by the latter as a
public task.141 The costs involved in undertaking such public tasks must be disclosed
to the legislator so that it can make an informed decision on the cost-benefit ratio of
the project.142
5.2 Financial Advantages
If private-sector activities of EUCs are financed by means of debt (loans, credits,
etc.), the law must provide that the EUC has to pay interest at market rates in order to
avoid financing advantages. On the one hand, an EUC may only grant loans to its
private sector business divisions or subsidiaries at normal market conditions in order
not to expose itself to the accusation of abusive cross-subsidization under antitrust
law.143 On the other hand, the public owners themselves can also ensure that there
are no financing advantages by granting loans to an EUC for private sector activities
only on market terms.
In order to determine the market rate, the interest rate that would apply to
comparable private companies must be ascertained. To this end, EUCs should obtain
appropriate benchmark ratings for all loans. The rating would determine the interest
rate at which the public utility would have to take out the loan if it were operating as
138See Sect. 3.2; Mayoraz (2018), n. 556.
139See Finger et al. (2009), p. 22.
140See Sect. 4.3. According to Art. 4 para. 1 Directive 2006/111 of the European Commission of
16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public
undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings, OJ L
318, 17 November 2006, 17-25, the costs and revenues are to be allocated by means of uniformly
applied, objectively justified and clearly defined cost accounting principles.
141See OECD (2012), p. 53.
142See OECD (2015), p. 47.
143Competition Commission (2014), p. 79 et seq., n. 115, ewb.
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a private company. To ensure the independence of the ratings, they should not be
issued by institutions that maintain a significant business relationship with the EUC.
It may prove disproportionately costly for EUCs to obtain such ratings, especially
if the debt financing is negligible for the EUC’s business. For this reason, it might be
appropriate for the regulator to calculate the interest advantage resulting from state
control for different categories of utilities. This would then be added to the interest
rate actually granted in order to determine the market rate.
Interest rate adjustments are more difficult when utilities take out loans from third
parties. As shown above, state guarantees in favor of EUCs lead to financing
advantages. For this reason, explicit state guarantees for private sector activities of
EUCs must be abolished as a first step. However, it can be presumed that even
without an explicit state guarantee, third parties assume that there is a low risk of
default of a state-owned utility. In order to avoid financing advantages, EUCs should
be obliged to calculate the resulting interest advantage using the methods described
above and then pay it to the state.
In addition, public authorities should only provide collateral for EUC loans at
market conditions. Market conditions may normally be assumed if (i) the EUC is not
in any financial difficulties, (ii) the collateral is linked to a specific transaction, (iii)
the community also bears part of the risk and (iv) the utility pays a market price for
the provision of the collateral.144
With regard to advantages in terms of return on equity, it is imperative for the
community to expressly state in both the organizational decree and the owner
strategy that private sector activities may only be taken up by the EUC if market
returns are achieved.145 A market return corresponds to the average expected return
on an investment that the market requires on the basis of generally accepted criteria,
taking into account in particular the risk involved in the investment, the financial
situation of the firm and the specific characteristics of the economic activity
concerned.146
For example, the calculation of the internal rate of return (IRR) is a widely
accepted standard method for determining the annual return on capital.147 The
same results are usually obtained when the investment decision is evaluated on the
144See n. 114 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C/2016/2946, OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, 1–50.
145According to Schedler et al. (2016), p. 118, the return on equity must be regulated in the owner
strategy.
146See n. 102 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C/2016/2946, OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, 1–50.
147See n. 102 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C/2016/2946, OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, 1–50. The
IRR takes into account the future cash flows that an investor expects to receive during the
investment period. It defines the discount rate at which the capital value of several cash flows
is zero.
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basis of its net present value (NPV).148 The target return can also be derived from the
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). According to this method, an EUC must
at least generate returns that exceed its capital costs.149 Ideally, EUCs generally
examine their private sector projects using various methods to confirm the
estimates.150
Especially for smaller EUCs, the calculation of a target return at market condi-
tions is likely to be a challenge. It might be appropriate then to provide guidelines to
EUCs with ranges of normal market returns for relevant private sector activities.
5.3 Tax and Regulatory Advantages
Private activities of EUCs must be subject to the same taxation as the corresponding
activities of private operators. Tax advantages of EUCs mostly result from the fact
that the tax preference is linked to a legal form which is not open to private
competitors.151 The maxim must be that the tax liability of EUCs has to be based
on their activity and not on their organizational form.152 To this end, the organiza-
tional decrees of public law institutions must stipulate as standard that utilities are
taxable as private companies with regard to their private sector activities.153
However, even with a corresponding decree, preferential tax treatment at the level
of federal taxes remains in place. Against this background, it is imperative that the
private sector activities of EUCs be conducted only in the legal form of companies
limited by shares under private law.154 If such adaption of the legal form cannot be
carried out, EUCs should be required by law to calculate the normal taxation for their
private sector activities. The calculated tax advantage must then be compensated for
by means of a compensatory payment to the public authorities.
If there are other regulatory advantages in favor of the private sector activities of
EUCs, the relevant provisions must be repealed or adapted by the respective
community. If regulatory preferences cannot be avoided, the advantage must be
compensated to the community and taken into account in the pricing of the private
sector offer.
148See n. 102 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C/2016/2946, OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, 1–50. In
the case of NPVs, the difference between the positive and negative cash flows accruing during the
investment period is discounted at an appropriate rate of return.
149See Art. 13 para. 3 let. b Electricity Supply Ordinance.
150See n. 105 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C/2016/2946, OJ C 262, 19 July 2016, 1–50.
151See Sect. 3.2.
152This is stated explicitly in the Guidelines of the Federal Council on Corporate Governance
(Guideline 28) (Federal Council 2006, p. 8283).
153See Federal Council (2006), p. 8282.
154See Sect. 3.2.
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5.4 Cross-Subsidies
As described above, the current prohibition of cross-subsidization is difficult to
specify and verify with regard to the more than 600 EUCs in Switzerland. The
following measures can also be taken to ensure that no cross-subsidization takes
place.
The law should stipulate that services between the private and public sector
business divisions of an EUC must be provided at arm’s length and must be set
out in contractual agreements.155 In this way, EUCs can also ensure that they are not
suspected of abusive practices under antitrust law in connection with cross-
subsidization.156
Cross-subsidization resulting from a misallocation of overheads is particularly
difficult to trace. For this reason, it is important that overhead costs are correctly
broken down. In doing so, appropriate, comprehensible and written cost codes that
comply with the principle of consistency must be used. As a result of the differences
between the EUCs, it is hardly possible to provide uniform cost codes. However, it
would be useful to use concrete, meaningful examples to show which requirements
the overhead cost codes of the utility companies have to meet.
Within the framework of the “sunshine regulation” now provided for by law in
accordance with Art. 22a of the Draft Electricity Supply Act, ElCom can also collect
information on the relevant overhead costs (allocations) from the electricity utility
companies and compare the data received.157 The results of this comparison can then
be published. EUCs whose overhead costs (allocations) differ significantly from the
average are motivated to make adjustments to the cost allocation or to justify their
chosen method convincingly.
Finally, EUCs should regularly check whether their private business activities are
free of cross-subsidies. In practice, there are various methods to do so.158 In the
present case, it would make sense to follow a further development of the Faulhaber
rule, as provided for in Art. 48(1) of the Swiss Postal Regulation.159 Accordingly,
there is an illegal cross-subsidization if the revenue from a particular good offered by
the utility in the private sector is not sufficient to cover the incremental costs of this
155See European Commission, Interpretative Note on Directive 2009/72 of the European Parlia-
ment and the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity
and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, OJ L 211, 14 August 2009, 55-93, and Directive 2009/73 of
the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ L 211, 14 August 2009, 94–136;
European Commission (2010), p. 25.
156See Sect. 4.2.
157See Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018c), p. 33 et seq.
158See Baumann (2020), n. 12 et seq.; Spiekermann (2010), p. 28 et seq.
159See with regard to the further development of the Faulhaber rule Baumann (2020), n. 16; Platt
(2005), p. 39.
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good and there is a service or business division in the public sector whose revenue
exceeds its stand-alone costs.160
5.5 Economies of Scope
In the case of economies of scope, the requirements regarding cross-subsidization
and informational unbundling must always be observed.161 This means that the
private sector activities of the EUC can only provide shared services such as IT
services and HR support if information unbundling is guaranteed and there is no risk
of cross-subsidization.162
EUCs are to be prohibited by law from offering combined products or combina-
tion discounts from the public sector and private business activities. This is already
required in view of the fact that they would otherwise expose themselves to risks
under antitrust law.163 “All-round carefree packages” that are offered by EUCs and
include both public and private sector services must therefore be unbundled.
It can be assumed that the average customer is unaware of the fact that EUCs have
public functions alongside private sector activities.164 In order to avoid unjustified
advantages in this respect, it must be clearly recognizable for the customer in each
case whether a service is offered by an EUC’s public sector or private sector
activities. It is important to rule out any likelihood of confusion between the two
areas.165
To this end, an EUC may be required by law to use a different brand in its private
business activities than the one it uses for its public service activities.166 The brands
must thus be designed and also deployed in such a way that customers can recognize
the services of the EUC and have no doubt about which of the two areas of activity
the services belong to.167 Measures to achieve this include, for example, different
color choices, distinguishable fonts and the use of individual image components and
unique names.168
160See Baumann (2020), n. 14 et seq., for a detailed description of incremental and stand-alone
costs; see for the calculation of the stand-alone costs PostCom (2013), p. 3.
161See Sect. 4.3.
162See Bundesnetzagentur (2006), p. 19; European Commission (2010), p. 25.
163See Sect. 4.2.
164In a similar way Bundesnetzagentur (2012), p. 9.
165See Art. 26 para. 3 Directive 2009/72 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July
2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/
54/EC, OJ L 211, 14 August 2009, 55–93; European Commission (2010), p. 27.
166Art. 26 para. 3 Directive 2009/72/EC.
167See Bundesnetzagentur (2012), p. 10. However, it should probably remain possible that cus-
tomers conclude on the basis of the respective brands that the two divisions belong to the same
company or group of companies.
168Bundesnetzagentur (2012), p. 10.
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Likewise, the business correspondence and advertising material of EUCs are to be
designed so as to avoid confusion. In the case of letters, faxes, emails, price lists, etc.,
it should be clearly visible for the customer whether these are messages related to the
public tasks fulfilled by the EUC or from private customer care. In order to avoid any
risk of confusion between the two areas, EUCs must generally refrain from publish-
ing joint customer magazines, newsletters and the like.169
Finally, it has to be ensured that customers can easily see whether the information
presented on the internet is part of the private sector activity or the public sector remit
of the EUC. For this reason, a joint internet presence must be avoided and separate
web addresses are to be maintained for the two areas. In order to avoid any risk of
confusion, different email addresses or contact forms should be used for contact
requests.170 Corresponding principles must also apply to telephone communication.
For the public sector and private sector activities, the EUC should have to set up
separate service telephone numbers and make them known to customers.171
5.6 Information Advantages
For EUCs, the requirements for information unbundling according to the Swiss
Electricity Supply Act are to be observed first and foremost. However, these
requirements are rather general and only cover the use of information benefits
from the network sector and the universal energy supply.172 Against this back-
ground, it is necessary to provide for additional measures. Where possible, these
can be integrated into existing internal company guidelines, processes and systems
for data compliance and data governance.173
EUCs are to be obliged to identify and document the information relevant to
competition in a first step. A corresponding analysis must be carried out for all the
public service areas operated by the EUCs. It must also be determined where and by
means of which processes this information is to be stored physically and electron-
ically.174 To the extent permitted by the applicable legal provisions, competition-
relevant information from the public task areas must be disclosed to all private
169See Bundesnetzagentur (2012), p. 5.
170See Bundesnetzagentur (2012), p. 6.
171See Bundesnetzagentur (2012), p. 7. For example, EKZ has different service numbers for
inquiries regarding power outages and the like and for inquiries with regard to electrical installations
offered by EKZ Eltop.
172See Lang (2019), p. 3.
173See VSE (2019), p. 20 et seq.
174Bundesnetzagentur (2007), p. 8.
272 A. Abegg and P. Baumann
competitors on a non-discriminatory basis.175 Ideally, such publications should use
an easy to find, central link on the EUC’s website.
In a second step, “Chinese Walls” are to be set up between the public and private
sectors. The aim of these is to ensure that the private sector does not gain information
benefits from the public tasks of the utility. From an organizational point of view, a
functional and spatial separation of the areas of activity is possible. At the same time,
access restrictions must be provided for, if necessary, and access rights to data
relevant to competition must be regulated.176
To this end, employees must be clearly assigned to the individual areas of
activity. Management positions should be filled differently for the public sector
and private sector activities.177 Competition-relevant information from the public
task areas must only be accessible to employees who actually belong to the relevant
public task area of the EUC.178 The access rights to computer systems in which
competition-relevant information of the public task area is managed must be
restricted accordingly for employees of the private enterprise sector.179 Conse-
quently, employees in the private sector must not be able to access customer
information (name, address, bank details, etc.) from the public sector in the inte-
grated computer system.180
If services are provided for customers within the scope of the public remit, the
EUC should not refer exclusively to its own private sector offer in this context.181
For example, it is not permitted to draw the attention of a customer for whom the
utility company provides a network connection to the utility company’s own range
of services regarding the installation of solar systems. Employees with customer
contact should be trained in how to classify customers into their respective areas of
responsibility and activity and how to deal with customer enquiries regarding the
private sector offer.182
175Bundesnetzagentur (2007), p. 10; Finger et al. (2009), p. 22. For example,Gebäudeversicherung
Bern has undertaken to offer data records from the monopoly sector which it makes available to its
subsidiaries operating in the private sector to private providers on equal terms (Competition
Commission 2011b, p. 483 et seq., n. 167, Gebäudeversicherung Bern [GVB]).
176Bundesnetzagentur (2007), p. 22; see further Ziegler and Moser (2019), n. 30.
177For example, Gebäudeversicherung Bern has committed itself to this (Competition Commission
2011b, p. 483 et seq., n. 167, Gebäudeversicherung Bern [GVB]).
178Bundesnetzagentur (2007), p. 8.
179Bundesnetzagentur (2007), p. 9.
180Bundesnetzagentur (2006), p. 24.
181Bundesnetzagentur (2007), p. 11.
182Bundesnetzagentur (2007), p. 11.
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6 Summary and Outlook
Electricity utility companies today often operate in hybrid mode. On the one hand,
they carry out the public tasks assigned to them by the legislator. On the other hand,
apart from the fulfillment of public tasks, they are active as entrepreneurs and thus in
the private sector. Private sector activities may range from electricity products for
large customers, photovoltaic and e-mobility installations to services in the field of
building services engineering, internet offerings and the sale of household
appliances.
A utility’s private sector activities can be associated with several potential
distortions of competition. It is not only cross-subsidization, which is often at the
forefront of discussions, that should be considered. Rather, EUCs potentially benefit
from financing advantages and, due to their legal form, from significant exceptions
to taxation. Furthermore, considerable economies of scope can be achieved by
hybrid EUCs, as the public and private sectors can draw on joint company resources.
As a result of the proximity to the state and their function as distribution system
operators, EUCs have a competitive information advantage over private suppliers
(Sect. 3 above).
Guidelines for dealing with the individual distortions of competition derived from
constitutional, antitrust and electricity supply law are only partially binding. In
particular, there is a lack of instruments for dealing with issues related to taxation,
financing and economies of scope. In contrast, the requirements relating to cross-
subsidization and the exploitation of information benefits for private sector activities
are more comprehensive (Sect. 4 above).
The present contribution has set out (above in Sect. 5) de lege ferendameasures to
avoid distortions of competition. Irrespective of the extent to which these reform
proposals are implemented, it is imperative that EUCs and their public owners
seriously address the problem of distortions of competition and the measures
described. Otherwise, there is a risk that their private sector activities will increas-
ingly be rejected and that their scope for economic development will be restricted by
political considerations.
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Abstract What are the patterns in media coverage in Swiss energy policy-making,
and to what extent do the media influence voters’ decisions at the ballot? In a first
step, this chapter provides a comparative investigation of media coverage in the
run-up to three recent energy-related referenda (2015 initiative “Energy tax instead
of VAT”; 2016 nuclear phase-out initiative; 2017 referendum on the federal Energy
Strategy 2050), with 31 other referenda between 2014 and 2018 as a benchmark.
Based on a content analysis of articles published in 21 Swiss newspapers, our
analysis demonstrates that the three energy-policy referenda are characterized by
patterns similar to non-energy votes but also have distinct features. In a second step,
we specifically focus on the 2016 nuclear phase-out initiative, which was character-
ized by balanced newspaper reporting, and explain voting behavior by linking data
on media coverage and individual-level data from a panel survey (n ¼ 1014). The
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analysis relies on “linkage analysis”, a method that takes media contents as quasi-
experimental stimuli to explain individual-level outcomes. We find that the failure of
the phase-out initiative can be partly explained by exposure to newspaper coverage:
one in four left-wing voters who had initially been in favor of the popular initiative
but were exposed to strongly negative coverage about it during the “hot” campaign
phase changed their initial voting intention. The analysis also suggests that the media
coverage may have helped center/right-wing voters to learn about their preferred
party’s position so as to align their vote choice with their political predisposition.
1 Introduction
Direct democracy is an important component of Switzerland’s political DNA. On
average, Swiss citizens were called to vote on eight federal ballot propositions per
year since the beginning of the century. In international comparison, there is no
country in which direct democratic votes are held as frequently as in Switzerland.
While energy topics had been absent from the voting agenda for more than a decade,
a number of direct democratic votes with important implications for the country’s
energy system have been held at the federal level since 2015. In this chapter, we
discuss two interrelated questions with respect to these direct democratic votes: First,
what are the patterns of media coverage of energy topics in the run-up to direct
democratic votes? And second, to what extent does media reporting influence
citizens’ vote decision?
Media coverage about referendum campaigns1 has received increasing scholarly
attention not only in Switzerland but also internationally. So far, most analyses fall
into two camps, focusing either on the media as a “mirror” of society or as a
“molder” of society. On the one hand, scholars analyze media coverage as a
dependent variable, asking which factors actually shape the news. On the other
hand, scholars use media coverage as an independent variable to examine possible
effects on decision-making. In this vein, linkage studies often examine whether
frames and arguments salient in media coverage can be linked to citizens’
decision-making. Scholars also use the overall intensity and tonality of media
coverage in order to explain voting behavior. Encompassing analyses, however,
which examine the dual role of the media both as a dependent and independent
variable are rare, with the study led by Hanspeter Kriesi being the most notable
1Throughout the text, we use the term “referenda” to refer to three distinct instruments of Swiss
direct democracy: “popular initiatives” (popular votes launched by citizens to enact a constitutional
amendment), “optional referenda” (popular votes to challenge a bill adopted by parliament) and
“mandatory referenda” (popular votes on bills which by law have to be put on the ballot in
any case).
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exception.2 In this chapter, we try to address this shortcoming by showing how
media coverage about three energy-related proposals can be explained and by
illuminating how media coverage about one energy policy-related proposal, the
nuclear phase-out initiative, affected voting behavior.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we first provide some context by
reviewing research on media coverage in referendum campaigns. Next, we empir-
ically investigate how three recent energy-related direct democratic votes were
covered by the media, also in comparison with other direct democratic votes. Sect. 3
starts by deriving several theoretical expectations regarding the influence of media
coverage on voting behavior, before using the case of the nuclear phase-out initiative
(2016) to investigate these expectations empirically. The chapter concludes by
discussing implications for Swiss energy governance and further research.
2 Media Coverage in Referendum Campaigns
2.1 Research on Media Coverage About Swiss Referenda
An important strand of research on the role of media in direct democracy focuses on
media coverage as a dependent variable, evaluating the quality of media coverage3
and asking which factors shape news reporting. When it comes to explaining actual
media coverage, most data comes from the Swiss case. This is not surprising because
the Swiss case offers excellent conditions for comparative analyses. This stream of
research argues that media coverage largely reflects power structures in society and
actual campaign activities, which is why media do not cover all votes, actors or
arguments with the same intensity and tonality. Hence, media often quote political
actors who hold important positions and have official roles in the campaigns (e.g.,
referendum committees), and they often report on actors’ campaign activities such as
press conferences.4 In a comparative analysis, Linards Udris and colleagues found
that the amount of media attention to a referendum in the “hot” phase of the
campaign cannot be explained with the “real” degree of contestation (e.g., inner-
party conflicts), the status of the challengers or the temporal proximity of the vote in
parliament or at the polls (both opinion polls and final results).5 Instead, media
attention is higher if at least one of the following conditions is present: a) media
attention was already high in an earlier phase, b) the referendum is about “identity
politics” or the cultural dimension of political conflicts (e.g., the initiative against
“mass immigration”) rather than socio-economic issues, c) the challengers use
2Kriesi (2012).
3For instance, Dekavalla (2016); Ettinger and Imhof (2014); Marcinkowski and Donk (2012);
Marquis et al. (2011); Renwick and Lamb (2013).
4Hänggli (2012).
5Udris et al. (2016, 2018).
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populist rhetoric, or d) political advertising expenditures are high, which evidently
favors political actors from the right, since they normally have a relatively large
campaign budget.6 Matthias Gerth and colleagues also argue that issue characteris-
tics matter: familiar and uncomplex issues (e.g., asylum policy) trigger more atten-
tion than unfamiliar, complex issues (e.g., tax reform).7
At the same time, media do not merely follow political agendas but also shape
news coverage according to their own logics. This is illustrated by the considerable
differences in media attention among media types, for instance between tabloid and
quality media, with the former investing fewer resources and producing fewer
articles than the latter. These differences can be explained with different structural
features of these media types and thus different organizational routines and logics.8
Furthermore, ownership structures shape news coverage; media with close ties to
political parties or milieus tend to take a political stance in their reporting, including
on referenda.9 Finally, with the ongoing commercialization of the media, media tend
to frame politics, including referendum campaigns, as a “horse race” between
political actors, stressing contestation and tactics instead of issue substance.10
These findings point to certain deficits in the quality of media coverage. In sum,
however, the empirical literature paints a rather positive picture of Swiss media
coverage. Initiatives and referenda are considered “routine and ritualized business”
for Swiss media and most votes are covered in a more or less substantial and
objective way.11
Within the growing literature on referendum coverage in Swiss media, energy-
related referenda, however, have not played a role recently. Scholars are either
concerned with general patterns across policy issues12 or have empirically investi-
gated other policy fields such as social policy13 or migration, traffic, and foreign
policy.14 The few available recent studies on Swiss energy policy do not focus on
referendum debates in news media but on Twitter15 or focus on media coverage not
about a specific referendum campaign but on the aftermath of the Fukushima
accident in general.16
This dearth of research is unfortunate because in recent years, the number of
energy-related votes at the national level has increased. Since 2015, Swiss citizens
have voted on three different energy-related proposals (see Table 1): the popular
6Hermann (2012).
7Gerth et al. (2012).
8Rademacher et al. (2012).
9Jandura and Udris (2019); Udris et al. (2020).
10Hänggli (2012).
11Kriesi (2012), p. 232.
12For instance, Udris et al. (2018).
13Marquis et al. (2011).
14Marcinkowski and Donk (2012).
15Arlt et al. (2019) on the nuclear phase-out initiative.
16Kepplinger and Lemke (2016); Kristiansen (2017).
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initiative “Energy tax instead of VAT” by the Green Liberal Party (GLP) in March
2015 (henceforth “GLP initiative”), the popular initiative on a nuclear phase-out
(“Atomausstiegsinitiative”) by the Green Party (GP) in November 2016 and the
referendum on the national Energy Strategy 2050 in May 2017 (henceforth
“ES2050”).17 After a break of more than a decade—energy-related referenda peaked
between 2000 and 2003—these recent votes have brought energy policy back on the
voting agenda. While two popular initiatives attempted to challenge the status quo
by advocating for more renewable energies, the referendum against the federal
Energy Strategy 2050 tried to keep the status quo by blocking an encompassing
move away from nuclear energy and fossil fuels toward renewable energies. Is the
growing importance of energy policy and the according conflict also reflected in
media coverage? Knowing that public votes are, by and large, “routine business” for
Swiss media, we expect the media, of course, to devote their attention also to these
energy-related proposals. But how much and in which way is an open question
which we investigate in Sect. 2.2.
2.2 Media Coverage of Recent Energy-Related Referenda
In order to determine and contextualize media attention to public votes and tonality
towards these votes, we rely on data from the “Abstimmungsmonitor”, a project at
fög—Forschungszentrum Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft (University of Zurich),
which has examined news coverage about national public votes in Switzerland
since 2013. Data from the “Abstimmungsmonitor” (monitor on public votes, hence-
forth “monitor”) has been used for case studies18 and comparative analyses.19 Short
reports on each voting day are publicly available on the website of the research
center.20
Table 1 Energy-related direct democratic votes at the federal level since 2015
Title Type (Sponsor) Voting Day
Yes-votes
(in percent)



















17The popular initiative on a “Green Economy” in the broader field of environmental policy also
included some energy-related aspects. It was rejected in 2016.
18For instance, Udris et al. (2020).
19For instance, Udris (2016).
20See https://www.foeg.uzh.ch/de/forschung/Projekte/Abstimmungsmonitor.html.
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In order to rely on the same media sample and time frame for each public vote, the
monitor data is based on a standardized data collection approach. The entire sample
now consists of news coverage about 34 different public votes between 2014 and
2018 published in 21 different news outlets during 11 weeks in the run-up to the vote
(starting 12 weeks before voting day until 1 week before voting day). The sample
yields 9951 news articles in total, 1046 of which relate to the three energy-related
referenda. The newspaper sample covers a broad spectrum in terms of regional
diversity, including 15 outlets from German-speaking Switzerland and 6 from
French-speaking Switzerland, and in terms of media types, ranging from
low-quality tabloid and commuter papers to more mid-market regional papers
(e.g., Südostschweiz) to high-quality papers (e.g., Neue Zürcher Zeitung), and
including daily papers, Sunday papers and one weekly magazine.21
Apart from the number of articles (a proxy for media attention), the monitor data
includes information on tonality, which is measured at the article level. Each article
is assigned a type of tonality, with “positive” indicating an article primarily convey-
ing a message of support for the proposal, for instance an editorial or a report
describing the press conference of the proponents; “negative” conveying rejection;
and “ambivalent” including rather balanced (or ambivalent) messages. Next, an
aggregated tonality score is constructed at the newspaper level by subtracting the
number of negative articles from the number of positive ones, dividing the result by
the overall number of articles (including articles with ambivalent tonality) and
multiplying by 100. Hence, the aggregated tonality score is bounded between
100 and 100. In addition, for each article, the data includes up to three actors
(individual or collective actors) with a statement on the proposal, including the
stance an actor takes (positive, negative, ambivalent). In the data analysis, for each
collective actor (e.g., SVP) or actor type (e.g., experts), a score that displays the
overall acceptance towards the proposal is shown. This actor-level score is calcu-
lated in the same way as the article-level tonality score discussed above.
We now present the results from our comparative analysis of media coverage.
First, we focus on media attention and tonality; second, we shed light on differences
among media outlets; and third, we highlight actor constellations in the three energy-
related referenda.
Table 2 shows the amount of media attention and the tonality towards the three
recent energy-related proposals in comparison with 31 other votes. We display
initiatives (Volksinitiativen) and referenda in the narrow sense (Referenden against
federal proposals) separately, since they have different institutional characteristics
(initiatives are initiated bottom-up, federal proposals top-down) and different tonal-
ity directions—support for challengers takes a positive tonality in the case of
initiatives but a negative tonality in the case of federal proposals. The three referenda
21The 21 examined news outlets are listed alphabetically: 20 minuten; 20 minutes; 24-Heures;
Aargauer Zeitung; Basler Zeitung; Berner Zeitung; Blick; Blick am Abend; Die Südostschweiz; Le
Matin; Le Matin Dimanche; Le Temps; (Neue) Luzerner Zeitung; Neue Zürcher Zeitung; NZZ am
Sonntag; Schweiz am Wochenende/am Sonntag; SonntagsBlick; SonntagsZeitung; Tages-
Anzeiger; Tribune de Genève; Weltwoche.
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share common features, but they differ in terms of attention and tonality. The data
shows relatively low media attention to the GLP initiative in 2015, while both the
nuclear phase-out initiative in 2016 and the energy referendum ES2050 in 2017
triggered much more media coverage than other votes.
We argue that the following factors help explain these differences in media
attention.22 Political advertising expenditures, which usually correlate with overall
media attention, were below average in the run-up to the GLP initiative and above
average in the other two cases, with the number of political ads as a possible proxy.23
Furthermore, only the two referenda with high media attention included debates on
nuclear energy, while the GLP initiative focused more on renewable energy and on
financial policy in general. This difference in issue characteristics is important, since
nuclear energy has been found to be extensively and intensively covered by the
media, especially after the accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant.24 In this sense, in gauging the newsworthiness of an issue in the “hot” phase,
journalists use previous media attention as a yardstick.25 We can also argue that the
GLP initiative constituted a more technical and unfamiliar issue; hence it was less
attractive and more difficult for the media to cover. The nuclear phase-out initiative
and ES2050, on the other hand, with their focus on nuclear energy (in the case of the
phase-out initiative including a date to end electricity generation based on nuclear
energy) represented a more familiar and concrete issue.
As regards tonality, media coverage is, on average, negative towards initiatives
and positive towards federal proposals (see Table 2). Given that federal proposals
have, on average, good chances to withstand a referendum, while the majority of
popular initiatives is rejected, this supports the finding that media typically reflect the
majority view of political actors and the final voting result. However, the three
energy proposals fit this pattern to different extents. Media coverage about the GLP
initiative was indeed typical of media coverage about initiatives, even though
criticism in this case was even more pronounced. (In this light, the very low approval
rate at the polls is not surprising.) In comparison, the nuclear phase-out initiative
Table 2 Media attention and tonality towards initiatives and referenda
Media attention Tonality
Initiative “Energy tax instead of VAT” (2015) 132 41
Nuclear phase-out initiative (2016) 398 1
18 other initiatives (average) 296 27
Energy Strategy 2050 (2017) 516 8
13 other federal proposals (average) 275 18
Note: “Media attention” indicates the number of articles published on the respective public vote.
“Tonality” indicates tonality (averaged over all newspapers) towards the respective vote
22See Udris et al. (2018).
23Heidelberger (2017).
24Kristiansen (2017).
25Udris et al. (2018).
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found more support and less criticism in media coverage than expected. Unlike other
initiatives, tonality towards the nuclear phase-out was ambivalent, i.e., the numbers
of articles supportive and critical of the initiative were about equal. The Green Party
as a challenger of the status quo thus managed to stimulate a salient and multifaceted
debate, with their proposal finding more support in the media than average initia-
tives. Finally, on average, the media portrayed the ES2050 only in a slightly positive
light compared to other federal proposals. Hence, the federal energy strategy was a
hotly debated and controversial issue in the media, a finding that is mirrored by the
diversity of views about the implementation of the ES2050 among stakeholders of
the Swiss energy system, as documented by a stakeholder survey conducted within
the work package “Energy Governance” of SCCER-CREST.26
At the same time, media coverage differed considerably among newspapers (see
Fig. 1). This is not surprising, since each newspaper is embedded in a different
context, reflecting both the specific political climate in cantons and regions and,
above all, specific ownership and production structures. For the data analysis, we
combined the three energy-related proposals, as positive tonality in all cases ulti-
mately means support for more “green” policies and renewable energies. Through
this comparison, large differences among newspapers become clear. Weltwoche
(64), Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ; 31) and its sister paper NZZ am Sonntag
(35) and Basler Zeitung (32) had the most negative tonality scores, while Le
Fig. 1 Media attention and tonality in different newspapers—three energy-related proposals
26See Duygan et al. (2021).
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Matin (+32) and its sister paper Le Matin Dimanche (+19) and Blick (+25) displayed
the most positive tonality scores. The positive tonality apparent in newspapers from
Suisse romande (e.g., Le Matin, Le Matin Dimanche, Tribune de Genève) seems to
reflect a political climate more favorable to renewable energies, as is also attested in
the final voting results. As concerns negative tonality, ownership structures might
indeed be another explanatory factor. Weltwoche and Basler Zeitung (at that time)
were owned by political actors from the SVP, and NZZ is owned by shareholders
who are obliged to be either members of the FDP or have a “liberal” (“freisinnig-
demokratisch” in German, in the sense of conservative liberalism) worldview. Both
SVP and FDP were more or less critical of renewable energy policies and of phasing
out nuclear energy. In media coverage, journalists then seemed to align with the
official or long-standing political stance of their newspapers, which is in line with
earlier findings.27
Apart from media-specific factors, the overall support or rejection reflected in the
tonality is a specific result of actor constellations and political conflict. This is
illustrated by the media attention that was given to different actors (Table 3) and
actors’ acceptance of proposals (based on their statements; Table 4). With respect to
the latter, +100 means that all statements of an actor are positive (indicating support),
100 means that all statements of an actor are negative (indicating rejection), and
0 means that either the actor uses ambivalent messages or there are various compet-
ing factions within a collective actor (e.g., within a political party). Table 3 (media
Table 3 Share of media attention given to different collective actors and actor types in media
coverage of the three energy-related proposals






Media 13% 13% 24% 329
Economy 2% 15% 12% 220
SVP 6% 6% 13% 165
FDP 6% 5% 10% 138
Green party 6% 14% 2% 128
Civil society 4% 9% 6% 127
Federal
Council
13% 6% 6% 120
Experts 3% 5% 6% 94
SP 9% 6% 3% 81
CVP 2% 5% 4% 76
Green Lib-
eral party
19% 2% 2% 69
Other actors 16% 15% 11% 234
Statements
all actors
193 717 871 1781
27See Jandura and Udris (2019); Udris et al. (2020); Kepplinger and Lemke (2016).
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attention) and Table 4 (acceptance) show that each referendum followed a specific
pattern. The overall negative tonality towards the GLP initiative was also reflected in
the actor constellation. Apart from the GLP, this initiative received some support
only from the Green Party (6%; +75), while almost all other actor groups were
quoted with primarily negative messages.
In contrast, the nuclear phase-out initiative and ES2050 proposal were much
more contested, albeit with different conflict constellations. The nuclear phase-out
received support not only from the Green Party but also from the GLP, the Social
Democrats and parts of civil society and experts. Notably, when media used com-
ments and their own evaluations, there was a balance between support and rejec-
tion—unlike in the case of the GLP initiative. In terms of media attention, the Green
Party was highly visible (14%; +99), as were its opponents representing incumbent
business interests such as those from the nuclear sector (“economy”, 15%; 79) and
the center-right parties including SVP, FDP and CVP (collective media attention:
16%). In sum, this media portrayal followed a rather “classic” energy- and
environment-related conflict in the economic left-right dimension, with some sup-
port by the media themselves.28
Media coverage about ES2050 shows that the majority of actors used favorable
messages, but two large parties, which were also the parties with the highest media
attention, were either highly critical (SVP: 13%; 85) or internally divided (FDP:
Table 4 Acceptance of energy-related proposals by different collective actors and actor types
Initiative “Energy tax





Media 62 2 10 329
Economy 100 79 16 220
SVP 100 63 85 165
FDP 100 78 20 138
Green party 75 99 100 128
Civil society 13 51 9 127
Federal
Council
88 98 88 120
Experts 40 15 2 94
SP 100 93 100 81
CVP 50 74 63 76
Green Liberal
party
92 87 88 69
Other actors N/A N/A N/A 234
Statements all
actors (n)
193 717 871 1781
28This is also supported by an analysis of the Statistical Office of the Canton of Zurich, available at
https://statistik.zh.ch. Based on aggregate data on municipalities and voting results in these munic-
ipalities, Moser (2018), p. 3, finds that the vote can be explained much more on the economic
dimension than on the cultural dimension.
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10%; 20). Support from economic actors, which gained much media coverage,
remained limited (12%; only +16), again pointing at competing positions and
conflict among economic organizations. In addition, parts of civil society were
somewhat skeptical towards ES2050 (9), as were the media themselves (10),
especially right-wing leaning media from German-speaking Switzerland (cf. above).
In sum, media portrayal of ES2050 did not follow a “classic” economic left-right
conflict but rather showed internal conflict among the center-right and the economy.
Finally, when it comes to actual dynamics in media coverage about referenda in
general, the overall campaign period is usually relatively short. The “hot” phase
typically begins around 6 to 4 weeks before voting day and intensifies until a climax
is reached around three to 1 week(s) before voting day. Dynamics in media reporting
are usually linked to dynamics in campaign activities and to the timing of voters’
decision-making. For instance, many citizens send out their ballots by mail during
the “hot” campaign phase.29 During this peak period, media publish more than three
to four times as many articles per week compared to two or more months before the
vote. At the same time, media coverage typically does not intensify any longer, the
closer the voting day gets.
Broadly speaking, votes on energy policy are no exception to this rule. However,
some interesting deviations can be observed (see Fig. 2). First, both ES2050 and the
nuclear phase-out initiative showed an unusually marked increase in media attention
even in the second week before voting day, while media coverage on the GLP
initiative began to stagnate earlier on. Second, media attention to ES2050 started
rather early, also because parliamentary debates on related issues (in particular
hydropower) that were taking place at the same time were discursively linked to
the ongoing referendum campaign. In this sense, the “hot” phase of the ES2050
lasted longer than on average, while the nuclear phase-out initiative showed the most
intense, i.e., most “condensed” media coverage.
To conclude, media coverage about all three proposals reflected the actor con-
stellations and foreshadowed the final voting result. Hence, the two initiatives were
portrayed less favorably than the federal proposal. However, the GLP initiative
found much less media attention and was rejected even more strongly than is
typically the case for popular initiatives (both at the ballot and as measured through
the tonality index), while the nuclear phase-out initiative, in contrast to other
initiatives, was characterized by a balanced amount of supportive and critical
newspaper articles. As the high level of media attention indicates, both the nuclear
phase-out initiative and the ES2050 were heavily contested, and the latter triggered
more criticism than the average federal proposal. The strong contestation was at the
time also underlined by survey results indicating a close race between proponents
and opponents a few weeks before the vote. But the nature of contestation differed
29See Milic et al. (2014), p. 290 et seq. One reason is that this is exactly the period when citizens
receive their voting material, which consists of the official ballots and accompanying official
brochures on the content of the votes. There is evidence suggesting that many citizens cast their
vote by postal ballot right after they receive the voting material.
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between the cases. The ES2050 media coverage pointed at internal conflicts within
the FDP and among economic actors, i.e., disagreements within political and
economic elites. Media coverage about the nuclear phase-out initiative, on the
other hand, reflected well-known conflict constellations with two antagonistic
camps, i.e., between left-wing actors in favor of an expedited nuclear phase-out
and economic and right-wing actors (plus the Federal Council) campaigning unit-
edly against such a measure.
3 The Role of Media Coverage in Explaining the Result
of the Nuclear Phase-Out Vote
While Sect. 2 has provided insights into media coverage of energy-related referenda
as a dependent variable, we now focus on media coverage as an independent
variable. Based on a linkage approach, we test to what extent the tonality of media
coverage affects citizens’ decision-making and voting behavior. We do this by
studying the case of the 2016 nuclear phase-out initiative. We selected this case
because it allows, we believe, even better testing of several effects known from the
literature on electoral choice. As shown above, media attention to the nuclear phase-
out initiative was relatively high; thus, citizens were potentially confronted with a lot
Fig. 2 Dynamics of media attention
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of information. This was also true for the ES2050, but not for the GLP initiative.
Information on the nuclear phase-out initiative conveyed an almost “perfectly”
ambivalent tonality in terms of support and rejection, while the ES2050 was
characterized by a slightly positive aggregated tonality and the GLP initiative by a
clearly negative one. Therefore, at the individual level, we assume to detect a lot of
variation with respect to exposure to different kinds of tonality regarding the
phase-out proposal. Moreover, unlike the media debate on the ES2050, the debate
surrounding the nuclear phase-out initiative conveyed clear actor and conflict con-
stellations well-known from partisan politics. In sum, citizens potentially received
much information—“new” information regarding the (surprisingly) ambivalent
tonality but also “old” information regarding the well-known actor constellation.
We examine this configuration in light of the literature on campaign effects.
3.1 Campaign Effects
As noted by McCombs and Shaw almost half a century ago, “the pledges, promises,
and rhetoric encapsulated in news stories, columns, and editorials constitute much of
the information upon which a voting decision has to be made.”30 Despite the changes
in the relevance of communication channels and media systems that have occurred
since then, the news media still play a major role as a transmission belt in today’s
democracies in general and in helping citizens to form vote choices in particular.31
For Switzerland’s direct democratic system, it has been shown that voters rely
strongly on the media (especially newspapers) as a source of information to form
their voting preferences.32
What kinds of effects can be expected to be brought about by media coverage in
the run-up to a direct democratic vote? Research on campaign effects often draws on
the classical work of Lazarsfeld and colleagues.33 Accordingly, an electoral cam-
paign may have three distinct effects. First, it can lead to a reinforcement of voters’
initial intentions; that is, voters have already formed certain intentions at the outset of
a campaign and these become reinforced over the course of the latter. Second, voters
may have no voting intentions at the beginning of a campaign, but the latter activates
their latent political predispositions and thereby helps them to take a vote choice—a
mechanism called activation or crystallization. As a third possibility, a campaign
may induce voters to rethink their original voting intention, leading to a conversion
in the sense that they take a choice that is different from their original voting
intention. As Kriesi and Sciarini34 pointed out, a campaign may bring about a fourth
30McCombs and Shaw (1972), p. 176.
31E.g., Kübler and Kriesi (2017); Wettstein and Wirth (2017).
32Bonfadelli and Friemel (2012); Tresch (2008).
33Lazarsfeld et al. (1944).
34Kriesi and Sciarini (2004).
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effect: voters who have a specific voting intention at the outset of a campaign may
finally refrain from casting a vote. This fourth campaign effect may be called
demobilization.
When it comes to media effects, our baseline expectation is that exposure to
positive coverage—i.e., news coverage favorable about the ballot proposition—
increases the probability of voting in favor of it vis-à-vis casting a “no”-vote
(hypothesis 1).
Positive coverage should reinforce the voting intentions of voters who already
had favorable intentions before, especially by reinforcing known arguments in favor
of the proposal and potentially providing new ones. For voters with initially negative
voting intentions, one may expect positive coverage to lead to a persuasion effect.
However, this view ignores voters’ political predispositions including their partisan
orientation, which can be expected to condition the effects of exposure to media
coverage. Referendum campaigns not only help voters to gain issue-specific knowl-
edge but also to learn about the positions political parties take on a ballot proposi-
tion.35 Many voters use information about a party’s stance on a political issue as
shortcuts in forming their own preferences,36 and the relevance of this partisan
heuristic has also been demonstrated in the context of Swiss direct democratic
votes.37 In sum, in the context of the nuclear phase-out initiative, which was
characterized by the long-standing ideological divide between (nuclear-skeptic)
left-wing and (nuclear-friendly) right-wing parties,38 we therefore expect exposure
to positive media coverage about the phase-out proposal to reinforce positive voting
intentions among left-party voters (hypothesis 2). For right-party voters with posi-
tive voting intentions, on the other hand, exposure to positive coverage may resonate
with their prior intentions, but as the campaign advances, these voters are likely to
become aware of the inconsistency between their political predisposition and their
voting intention. This ambivalence can be expected to dampen any reinforcement
effect.
As a mirror image to the second hypothesis, we expect exposure to negative
coverage about the proposal to reinforce negative voting intentions among right-
party voters (hypothesis 3). Again, we do not expect such an effect for left-party
voters with initially negative voting intentions, due to the ambivalence that arises
between growing awareness of one’s preferred party’s position and the original
voting intention.
Based on our hypotheses, the subsequent analyses focus specifically on rein-
forcement effects. While we will also explore conversion and demobilization effects,
our data are not suited to investigate activation effects, as will be further explained
below.
35Selb et al. (2009).
36Arceneaux (2008); Nicholson (2012).
37Kriesi (2005).
38Dermont and Kammermann (2020).
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3.2 Empirical Analysis of Media Effects in the Nuclear
Phase-Out Vote
To examine media effects on voting behavior, we combine data from a panel survey
with a content analysis of newspaper articles from the monitor database described
above. We thus rely on “linkage analysis”, an approach pioneered by Arthur
H. Miller and colleagues in the 1970s that uses media content as a quasi-
experimental stimulus to explain individual-level variables.39 The idea behind the
method is to link media content data with survey data after having matched survey
respondents with the media they actually consume. Linkage analysis is suited to
identify effects of media content on individual-level variables in real-world settings,
but it might be prone to underestimating the true size of effects.40 The approach is the
state-of-the-art method in media effects research and has been applied extensively in
studies of the impact of news consumption on political behavior.41 In Sect. 3.2.1 we
describe our survey data, which captures the outcome of interest (voting behavior) as
well as several focal explanatory and control variables. Sect. 3.2.2 presents the media
content data, and Sect. 3.2.3 presents the results of our regression analyses. We
discuss the results in Sect. 3.3.
3.2.1 The Survey: Sampling Strategy and Relevant Variables
To gather data on individuals’ voting behavior in the 2016 nuclear phase-out vote
and other variables of interest, we fielded a panel survey with Swiss voters. The
study participants were drawn from an online consumer panel operated by the Swiss
market research agency Intervista. Participants were part of an entirely actively
recruited pool, which included nearly 70,000 registered individuals in 2016.42 We
employed stratified random sampling with proportionate allocation to approximate a
sample that demographically represents the Swiss voting population. The population
was stratified by gender, age, education, partisan orientation and region, covering the
German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland.43 Respondents were surveyed
based on computer-assisted web interviews. The pre-vote questionnaire (t0,
n¼ 1216) was administered right at the outset of the “hot” campaign phase (October
10–19, 2016). The post-vote survey (t1, n ¼ 1014) started 1 h after the polling
39Miller et al. (1979).
40Scharkow and Bachl (2017).
41See De Vreese et al. (2017), who provide an excellent and hands-on overview on the method, and
Fazekas and Larsen (2016).
42While opt-in panels consist of a self-selected sample of volunteers, Intervista’s actively recruited
panel comes close to a probability sample of the Swiss voting population. See https://www.
intervista.ch/en/panel.
43The Italian-speaking region of Switzerland, in which only 6.1% of Swiss voters reside, was not
covered by the survey.
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stations had closed (November 27) and ended 4 days later (December 1). The drop-
out rate between the waves was 16.6%.44
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable captures voting behavior in the popular vote on the nuclear
phase-out initiative in 2016. At t1, we asked whether respondents had participated in
the vote and, if they had, whether they had voted in favor or not. The dependent
variable finally consists of three categories: voting in favor, voting against, and
abstention.
Explanatory and Control Variables
In order to investigate the possible effects of newspaper coverage on voting behav-
ior, the pre-vote survey included an item for measuring respondents’ newspaper
consumption. Respondents were given a list of 30 Swiss newspapers and asked to
indicate which ones they consulted regularly to find out about political and economic
issues. Respondents could choose as many papers as they wanted. These individual-
level data were later on linked to data covering the tonality of newspaper reporting
about the phase-out initiative (see Sect. 3.2.2).
In the post-vote survey, respondents were asked about the sources of information
they had used to inform themselves about the phase-out initiative (see Fig. 4). Here,
they could select among a number of sources, which also included the official
governmental information booklet (Bundesbüchlein). To investigate the role gov-
ernment messaging might have played in shaping voting behavior, we use a dummy
variable measuring whether voters had read the booklet or not.
Voters also receive advice from their social environment, e.g., through discus-
sions with friends and family members.45 To measure the intensity of respondents’
exposure to these sources of information, the post-vote survey included an item
asking respondents to indicate the frequency with which they had discussed the
popular initiative with other people around them. For eight categories,46 respondents
indicated whether they had discussed the initiative “never” (coded as 0), “rarely” (1),
“sometimes” (2) or “often” (3). These data were aggregated to an additive index of
exposure to social voting cues.
To assess partisan orientation, respondents were asked to indicate (at t0) which
political party best represented their political views. Based on this information, we
generated a variable capturing whether respondents leaned towards one of the parties
44More information on the survey data can be found in Rinscheid and Wüstenhagen (2018).
45Bonfadelli and Friemel (2012).
46The categories are: spouse/partner; own children; own parents; other relatives; friends; neighbors;
workmates; acquaintances from clubs, associations or congregations.
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supporting the initiative, a party without a clear stance, or one of the parties rejecting
it. Information on stable sociodemographic variables including respondents’ gender,
age, education, and place of residence were also collected at t0. Based on the latter,
we generated two dummy variables. The first, “Danger Zone”, captures whether the
place of residence is within a radius of 20 kilometers from one of the country’s
nuclear reactors. This radius corresponds to the legally defined “danger zone”, in
which a serious nuclear incident can pose a threat to the population, for which
protective measures are required.47 The second, “Language Region”, captures
whether respondents live in the French- or German-speaking part of Switzerland.
Finally, our analyses control for initial (t0) voting intentions and the strength of
these. At t0, respondents were asked to indicate, on a 5-point scale, whether they
intended to certainly (coded as 1) or rather (2) vote in favor of the initiative, had not
formed a voting intention yet (3), or intended to rather (4) or certainly (5) vote
against the initiative. We generated a dummy variable “Initial voting intention” to
differentiate between voters intending to vote in favor and voters intending to vote
against. We generated a second dummy variable “Strength of initial voting inten-
tion”, distinguishing between voters with “weak” intentions in favor or against the
initiative at t0 (corresponding to “2” and “4” on the 5-point scale) and voters with
“strong intentions” (“1” and “5”).
3.2.2 Newspaper Data: Sample, Coding and Index Construction
In order to investigate the effects of newspaper coverage on voting behavior, the
individual-level behavioral data on media consumption described in Sect. 3.2.1 were
merged with data on newspaper coverage about the initiative. In general, for the
latter, we relied on the newspaper-level tonality scores described in Sect. 2.2.
However, our sample of newspapers used here deviates slightly from the monitor
sample described in Sect. 2.2. First, the Sunday newspapers SonntagsBlick and Le
Matin Dimanche were not included because they were not covered by the survey.
Second, L’Hebdo was included in the linkage analysis, but was not used for the
comparative analysis in Sect. 2.2 (including data between 2014 and 2018), since
L’Hebdo ceased to exist in 2017. This leaves us with a sample of 10 subscription
newspapers, 5 tabloid and free newspapers, and 5 Sunday newspapers. 6 of these
newspapers appear in French and 14 in German.
Moreover, given that the implementation of the first survey wave was not
finalized before October 20, 2016, our linkage analysis only used tonality data
based on the 268 articles that were published between October 20 and November
20, 2016 (see Table 5). That way, we made sure to relate the mechanisms of
reinforcement, conversion and demobilization to the newspaper coverage that
47Art. 3 para. 1 let. b Emergency Protection Ordinance (Verordnung über den Notfallschutz in der
Umgebung von Kernanlagen, Notfallschutzverordnung, NSFV, SR 732.33).
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happened precisely between the two survey waves. Our analysis thereby covers
almost the entire “hot” phase of the referendum campaign (see Fig. 2).
Table 5 shows the numbers of articles with a positive, neutral/ambivalent or
negative tonality with regard to the nuclear phase-out initiative used for the linkage
analysis. The proportion of articles classified as positive (58, or 21.6%) was slightly
higher than the proportion of articles classified as negative (52, or 19.4%) during the
period of observation. The majority of articles (158, or 59%) was coded as neutral or
ambivalent. Similar to the procedure described in Sect. 2.2, we computed tonality
scores at the level of individual newspapers. These ranged from 33.3 (20 minutes)
to +83.3 (L’Hebdo). To account for variations in the frequency with which different
newspapers reported about the nuclear phase-out initiative, we multiplied the tonal-
ity scores by the number of articles about the nuclear phase-out initiative per
publication day. The resulting normalized tonality score ranges from 18.5
(Luzerner Zeitung) to 18.5 (L’Hebdo). Next, for each respondent, we added the
newspaper-level tonality scores for those newspapers that (s)he had indicated to use
regularly to find out about political and economic issues. The distribution of the
resulting (z-transformed) individual-level index of exposure to newspaper coverage
about the nuclear phase-out initiative is shown in Fig. 3.
Table 5 Classification of
newspaper articles used for
the study of media effects




Fig. 3 Distribution of the tonality index (z-transformed) among study participants
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3.2.3 Data Analysis and Results
Frequencies: Relevance of Information Sources
In Switzerland, newspapers are perceived as (highly) important mass media chan-
nels. In a study on three referendum campaigns, newspapers were found to be among
the three most important information sources, together with television and the
governmental information booklet;48 this pattern is confirmed by the regularly
conducted VOTO (formerly VOX) analyses.49 In our sample, 75% of respondents
indicated that they used newspapers to inform themselves about the nuclear phase-
out initiative, followed by the voting booklet published by the Federal Council
(51%) and way ahead of further media like radio, television and internet sources
(see Fig. 4). This underscores the importance of newspapers as a source of informa-
tion in the run-up to the referendum.50
Fig. 4 Respondents’ use of media in the context of the nuclear phase-out initiative
48Bonfadelli and Friemel (2012), p. 174.
49See Milic et al. (2014), p. 299.
50See also the contribution by Schaffer and Levis (2021) in this volume, which underscores the
particularly prominent role of newspapers in shaping public opinion compared with other news
media.
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From Initial Voting Intentions to Voting Behavior
Figure 5 indicates the extent to which initial voting intentions (t0) were in line with
actual voting behavior (t1), differentiating between voters leaning towards the left-
wing parties supportive of the popular initiative (a) and voters leaning towards the
center-right parties that rejected the phase-out proposal (b). As Fig. 5 illustrates,
there was considerable movement in voters’ preferences on both sides of the political
spectrum. While 85% of left-wing voters in our sample had expressed an intention to
vote in favor of the popular initiative right before the “hot” campaign phase, only
68% finally voted in favor, with the remainder either voting against (20%) or not
casting a vote at all (12%).
A different pattern can be observed for voters of the parties that rejected the
initiative. While there was almost a balance between supporters (46%) and oppo-
nents (52%) of the initiative at t0, only one in four right-wing voters finally voted
“yes”. Half of the voters who defected from their initial support did not participate
and the other half voted against. On aggregate, the majority of voters participating in
both survey waves (60.5%) had expressed an intention to vote in favor of the
initiative at t0, but only 45.7% of participating voters finally supported it at the
ballot (compared with 45.8% in the electorate).51 These patterns beg the question
Fig. 5 Initial voting intentions and actual voting behavior of (a) voters leaning towards a left-wing
party (including SP, Green and GLP) and (b) voters leaning towards a center-right or right-wing
party (including CVP, FDP, BDP and SVP). Bar width is proportional to the size of the respective
voter segment
51Our survey overestimates voter turnout (88.6% vs. 45.3% in reality). Such turnout gaps are a
phenomenon typical of post-election studies, and the magnitude of the gap in our data is similar or
slightly higher than turnout gaps documented in panel studies in the context of other Swiss
referenda (Hänggli et al. 2012). The reasons are threefold: besides overrepresentation of politically
interested citizens in political surveys and vote misreporting (Selb and Munzert 2013), politically
active citizens are more likely to participate in a multi-wave survey (Sciarini and Kriesi 2003). One
implication is that the numbers representing “voting behavior” in Fig. 5 are not representative of the
entire electorate.
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how the observed opinion swings on both sides may be explained and, in particular,
what role media coverage of the phase-out initiative might have played in bringing
about not only the erosion of the relatively strong cohesion of the political left
between t0 and t1 but also the consolidation of the “no-camp” within the political
right.
Regression Analysis
To analyze voting behavior, we start with a multinomial logistic regression analysis.
This classification method is a generalization of logistic regression that can be
applied if the dependent variable is categorically distributed. The dependent variable
of our multinomial logit model consists of three categories corresponding to voting
in favor of the phase-out initiative, voting against, and abstention. Table 6 contains
the regression coefficients for the three contrasts: voting in favor versus against,
Table 6 Multinomial Logistic Regression coefficients: Voting behavior in the popular initiative on
the nuclear phase-out (2016)







Tonality about initiative 0.077 (0.094) 0.331** (0.122) 0.255* (0.120)
Government booklet 0.430* (0.197) 1.230*** (0.270) 1.660*** (0.271)
Partisan orientation 0.620*** (0.106) 0.221 (0.137) 0.399** (0.145)
Social cues 0.124 (0.108) 0.866*** (0.152) 0.742*** (0.152)
Age 0.114 (0.061) 0.200* (0.081) 0.314*** (0.080)
Gender 0.233 (0.193) 0.282 (0.254) 0.515* (0.251)
Education 0.007 (0.207) 0.263 (0.273) 0.270 (0.277)
Danger zone 0.304 (0.269) 0.277 (0.334) 0.026 (0.329)
Language region 0.099 (0.232) 0.013 (0.299) 0.085 (0.306)
Initial voting intention 3.365*** (0.258) 1.913*** (0.338) 1.452*** (0.270)
Strength of initial voting
intention
1.420*** (0.200) 1.058*** (0.254) 0.362 (0.257)
Intercept 2.867*** (0.578) 1.613* (0.731) 1.254 (0.688)
n 983
Pseudo R2 0.355
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; standard errors in parentheses
The following are dummy variables: Government booklet: consulted ¼ 1 (51.5%)—not
consulted ¼ 0 | Gender: female ¼ 1 (50.2%)—male ¼ 0 | Education: attended high school ¼ 1
(36.9%)—did not attend high school ¼ 0 | Danger Zone: lives within danger zone ¼ 1 (16.4%)—
does not live within danger zone ¼ 0 | Language Region: French-speaking ¼ 1 (22.9%)—German-
speaking ¼ 0 | Initial voting intention: In favor ¼ 1 (61.6%)—Against ¼ 0 | Strength of initial
voting intention: Strong ¼ 1 (51.1%)—Weak ¼ 0. Partisan orientation is 3-tiered (supporting a
party in favor of initiative, without clear stance, against the initiative). Age has 6 categories (>29,
30–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–69, 70+). Tonality about initiative (negative to positive) and Social cues
(little to much exposure) are continuous
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voting in favor versus abstention, and voting against versus abstention. The coeffi-
cients of the third column are simply the result of subtracting the coefficients of the
first column from those of the second.
The coefficients provide first clues with respect to the impact of the independent
variables on voting behavior. Regarding the focal explanatory variable—exposure to
newspaper coverage regarding the popular initiative—the results do not unambigu-
ously support our first hypothesis. Contrary to what we had expected, exposure to
increasingly positive tonality did not increase the probability to cast a “yes”-vote, at
least in the contrast with voting “against” (first column). However, as can be seen
from the coefficients in the second and third column, higher exposure to positive
tonality led to a higher probability of casting a vote at all. While this finding seems
counterintuitive in the case of rejecting the proposal, we conclude that positive
coverage about the phase-out initiative generally had a mobilizing effect. Table 6
conveys some more interesting results. With respect to the government booklet,
taking note of this publication had a mobilization effect, given that it significantly
increased the probability to cast either a yes- or no-vote. Reading the booklet also
significantly increased the probability of voting against, compared to voting in favor,
which is hardly surprising given that the booklet advocated strongly against the
popular initiative. With respect to partisan orientation, our model confirms that right-
wing voters were significantly more likely to vote against the initiative. Moreover,
both higher exposure to social voting cues and higher age operated in favor of
participating in the vote but do not help explaining voting behavior as such. Finally,
both the intention to vote in favor at t0 and the strength of the initial intention were
significantly (and strongly) related to approval of the initiative at t1, while only the
intention to reject the initiative (but not the strength of it) helps explain the mobi-
lization of “no”-voters.
However, the results contained in Table 6 do not illuminate the ways in which the
tonality of media reporting may have driven the three mechanisms introduced above.
Therefore, in the next step, we computed predicted probabilities for different values
of exposure to media coverage. We differentiated between voter segments
corresponding to the mechanisms of reinforcement, demobilization and conversion
in the following way:
• Voters who were in favor of the initiative throughout (i.e., at t0 and t1): Rein-
forcement of support (n ¼ 379)
• Voters who intended to vote in favor of the initiative at t0 but did not vote:
Demobilization of support (n ¼ 77)
• Voters who changed their preference from support (t0) to rejection (t1): Conver-
sion of support (n ¼ 148)
• Voters who rejected the initiative at t0 and t1: Reinforcement of rejection
(n ¼ 324)
• Voters who rejected the initiative at t0 but either did not vote (demobilization) or
changed their preference to support at t1 (conversion; n ¼ 56).
We pooled demobilization and conversion for initial opponents because these two
subgroups would become too small for meaningful quantitative analyses if included
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separately in our models. The remaining 30 voters who participated in both survey
waves either had no preference at t0 or refused to indicate/did not remember their
voting behavior at t1. As only three (nine) voters who had no initial voting intention
finally supported (rejected) the phase-out proposal t1, we did not investigate potential
activation effects.
Figure 6 shows predicted reinforcement, conversion, and demobilization effects
for different values of the tonality index. For the computation of predicted proba-
bilities, we converted the tonality index into five categories based on the quintiles of
the distribution shown in Fig. 3: respondents exposed to strongly (1) or moderately
(2) negative tonality about the phase-out initiative, respondents exposed to
Fig. 6 Predicted reinforcement, demobilization, and conversion effects in the nuclear phase-out
vote, 2016: the influence of newspaper coverage
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ambivalent tonality (3), and respondents exposed to moderately (4) or strongly
(5) positive tonality. In line with our expectation (hypothesis 2), the probability of
casting a “yes”-vote increased for left-party voters who intended to vote in favor at t0
(n ¼ 306), as we move from very negative (0.76) to very positive (0.95) tonality.
Conversely, both the probability of demobilization (0.12 to 0.03) and conversion
(0.12 to 0.02) significantly decreased, the more positive the newspaper coverage
about the initiative became. Hence, positive media reporting played a significant role
in fostering left-party voters’ initial voting intentions, and very negative reporting
resulted in abstention or rejection of the initiative for a quarter of supporters of the
political left who had initially intended to vote in favor. Looking at center/right-party
voters with an initial intention to cast a “yes”-vote (n¼ 285), the pattern is different.
Here, positive tonality did not lead to a reinforcement of initial intentions. Higher
exposure to positive coverage even seems to have led to higher conversion rates
(from 0.35 to 0.46), but the coefficients did not differ significantly from each other.
Similar to voters of the left, tonality of newspaper reporting influenced the extent to
which demobilization played a role: as we pass from a very negative (0.14) to a very
positive (0.02) tonality, the probability to abstain from the vote significantly
decreased. With respect to the groups of voters who opposed the proposal at t0
(the lower panels in Fig. 6), little effects of newspaper coverage can be detected. For
both supporters of left parties (n ¼ 48) and of center/right parties (n ¼ 326) with
initial intentions to reject the initiative, exposure to an increasingly negative tonality
tended to reinforce initial intentions, but none of these effects were statistically
significant. We therefore reject hypothesis 3. While positive tonality tended to
encourage demobilization or conversion for both groups of voters, these effects
were also not statistically significant.
3.3 Discussion
Our analysis of voting behavior in the popular initiative on the nuclear phase-out
yields three main results. With respect to reinforcement of initial voting intentions,
we found a media effect for citizens leaning towards a party of the political left, but
not for citizens leaning towards a party that opposed the proposal. For the latter, the
tonality of newspaper reporting did not substantially influence whether they stuck to
their original voting intentions or not, although exposure to very positive tonality
was associated with somewhat weaker reinforcement among right-party voters with
initial intentions to vote against the proposal. The cohesion of the political left, on
the other hand, proved to be contingent on the tonality of newspaper coverage. While
exposure to a (very) positive tonality towards the initiative engendered strong
reinforcement of initial intentions, a (very) negative tonality was associated with
significantly weaker reinforcement, with one in four left-wing voters who were
exposed to strongly negative coverage during the “hot” campaign phase changing
their initial voting intention. These voters either abstained from the vote or voted
against. As we have shown elsewhere, an emphasis on the benefits of nuclear power
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(especially its better climate performance vis-à-vis imported coal power, which
opponents of the initiative portrayed as the main alternative) may have caused
many voters to rethink their initial preference.52 Notwithstanding the deep partisan
divide over nuclear power, which has recently been corroborated in a conjoint
experiment by Dermont,53 this finding suggests that the fundamental rejection of
nuclear power is a less important part of the political DNA of the left than one may
have assumed.
Second, in terms of demobilization, our multinomial logit model showed that
exposure to positive tonality had a mobilizing effect. To put this finding into
perspective, it needs to be highlighted that other variables including information
sources such as the government booklet and social voting cues operated in favor of
voter participation as well. What we deem worth to be emphasized, however, is that
the more negative the tonality of media coverage about the initiative became, the less
likely voters with an initial intention to cast a “yes”-vote were to participate in the
vote. Given the rather low number of non-voters in our sample, future research
should more closely investigate the role of media coverage in influencing turnout in
the context of popular votes on energy topics and beyond.
Third, with respect to conversion, we found a significant effect of our exposure
index for left-party voters but not for center- and right-wing voters. Nevertheless, as
we showed in Fig. 5, many of the latter had initially supported the initiative but
“defected” in the course of the campaign, voting in line with their preferred parties.
Interestingly, they did this even when being exposed to newspaper coverage that was
quite supportive of the initiative. Hence, while the tonality of newspaper coverage as
such did not lead to conversion, it would be premature to conclude that the
consolidation of the political right was independent of media coverage. As our
regression analysis shows, partisan orientation was significantly related to voting
behavior. This suggests that, for those voters, newspaper coverage in general may
have helped them to learn about parties’ positions on the proposal, leading to an
alignment of their voting intentions and general political predispositions.54
To put the interpretation of results into context, two methodological issues should
be noted. First, as is typically the case in applications of linkage analysis, the
detected effects are very likely to represent lower-bound estimates of the true
effects.55 Given the high intensity of the campaign, the nuclear phase-out case can
be seen as a most-likely case for identifying media effects in a referendum cam-
paign,56 which should have worked in favor of detecting any media effects at all. The
fact that the effects are likely to be biased downwards is due to measurement
limitations both in terms of media content analysis and media use. As a remedy,
future studies on the role of media in citizens’ decision-making should consider
52Rinscheid and Wüstenhagen (2018).
53Dermont (2019).
54On this argument, see Selb et al. (2009).
55Scharkow and Bachl (2017).
56Sciarini and Tresch (2011).
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using more fine-grained (beyond tonality scores at the article level) and
encompassing (in terms of included media) measurements of media content. With
respect to media use, recent work has proposed a range of sophisticated data
collection techniques that may be more reliable than the self-reported media use
queries used in this study.57 Second, one may wonder whether voters’ decision to
consume specific news media is an endogenous companion of socio-demographic
characteristics and, most importantly, partisan orientation. To check for this possi-
bility, we conducted a series of robustness analyses, including regressing the tonality
index on the set of variables used in our main regression models as well as
examining the average political leaning of readers of various newspapers. The
main result of these analyses is that only geography, i.e., voters’ place of residence,
is significantly related with consumption of specific newspapers. With respect to the
partisan orientation of newspapers’ readership, we see differences for some news-
papers, but these are overall quite small.
4 Conclusion
This chapter took a two-step approach. First, it investigated patterns of media
coverage surrounding referendum campaigns in Swiss energy policy-making. Sec-
ond, it asked to what extent the media have an effect on voters’ decisions at the
ballot. As regards media coverage, we saw that media attention and tonality towards
three recent energy policy votes followed some typical patterns in referendum
coverage but also showed proposal-specific features. Compared to typical patterns,
the media paid considerably more attention to the nuclear phase-out initiative and the
Energy Strategy 2050, while much less attention was given to the initiative by the
Green Liberals. In line with the finding that the media tend to reflect the political
constellation surrounding a given proposal, tonality towards the Energy Strategy, a
federal proposal, was indeed more positive than tonality towards the initiatives
brought forward by challengers of the status quo. Interestingly, however, tonality
towards the nuclear phase-out initiative was less negative than is typically the case
for popular initiatives, leading to balanced coverage of the proposal. Apart from
tonality, our findings highlighted different actor constellations. Through a combina-
tion of indicators (attention, tonality, actors), we came to the conclusion that media
coverage of the nuclear phase-out initiative constituted a salient and politically well-
known debate, boiling down to a left-right conflict typical of previous debates in the
energy domain.
Following recent suggestions to study how voters’ acceptance of energy policies
is formed by media coverage during political campaigns58 and to combine media
content analysis with survey research to examine the nexus between news media
57For an overview, see De Vreese and Neijens (2016).
58Carattini et al. (2017).
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reporting and individual preference formation on nuclear power,59 the second part of
the chapter linked data on newspaper coverage of the phase-out initiative with a
panel study. Using media content as a quasi-experimental stimulus allowed us to
investigate the extent to which exposure to newspaper reporting had a bearing on
changes in voting intentions among different groups of voters. Indeed, our analysis
identified specific media effects regarding reinforcement and conversion of voting
intentions and with respect to mobilization. While these effects were moderated by
partisan orientation, they did not always play out as expected. Above all, for the
important group of right-leaning voters who had initially supported the initiative but
casted a “no”-vote, their vote choices were not contingent on their exposure to
tonality as conveyed by newspapers. We concluded that media coverage affected
voting behavior not only through its tonality (as for left-wing voters) but presumably
through its volume (amount of media attention) and the cues on party positions,
which future studies should more closely attend to. Again, we believe that these
effects were issue- and proposal-dependent, given that popular initiatives usually
receive a lot of support in their early stages but lose support as the campaigns go
on. In this light, it would be interesting to examine media effects in the run-up to the
vote on the Energy Strategy 2050, a much more “confusing” proposal from the
perspective of citizens, as the center-right was itself divided. In general, combining
manual content analysis of news articles provided by the monitor data with a panel
survey in the context of a typical popular vote in Switzerland is a methodological
innovation that should be taken up and refined in future research to even better
understand the mechanisms through which media coverage helps voters to shape
their vote choices on energy topics and beyond. Such an approach may also provide
valuable insights into the dynamics of opinion formation in the context of local
infrastructure siting decisions, most importantly perhaps in the context of wind
turbine installations, where social acceptance risks and their roots need to be better
understood and carefully managed in order to fulfill the goals of the ES2050.60
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Abstract Energy transitions are based upon policy choices of sovereign nation
states. Hence, politics plays a role in determining which policies governments
implement and which sectors are targeted. Our chapter looks at the evolution of
public discourse on energy policy as one important factor reflecting policy discus-
sion and contestation within the political arena. Our descriptive and explorative
analysis of the early public discourse in Swiss energy policy between 1997 and 2011
contributes to three main issues. First, it makes a case for the disaggregation of
energy policy and its public perception to add to our understanding of energy
transition pathways. We argue that looking at sectoral discourses as well as sectoral
policy outputs allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the idiosyncrasies
of Swiss energy policy regarding temporal as well as sectoral variation. Second, an
increased politicization of energy policy may affect future policy choice, and thus
any account on energy transition policy needs to scrutinize potential feedback effects
from policies that manifest via policy discourse. Third, and on a more
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methodological stance, we argue that our approach to use news media as a repre-
sentation of the public discourse via structural topic models can help to explore and
explain the evolving national policy priorities regarding energy transition.
1 Introduction
The most central task for effective climate policy is the fundamental restructuring of
the way in which we produce and consume energy—a process generally referred to
as energy transition. The policies associated with energy transition are needed for
nations to fulfill their emission goals under the Paris Agreement, given that energy
consumption for electricity generation, transport and heating and cooling of build-
ings is contributing massively to CO2 emissions in most countries. To honor their
international commitments, nations have implemented a plethora of different poli-
cies to convert their economies from using mainly fossil fuels to economies based on
renewable energy consumption and an efficient use of energy within the past
30 years.
The resultant national energy governance, i.e. which policies governments imple-
ment and which sectors are targeted by these policies, is idiosyncratic. While most
nations follow a rough pattern starting from green industrial policy to later add
pricing policies and finally ratchet up the policy mix,1 the concrete choices about
which sectors are addressed to what extent vary widely between countries. In our
contribution, we heed the calls of different scholars for the joint analysis of different
sectors and their associated policies.2 More precisely, we first make a case for the
increased disaggregation of energy policy and its public perception and discourse to
add to our understanding of energy transition pathways. To this end, we argue that
our descriptive and explorative analysis of the public discourse in Swiss energy
policy between 1997 and 2011 allows for a more comprehensive description and
understanding of the idiosyncrasies of Swiss energy policy regarding temporal and
sectoral variation.
Second, the path-dependent character of national energy policy, which has been
stressed in previous scholarly work,3 means that former decisions in energy policy
have strong implications for future choices. In this chapter, we argue that compar-
ative research should go beyond explaining policy adoption. Energy transitions are
long-term policy projects that have distributive effects. If policies are increasingly
contested and politicized, this may affect future policy choices. Politicization might
be visible in increased discourse after policy-making. We suggest that researchers
use public discourse to monitor contested policies.
1According to Meckling et al. (2017).
2Stokes and Breetz (2018).
3Aklin and Urpelainen (2013); Unruh (2002).
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Third, our approach to use news media as a representation of the public discourse
via structural topic models can help to explore and explain patterns within energy
policy discussions and the evolving national policy priorities regarding the energy
transition.
We descriptively map the development of the Swiss energy policy discourse over
the years 1997–2011 by looking at different sectors and comparing discussions on
different instruments. Our guiding questions are: How does media discourse develop
over time and which factors are associated with (low) high levels of discourse?
Drawing on an extensive news media content analysis of the two leading Swiss
quality newspapers, we first show how climate change relevant energy policy was
reflected within the media. We link our insights from these media discourses with
actual policy outcomes as well as incidences of popular referendums on energy
policy to gain some leverage over the question whether policy-making of the Swiss
government has been more responsive to issues or sectors that loomed large on the
public’s agenda or whether we cannot establish any connection. Second, we depict
how specific discourses and debates around energy policy developed over time. To
explain this variation in the Swiss discourse on energy policy, we submit that
through the discourse a potential political space opens for the formulation of and
debate on alternative solutions.
2 How News Media Can Approximate Public Discourses
We measure our theoretical construct “public discourse” by texts in newspapers.
Along with other research streams like politicization research4 that heavily draw on
news content to capture their phenomenon of interest, we do not equate concept and
measurement. However, we want to explain directly why the news media appears to
be the premium choice for our research interest, especially by highlighting the
advantages of the text-as-data/content analysis approach on the basis of newspapers.
Newspaper reporting provides researchers with an accessible medium through
which one can assess national tendencies in issue framing or general topics of
discourses.5 And although other media outlets such as TV or social media have
gained tremendous ground over the past 30 years, newspapers still maintain their
inter-media agenda-setting power.6 This means that issues picked up by leading
quality newspapers actually influence reporting in other outlets such as social
media,7 TV or radio. This ability of news media to influence the national conversa-
tion on certain policy issues is forcefully shown in the study by King et al.,8 who find
4De Wilde et al. (2016).
5Broadbent et al. (2016), p. 6.
6Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2008); Golan (2006).
7King et al. (2017).
8King et al. (2017), p. 776.
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that “exposure to the news media causes Americans to take public stands on specific
issues, join national policy conversations, and express themselves publicly—all key
components of democratic politics—more often than they would otherwise.” This
suggests that quality newspapers can serve as a valid proxy for the general media
landscape.
Moreover, news media reporting impacts on individuals as well as policy-makers.
On the one hand, publicly available information is crucial to the formation of
individual political preferences.9 Additionally, media content is often found to be
closely linked to public opinion on given issues.10 On the other hand, policy-makers
tend to rely on opinions represented in the media when trying to gauge public
opinion,11 considering published opinion as an approximation of public opinion.12
Thus, the news media is an important source of information for any inquiry on
discourses in national energy politics.
For our contribution to this edited volume, we use data on Swiss newspaper
reporting on climate change and energy transition policy as a starting point.13 In
recent years, text-as-data approaches have gained in popularity within political
science research.14 Especially topic models have come into use more often to
analyze large amounts of data without having to refer to (expensive) human coders.
The specific unsupervised automated content analysis method used in this contribu-
tion is called structural topic modeling (STM). It allows scholars to include
covariates that affect the topical prevalence and furthermore analyze the effect of
covariates on topic proportions on the document level.
In our contribution, we apply these automated content analysis tools to under-
stand how the public discourse on energy policy has evolved over time and whether
we can gain general insights into potential future discourses. In the following
section, we present general assumptions on the development of energy policy
discourses over time and across newspapers. We then introduce our data and STM
as a novel method to study energy policy discourses via newspaper data. A discus-
sion of our results and of possible avenues for future research concludes our chapter.
9Gilens (2001).
10Bauer (2005); Oehl et al. (2017); Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui (2009); Schaffer et al. (2021).
11Herbst (1998).
12Schaffer et al. (2021).
13Oehl (2015); Oehl et al. (2017); Schaffer et al. (2021).
14E.g. Tvinnereim and Fløttum (2015); Tvinnereim et al. (2017).
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3 The Evolution of Public Discourse on Energy Transition
Policies
While the transitions in the energy sector we have been observing globally over the
past 20 years are certainly accelerated by technological progress, they are based
upon policy choices of sovereign nation states. Certainly, outcomes of international
climate negotiations, such as the Paris Agreement, act as an external accelerator of
energy transitions. In the end, however, national governments are firmly in the
driving seat with respect to the pathways towards decarbonizing their economies.
As a result, politics is supposed to play a major role in energy transition pathways.
We thus heed the call from transition scholars to more closely look into the politics
of energy transition.15
3.1 Explaining Energy Transition Policy
Energy policy adoption and change are the outcomes that have primarily been
analyzed in different literatures, including political science and political economy,
but also within the public policy literature. With respect to the political science
literature, scholars have argued that governments’ energy policy choices depend on a
plethora of factors such as domestic political institutions,16 the national energy
mix,17 governing parties,18 as well as coalitional politics.19 In general, one would
assume that public policy in democracies will depend on the public’s stance towards
the societal goal of energy transition. That is, according to normative theories of
democracy, governments should be responsive to the public’s demand on issues.
Studies in the transition and political science literatures that focus on how public
discourses as a dimension of demand shape policy change or how media discourses
can be linked to feedback effects of policy, however, have so far been rare.20
Within the policy literature, the Advocacy Coalition Framework21 or the multiple
streams model have been prominent choices to describe when crucial events hap-
pened or “windows of opportunity” opened for policy change. Most notably, the
Fukushima incident is portrayed as such a focusing event for accelerated energy
transition pathways in many different countries.22 Such focusing events may lead to
15E.g. Markard et al. (2016).
16Aklin and Urpelainen (2013).
17Schaffer and Bernauer (2014).
18Cao (2012); Schaffer and Bernauer (2014).
19Meckling and Jenner (2016).
20Notable exceptions include: Kern (2011); Isoaho and Markard (2020).
21Ingold (2011); Ingold and Fischer (2014); Markard et al. (2016).
22Hermwille (2016); Kammerer et al. (2020); Markard et al. (2016); Rinscheid (2015);
Wittneben (2012).
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policy change through public pressure and upcoming elections,23 further exposing
the importance of public opinion and media discourses for policy choice.
Our contribution seeks to add to both literatures by considering the relationship
between public discourses and public policy as well as between public discourses
and other political events.
We argue that there are two shortcomings within the literature that we address in a
preliminary attempt here. First, energy policy and decarbonization pathways should
not be addressed in an aggregated fashion. It becomes increasingly unsatisfactory to
link broad measures of e.g. public demand for climate change or energy transition
policies to an aggregated measure of policy output without differentiating whether
the measure targets the transport or buildings sector or whether the policy instrument
used is a carbon tax or an information campaign on energy efficiency.24 Energy
policy is not one monolithic block and we submit that disaggregating national
energy policy choices into sectors, policy instruments or other meaningful units
can add to our understanding of idiosyncratic pathways and delivers a more accurate
representation of the whole picture. Second, research has overly focused on policy
adoption.25 In our view, research should move on from the study of what determines
countries’ energy policies to the question of what happens after policy adoption.26
To this end, we stress the importance of contestation in politics and that researchers
need to account for an increased politicization as it may impact on future policy
choices.27 In considering both discourses toward policy adoption and policy con-
testation as well as politicization in our descriptive analysis, we expect interesting
first insights into the level of contestation of different policies. Eventually future
contributions might seek to theorize a priori about different impacts of policies on
their contestation and politicization within the policy discourse.
In the following paragraphs, we formulate assumptions about the evolution and
development of public discourse on energy policy in general before we turn to our
data and test our assumptions on the early media discourses in Switzerland.
3.2 Differences in Energy Policy Discourse
A public debate over issues that interest the general public is a key element of
democracy. Especially regarding topics that newly emerge on the national agenda,
23Jahn and Korolczuk (2012); Kammerer et al. (2020); Wittneben (2012).
24Schaffer et al. (2021).
25Hughes and Urpelainen (2015); Jenner et al. (2012); Jenner et al. (2013); Schaffer et al. (2021);
Ward and Cao (2012).
26Béland (2010); Schaffer and Bernauer (2014); Sewerin et al. (2020).
27Meckling et al. (2017); Béland et al. (2020); Isoaho and Markard (2020); Lüth and
Schaffer (2021).
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media discourse can shape public discourse which is observed by policy-makers.28
Accordingly, scrutinizing the development of the public discourse on energy policy
in its early stages can add interesting insights to the debate on policy adoption and
change. As energy policy is becoming more central to achieve societal goals such as
a reduction of CO2 emissions, lower risk from nuclear energy, or energy indepen-
dence, these policies become ever more salient in the public discourse. With the
increased salience of climate change as a topic on the international as well as the
national agenda, the importance of energy issues within the national public discourse
should increase. Accordingly, we would expect that the overall prevalence of energy
policy topics within newspapers should increase over time (assumption 1).
As we have emphasized above, seeing the discourse over energy policy as one
monolithic block might not do justice to the differences that exist with regards to
topics, sectors or instruments of energy policy. That is, beyond the overall changes in
the prevalence of energy policy in public debate, we aim to disaggregate our data to
consider variation in discourse between different energy sectors.
This leads to the following questions: Which sectors in energy policy are empha-
sized in the debate? What are the broader narratives that guide the discourse? We
submit that differences in the public discourse may arise from two main reasons:
(1) differences arise from policy-making and (2) differences arise from the indepen-
dent role of news media.
On the level of policy-making (1), the strength of public discourse may change in
the course of the legislative process. On the one hand, before policy-making takes
place, general news media reporting varies with legislative activity as the news
media report about parliamentary debates or governmental policy choices. On the
other hand, legislative activity induces feedback effects after policy-making that will
enter media discourse and politicize issues surrounding energy policy.
More concretely, the political decision in favor of the transition to a low-carbon
economy and the policies associated with it give governments considerable leeway
concerning their selection of instruments and sectors to target. This difference in
policy-making focus of the government may result in varying reporting on different
energy policy issues within news media. Thus, we expect that news media reporting
mirrors policy-making activity (assumption 2a).
In line with the policy-cycle model,29 not only the reporting of sectoral policy
output during the legislative process can cause a higher prevalence in public
discourse, but—once implemented—policies can also lead to feedback effects and
politicization. Policies targeted to replace, for example, fossil fuel-based energy with
renewable, low-carbon energy generate private distributional effects for firms and
individuals. They create winners and losers and these distributional consequences
may lead to an increased politicization of media discourse. Accordingly, we would
assume that such policy feedback and politicization effects emerge after sectoral
policy output (assumption 2b).
28Herbst (1998).
29Howlett et al. (2009).
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As a Swiss singularity, we introduce the role of direct democracy separately.
While governmental policy-making clearly is a factor determining discourse on
specific energy policy issues, the role of direct democratic decision-making on the
energy policy discourse is less clear. In general, to what extent direct democracy
helps or hinders a successful energy transition is still an understudied phenome-
non.30 Singular events such as referendums on energy policy issues require media
space to trace arguments and the general debate.31 Therefore, a mediated public
debate around popular initiatives or referendums is supposed to heighten issue-
specific salience (assumption 3).
In addition to these policy-specific factors, we refer to the independent role of
news media (2) as a second explanatory factor that may explain variation within and
between (sectoral) public discourse on energy issues. One of the basic functions of
news media as an agenda setter is to communicate to people what issues to think
about32 and to provide a marketplace of ideas.33 Moreover, news media can serve as
an important actor especially in the early stages of energy transition that we focus
on. In their agenda-setting and gate-keeping role,34 media outlets can first bring ideas
into the discourse; and they can, second, transport important alternatives and thus
nuance ongoing debates on energy policy. Referring to the work of Eilders et al.
(2004), Tresch35 speaks of a dual role that newspapers take in referendum cam-
paigns: “Through news coverage, newspapers inform the public about the issue
positions and frames of the competing camps and convey information between
political actors and citizens. In editorials and commentaries, in contrast, newspapers
become political advocates in their own right that raise their voice, set an agenda,
pursue policy options and try to shape public opinion”. In sum, newspapers as
agenda setters could seek to stress issues differently to encourage the wider public
to focus on certain sectors more heavily (assumption 4). Thus, differences in salience
between sectors may emanate from the newspapers’ agenda-setting role in empha-
sizing certain issues.
4 Data and Methods
4.1 Data
The newspapers that form the basis of our analysis are the two newspapers of record
with broad coverage in the German-speaking part of Switzerland: the Neue Zürcher
30Biber et al. (2016); see especially Rinscheid and Udris (2021).
31Marcinkowski and Donk (2012).
32McCombs and Shaw (1972).
33Entman and Wildman (1992); Van Cuilenburg (1999).
34Bernauer et al. (2015).
35Tresch (2012), p. 288.
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Zeitung (NZZ) and the Tages-Anzeiger (TA). All published articles by the NZZ and
the Tages-Anzeiger between of January 1997 and 31st of December of 2010 were
scraped from wiso.36 This procedure yielded over a million articles (see Table 1
below). Then, a search string was used to select potentially relevant articles. After-
wards, the articles were manually coded determining whether the articles were
relevant, i.e. whether they covered climate change or energy policy issues. This
substantially decreased the sample and led to the text corpus in column B of Table 1.
For our structural topic models, all the articles were then assembled into a
common text corpus and preprocessed (column C in Table 1). This included the
removal of stop words, punctuation and numbers. In addition, words with an
extremely low or extremely high occurrence were removed by using a specific
percentage as a threshold. While nearly every automated content analysis removes
certain words, the exact definition of the limits, in this case the specific percentage,
can vary.37 In our case, words with less than 1% or more than 99% appearance were
removed. The same applies to extremely short or extremely long articles. The last
step of the preprocessing includes the removal of capitalization and the removal of
word endings of conjugated verbs or plural nouns. This then leaves just the “word
stem”, which is especially useful for languages that change the word ending
according to the sentence the word is placed in.38
Table 1 Newspaper data used
Newspaper
(A) Data basis: Total
Articles (Scraping)
(B) Total MaxQDA (human-
coding, climate change
relevanta)b










aOehl (2015); Oehl et al. (2017)
bEnglish translation of search string used: (climat! OR greenhouse! OR global warming) AND
(renewable energ! OR energy polic! OR refining OR feed-in! OR emissio! OR emissions trading
OR certificate trading OR (green OR white) AND certificate) OR combined heat OR cogeneration
OR power solutio! OR energy solutio! OR CO2 OR carbon OR energy efficiency OR energy saving
OR extraction OR exploitation OR geotherm! OR (solar w/5 (power OR energy) OR (wind w/5
(energy OR power)) OR hydro! OR agricultu! OR waste management OR forest OR wood!). For
more information on the procedure, see Oehl et al. (2017); Oehl (2015) or Schaffer et al. (2021).
36See Oehl (2015) and Oehl et al. (2017).
37Lucas et al. (2015), pp. 256–258.
38Lucas et al. (2015), p. 258.
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4.2 Structural Topic Model
Previous applications of automated text analysis have shown that the method offers a
great advantage especially for large amounts of text dealing with the same general
topic.39 For the specific academic research area of climate change and climate policy,
the method was successfully applied to analyze the public’s perception of air
pollution and climate change from open-ended surveys.40 Further, topic modeling
was used to identify the most central topics in a collection of more than 800 academic
articles in the area of environmental sociology.41 STM is also perfectly suited for this
study, as we have already categorized the collected articles as relevant to the topic of
“climate change”.
In order to determine the most important factor in any topic modeling (the k
number of topics), different models were calculated with k ¼ 20/40/. . .80/100.
Subsequently, these models were validated by analyzing the semantic coherence
as well as the exclusivity of topics. The semantic coherence is maximized when the
words that are most probable in a single topic frequently co-occur, while the
exclusivity analyzes to what extent words which often occur in one topic tend to
occur in another topic. Both validation steps were done by using a data-driven
approach as well as human coding. In the end, the model with a k number of
100 was chosen as the best fitted model for our purpose. But a high number of
topics also means that some topics of the same general subject overlap. As can be
seen in Table 2, these two different topics of the same model both describe the
supply of “renewable energy”.
Since we are interested in the prevalence of general subjects such as, for example,
“renewable energy sources” or “buildings”, the prevalence of all topics that had the
same overall theme was added up. It is therefore possible that the sectors in the
following analysis can consist of one or multiple topics.
From the 100 topics assembled within the topic models, we identified 36 energy
policy relevant topics; thus, the majority of topics were not relevant for our interest.
For example, Table 3 shows that topics that were not relevant for our specific interest
concerned the implications of global warming as well as international
Table 2 Example: two topics pertaining to renewable energy
energi, energien, erneuerbar, energieeffizient, energiepolitik, erneuerbaren,
programm, massnahmen, . . .
Renewable
strom, energi, solarstrom, kraftwerk, wassserkraft, produzieren, solarzellen, pro,
produziert, netz, kwh, . . .
Renewable
39STM itself is the result of a multi-stage development of the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA); see
Blei and Lafferty (2009). While the LDA, as one application in the broader field of probabilistic
topic modeling and mixed-membership models, does not allow the inclusion of covariates in its
original form, STM does.
40Tvinnereim and Fløttum (2015); Tvinnereim et al. (2017).
41Bohr and Dunlap (2018).
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negotiations. The data on energy policy output is from Schaffer and Bernauer (2014)
and Schaffer et al. (2021).
5 Development of Energy Policy Discourse in Switzerland
1997–2011
The period of investigation for this chapter might be seen as the beginning of climate
change related energy transition policy in Switzerland.42 By the start of the period, a
proposed CO2 law had just been discarded after consultations had taken place. On
the international level, the IPCC had released its 2nd assessment report; again
confirming the workings of man-made climate change and the potentially disastrous
consequences of an ongoing business as usual. Two years later, the international
community agreed on the Kyoto Protocol, the first-ever binding international treaty
to combat climate change. Having ratified an international agreement on climate
change, states were supposed to comply by enacting policies to reach their pre-
scribed goals.
Central to the national responses to climate change were policies that target
energy production due to its large contribution to CO2 emissions as well as energy
efficiency policies. Thus, energy policies helping to decarbonize the economy by,
e.g., switching from fossil fuels to renewable energy were a popular choice. This
increased relevance of energy policy within governments’ agendas led us to stipulate
that the overall prevalence of energy policy topics within newspapers would increase
over time (assumption 1). Figure 1 shows the prevalence of articles including energy
policy topics with respect to all articles published in the respective Swiss newspapers
of record, the NZZ and the Tages-Anzeiger.43 Overall and counter to our assumption
1, there is no general upward trend throughout the time period. Instead, we can see
that from 1997 up until 2002 there is a slight downward trend in the prevalence of
energy policy topics within news media discourse. From 2002 onwards until around
2006, however, we observe a sharp increase in the prevalence of energy policy
Table 3 Example: two irrelevant topics from the STM
grad, erwaermung, celsius, global, globale, jahrhundert,
meeressspiegel, anstieg, wuerd, wahrscheinlichkeit, temperatur,
koennt, temperaturen, wert, etwa
Implications of global
warming
klimakonferenz, uno, kyoto, bali, protokol, entwicklungslaend,




42C.f. Rieder and Strotz (2018), p. 25.
43As our Fig. 1 reports the prevalence of energy policy topics in relation to all daily media content,
reported % on the y-axis are very small.
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topics. From 2006 until 2011, again, the prevalence of energy policy topics in
relation to total news reported decreases. If we recall our assumption, the main
rationale for an increase was supposed to emanate from an increase in policy-making
activity to target CO2 emissions and, linked with this activity, public discourse on
and politicization over energy policy.
Let us now take a look at the developments with respect to legislative activity on
energy policy in Switzerland. We will concentrate on the largest and most relevant
activities here.44 Directly from 1997 onwards, the Swiss Parliament debated and
drafted a revised version of the CO2 Act to comply with the Kyoto goals of an 8%
reduction of GHG emissions and passed the bill by 1999. This CO2 Act is the main
legal basis for regulating CO2 emissions in Switzerland. Although it is
an encompassing piece of legislation that generated a lot of debate about its design
and about who would be responsible for its initiation, we can observe from Fig. 1
above, that there is comparatively little attention within the media discourse.45 This
is a notable finding suggesting a decoupling of the early policy process and news
media discourse that has, for example, also been found by Tresch, Sciarini and
Varone.46 Nevertheless, the law contained a provision for a CO2 levy
47 to be
Fig. 1 Prevalence of energy policy topics with respect to total reporting by NZZ and Tages-
Anzeiger
44For more information on the history of Swiss energy policy, see Rieder and Strotz (2018).
45Also, the Energy Act (EnG) dates to this period (1998), which may also have contributed to an
increase in public discourse with respect to energy.
46Tresch et al. (2013).
47The term “levy” is used “to distinguish the CO2 levy from a conventional tax, since the revenue
from the levy is not channeled into the national budget, but is returned in its entirety to the
population (via reduction of health insurance premiums), to businesses that pay for it (in the form
of a cut in old-age pension contribution), and the buildings program”, IETA (2015), p. 3.
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implemented if voluntary measures toward CO2 reductions were not successful,
which—literally—fueled the debate from 2002 to 2006, as we will show below.
So, what moves public discourse over energy policy topics? In our theoretical
part, we have assumed that public discourse might be determined by news media
reporting on (discussions of) upcoming legislative activity (assumption 2a). Con-
trarily, one might expect public discourse to be highest in the implementation and
evaluation phase of a policy,48 that is when the consequences from policies become
apparent and a given issue is politicized (assumption 2b).
These differences in the timing of public discourse notwithstanding, actual
policy-making in the area of energy policy is supposed to be linked to differences
in news media attention. In Fig. 2, the bars represent energy policy output.49 One
may observe the peak of overall policy adoptions to occur somewhere around 2009,
while the mode of the prevalence of energy policy in our news media data is clearly
in the year 2006. Accordingly, one may speculate whether policy either follows
public discourse with a 2–3-year lag or whether the cumulative change in policies
from the years 2002–2004 triggered discussion in 2006. The former would rather
support assumption 2a, while the latter would be in line with our politicization
assumption 2b. In any case, there does not seem to be an apparent co-occurrence
of governmental policy in the area of energy and the overall public discourse on
energy. But before we turn to our more disaggregated descriptive analysis, we need
to consider other important political events and their impact on the overall energy
policy discourse, most importantly national referendums.
While the public does not have an active role in everyday energy policy-making,
in a direct democratic setting as in Switzerland, referendums on specific issues will
need to be voted on from time to time. Referendums are relevant for our analysis for
two reasons: First, we might expect a lot of public discourse on the respective issue.
Our assumption 3 accordingly stipulated that these popular referendums should go
together with a high level of public discourse on energy issues, as media within
direct democracies assume their role in informing the public.50 Second, a “no” to a
proposed law might imply that the respective policy has little chance of being
implemented. Not considering referendums and the potential policies on energy
that may not manifest (after a lost referendum) may bias our descriptive analysis.
Within the time period in question for this chapter, there were seven referendums on
issues of energy policy that are depicted and explained in Fig. 2. Notably, in 200051
48Jann and Wegrich (2007).
49Various information sources were used to code policy output (Schaffer and Bernauer 2014;
Schaffer et al. 2021) including IEA and EU databases, country reports to the UNFCCC, and
information from national environmental and energy agencies to code the data for the dependent
variable. Especially useful in this context were the IEA database on Climate Change Policies and
Measures (IEA 2018) and the national communications (NCs), which Annex I countries to the
Kyoto Protocol submit under the UNFCCC.
50Tresch (2012).
51In 2000, a referendum about energy taxes with the purpose to encourage renewable energies took
place. The population had to express itself on three proposals: a popular initiative on solar energy
(Solar-Initiative) and two governmental proposals, namely a measure for the promotion of renew-
able energies (Förderabgabe) and a constitutional article to introduce an eco-tax
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the Swiss population rejected the introduction of incentive taxes to promote renew-
able energies, such as the “solar cent” or taxes on non-renewable energies to promote
renewable energies.52 Moreover, the draft of the Electricity Market Act
(Elektrizitätsmarktgesetz EMG) was rejected in 2002. The initial purpose of this
act was to liberalize the market for electricity, and it contained provisions on
renewable energies. A proposition to phase out nuclear energy and to extend the
moratorium on the construction of new nuclear power plants (MoratoriumPlus) was
also rejected in 2003, showing little will from the Swiss population to go beyond the
existing regulation in terms of energy supply or to promote renewable energies.53
Comparing these referendum events that took place in a relatively short time period
between 2001 and 2003 (see the dashed lines in Fig. 2) with the overall prevalence of
energy policy in the news media discourse, again, there is no apparent
co-occurrence. While this is not in line with our assumption 3, others have found
that the level of media coverage and public discourse on referendum campaigns
varies widely between issues. Marcinkowski and Donk,54 for example, find in their
study that the topic of international politics yielded a large number of articles,
whereas immigration and traffic issues led to less coverage. Thus, we may conclude
that either the topics relating to energy policy on the ballot did not spark an above-
average discourse in the media, or we need to consider the specific sub-issue the
referendum was about in order to account for the referendum’s impact on media
discourse.
In summary, the aggregated information from an overall consideration of public
discourse on energy policy topics is not detailed enough to distinguish whether the
observed peak around 2005 can be linked—for example—to an emergent discussion
around the Electricity Supply Act from 2007 (Stromversorgungsgesetz, StromVG) or
whether the final introduction of a CO2 levy (as stipulated within the CO2 Act) in
2007 was responsible for the heightened level of energy policy discourse. To this
end, we have argued that one needs to account for different energy policy issues or
sectors about which there was discussion and that structural topic models can assist
researchers in these more fine-grained analyses.
Figure 3 depicts how the prevalence of topics related to different sectors55
published in the respective Swiss newspapers developed over time. The y-axis
(Energielenkungsabgabe). The three proposals had in common that they would have raised a tax on
non-renewable energies. Compared to other countries, the proposed levels of taxation were rather
low, but there was substantial opposition from industrial associations, who campaigned against all
three proposals. The coincidence with prices spikes in the oil market in the summer 2000 led to a
rejection of all proposals in the popular vote.
52Wüstenhagen et al. (2003).
53After these 7 referendum decisions within only 3 years, the Swiss people were granted some
12 years until they were asked to vote on energy matters again in 2015, SFOE (2019), p. 29.
54Marcinkowski and Donk (2012).
55The following sectors are considered in our analysis: energy supply (power and heat generation),
transport (public and private), buildings and appliances. The categorization used here is in accor-
dance with Schaffer et al. (2021).
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shows the sector percentage in relation to all climate-change relevant articles
(i.e. column C in Table 1) and not to the total of articles published in the newspaper.
So, do we see stark differences in how news media discourse evolved within
those four sectors, and can we gain additional insight regarding the importance and
timing of actual policy output? First, we see that there is variation in the prevalence
of sectoral topics both over time and between sectors. Topics relating to energy
sources in power and heat generation (energy supply) clearly enjoy the highest
prevalence, while appliances apparently were not much of a discussion item within
the public discourse. Second, similar to the overall picture, we also see the peak in
media discourse concerning energy supply (and also regarding buildings) in the
year 2006.
In Fig. 4, we further divide the topics within the energy supply category into
topics pertaining to the different energy sources: nuclear, renewable or fossil. Here,
we see a remarkable difference in the prominence of topics in the overall discussion.
While most of the discourse in energy policy concentrated on how to deal with
power and heat generated from renewable sources during the beginning of our
period and peaking around the year 2000, topics pertaining to fossil energy sources
were comparatively less prevalent in this first period. According to our disaggregated
Fig. 4, the referendums on the solar initiative as well as the government proposal for
the promotion of renewable energies (Förderabgabe) in 2001 seemingly did lead to
comparatively high levels of public discourse on the topic of renewables within the
two main newspapers of record. This observation supports our assumption 3 on the
importance of media discourse in the event of a referendum and the value of a public
debate over issues that interest the general public as a key element of democracy.
After the lost referendums on solar energy and a promotion levy for renewable
energy (Förderabgabe), however, topics pertaining to renewables dropped in prev-
alence and never reached the same amount of relative consideration within the media
Fig. 3 Prevalence of topics regarding different sectors
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discourse again. This is an unexpected finding as—following the rejection of the
Electricity Market Act in the referendum in 2002 and facing the threat of the EU
market liberalization—the question of renewables within the energy supply was a
central one within elite discourse and it received increased parliamentary attention.56
Moreover, the decision on the Swiss feed-in tariff (kostendeckende
Einspeisevergütung KEV) as the prime mechanism to encourage renewable energy
is associated with the adoption of the Energy Supply Act (StromVG) of the 23rd of
March 2007 (in force from 1st of January 2008) and with the revision of the Energy
Act of 1998 (Energiegesetz EnG) on the 1st of January 2009. These important
decisions on the promotion of renewable energy seem not to be accompanied by
an increased public discourse. From our visual inspection of relative topic preva-
lence, we may thus conclude that renewable energy was a comparatively
uncontested issue during our period of analysis. From Fig. 4, we further observe
that the prevalence of topics relating to power and heat generated from fossil energy
sources moves somewhat counter to the renewables debate. Starting comparatively
low, fossil energy topics received above-average attention between 2004 and 2007.
Fig. 4 Prevalence of topics regarding different sectors (accounting for different energy sources).
Dashed lines mark times of popular referendums on energy policy topics during the period between
1997 and 2011. (a) 24.09.2000 Popular initiative on solar energy; (b) 24.09.2000 Government
proposal for the promotion of renewable energies (Förderabgabe); (c) 24.09.2000 Government
proposal on a constitutional article to introduce an eco-tax (Energielenkungsabgabe); (d)
02.12.2001 Referendum on Energy tax not VAT; (e) 22.9.2002 Referendum Electricity Market
Act; (f) 18.05.2003 Popular initiative “Strom ohne Atom” (nuclear phase-out); (g) 18.02.2003
Popular initiative “MoratoriumPlus” (extension of nuclear construction stop)
56For example, notable parliamentary initiatives regarding how to change the current approach with
respect to renewable energy sources were proposed by Dupraz (2004), n. 03.462 and Speck (2003),
n. 03.409.
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Moreover, the prevalence of nuclear energy in the public discourse has also been
comparatively low but steadily increasing to reach a peak around 2007, when
nuclear energy also ranked prominently in discussions surrounding the Energy
Supply Act and the preparation of energy perspectives up to 2035.
The above-mentioned accumulation of policies with respect to energy supply
around the years 2007–2009 can be observed in Fig. 5 below. Here, the disaggre-
gation of policies as well as the public discourse into different sectors can bring
additional information to the overall picture. For example, we clearly see that policy
output concerning sources of energy supply dominates the political agenda with
respect to energy issues over the whole period, whereas there are only two policies
associated with regulating appliances. Policy output thus generally corresponds to
the levels of public discourse. What about the timing? For example, with respect to
the building (residential) sector and regarding energy supply, the peak in public
discourse is observed before the respective peaks in policy output. While this
suggests that public discourse over different sectors happened before important
and comprehensive policy-making within these sectors took place, our visual evi-
dence is indicative at best. For the transport sector, the prevalence of transport topics
within the news media in 2004 may be driven by discussions regarding the ordinance
about an emission compensation obligation for importers of fossil motor fuels
coming into effect in that year.
The question of how to deal with a potential tax on motor fuels as originally
foreseen within the CO2 Act marks the start of discussions surrounding the CO2 tax
from around 2004. As stipulated above, these discussions relating to the CO2 levy
(that was decided upon in 2005 and that came into effect by 2008)57 can proba-
bly serve as a possible explanation for the bump in overall energy policy prevalence
within the public discourse (as observed in Fig. 1). The CO2 Act and especially the
coalitional dynamics within the debates over the design of the CO2 levy have already
sparked a lot of academic interest.58 To also look into this important debate in a bit
more detail, we chose to pick topics (from our 100 topic STM) that included the
word stem “abgabe” (levy). Accordingly, Fig. 6 provides a graphic representation of
the discussion on the CO2 levy.
59
“Abgabe” was listed as a representative word
within four different topics (see Table 2). Moreover, given that a “climate penny”
(Klimarappen) was presented as an alternative suggestion by the Swiss Petrol Union
(Erdöl-Vereinigung60) to circumvent a levy on motor fuels,61 we have also added the
one topic representing the climate penny (Klimarappen). According to the 15 words
57IEA (2018).
58Ingold (2011); Ingold and Varone (2012); Ingold and Fischer (2014); Kriesi and Jegen (2001);
Lehmann and Rieder (2002).
59For example, we did not use a topic that explicitly dealt with “foerderabgabe”, as from the
15 words it became clear that this referred to an earlier debate around the referendums in 2001
(however, it obviously counted towards the (renewable) energy supply discourse).
60Avenergy Suisse (since 2019).
61Ingold (2011).
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most representative of these topics (column A in Table 4), we assigned headings for
the reader to more easily relate to the (approximate) content of the topic (column B in
Table 4). As the levy and the climate penny were mostly discussed together, we
looked for the words that could best discriminate between the topics and assigned
headings accordingly. To this end, the main difference between topic 57 and topic
3 is that 57 prominently deals with motor fuels (treibstoffe) whereas 3 concerns
heating oil (heizöl). Topic 79 also includes heating oil as a top word but is referred to
in the context of building renovations and can thus be discriminated from topic
57 (Table 4).
Fig. 6 Debate surrounding the introduction of a CO2 levy
Table 4 Topics relating to the discussion surrounding the CO2 levy
A: Topic (top 15 words ranked by prevalence) B: Topic
abgab, bundesrat, klimarappen, pro, lenkungsabgabe,
treibstoffen, rappen, wuerd, liter, treibstoff, massnahmen,
benzin, gesetz, inland, einfuehrung
CO2 levy on motor fuels (Topic 57)
abgab, oi, klimarappen, klimaschutz, rappen, heizoel,
nationalrat, liter, cvp, ausstoss, pro, bundesrat, vanoni,
inland, lenkungsabgab
CO2 levy on heating and process
fuels (Topic 3)
gesetz, wirtschaft, emissionen, abgab, redukt,
massnahmen, ziel, freiwillig, unternehmen,
reduktionsziel, erreicht freiwilligen, verpflichtungen,
umsetzung, klimapolitik
Voluntary commitment (Topic 49)
klimarappen, stiftung, millionen, tonnen, inland, ausland,
redukt, projekt, pro, bund, ziel, zertifik, rappen, franken,
beitrag
Climate penny (Topic 6)
abgab, gebaeudesanierungen, bundesrat, nationalrat,
franken, vorlag, wab, staenderat, parlament, heizoel,
millionen, massnahmen, bevoelkerung, vorschlag, pro
CO2 levy on heating and process
fuels/buildings (Topic 79)
Public Discourses on (Sectoral) Energy Policy in Switzerland 333
Figure 6 shows the prevalence of these singular topics on the CO2 levy over time
to zoom into the main discussion expected to have driven the observed overall peak
around 2006 (c.f. Fig. 1). As mentioned above, the CO2 levy was included in the
2000 CO2 Act; however, it was not immediately effective. Voluntary agreements by
industry to cut their CO2 emissions were the initial measure to bring Switzerland in
line with its 10% emission reduction goal defined in the Kyoto Protocol. Only if the
voluntary agreements were not sufficient to reach this goal, in a second, subsidiary
phase, a CO2 levy (tax) would be introduced.
62 Accordingly, from Fig. 6 we can see
that the first topic mentioning a levy and showing increases in prevalence within the
public discourse is indeed the one associated with the voluntary agreements (topic
49). Prevalence of this topic increases steadily, representing the phase (2000–2002)
in which the private sector could sign voluntary agreements to reduce CO2 emis-
sions. By 2002, however, it became obvious that the voluntary measures would not
suffice to reach the 10% reduction goal compared to 1990 levels by 2010.63 Thus,
from 2003 onwards, debates over a potential CO2 levy and whether it would be
levied only on heating and process fuels (topics 3 and 79 in Fig. 6) or also on motor
fuels (topic 57 in Fig. 6) began that ended with the formal introduction of the CO2
levy on heating and process fuels in 2008. In the course of this debate, opponents of a
levy on motor fuels mobilized, and the Swiss Petrol Union (Erdöl-Vereinigung)
presented the climate penny (Klimarappen) as an alternative to the ongoing dis-
course (topic 6 in Fig. 6), which was later taken up by the government in public
consultation and eventually led to the abandonment of a CO2 levy on motor fuels.
64
These real-world developments are picked up quite well by our 5 topics; for
example, the discussion around a levy on motor fuels (topic 57) and a levy on
heating and process fuels (topic 3, topic 79) dominated the public discourse espe-
cially in the years between 2003 and 2008. Also, the topic “Klimarappen” gains in
prevalence throughout this same period. After the Bundesrat had decided on a
compromise solution, namely a levy on heating and process fuels in combination
with the “Klimarappen”, and parliament had voted upon it by 2005, questions on the
concrete design dominated the discourse. In our Fig. 6, this is manifested by the
increased importance of topic 79 that unites the levy on heating and process fuels and
the building sector in the discussions from 2005 onwards. In this context, the set-up
of how to recycle revenue from the levy back to the population and how to link
revenue to further measures in the building sector through the Buildings Program
(Gebäudeprogramm) was a topic of public discourse.
In making assumptions about the public discourse above, we mentioned potential
differences between newspapers and their reporting on energy issues as one expla-
nation. We assumed that newspapers might take different foci and stress different
62Lehmann and Rieder (2002).
63Ingold (2011); Prognos (2002).
64It is quite remarkable that a private actor and interest group proposed a policy alternative that later
was adopted.
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elements or sectors of a discourse. The newspapers used for our STM are two leading
quality newspapers in Switzerland that are considered to have different ideological
leanings. While the NZZ is considered to be more conservative, the TA is more
center-left leaning.65 In Fig. 7, we can see that for the overall prevalence of energy
policy topics within the total articles featured in the newspaper, the only notable
finding is that the TA seems to dedicate more relative space to topics of energy
policy compared with the NZZ.
Again, using such an aggregated measure to compare the two newspapers may
not show large differences between them. The devil might be in the details regarding
which newspaper pushes a certain topic while potentially neglecting another. Taking
the debate about the CO2 levy presented above, we might take a look whether both
newspapers reported on all topics or whether some topics (e.g. the climate penny)
were discussed more often in one of the newspapers. The debate at the level of single
topics is very well suited for such a detailed comparison. To this end, Fig. 8 shows
the estimated mean difference in topic proportions for the two newspapers. Indeed,
we can see some interesting variation. First, we cannot observe any difference
between the two newspapers regarding the topic of voluntary commitment and
the—arguably most controversial—discussion on a levy on motor fuels. Second,
the reporting and discussion on the climate penny is comparatively based more
within the NZZ. But the real difference lies in the coverage on the levy on heating
and process fuels (combustibles). Here, topic 3 (abgab, oi, klimarappen,
klimaschutz, rappen, heizoel, nationalrat, liter, cvp, ausstoss, pro, bundesrat,

























































Fig. 7 Prevalence of energy policy topics with respect to total reporting by the NZZ (dashed line)
and the Tages-Anzeiger, split by covariate “newspaper”
65C.f. Stauffacher et al. (2015).
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Anzeiger, while topic 79 (abgab, gebaeudesanierungen, bundesrat, nationalrat,
franken, vorlag, wab, staenderat, parlament, heizoel, millionen, massnahmen,
bevoelkerung, vorschlag, pro), which links the CO2 levy to the building sector, is
mostly covered by the NZZ. To what extent this relates to their more conservative
platform remains open, but nevertheless very subtle differences in the coverage of
certain topics can be observed. Overall, however, Swiss media rather stick to their
non-interventionist style of reporting elite discourses.66 Media and communication
studies might find it interesting to explore these issues closer with respect to climate
and energy policy.
In conclusion, we had expected a general increase in the importance of energy
policy within the public and news media discourse during the early period of the
Swiss energy transition. In our content analysis of all articles published by the two
leading newspapers and consecutively using structural topic models, we found that
the overall energy policy discourse was dominated by the discussions surrounding
the CO2 levy. While these discussions can explain most of the above-average
increase in public discourse around the years 2004 and 2008, discussions on
potential market mechanisms to promote renewable energy were also consistently
led. While this is speculative given our exploratory analysis, one might argue that the
heightened public discourse led to profound and stable compromises and served the
idea that all parties were heard before passing legislation, which might, for example,
have prevented a referendum on the Electricity Supply Act of 2008.
In any case, as energy policy-making does not necessarily progress in a uniform
manner adding important legislation year-by-year, the discourse on energy policy
Fig. 8 Estimated mean difference in topic proportions based on covariate newspaper
66Cammarano et al. (2010).
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does not either. National and international circumstances, such as the financial crisis
from 2008 onwards,67 may possibly crowd-out discussions on energy or climate
issues, while domestic debates on one energy policy issue (CO2 levy) may sustain
interest and potentially increase the prevalence of other energy policy issues (renew-
able energy remuneration) as well. Indeed, policy sequencing68 may well describe
the pathways observed in Swiss energy policy from 2008 onwards.
Looking at the developments presented here with hindsight in our explorative
analysis of the public discourse, Switzerland did eventually meet its Kyoto Protocol
targets, although some sectoral sub-targets were not met. Most notable for our
descriptive analysis here is the transport vs. the building sectors trajectory. While
the transport sector emissions were 10% above the 1990 level in 2012 (and should
have been 10% below), the building sector’s emission target was met and even
undercut with a 16% reduction.69 The proposed CO2 tax on motor fuels, which
represented a contested issue in terms of competitiveness but also inequality
issues,70 was replaced by the Klimarappen Initiative of the Swiss Petrol Union
(Erdöl-Vereinigung). And although the emission gap that still exists in the transport
sector has narrowed, a CO2 tax on motor fuels has to this day not seriously re-entered
the policy-making process—a case in point showing the political difficulty in
seriously decarbonizing the transport sector.71
A central finding from our research is that it pays off to disaggregate reporting on
the energy transition or equally climate change. Without a discussion on energy
policy topics within the media, important topics such as the energy transition within
the buildings and transport sector may not be discussed and thus are neither on the
public nor on policy-makers’ list of priorities.
6 Conclusion
Given the path-dependency of energy policy, it is of eminent importance to look at
how topics evolve to account for today’s realities. Our chapter aimed to contribute to
and argue on three main points. First, in providing the whole picture, we suggested
that energy policy and decarbonization pathways should not be addressed in an
aggregated fashion, and we stressed the importance of disaggregating both the
supply and demand of energy policies to more closely map the politics of energy.
In this chapter, we chose to look into different energy-relevant sectors and visually
traced the development of public discourse in each of these sectors. Our strategy
seems warranted given the widely differing trajectories of topic prevalence
67Geels (2013); Scruggs and Benegal (2012).
68Pahle et al. (2018).
69IEA (2018).
70Thalmann and Vielle (2019).
71Thalmann and Vielle (2019).
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concerning our four sectors. Whereas news media discourse regarding energy
sources in power and heat generation (energy supply) as well as regarding buildings
both peak at similar points in time, the prevalence of discussions surrounding
transport issues peaks earlier, and appliances are barely featured within the public
discourse. Our explorative analysis linking the sector-specific discourse to sector-
specific policy output as well as political events (referendums) then showed that the
news media discourse on energy policy was mostly driven by two major policy
discussions: by the design of the CO2 tax and the discussion around how to deal with
renewable energy sources. In fact, the peak of the Swiss energy policy discourse—
which happened between 2004 to 2008—occurs just before and during a peak in
policy-making in the years 2007–2010. While our visual inspection cannot make a
causal argument about discourse triggering policy-making, one may at least claim
that the level of discourse in a sector is related to the level of policy-making (Schaffer
et al. 2021). Vivid public discussions between 2004 and 2008 around those two
topics might have helped reach a compromise and circumvent further referendums.
Concerning the importance of media discourse around referendums on energy
policy, we also found a meaningful connection especially with respect to referen-
dums on renewable energy after disaggregating into different issues regarding
energy supply. However, we do not see a connection regarding referendums on
nuclear energy. One reason for this difference may be that public and news media
discourse is higher with respect to comparatively “newer” topics (renewables) than
on discussions surrounding nuclear energy where the public presumably already has
formed an opinion and arguments are well known.
The second issue we wanted to highlight with our contribution pertains to the
timely study of policy contestation and the politicization of energy policy. We
argued to look beyond policy adoption and to systematically study how policies
affect politics.72 Energy transitions have non-neglectable distributional effects,
which can be used to campaign against more stringent energy policy (as one could
observe with the 2021 referendum on the revised CO2 law).
73 While winning
coalitions may help to break carbon lock-in,74 increased politicization from losers
of the process may have negative consequences on their continuation or change
towards more ambition. In our explorative analysis we could observe only slight
feedback effects due to the discussion on policy alternatives to the CO2 levy on
motor fuels. It remains to be seen whether politicization and an increase in contes-
tation of energy policy happened within the decade from 2010 to 2020.75 Given the
only slight increase in energy prices (compared to other countries embarking on
72Béland (2010).
73Schaffer (2021); Schaffer and Magyar (2021).
74Meckling et al. (2015).
75Rinscheid and Udris (2021) give a first indication in their analysis of three energy-related
referendums and find—for two of these—more media attention compared to a baseline of other
referendums in the same period; see also Duygan et al. (2021), who find contestation of the Energy
Strategy 2050 in their stakeholder survey.
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energy transition and heavily subsidizing renewable energy such as Germany) and
the overall satisfactory performance of Switzerland due to strong efficiency gains,
we would expect only a moderate contestation. Nevertheless, the popular rejection of
the complete revision of the CO2 Act at the ballot in June 2021 may continue to lead
to a higher level of contestation in the public debate as the climate crisis unfolds and
action is needed.76 Politicization of the public discourse is further assumed to go
hand in hand with political parties distinctly positioning themselves and competing
on energy policy issues.77
A third goal of our contribution was to explore how new unsupervised content
analysis methods can inform policy analysis and studies on energy transition. Topic
models can help identify certain topics and their prevalence over time, while
structural topic models can add further relevant insights by using different
document-level covariates. In our case, we differentiated between the coverage of
the two main newspapers of record in Switzerland, the NZZ and the Tages-Anzeiger.
We found that with respect to energy policy topics and their general salience within
the discourse, there was little meaningful difference. As expected, the newspapers
stressed different issues in their reporting. For example, the NZZ emphasized
retrofitting buildings in connection with the discussion on the CO2 levy, while the
Tages-Anzeiger did not. As energy policy becomes an ever more contested issue, the
agenda-setting of media outlets or their power to structure the discourse might as
well increase in importance in the future. Communication scholars may be interested
in further exploring these developments.
For future research, the obvious extension is to scrutinize how the public dis-
course evolved in the 2010s. The guiding question would be whether the level of
discourse did actually again reach the heights experienced around the years 2004 to
2008. Can we still see that there are sectoral differences, or has energy politics
become more encompassing to include all sectors, for example with the discussion of
the Energy Strategy 2050? Our data and explorative analysis may serve as ground-
work for such efforts.
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Abstract Wind energy is one of the most affordable and fastest-growing sources of
electricity worldwide. As a large share of wind power generation occurs in the winter
season, it could make an important contribution to seasonal diversification of
domestic electricity supply. However, the development of wind energy projects in
Switzerland has been characterized by long and complex administrative processes,
with the planning phase taking up to a decade, more than twice as long as the
European average. The objective of this chapter is to quantify the risk premium that
lengthy permitting processes imply for wind energy investors in Switzerland and to
suggest ways to reduce policy risk. The data have been gathered through 22 confi-
dential interviews with project developers and several cantonal permitting agencies
as well as a review of federal and cantonal regulatory documents. Furthermore, a
discounted cash flow model was built to compare the profitability indicators (IRR,
NPV) and the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of a reference case to scenarios
with various risks—for example, delays in the permitting process, downsizing the
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project, or changes in the regulatory environment such as phasing out feed-in tariffs.
The model shows that the highest profitability risks are related to the availability of a
feed-in tariff, but other changes in the permitting process can also have a critical
impact on the project’s bottom line. The findings illustrate a significant policy risk
premium in the pre-construction stage faced by wind energy project developers in
Switzerland.
1 Introduction
The Swiss Energy Strategy 2050 (ES2050), which established ambitious energy
efficiency and renewable electricity production targets and a ban for new nuclear
power plants,1 was accepted by 58.2% of the voters in a May 2017 referendum.2 As
a consequence, wind energy projects, together with other renewable energy sources,
were granted the status of “national interest”, thus leveling the importance of
renewable power generation with other national interests, such as landscape protec-
tion.3 Another important implication was that no new feed-in-tariff payments
(“kostendeckende Einspeisevergütung KEV”) would be earmarked for renewable
energy after the end of 2022. Since January 2018, the previous KEV system has been
changed towards a system of feed-in remuneration with direct marketing.4
ES2050 recommends a target of 11,400 GWh of new renewables (without
hydropower) in 20355 and it is expected that wind energy will play an important
part in fulfilling this goal. By the end of 2018, there were 75 MW of wind energy
capacity installed in the country, producing roughly 122 GWh of electricity, which
corresponds to the electricity consumption of 35,000 Swiss households.6 These
numbers suggest that in order to meet the federal production targets, wind power
needs to see significant growth in the coming years. Administrative and regulatory
issues7 are among the major barriers to the development of renewable energy pro-
jects in Switzerland and internationally.8 Leading Swiss governmental and industry
stakeholders have identified the duration of administrative processes as an area of
1Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2016a).
2Federal Chancellery (2017).
3Energy Act (Energiegesetz, SR 730.0), Art. 12.
4For the sake of brevity, we use the term “KEV” in this chapter to refer to Swiss feed-in tariffs,
including the system of feed-in remuneration with direct marketing introduced in 2018.
5Energy Act (Energiegesetz).
6Suisse Eole (2019).
7The words “administrative”, “planning”, “permitting”, and “regulatory” costs are used inter-
changeably to refer to the costs borne by the project developer before the construction of wind
turbines takes place.
8Battaglini et al. (2012); Burkhardt et al. (2015); Dong and Wiser (2013); Ceña et al. (2010).
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concern: it can take more than 10 years to obtain all the necessary permits to
construct a large wind energy project.9 By comparison, the average
pre-construction lead times are 4.5 years in Europe, with a considerable variation
by country.10 The long duration and complexity of the permitting process result in
reduced attractiveness of the Swiss market for foreign and domestic investors, who
prefer shorter administrative procedures.11 This preference is financially sound:
administrative costs are ‘sunk’ and increase the levelized cost of electricity
(LCOE), thus directly impacting project profitability.
There are several types of costs that are connected to permitting procedures. The
first type is easily quantifiable—these are direct monetary expenses, such as permit-
ting fees or expenses on environmental impact assessment (EIA) and ecological
compensation. We argue that administrative delays incur additional indirect costs,
which have a detrimental and significant effect on the financial attractiveness of a
wind project due to opportunity cost of capital and foregone profits. Moreover,
delays give rise to regulatory and policy risk and uncertainty with respect to the
federal support scheme and possible changes in environmental and spatial planning
laws. Taken all together, we posit that direct and indirect costs of permitting and
associated risks constitute a significant barrier for wind energy project development
in Switzerland.
The aim of this chapter is to quantify the cost of regulatory and policy risks (the
“risk premium”) faced by investors in Swiss wind energy projects. The research
focuses on the question: How can the policy risk premium for planning and
permitting of wind energy projects be quantified and reduced? To answer this
question, we describe wind energy project permitting procedures, summarize empir-
ical data on their costs and duration, and analyze the impacts that regulatory risks
have on LCOE under different scenarios.
Our analysis is informed by a review of publicly available documents and
interviews with federal and cantonal authorities. The aim of the interviews was to
cross-check information obtained from public documents and identify the most
important bottlenecks. Industry-related data were gathered through 22 confidential
interviews with wind energy project developers in German and French-speaking
parts of Switzerland.
The results have significant policy relevance. To invest in renewable energy,
project developers have to recover the cost of electricity production (“hard cost”) as
well as the associated risk premium (“soft cost”). While technological and market
risks can be reduced through careful due diligence by the project developers,
political and regulatory risks are harder to manage.12 Quantifying the risk premium
induced by the administrative process will allow a more precise calculation of
adequate levels of public support, which will help policymakers balance the multiple
9Guy-Ecabert and Meyer (2016); Suisse Eole (2016).
10Ceña et al. (2010).
11De Jager and Rathmann (2008); Lüthi and Wüstenhagen (2012).
12Noothout et al. (2016); Bürer and Wüstenhagen (2008).
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objectives of providing investor confidence, securing low-carbon electricity supply,
protecting local landscapes and the environment, and maintaining affordable elec-
tricity prices.
The rest of this chapter has the following structure. First, we classify the risk
categories faced by wind project developers and visualize the complexity of the
administrative process for building large wind energy projects in Switzerland. Then,
we quantify the policy risk premium based on the calculation of project profitability
and LCOE under eight different scenarios. Finally, policy implications and recom-
mendations for risk reduction are derived, informed by the model results and
interview insights.
2 Risk Categories in Wind Energy Investment
This section investigates ten risks from the wind energy project developer’s per-
spective, adapted from Noothout et al.13 Careful consideration and weighting of
wind energy project risks are paramount for successful project completion. While
some risks are regulatory in nature and can be somewhat mitigated, a number of
other factors need to be accepted “as is”, exposing the project developer to cumu-
lative project risk.
Policy design risk, policy change risk and administrative risk are the most
relevant for our research, since they cannot be easily managed by the project
developer. Policy design risk is connected to opportunities and threats arising
from how the policy instrument is designed by the authorities, including duration
and size of support and existence of a support cap. Since 2009, Swiss authorities
have been offering feed-in-tariffs (KEV), a fixed remuneration paid for electricity
produced from renewable sources for the duration of 20 years.14 The KEV ensures
that electricity generators receive compensation for the green power they produce
and shields the project cash flows from the price volatility of the electric power
markets. Moreover, wind projects that are ready to be built enjoy preferential
treatment in the KEV system.15
Even though KEV offers an attractive and stable revenue stream, there are several
challenges with the current implementation of this policy instrument in Switzerland,
which translate into considerable risk for developers. The first challenge is the risk of
not receiving KEV (considered by Scenarios VI–VIII in section 4.2). In fact, in the
third quarter of 2019, only 40 wind turbines with an installed capacity of 62 MW
benefited from KEV support.16 Another 438 wind projects with a capacity of
1014 MW were approved for KEV support should they be built, and an additional
13Noothout et al. (2016).
14Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2016b).
15Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2016a).
16Pronovo (2019a).
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356 planned wind energy projects with a nominal capacity of 843 MW were on the
KEV waiting list, unlikely to get approval before the 2022 expiration of the feed-in
tariff system.17 Relieving this bottleneck could contribute significantly to achieving
Switzerland’s renewable energy goals. If half of the currently planned projects were
implemented by 2035, this would lead to an expected annual power generation of
1637 GWh or 14% of the ES2050 target.18
Policy change risk: The second challenge is uncertainty about the subsequent
support scheme after the KEV system is discontinued. Article 38 of the revised
Energy Act specifies a sunset clause that phases out feed-in tariffs after 2022,
suggesting that the majority of wind projects on the waiting list are unlikely to
receive KEV support.19 The design of a possible public support scheme after 2022 is
currently unknown, which is a source of considerable uncertainty for project
developers.
Administrative risks can be recognized as a significant hurdle to wind power
development in Switzerland, as they have been internationally.20 The risk stems
from complex permitting procedures (described in detail in Sect. 3), variations of
procedures by canton, changing requirements for environmental impact assessment
(EIA), long administrative lead times, multiple opportunities for objections on the
cantonal and municipal level, and the high number of authorities involved. The
administrative risks bring about additional costs (e.g., new environmental impact
studies), cause project delays (e.g., pending court cases), and introduce uncertainty
(e.g., regarding a project’s chances of receiving financing).
Social acceptance risk: Another important risk in the planning phase is
connected to social acceptance, which includes acceptance by the markets, local
communities, and society in general.21 Note that social acceptance is closely
intertwined with administrative risks, since projects with significant opposition
from the local population or the NGOs are often delayed and are less likely to
receive the necessary permits. Generally, Swiss public opinion polls show high
approval ratings of wind energy: a favorable public opinion has been a defining
trend in Switzerland for more than a decade.22 Even though intense political
campaigns ahead of voting can lead to opinion swings,23 local voters accepted
19 out of 22 specific wind energy projects in the past 7 years.24
Public support for wind energy does not mean that all stakeholders are on board
with wind energy development. Often, there is a highly organized and influential
17Pronovo (2019b).
18Own calculation based on data from Pronovo (2019a).
19Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2016a).
20Ceña et al. (2010); Lüthi and Prässler (2011).
21Wüstenhagen et al. (2007).
22Geissmann (2015); Ebers and Wüstenhagen (2016); Ebers Broughel and Hampl (2018); Tabi and
Wüstenhagen (2015); Tamedia (2017).
23Rinscheid and Wüstenhagen (2018); see also Rinscheid and Udris (2021).
24Perret (2019).
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opposition, which presents a variety of arguments against wind power development.
These concerns are usually related to impacts of wind turbines on different aspects of
local life: environmental (impacts on local flora and fauna, landscape change),
emotional (place attachment), technological (contestation of wind technology),
health-related (impact of noise, flicker), and economic (unfavorable perceived
cost-benefit ratio of wind power development). In the academic literature, the issues
of social acceptance are discussed in the context of environmental equity and
fairness of renewable energy generation.25 The project developers usually search
collaboration and compromise with the opposition, which might involve commis-
sioning of additional studies, introduction of ecological mitigation measures, chang-
ing the location of turbines, reducing the number of turbines, and switching off
turbines when birds and bats are most likely to be impacted. Our estimations show
that these factors may have significant financial consequences for the project devel-
oper. Social acceptance risks can be addressed through a careful stakeholder man-
agement strategy, but they cannot be fully avoided.
A wind project might receive dozens of objections, most of which are settled out
of court. When a compromise cannot be found, the courts are likely to get involved.
The task of the court is to weigh the conflicting interests: for example, environmental
protection versus domestic energy supply.26 Court cases have considerable impacts
on the project’s cash flow. Court deliberations lead to direct monetary expenses,
such as remuneration for lawyers, expenses for commissioning new studies and
project managers’ work hours. The objections often lead to considerable delays,
putting the project on hold for the duration of the court deliberations. Municipal
courts are likely to hear a case in about 6 months, while the cantonal courts might
require a year to reach a decision. A federal court is likely to need several years to
announce their verdict. Multiple court cases might delay the project to the extent that
it can no longer be realized.
Grid access risk: The project developer greatly depends on the availability of a
grid connection; therefore, this is among the first points to be clarified in the initial
project stages. If there are no suitable connection options available, the developer
usually abandons the project idea because building new electric infrastructure can be
prohibitively expensive. Generally, project developers tend to seek a close collabo-
ration with the local grid operators.
Financing risk: Due to the stability of the Swiss financial system and currently
very low interest rates, the developers are able to finance wind projects with
relatively low cost of capital. Yet, financing of the existing wind projects in
Switzerland was greatly facilitated by receiving a KEV, thus connecting the financ-
ing risk of project development with federal policy-making. The interviewees have
reported that without the KEV, their projects are unlikely to obtain financing, as they
would be exposed to volatile electricity prices, making it harder to present a clear
25E.g., see Wolsink (2007); Wüstenhagen et al. (2007).
26Plüss (2017).
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investment case. In the absence of KEV, a long-term power purchasing agreement
(PPA) might make the wind project financially attractive, if it covers LCOE.
Technology risk relates to the level of maturity of wind energy technology. Even
though wind turbines are a novelty in many regions, wind power is a mature
technology. The developer cannot influence the maturity of the best available
technology, but a project can be designed to use the most appropriate technological
solution, given local wind conditions, altitude, and environmental impacts. In recent
years, technological progress has permitted the construction of increasingly larger
turbines for increasingly lower cost, which tremendously improved the cost effi-
ciency of wind energy per MW of installed capacity. One of the challenges of rapid
technological development is that in the case of serious delays, by the time the
project obtains all the necessary permits, the technology specified in the permitting
documentation may be outdated or even no longer available. In this case, some
permitting steps need to be repeated.27 On the other hand, some project delays can
also be an advantage, as they allow the developer to gather further information about
the site and employ more efficient wind turbines as they become available on the
market.
Management risk is related to the overall experience level of the project
developer to successfully plan, commission, operate, and decommission or repower
the wind project. Our interviews identified a significant learning-by-doing effect, as
project developers learn about the complex permitting procedures. An experienced
project team has the potential to reduce management risk.
To complete the picture, project developers are subject to market design and
country risks, which equally apply to all electricity producers. These two risks
pertain to such factors as: political stability, level of corruption, economic develop-
ment, design and functioning of the electricity market, the legal system, and
exchange rate fluctuations. The Swiss electricity market is partially liberalized,
with the second stage of liberalization depending on an electricity trading agreement
with the EU. The electricity market is dominated by public utilities, which makes the
entrance of smaller players more challenging.28 This stands in contrast with many
private wind energy developers who are active in such countries as the US, Ger-
many, the UK, or Sweden.29 At the same time, Switzerland is a rather small market,
which makes large-scale renewable energy developments challenging. As a result,
many Swiss developers have built or acquired wind projects abroad.30
27One standard practice is to use approximate turbine characteristics in the beginning of the
permitting process and avoid specifying the turbine model for as long as possible.
28Ebers Broughel et al. (2019).
29E.g., Bergek et al. (2013).
30Blondiau and Reuter (2019).
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3 Wind Energy Project Development Process
Wind energy projects are subject to a rigorous technical, financial, ecological, and
geological evaluation, with the involvement of multiple stakeholders.31 Fig. 1 shows
the project development process of a wind park, consisting of six distinct steps:
feasibility study, pre-project, main project, construction, operation, and repowering
or decommissioning.
In Switzerland, the pre-construction stage (first 3 project steps) can last between
6 and 7 years without objections and stretch up to 15 or more years in case the project
faces regulatory hurdles or opposition. In this stage, the project developer expects to
spend 5–10% of the total budget on planning and permitting activities, which might
range from several hundred thousand Swiss francs (in case no EIA is needed) to 3–6
million CHF. It must be noted that exact development costs are difficult to predict,
since the requirements for implementing wind projects have increased tremendously,
putting an upward pressure on pre-construction budgets. Moreover, pre-construction
costs do not linearly increase with project size, as they are made up of fixed costs
(independent of project size) and variable costs (dependent on project size, but also
on location, the situation in the community, objections, cantonal planning decisions,
etc.). Thus, larger projects tend to expose project developers to higher
pre-construction risks (and expenses) because they require more extensive EIAs,
more permits for wind measurement towers, complex technical planning, and
coordination among multiple jurisdictions and landowners. On the other hand, in
case of larger projects, the development costs are spread over a larger installed
capacity, thus reducing cost per megawatt. To mitigate pre-construction risks,
project developers were observed to form partnerships for the development of larger
projects (cost sharing) or to develop a small lighthouse project first (cost-
minimizing). In both cases, potential project failure would result in smaller monetary
losses.
Exact pre-construction steps somewhat vary by developer, prior experience, and
the jurisdiction. The initial “exploratory” stage of the project results in the feasibility
study, which usually takes 1–2 years to complete. The study includes rough wind
Fig. 1 Wind power project development process
31Twele and Liersch (2011).
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potential evaluations, an initial consideration of environmental impacts and acces-
sibility options, a preliminary geological assessment of the grounds, an evaluation of
suitable wind turbines, and an initial financial appraisal. In this phase, the approx-
imate project location and the number of turbines are proposed. This is also the time
for the initial contact with local stakeholders. The authorities are contacted for
information on permits and zoning requirements. Consent of the land owner(s) is
of paramount importance, and it is usually secured through a contract. Interconnec-
tion options are discussed with the grid operator. Most project developers have
applied for KEV by submitting a free-of-charge online application to the relevant
agency, Pronovo (formerly Stiftung KEV). This is a rather fast and straightforward
procedure. If the KEV approval is granted, the project developer has to notify the
authorities of the project status every 2 years.
At the pre-project stage, all of the previously mentioned points get a deeper and
more detailed assessment. The project developer obtains reliable wind speed data, by
installing a wind measurement tower to monitor wind speeds, usually for 1 year. A
more detailed pre-project file is submitted to the municipal and cantonal authorities
for evaluation, so that the project can be integrated in the zoning plans.
The main project builds upon the outcome of the pre-project and includes a
number of detailed studies, which are made to satisfy the building permit application
and requirements of the Federal Inspectorate for Heavy Current Installations.32 This
stage can take several years and often stretches out longer due to delays. The main
project file usually includes the following components: a detailed wind speed
evaluation, a road access assessment, an interconnection study, contracts with the
landowner, a technical plan, a business plan, and a full EIA with suggested measures
of ecological compensation. The EIA, compulsory for projects over 5 MW, is an
especially important part of the project plan, as it assesses the project’s influence on
flora, fauna, landscape, and noise exposure.33 The EIA often represents a stumbling
stone for project developers. Authorities, courts, and external stakeholders can
require additional environmental studies, which range in cost between 30 and
300 kCHF each and take months (and sometimes several years) to complete.
Generally, the authorities recommend clustering wind power developments, thus
avoiding locations with high natural value.34 Finally, the municipality decides
whether to grant the project a construction permit, which takes several years with
a possibility of a referendum. After the project receives all necessary permits, the
construction phase begins. In order to install wind turbines, a number of infrastruc-
tural improvements (clearing forests, building roads) are often needed.
The next phase is the operational phase, which is the longest phase of the project
cycle. It can last 20 years or more, and this is actually the first time when the project
is generating revenues. During this time, the project developer might also implement
ecological compensation measures to mitigate project impacts on flora, fauna and
32https://www.esti.admin.ch/en/esti-homepage
33Federal Council (2016).
34Federal Office for Spatial Development (2017).
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local residents. After the end of the operational phase, the project can be either
decommissioned or repowered with new turbines.35
While the six steps of the project development process seem straightforward, the
picture becomes more complicated when the complexities of the administrative
process are taken into account. In Fig. 2, we mapped out the permitting steps and
the stakeholders involved, with arrows denoting the most significant
interdependencies.
As evident from this visualization, the project developer has to obtain permits or
decisions from a number of federal agencies, including aviation authorities, military
authorities, the Federal Inspectorate for Heavy Current Installations, the Federal
Office for the Environment, to name a few. To simplify this permitting process, the
Federal Office of Energy has set up a one-stop-shop called “guichet unique”36 to
allow project developers to have a single point of contact with relevant federal
authorities, instead of having to coordinate among multiple agencies. Even though
federal authorities play an important role in the permitting process, the permitting
authority lies with the cantonal and municipal agencies responsible for energy,
zoning, the environment, and building.37
4 Quantification of the Policy Risk Premium
4.1 Methodological Approach
The following section focuses on the quantification of the risk premium, which was
done by comparing the profitability and the LCOE of a reference project (risk-free
scenario) with several risk-adjusted scenarios, when the project witnessed regulatory
challenges. The calculations were based on the discounted cash flow model,
expressing project profitability in terms of the Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal
Rate of Return (IRR), which are standard project evaluation methods in finance.38
For the calculation of project cash flows, the authors use annual Free Cash Flow to
Firm (FCFF) values.
The LCOE calculations were based on an established method of accounting for
project expenses and predicted electricity production at certain periods of time.
LCOE was calculated with the following formula39:
35Deloitte (2015).
36Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2019).
37Federal Office for Spatial Development (2017).
38Brealey et al. (2012).
39Adapted from Kost et al. (2018).
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• LCOE is levelized cost of electricity in ct/kWh;
• At are all project expenses in cent (0.01 CHF) in year t, including permitting
expenses in the pre-construction stage, construction expenses, ecological com-
pensation, and operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses once the project is
built;
• Mt is produced electricity in kWh in year t;
• WACC is the discount factor;
• n is the project lifetime, including pre-construction stage.
It should be noted that our calculations of LCOE do not take into account taxes,
so caution is advised in comparing LCOE results with the level of feed-in tariffs.
The reference case assumptions were selected to describe a financially attractive
wind energy project with realistic features, which have been cross-checked with
project developers during the interviews (Table 1). The reference case presents a




Number of turbines 9
Nameplate capacity per turbine (MW) 3
Capacity factor (%) 20.9%
Decrease in turbine power output (%/year) 1.6%
Planning stage (years) 7
Construction stage (years) 1




Corporate tax rate (%) 17.81%
Inflation rate (%) 0%
Building and O&M
Construction cost (CHF/MW) 2,200,000
Interconnection cost (CHF) 660,000
Operations & maintenance (CHF/year) 594,000
Increase of O&M cost (%/year) 1%
Ecological compensation measures (CHF) 1500,000
Planning expenses (CHF/MW) 130,000
Revenues
KEV remuneration in years 1–5, ct/kWh 21.5
KEV remuneration in years 6–20, ct/kWh 13.5
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planned wind park consisting of 9 wind turbines, with a capacity of 3 MW each
(27 MW in total). The capacity factor, which is a measure of annual electricity
generation per MW installed, is 20.9%, based on the average production values of
wind energy projects in Switzerland in 2015.40 The turbines’ efficiency decreases at
a rate of 1.6% per year.41 The project developer expects the planning to take 7 years,
construction to be completed in 1 year, and the turbines to generate electricity for
20 years. The project developer discounts her annual cash flows at the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) of 3.97%.42 The inflation rate is set at zero for
simplicity. The capital expenditure is fully depreciated in 20 years. The corporate tax
rate is 17.81%, which is an average corporate Swiss tax rate.43 The model assumes
1-year intervals for cash flows, which occur at the end of each year.
The construction cost of the reference project is 59.4 million CHF (2.2 million
CHF/MW) and it costs 660 kCHF to connect the project to the power grid. After the
construction, there is an annual expense of 594 kCHF (1% of construction costs) for
operations and maintenance (O&M), which increases at a rate of 1% per year. The
project developer expects to receive a feed-in tariff of 21.5 ct/kWh for the first
5 years of operation, followed by a lower KEV rate of 13.5 ct/kWh for the remaining
15 years.44 During the interviews, the project developers reported production costs
ranging from 10 to 20.5 ct/kWh.
Ecological compensation measures are carried out in the year of construction only
if the project is realized, and they represent the NPV of all expenses on ecological
compensation over the project’s lifetime. They are assumed to cost 1.5 million CHF,
which is due to the high number of planned turbines and increasingly stringent
ecological requirements. After 20 years of power production, the developer expects
to sell the turbines in the second-hand market, which should cover decommissioning
costs; so the decommissioning is assumed to be cost-neutral. Note that project
expenses in the reference case are rather conservative, tending to underestimate
the project’s risks rather than overestimate them.
In the beginning of the project, the developer earmarks a planning budget of
130,000 CHF per MW of planned capacity (3.5 million CHF), corresponding to
about 6% of construction cost. For the reference case, project planning and ecolog-
ical compensation expenses were informed by the values summarized from the
interviews (Table 2). This represents a rather conservative assumption, given that
the international literature reports planning budgets reaching 10% of the construction
cost.45 The planning expenses include wind measurements, environmental studies
40Wind Data (2017).
41Staffell and Green (2014).
42Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2016c).
43KPMG (2016).
44For reasons of simplicity, we assumed the standard feed-in tariffs for wind energy in years 6 to
20 rather than taking into account the exceptions specified in Appendix 1.3, section 3.2, of the
Energy Ordinance (Energieverordnung, SR 730.01); Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2016b).
45Krohn et al. (2009); Blanco (2009).
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and mitigation measures, salaries for lawyers, engineers, financial managers, as well
as PR and stakeholder management expenses. The minimum and maximum values
vary considerably depending on the interviewee, which can be explained by differ-
ences in project accounting, varying project complexity, and project experiences.
Still, Table 2 presents a useful illustration of project planning expenses.
One of the most significant cost categories is connected to EIA and ecological
mitigation measures, often accounting for half of the planning budget. EIAs take 1.5
to 6 years to perform and range in total cost from 100 kCHF for simpler studies to
700 kCHF for longer and more complex estimations. Similarly, all except for one
interviewee reported ecological compensation measures in excess of half a million
Swiss francs. Coordination with stakeholders was a significant cost category for
some project developers, leading to spending of up to 1.1 million CHF over the
project lifetime. In contrast, other developers planned several hundred thousand
Swiss francs on such activities per year during the planning stage, depending on
the type of activities carried out (organization of site visits and informational
meetings with or without catering; noise simulations; preparation of dossiers,
website, posters, and flyers; communication campaigns; support of local community
activities).
The technical dimension of the project requires planning by experienced engi-
neers, which can be done in-house or outsourced to an engineering company, costing
on average about 400 kCHF (might include geotechnical study, road access survey,
etc.) and taking 4–5 months to complete. Similarly, wind measurements depend on
project complexity and can be completed in several stages, costing from under
100 kCHF to more than half a million CHF. Obtaining the permit for wind mea-
surements can take several months for approval and can be subject to objections.
Planning for interconnection might cost about 100 kCHF.
One of the cost categories that are most difficult to predict is the HR expense for
project management and expenses for legal advice, as these directly increase with
project delays, the number of objections, the number of subsequent court cases, and
Table 2 Estimation of average expenses of wind project planning
Project planning expenses (kCHF) Mean Min Max SD
Ecological compensation measures 844 100 1700 536
EIA pre-study and main studies 417 100 700 164
Coordination with stakeholders and PR 550 200 1100 288
General technical planning 398 100 1500 480
Wind speed measurements 243 80 530 152
Planning of grid interconnection 109 50 200 58
Federal permits and interests 20.5 9 35 7.7
HR expenses, accounting, controlling, legal advice 500
Municipal court cases (1/2 year delay) 30–50/case
Cantonal court cases (1 year delay) 30–50/case
Federal court case (2 years delay) 50–100/case
Insurances, land rent, leases 50
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court instances involved. We made a conservative estimation of 500 kCHF over the
planning period but also provide mean values for legal expenses per court case,
which would be added to the planning budget as they arise. Finally, we include the
cost of insurances, land rent and leases, estimated at 50 kCHF.
In order to evaluate marginal impacts of different administrative hurdles, we
compute the NPV, IRR, and LCOE in the reference case and different scenarios.
Each scenario investigates two levels of risk: low risk and high risk. The overall aim
of the scenarios is to determine which factors have the highest impact on project
profitability and hence represent the most severe policy risk.
Scenario I investigates changes in profitability and LCOE as a result of a 3-year
(low risk) and 10-year (high risk) delay in project development in the
pre-construction stage. The planning budget increases by 100 k CHF for every
year of delay, which accounts for additional project management hours, legal advice
costs and coordination efforts.
Scenario II illustrates the detrimental effect of policy-induced reductions in the
project’s capacity factor. Full load hours are usually predicted based on wind
measurements in the pre-construction stage. Yet, decreased hours of operation can
be a measure of ecological compensation, as the turbines might have to be switched
off to protect migratory birds or vulnerable bat species. The turbines in the reference
case operate with 1831 full load hours a year (20.9% capacity factor), while Scenario
II evaluates the changes in LCOE if the turbines work with a capacity factor of
19.9% (low risk) and 17.9% (high risk). A similar negative effect is expected in
Scenario III, where there are fewer turbines (5 in the low-risk case or 7 in the high-
risk case) permitted than originally planned. In Scenario IV, we investigate cost
overruns that increase the planning budgets to 200 kCHF (low risk) and 400 kCHF
(high risk) per MW of installed capacity (Table 3).
Table 3 Summary of scenarios
Scenario Description Details
I Delays 3- or 10-year delay in permitting
II Lower capacity
factor




7 or 5 turbines are permitted instead of 9
IV Planning costs
increase
Increase of planning costs to 200 kCHF/MW or 400 kCHF/MW
V Combination
scenario
Low risk: 3 years of delay, capacity factor is 19.9%, 7 turbines
permitted, planning budget is 200 kCHF/MW
High risk: 10 years of delay in permitting, capacity factor is 17.9%,
5 turbines permitted, planning budget is 400 kCHF/MW
VI KEV phased out Electricity sold at market price of 4 ct/kWh or 8 ct/kWh
VII KEV payments
delayed




KEV reduced by 10% or 20% in all years
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Scenario V combines multiple administrative hurdles and is, in many ways,
mirroring the reality of several Swiss wind projects. First, low project risks from
Scenarios I–IV are combined: planning takes 10 years, the planning expenses
increase to 200 kCHF/MW, only 7 out of 9 turbines are permitted, and the capacity
factor is reduced to 19.9%. In the high-risk combination scenario, we investigate a
5-turbine project with a pre-construction stage of 17 years and a planning budget of
400 kCHF/MW, with a capacity factor of 17.9%.
Finally, we investigated the impacts of the level and duration of KEV payments
on the project’s profitability (represented by IRR and NPV). Since LCOE does not
account for project revenues, it is not calculated here. We investigated whether wind
energy projects will be developed in Switzerland without KEV (Scenario VI) and
what levels of electricity market prices are necessary to make wind projects finan-
cially attractive. For modeling simplicity, we disregarded electricity price volatility
and assumed a constant price of 4 ct/kWh, which was the average spot price for
Swiss base load electricity in the day-ahead market between July 2015 and July
201646 and which is also within the range of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy’s
electricity price projections.47 The low-risk Scenario VI assumes the market price to
be 8 ct/kWh.48 Additionally, we looked at project profitability if KEV payments are
delayed by 1 or 2 years and the electricity is sold at the market price of 4 ct/kWh
(Scenario VII). Finally, we calculated profitability changes due to an overall
reduction in KEV support (by 10% or 20%) (Scenario VIII).
4.2 Results: The Price of Policy Risk
This section provides an indication of the magnitude of the policy risk premium
faced by project developers due to challenges in the pre-construction stage. We
compare LCOE in the risk-free scenario to the eight scenarios with policy risks
introduced in the previous section. The LCOE of the reference case is 12.57 ct/kWh.
Under the base case assumptions, the project is a reasonably attractive investment
with an IRR of 6.68%, an NPV of 10.3 million CHF and a payback time of 10 years
after construction. The following scenarios illustrate marginal impacts of policy risks
on the reference case.
Scenario I A 3-year delay increases LCOE by 0.16 ct/kWh and results in 1.76
million in losses in NPV (Fig. 3). A 10-year delay in project development creates
4.42 million in losses in NPV for the investor, increasing LCOE by 0.37 ct/kWh.
46Bloomberg (2016).
47Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2016c).
48Because of price volatility in the electricity market, it is challenging to predict a wind project’s
revenues over its lifetime of at least two decades. This assumption is representative of the electricity
price level when KEV was initially introduced. In late 2019, wholesale prices were 4 ct/kWh (www.
epexspot.com), corresponding to the high-risk scenario.
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Note that these numbers account for only 100 kCHF in additional expenses per year
of delay, thus increasing the planning budget by 300 kCHF and one million CHF
altogether. Despite these rather small changes in the planning budget (0.5% and
1.7% of construction cost), the estimated profitability losses and LCOE increases are
considerable. This observation illustrates an important lesson learned: project delays
have a much larger impact on project profitability than is obvious from the direct
additional expenses.
In addition to direct costs, delays in project development are connected to indirect
costs, such as the opportunity cost of capital. During the years of permitting, the
capital earmarked for the project is not productive; yet, it could have been invested at
a profit elsewhere. A simple calculation of the opportunity cost shows that if the
project developers in the reference case invested their planning budget of 3.5 million
CHF into a financial vehicle with an annual yield of 3%, they would have obtained
105 kCHF in revenue per year. In 15 years, the project developers would have
earned nearly two million CHF on their initial investment. In case of a wind project,
the developers do not see any return on their investment for the duration of the
permitting stage. Thus, the idling capital should be of the same level of concern as
idling wind turbines.
Moreover, administrative delays make the project developer forego profits from
electricity production, which also could have been reinvested. Depending on the
assumptions, foregone profits from electricity generation also run into hundreds of
thousands of francs, funds that cannot be reinvested if the project gets delayed. Even
though opportunity costs of capital and foregone profits do not enter the financial
accounting of the project developer, they should not be neglected, since they reduce
the overall attractiveness of the project.
Scenario II Major profit-reducing events can occur if not all planned turbines are
permitted or the turbines remain idle due to restrictions. Switching off wind turbines
can be a measure of environmental conservation. The reduction in capacity factor by
one percentage point to 19.9%, brings about an average loss in NPV of 2.8 million
CHF and increases LCOE by 0.63 ct/kWh. If the capacity factor decreases to 17.9%,
the NPV losses amount to 8.4 million CHF compared to the reference case. If this









































Fig. 3 Risk-adjusted LCOE in Scenarios I-V (high vs. low risk)
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Scenario III A significant decrease in profitability is experienced if multiple
turbines are not permitted. If only 7 of the 9 originally planned turbines can be
built, LCOE increases by 0.73 ct/kWh. If only 5 turbines are permitted, LCOE
climbs by 2.04 ct/kWh. Thus, reducing the capacity factor to 17.9% due to the
switching off of turbines has roughly the same impact on LCOE as having 4 of the
planned 9 turbines not permitted. The reference project needs at least 14 MW of
production capacity to break even. If the project faces additional costs and delays, it
requires larger capacities to counterbalance the permitting expenses. This illustrates
the sensitivity of wind projects to the number of hours the rotor is allowed to turn and
the number of turbines in the park.
Scenario IV The planning budget is likely to increase when the project is
experiencing delays. If the planning costs increase to 200 k per MW of installed
capacity, the project developer will not only have to invest 1.89 million CHF more
into the project in the pre-construction stage, but the LCOE also increases by 0.38 ct/
kWh. In a high-risk case, the planning costs would reach 400 kCHF/MW, which
would increase LCOE by 1.44 ct/kWh, making the project only marginally attractive
with an IRR of 4.88% (Fig. 4). From the interviews we have learned that some
project developers would abandon a project if the planning cost reaches half a
million CHF per MW. The planning costs for abandoned projects need to be
implicitly won back by successful projects, putting an upward pressure on the
required level of KEV payments.
Scenario V So far, the calculations estimated the marginal impacts of policy risks


















































































Project IRR under low/high risk scenarios
Low risk scenario High risk scenario
WACC
Fig. 4 Impact of policy risk on project’s internal rate of return (IRR)
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illustrates a case that is fairly representative of many Swiss wind projects: 3 years of
delays, a lower than planned capacity factor of 19.9%, 7 turbines permitted, the
planning budget amounting to 200 kCHF/MW. The IRR of the combination scenario
is 4.87%, which is still higher than WACC but does not represent a high-yield
investment. At the same time, LCOE would rise to 14.22 ct/kWh, which is higher
than the nominal KEV remuneration in years 6–20. This implies that the profitability
of the project would be substantially lower than initially projected.
If we combine the high-risk scenarios (10 years delay, reduction in capacity factor
to 17.9%, 5 turbines permitted, increase of planning costs to 400 kCHF/MW), LCOE
rises to the unsustainable level of 18.67 ct/kWh. The cumulative policy risks would
reduce the IRR below WACC, yielding a negative NPV, which suggests that an
economically rational developer would abandon the project, as it will not be
profitable. The combination scenario illustrates how multiple policy risks that are
present in reality can have a significant negative impact on a project’s financial
performance. Unless minimized, these policy risks can hamper the prospects of
development of wind energy projects.
Figure 3 presents the effects of the policy risks illustrated in Scenarios I–V on the
risk-adjusted LCOE of wind energy in Switzerland. In order to make a positive
investment decision, a project developer would compare LCOE with achievable
revenues, i.e., remuneration from KEV or electricity sales.
Scenarios VI–VIII The highest risks to a project’s financial viability are related to
the unavailability, reduction, or delays of KEV payments. In line with the informa-
tion received during the interviews, we find that no wind project can be developed
without KEV in the current market conditions. If KEV payments are not available
for 1 year and the electricity price is 40 CHF/MWh, the profitability of the whole
project drops by 1.03 percentage points, which would cost the project developer 3.5
million CHF. Delaying KEV for 2 years in the initial years of operation is equivalent
to not allowing 4 out of 9 wind turbines to be built in NPV terms. A relatively high
market price for electricity is required for the project to be financially viable in the
absence of a feed-in tariff: with the assumed WACC (3.97%), the wind project’s
NPV was positive when the average market price of electricity reached 13.5 ct/kWh
for all years of operation. A minimum KEV support of 16.0 ct/kWh is required for all
years of operation to maintain the profitability of 6%. If the level of KEV support is
reduced by 10%, the project’s NPV decreases by more than 5.84 million CHF (1.51
percentage point loss in terms of IRR). More significant reductions of KEV, say by
20%, are likely to deter investment, as the net present value of cash flows turns
negative and IRR (3.08%) is below WACC. Note that the relationship between the
reduction of KEV and losses in profitability is not one to one: if KEV is reduced by
10%, the profitability decreases by more than 22%.
Figure 4 summarizes the discussions in this section, illustrating how the initial
project IRR of 6.68% would be affected by the policy risks discussed in Scenarios I
to VIII. The dotted green line represents the assumed weighted average cost of
capital of 3.97%. Policy risks can significantly reduce the expected rate of return,
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and let it fall below WACC and even to negative absolute values in some cases,
suggesting that the project would turn unprofitable if the assumptions in some of the
high-risk scenarios materialize.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The profitability of a wind park is determined by an interplay of project risks and
returns. Most risks in wind energy development occur in the permitting stage, while
returns are only realized after the project is built (see Fig. 5). In order to incentivize
investment in wind power, policymakers can (1) reduce the risks in the planning
stage, (2) compensate investors for taking those risks through higher returns, or
(3) shorten the planning stage to reduce uncertainty about both risks and returns.
Many Swiss wind energy projects currently have a high-risk/high-return profile.
Project developers are facing significant risk in the planning stage, and they receive
attractive returns (in the form of the KEV) in those (few) cases where the project can
actually be built. For projects not completed before the expiration of feed-in tariffs at
the end of 2022, financing crucially depends on parliamentary decisions about any
follow-up scheme or on their ability to secure a long-term power purchase agreement
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Fig. 5 Risk-return profile in wind energy project development
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more projects towards the low-risk/low-return end of the spectrum would be
preferable.
Above all, this implies decreasing project risks in the pre-construction stage.
Possible measures include simplifying and streamlining permitting procedures,
creating regulatory clarity, and expediting court cases. An important consideration
is to implement such measures in a way that maintains social acceptance of wind
energy by relevant stakeholders. Successful wind projects are characterized by an
alignment of interests between investors and local communities, which can for
example be facilitated by enabling financial participation of the local population in
the project49 or public support for the planning of community wind projects.50 An
approach that has had positive effects on social acceptance in some regions of
Switzerland was to gain experience with one or a few turbines before planning an
extended project. This allows concerns of the local population, e.g., about noise, to
be contrasted with first-hand evidence and can, through word-of-mouth, facilitate
further development of wind energy also in neighboring regions.
While a large number of measures is available to improve administrative pro-
cedures and reduce the policy risk premium, coordinating the variety of stakeholders
in a federal democracy is not an easy task. The upside of successfully engaging in
this task is to secure a clean, affordable domestic supply of electricity – which is
ultimately what a majority of the population voted for in the 2017 referendum about
the Energy Strategy 2050.
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Abstract Along with policy proposers and individual voters, key stakeholders play
a crucial role in shaping the socio-political acceptance of energy policy. Understand-
ing a broad landscape of energy stakeholders’ views and practices thus should be
a central theme in energy transition research. The Energy Strategy 2050 (ES2050), a
sweeping energy transition policy package in Switzerland, was adopted in 2017.
Concrete policy goals implied by ES2050 are yet to be implemented. Although there
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is a large body of social acceptance studies focusing on individual voters, we have a
relatively scant empirical understanding of how stakeholders in this domain perceive
the policy goals and how perceptions are linked to their organizational characteris-
tics. To elucidate Swiss energy stakeholders’ perceptions on key action targets
implied by recent energy policies in Switzerland, we analyzed data from our original
survey with 364 organizations. We examined their views on concrete policy goals
related to electric mobility, deep geothermal energy, wind energy, hydropower, and
planned phase-outs of renewable energy subsidies. When asked to rate how realistic
these goals appear to them, the majority of the stakeholders responded negatively.
Furthermore, our findings indicate that, despite the considerable diversity and the
overall pessimism in their feasibility perceptions, those that consider goals to be
realistic are more likely to be active in the media. This is a concerning finding as the
public might receive a biased impression via the media about the level of consensus
among the stakeholders, who could, at times, be seen by the public as experts on the
topic.
1 Introduction
A lack of socio-political acceptance poses a hurdle to the pursuit of new energy
policies and technologies. Apart from policymakers and individual voters, key
stakeholders play a crucial role in shaping socio-political acceptance.1 Thus, under-
standing a broad landscape of energy stakeholders’ perceptions and practices should
be at the core of energy transition research.
In the context of socio-political acceptance, a large body of research has focused
on the role of citizens. So-called social acceptance studies investigate determinants
of public support for energy technologies, infrastructures, or policy packages.2
According to these studies, policy support does not only depend on citizens’
perceptions and socio-economic statuses but also on characteristics associated with
the decision-making process such as fairness and civil society participation.3 The
literature also stresses the role of policy communication, e.g., communication frames
and sources of information, as a potential determinant of public support.4 In this
volume, too, there are several important contributions that touch upon the topic of
citizens’ attitude formation.5 Understanding voters’ preference formation is certainly
important as it can directly influence policy outputs through referenda or indirectly
1Wüstenhagen et al. (2007).
2Gross (2007); Tabi and Wüstenhagen (2017); Blumer et al. (2018); Rinscheid and
Wüstenhagen (2019).
3Bidwell (2016).
4Druckman (2013); Aklin and Urpelainen (2013); Hansla (2011).
5Rinscheid and Udris (2021); Schaffer and Levis (2021).
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through the electoral pressure that voters exert on politicians’ policy stances as the
median voter theorem implies.6
However, we are all aware that it is not only individual voters’ preferences that
are reflected in political decisions; there are also other stakeholders. Here, we define
energy stakeholders as all actors that have a stake in the public rule-making for the
energy system,7 and in this chapter we specifically focus on actors that represent
collective interests. There are numerous examples in energy and climate
policymaking in which international and domestic lobbying by industry actors and
interest groups have won the policymakers over, when the collective policy prefer-
ence held by the public seemed to be the opposite of what the powerful stakeholders
preferred.
To mention a few examples, the European Union (EU)'s decision in 2011 to
include the aviation sector in the EU ETS was foiled by multiple international
lobbying efforts despite a relatively high level of public support for the measure.8
Also in 2011, there was a contentious policy debate in Germany regarding the
extension of stipulated lifespans for nuclear reactors. According to an opinion
survey, voters were on average against the extension; and yet, the new policy was
enacted by the governing coalition due to a small group of powerful stakeholders.9
Despite the significant influence of energy stakeholders on policymaking, sur-
prisingly little is known about perceptions and activities of these actors. This is in
part due to the inherent difficulty in collecting data on stakeholder characteristics and
perceptions of policies held by the stakeholders. This challenge also applies to our
understanding of energy policymaking in Switzerland, where the Energy Strategy
2050 (ES2050)—an energy policy directive that requires a fundamental realignment
of energy systems—was adopted recently. From the energy governance point of
view, this is clearly a deficit both for practitioners and energy researchers.
To elucidate Swiss energy stakeholders’ perceptions on key policy targets
implied by recent energy policies in Switzerland, we analyze data from our original
survey with 364 organizations that have been involved in energy legislation during
the past 3 years. We inspect their views on concrete policy goals related to electric
mobility, deep geothermal energy, wind energy, hydropower, and planned phase-
outs of renewable energy subsidies. We hope the chapter serves as a useful entry
point towards future studies on energy stakeholders and their policy influence.
6Black (1948); Downs (1957).
7Breetz et al. (2018).
8Bernauer et al. (2014).
9Rinscheid (2015).
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2 Energy Policymaking and Stakeholders in Switzerland
In Switzerland, the revised Federal Energy Act, commonly referred to as the Energy
Strategy 2050 (ES2050), has been adopted in 2017. ES2050 is a broad energy policy
directive aiming to achieve the goals of phasing out nuclear energy and increasing
the share of renewable energy.10 The final decision was made by public vote
(referendum) on May 21, 2017. However, the implementation of each measure is
expected to face a certain degree of acceptance and coordination challenges among
various members of society.
This is why socio-political acceptance, in particular public acceptance, has been
one of the key research topics in many branches of the SCCER (Swiss Competence
Center for Energy Research) since its outset. SCCER Mobility and SCCER CREST
have investigated ways to motivate the use of electric mobility by Swiss citizens.
SCCER CREST also has a dedicated work package seeking paths toward effective
curtailment of energy consumption based on public opinion panel surveys (Swiss
Household Energy Demand Survey (SHEDS)). SCCER CREST and SCCER SoE
(Supply of Electricity) have launched a new joint research program investigating
public acceptance related to the expansion of hydropower (HP) and the introduction
of deep geothermal energy (DGE) as ways to secure the baseload energy supply. All
these efforts are meant to contribute to successful implementations of the ES2050,
which aims at replacing all of Switzerland’s nuclear generating capacity with
renewable energy sources. Once again, many of these efforts focus on the determi-
nants of public support for energy policy goals or technologies.
In contrast to the rich volume of studies focusing on citizens, we have a relatively
thin understanding of how stakeholders in this domain perceive the various goals
implied by the ES2050 scheme. This is what we will investigate in this chapter using
our survey with more than 300 energy stakeholders. The adoption of new policies
creates economic and ideological “winners” and “losers”, which leads stakeholders
to hold heterogeneous policy preferences. Wherever they can, these actors mobilize
various financial and political resources to attain their policy goals. We must note,
however, that their policy preferences do not automatically imply what policy goals
they believe to be realistic based on their professional knowledge.
Especially in the case of ES2050 goals, there is a certain ambiguity on this. The
policy process went through thorough administrative (consultation) and legislative
steps between 2012 and 2017. From this dense process, one might expect that
the level of consensus concerning the feasibility of the implied goals is high among
the relevant energy stakeholders, who constantly engage with the topic. On the
contrary, proponents and opponents of ES2050 used various narratives and evidence
during the fierce political campaigns in the weeks leading to the referendum in 2017.
There was ample contestation as to whether the policy package was financially
too burdensome, whether the Swiss economy would benefit from it, and whether
we could secure energy supply without nuclear energy.11 One might interpret such a
10Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018a).
11See Rinscheid and Udris (2021).
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phenomenon as a consequence of sincerely divided perceptions by stakeholders
(with a touch of exacerbation by political campaigners).
Thus, it is useful to inspect, first, whether and to what extent Swiss energy
stakeholders’ views vary. We answer this question by focusing on five common
topics that are linked to Switzerland's energy policy: electric vehicles (EV), deep
geothermal energy (DGE), wind energy, renewable energy (RE) subsidies including
feed-in tariffs (FITs), and the expansion potential of hydropower (HP). In particular,
we are interested in measuring the extent to which the stakeholders perceive the
policy goals as realistic. Second, we examine the relationship between the actors’
views and their “activeness” in politics and media. From these analyses, we will be
able to identify sections of stakeholder topography that would benefit from further
coordination efforts by the government in the implementation stage.
3 Empirical Studies on Stakeholder Involvement in Energy
Policymaking
Before turning to the survey design, this section will outline how we identified key
metrics that characterize energy stakeholders and their activities that are relevant in
shaping policies. In doing so, we draw primarily on the political economy literature
on lobbying; more concretely, the literature that addresses sources of stakeholders’
success in their policy goal preference attainment.
As pointed out by prominent scholars in transitions studies, “consistently proving
that special interests affect energy transition policies has turned out to be difficult”.12
For this reason, many existing studies on the politics of energy transitions neither
succeed in properly conceptualizing what they aim to explain nor in systematically
assessing the factors that make certain actors more politically influential than others.
The political influence of stakeholders is often claimed to be captured by campaign
spending data or anecdotal evidence. However, actual influence on policy is rarely
ascertained and measured empirically in a convincing way.13 Hence, most empirical
studies that address stakeholder influence focus on other aspects, such as stake-
holders’ strategies (e.g., donations to politicians) and access (e.g., which politicians
meet with lobbyists and how often). These might shed light on some of the ways
through which actors exert political influence, but they are actually not the measures
of influence.14 One notable exception is a recent study that investigated what
configurations of actor endowments (resources, networks, and discursive elements)
are critical for their policy influence.15
12Cherp et al. (2018), p. 181.
13Bernhagen et al. (2014).
14Mahoney (2007).
15Duygan et al. (2021a).
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In the remainder of the section, we will summarize how the literature has
theorized various determinants of stakeholders’ policy influence based on the five
broad categories of actor resources that we identified. These are financial resources,
organizational capacity resources, informational resources, conflict capacity
resources, and network resources.
Studies using rational choice theory have demonstrated the importance of finan-
cial resources in conceptualizing lobbying as resource exchange.16 To influence
political outcomes, money can be either spent directly or converted to other forms
of useful resources. The motivation of direct spending is to align policymakers’
incentives with those of stakeholders through direct financial contributions.17 Unlike
popular views, however, empirical findings are mixed with regard to the link
between actors’ financial resources and their policy goal attainment.18
Stakeholders also differ in their ability to mobilize the motivational and material
resources needed to establish effective instruments for the representation of their
interests.19 Intuitively, one might simply suppose that the size of organizations (e.g.,
the number of employees and branches) has an impact on their ability to organize
political interests. However, the literature shows there are more nuanced organiza-
tional characteristics that are linked to the effectiveness of stakeholders’ policy-
related activities. For instance, the type of organizations’ membership (individual
versus collective) and organizational structure play a role.20 We broadly categorize
these organizational characteristics as organizational capacity resources.
Informational resources include both the level of technical knowledge and
professionalization efforts. Since organizations can also convert financial
resources to other essential resources such as human capital, these resources may
be correlated with financial resource endowments (which should be an empirical
question). However, the level of informational resources also depends on other
factors—for instance, whether the organization actively invests in the professional-
ization of its staff and how much the organization’s expertise is recognized by
policymakers for other reasons than its financial resources.21 This can be measured
by the stakeholder’s appearance in governmental documents and hearings. More-
over, political intelligence held by the organization can be exchanged for its access
to direct interactions with policymakers (inside lobbying) such as in parliamentary
committees or advisory boards of regulatory bodies.22 In addition, organizations
may also use informational resources to influence political outcomes through outside
lobbying or constituency building, the form of lobbying that aims at the media and
the public in the hope of generating support for one’s own position.23
16Stigler (1971).
17Hillman and Hitt (1999).
18Walker and Rea (2014), p. 286.
19Offe and Wiesenthal (1980).
20Dür (2008).
21Hall and Deardorff (2006).
22Binderkrantz and Pedersen (2017).
23Kollman (1998); Weiler and Brändli (2015).
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Vote-seeking politicians are generally concerned about their (re-)election proba-
bility, which depends on the employment rate, voters’ personal income, and the
government’s ability to use tax revenues for the provision of public services.
Therefore, some states are structurally dependent on private sector profitability and
this leads certain industries and groups (e.g., the coal industry in Australia) to
exercise influence on policymaking via their implicit conflict capacity against the
state.24
Finally, the effectiveness of actor-specific resources in influencing policies can be
amplified or suppressed by how the actors are embedded (e.g., the strategic or given
position) in a network of multiple stakeholders.25 Empirical studies confirm that
well-connected stakeholders that collaborate with influential actors exercise dispro-
portionate influence on political outcomes compared to less well-connected actors
with a similar endowment.26 Conceptually, we categorize various measures of
actors’ network embeddedness in network resources.
4 Methodology
To create measures for stakeholder resources that characterize their policy-related
practices, we designed and implemented an original survey with organizations that
are active in the energy policy domain in Switzerland. This section elaborates on the
data collection methodology.
4.1 Who Are Swiss Energy Stakeholders?
The first question that arises upon designing such a study is the selection of relevant
energy stakeholders in Switzerland. Hence, our empirical work starts with defining
the targeted population in order to construct our sample for the analysis. Conceptu-
ally, stakeholders are all actors that have a stake in the public rule-making for the
energy system.27 To reiterate, our aim is to analyze perceptions, activities, and
actors’ resources that represent collective interest. Our target group therefore is not
individual voters but organizational actors such as political parties, cantonal admin-
istrations, business associations, and other organizations.
The target population was determined using participation lists of federal consul-
tation processes on Swiss energy legislation. In addition to the fundamental realign-
ment of Swiss energy policy (ES2050) and its consultation process
24Levy and Egan (1998), p. 342; Stutzer et al. (2021).
25Hacker and Pierson (2014); Varone et al. (2016).
26Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2013); Baumgartner et al. (2011).
27Breetz et al. (2018).
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from 2012 to 2013, we included the three arguably most relevant energy-related bills
since 2016: Klimapolitik, ES2050 Ordinance, and StromVG.28 After dropping indi-
viduals29 and accounting for overlaps between consultations, the target group for our
data collection comprised 740 organizations.
Although our aim was to approach all 740 organizations we defined as the
population, identifying their contact information was anything but trivial. We were
not able to contact 60 organizations from the initial sample, either because they no
longer existed or because their contact details were unobtainable. This led us to
invite 680 organizations to participate in our survey.
4.2 Survey Data Collection and Sample Characteristics
We designed and fielded an original survey in order to collect information on the
characteristics, activities, and resources of stakeholders in Swiss energy policy. The
pilot wave was launched in April 2019 and the main survey was fielded between
May and September 2019. We communicated with the participants in German or
French, depending on their contact information, and the participants were able to
choose the survey language from German, French, and English.30
We conducted the pilot survey with 38 organizations, most of which were
environmental NGOs and cantonal offices. After receiving their feedback, the set
of included survey items remained unchanged for the main wave except for three
items that were dropped after the pilot study.31 This amounts to a total of 42 survey
items. After minor adjustments in the wording and the order of several items, the
main wave was launched with the remaining 642 organizations. Combining the pilot
and main wave, we reached out to 680 organizations.
28Klimapolitik: A consultation on Switzerland’s climate policy from 2016. This included the
ratification of the Paris treaty as well as the revision of the CO2 law.
ES2050 Ordinance: A consultation on the revision of 11 existing or newly introduced ordinances
resulting from the first set of measures of ES2050 from 2017. The ordinance set detailed provisions
in the context of the implementation of ES2050.
StromVG: A consultation on the revision of the Federal Electricity Supply Act from 2018. The
revision aimed at completing the liberalization of the market by introducing the right to freely
choose electricity suppliers also for small-scale consumers and households. Concurrently, it
introduced measures that incentivize investments in domestic renewable energy in order to
strengthen Switzerland’s supply security.
29Note that individuals can also submit their opinions during consultation processes.
30Among the four official national languages of Switzerland, German and French are dominant in
the political arena.
31The dropped items were on the number of business units occupied with political work, bill-
specific lobbying behavior and resource allocation. They covered previously assessed concepts in a
narrower context. After evaluating the survey length and the value-added of responses to these
items, we decided to drop them.
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Surveys with stakeholders are fundamentally different from surveys with indi-
vidual citizens which are often used in public opinion studies in that responses
require the organizations’, not specific individuals’, professional viewpoints. We
made every effort to make the procedure transparent, and our survey was directed to
people close to the competency of energy policy in order to avoid excessive
communication within their organizations. To this end, we first sent personalized
invitation letters with a fact sheet on the project and informed potential participants
about the request to participate. Unless contact details were insufficient, no imme-
diate action by the recipient was required. Ten days later, we emailed them person-
alized online survey links asking them to complete the survey within 16 days.32
After the online survey “deadline”, all 463 organizations which had not explicitly
indicated that they were not interested in participating and had not yet completed the
survey were contacted again. This time we contacted them by mail with a printed
survey along with a short reminder letter and a prepaid return envelope.33 Respon-
dents were able to choose between responding via the original online survey link or
the hardcopy.
Among the 680 organizations that we contacted, we received 364 responses. This
is a remarkably high response rate of 53.5% for a stakeholder survey. About 33% of
the respondents completed the survey after our reminder by mail via the hardcopy
survey. Our sample mirrors the population of energy stakeholders well with respect
to their organization types (Fig. 1). Our sample consists of energy businesses (30%),
business associations (23%), non-business associations (23%), cantonal administra-
tions (6%), other businesses, municipalities, and communal/cantonal associations
(4% each), and political parties and educational institutions (3% each).
4.3 Survey Flow
Figure 2 summarizes the survey flow. The heterogeneous sample required the use of
two different versions of the survey. Given their unique organizational form and
tasks, cantonal administrations completed a version in which two items had been
adapted: (i) the term “your organization” was explicitly associated with the office the
respondent was working for instead of the entire cantonal administration; (ii) the
item asking about the number of employees following political events was adapted
to cover energy policy events only. However, the survey flow remained the same for
all types of participants.
Between Welcome and Final Block are seven substantive survey blocks. The
welcome page clarifies that the data will be used only for research purposes and the
32The online survey was implemented with the survey software Qualtrics.
33It was typeset in LaTeX and compiled using SDAPS, an optical mark recognition program. While
minor wording changes regarding survey instruction were necessary to account for the different
format, no content-related changes were made. The document amounted to 14 pages.
A Survey of Stakeholders’ Views and Practices 377
results will be anonymized. Once respondents agree to participate, they answer
questions on their organization’s basic information. This block focuses on employee
characteristics such as average age, education attainment, and opportunities for
personnel development trainings. These questions are followed by a section that
probes the organization’s vision on various energy policy goals. Specifically, we ask
Fig. 1 Types of participating organizations (N ¼ 364): Comparison with the population of Swiss
energy stakeholders
1. Basic info (1) 
Employee and member characteriscs
Welcome
2. Vision on ES2050 goals
Wind, DGE, FIT, E-mobility, Hydro
3. Polical representaon
Collecvely vs. individually
4. Efforts for policy goal aainment
Magnitude and variety of pracces
5. Basic info (2) 
Organizaonal characteriscs
6. Influence
Own / other organizaons’ policy influence 
7. Stakeholder networks
Collecve lobbying, Informaon exchange
Final block
Fig. 2 Survey flow
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whether the following goals associated with the recent energy policies look realistic
from their professional point of view: new wind turbine installation, power gener-
ation capacity by deep geothermal energy, the role of feed-in tariffs, the share of
electric mobility, and the expansion of hydropower generation capacity.
Next, we turn to practices employed by the organizations. In the fourth block on
political representation of interests, we ask if the organization tends to take actions
related to political representation alone or collectively (with other organizations) and
if such collaborations come with a certain degree of adjustments (“costs”) in their
political goals. The fifth block, “4. Efforts for policy goal attainment”, expands on
related topics, focusing on the type and level of efforts exerted to follow political
events or to attain policy goals. Key aspects covered in the subsequent block, “5.
Basic info (2),” are the main fields of activities (e.g., sectors and types of energy
production technologies), the organizational structure, and the budget.
The last two survey blocks (“6. Influence” and “7. Stakeholder networks”) pose
various questions about the positioning of the organization within the energy policy
arena in Switzerland. First, we probe the participants’ perceptions about other
organizations’ influence on policymaking in Switzerland as well as their assessment
of their own influence on policy. Finally, we collect data on Swiss energy stake-
holder networks—namely, with which other organizations the participant collabo-
rates and/or exchanges information. The survey ends with an item asking whether
the participating organization would like to receive a report based on the data. If so,
then the participant should provide his or her email address. See Table 3 for the list of
survey items.
5 Results
5.1 Diversity of Stakeholder Perceptions About the ES2050
Policy Targets
In this section, we inspect the Swiss energy stakeholders’ views on five common
topics that are linked to recent energy policies: electric vehicles (EV), deep geother-
mal energy (DGE), wind energy, renewable energy (RE) subsidies including feed-in
tariffs (FITs), and the expansion potential of hydropower (HP). The following policy
goals implied by ES2050 (Table 1) have been some of the focal points in the current
policy debate.
5.1.1 Challenges Associated with the ES2050 Targets
We asked each participant to rate, all things considered, how realistic these targets
are from the organization’s point of view. Independently from their views on the
feasibility, we also asked what the primary challenges associated with each goal are.
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They were able to choose as many types of challenges as they wanted from the
provided list.
The question about the associated challenges mostly confirmed what we already
knew from previous policy debates and research. As for EV, more than half of the
respondents mentioned “weak infrastructure for electric vehicles” as a barrier and
nearly a third mentioned “technological maturity”, “high investment costs”, “infor-
mation deficits of consumers”, and “low acceptance of EV by consumers”. Power
generation by DGE is currently only in a pilot and development phase (although
heating by geothermal energy has been in use); however, two cities in Switzer-
land (Basel and St. Gallen) had their pilot projects halted due to seismic events
caused by exploratory drilling.34 The responses regarding DGE reflected these
episodes—“seismic risks” (63%), “opposition by citizens” (54%), and “high invest-
ment costs” (49%) were mentioned by many respondents.
Hydropower (HP) is also considered to be a potential clean source of the baseload
energy supply. HP has long been a major energy source in Switzerland and currently
produces approximately 60% of all domestic energy. Here, the main debate is
whether an expansion of current power generating capacity by any of the four
methods mentioned in Table 1 is feasible. The result confirms previous research
that the opposition by interest groups (mainly environmental NGOs) is the largest
barrier (mentioned by 74% of the participants).
Turning to the goals related to the so-called new renewables, the biggest chal-
lenges associated with a major installation of wind turbines are the opposition by
citizens and by interest groups; more than 80% of respondents mentioned these two.
Table 1 Goals in five energy sub-domains of Swiss energy policy
EV The share of electric vehicles of newly registered cars ought to reach 15% in 2022.a
DGE Deep geothermal energy (DGE) is a viable option to produce baseload electricity. A
substantial increase in electricity generation capacity by DGE should be considered.b
WIND Around 800-900 wind turbines need to be constructed in Switzerland by 2050.c
RE Feed-in tariffs for renewable energies will be phased out in 2022, and investment
contributions and one-time payments will be phased out in 2030.d
HP—We asked about 4 detailed points.
Hydropower is a viable option to produce baseload electricity. Potential measures to expand HP
capacity in Switzerland are:
. . .By new pumped storage.
. . .By new small hydropower plants.
. . .By expansion of existing plants.
. . .By modernization of existing plants.
aSee Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018b)
bBauer et al. (2017)
cSee also suisse éole (2017), p. 2; Stalder (2017); Morf (2020) for various estimates
dSee Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2017), pp. 2–3; Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018a), p. 12
34Ejderyan et al. (2019).
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This mirrors Ebers Broughel and Wüstenhagen’s contribution (in this volume) that
emphasizes opposition by the local population or other stakeholders as an important
factor that can lead to prohibitively high administrative risks in the implementation
of wind power projects.35 Finally, we asked what options should be considered to
support the expansion of RE in Switzerland against the backdrop that phase-outs of
some of the RE subsidies are planned by 2022 and some more by 2030. Half of the
respondents are in favor of an extension of FITs after 2022 and nearly 40% of them
are in favor of new market premium models after 2022.
5.1.2 Divergent Views on Feasibility
So far, on the aggregate level, our findings merely confirm mainstream views on the
barriers linked to each subdomain. What is more intriguing is how divided the
energy stakeholders’ ratings are with regard to the feasibility of each goal. We
asked whether each target summarized in Table 1 looked realistic from the organi-
zation’s point of view. They could choose their responses from a Likert scale of
completely unrealistic, rather unrealistic, rather realistic, and completely realistic.
For the item on FITs and other subsidies, the question was phrased as “All things
considered at this moment, from your organization’s point of view, do you think it is
realistic that the targets of the Energy Strategy 2050 will be attained in this policy
environment?”
From Figs. 3 and 4, one can clearly see that the stakeholders’ views are divided on
many of the policy targets. When it comes to EV, the majority of them consider the
target to be achievable; and yet, there are still 45% of them perceiving otherwise.
There is a commonly held impression that DGE in Switzerland carries a negative
legacy from the two cancelled pilot projects in Basel and St. Gallen due to seismic
events. However, 38% of energy stakeholders consider this goal realistic, which is
much higher than the proportion of respondents who think that wind turbine
installations and the RE promotion under the planned phase-outs of RE subsidies
are feasible. It is particularly noteworthy that those who hold negative perceptions
about the feasibility of a large-scale wind energy installation have a strong view—
more than 25% responded “completely unrealistic”. Overall, a relatively pessimistic
picture looms out of Fig. 3—the majority of Swiss energy stakeholders perceive the
policy targets as unrealistic.
As for HP, we asked more nuanced questions based on on-going debates. Given
the gradual phase-out plan of nuclear energy, HP is considered as one of the clean
energy sources that could contribute to a stable baseload. In this context, an
expansion of HP generation capacity is currently considered. At the same time,
there is a wide-spread view that Switzerland has exhausted potential sites for HP
facilities. Against this backdrop, it is rather surprising that around 50% of the
participants consider the construction of new plants to be realistic. Capacity
35Ebers Broughel and Wüstenhagen (2021).
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expansion of existing facilities is considered to be realistic by more than 80% of the
organizations.
5.2 Diversity in Fields of Activity and Practices Related
to Policy Goal Attainment
Needless to say, these actors are diverse with respect to their fields of activity as well
as their organizational characteristics. This section will give a glimpse on these
aspects. According to our survey, at some point during the last 10 years 126 organi-
zations have been active in the field related to HP, 119 in transport or mobility, 89 in
wind, 54 in DGE, and 50 in nuclear. (The activity fields are not mutually exclusive.)
Fig. 3 “All things considered at this moment, from your organization’s point of view, does this
target look realistic or unrealistic?” (N ¼ 303)
Fig. 4 “Hydropower represents an important part of the Swiss electricity generation mix. All things
considered at this moment, does your organization consider the following measures to expand HP
capacity in Switzerland to be realistic?” (N ¼ 304)
382 M. Duygan et al.
In the context of political influence, we should also pay attention to how active
these organizations are in politics and the mediasphere. These two arenas of stake-
holder activities relate to what political economists often label as inside and outside
lobbying. The former refers to actors’ efforts for policy goal attainment exerted
directly on policymakers, and the latter includes various channels outside of the
government (such as media) through which actors mobilize the public in a way that
creates electoral pressure in favor of their own policy preferences.
We assess the level of political activeness by aggregating survey items that probe
whether the organization has undertaken the following seven practices over the last
10 years: (i) definition of a political strategy regarding specific legislation,
(ii) communication of information and political views to policymakers/administra-
tion, (iii) informal exchange with politicians, (iv) accessing non-public parts of the
national parliament building (“Wandelhalle”), (v) participation in hearings of par-
liamentary commissions, (vi) participation in an official expert group to draft new
legislation, and (vii) preparation and publication of political opinions and position
papers. This composite index may not capture certain nuances. For instance, it
measures neither the intensity nor the salience of each practice directly36. However, it
certainly serves as a proxy for the organization’s political engagement by the breadth
of the activities. The distribution of the level of political engagement in our sample
has a relatively clean bell-shaped curve with a slight skew to the left. On average,
organizations have employed 4.22 practices out of the seven that were mentioned
above with a standard deviation of 1.8. 42 organizations demonstrated a very high
level of activity by engaging in all 7 activities. Interestingly, the mean level of
political activeness remains nearly the same when stakeholders that are active in the
mobility, DGE, wind, and HP domain are considered separately.
To measure the stakeholders’media-related activities, we used two items that ask
if the organization has pursued (i) an active involvement in media debates, including
opinion articles or interviews in print media, radio, television, and
(ii) communication with the public via digital media such as Facebook, Instagram,
Twitter, etc. Here, the responses were even more dispersed. 122 organizations
engaged in none of the media-related activities, 94 in only one type of the activities,
and 96 in both. Once again, there is no significant difference in this distribution when
respondents that are active in the five subdomains are analyzed separately.
Finally, in the context of stakeholders’ efforts for policy goal attainment, one
might associate their policy influence with the level of financial resources held by the
organizations. Such an inferential analysis is beyond the scope of the present
chapter; however, it might be useful to note that here, too, variation is large. Figure 5
plots the distribution of the total annual budget of the organizations (top) and their
budgets for political purposes (bottom). In political purposes we include political
advocacy, information brokerage, and campaign financing.
36It might not capture the scope of competence in which actors engage in these practices either
(Duygan et al. 2021b).
A Survey of Stakeholders’ Views and Practices 383
5.3 What Types of Stakeholders Perceive ES2050 Goals
as More Realistic?
Naturally, all these observations make us wonder what explains the dramatic diver-
sity in the stakeholders’ feasibility perceptions. Are there systematic patterns in the
type of actors that view a certain policy target as more realistic than others? The
question deserves more thorough investigations in the future; here we will highlight a
Fig. 5 Size of the budget of Swiss energy stakeholders: Total annual budget and budget for
political purposes (N ¼ 312)
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few interesting findings from our first-cut analyses. We devote this final section to
reporting our first insights.
We answer these questions by studying the correlations between some of the
stakeholders’ characteristics and their feasibility views that are summarized in
Figs. 3 and 4. More concretely, we focus on whether the organizations’ feasibility
assessment is linked to (1) their being active in the related energy subdomain (e.g.,
wind, HP, etc.), (2) how engaged they are in politics, (3) how active they are in
media, and (4) what types of challenges they flagged for the policy goal in question.
We categorized various challenges that the respondents marked into three groups:
technological challenges (including construction and operational costs), risks asso-
ciated with opposition (including voters and interest groups),37 and regulatory risks.
A measure for being active in the nuclear energy domain was also included as an
additional control. The dependent variable, feasibility assessment, is a 4-point Likert
scale from completely unrealistic (coded as 1) to completely realistic (coded as 4).
We estimated the correlations by running an ordered logistic regression for each
of the ES2050 policy targets listed in Table 1, except for the RE subsidy goal.
Table 2 summarizes the results as estimated odds ratios for each covariate. Each col-
umn represents regression results for a specific policy target.
Table 2 Odds ratios from a logistic regression on each policy target
Dependent variable EV DGE Wind
Active in the area of transport/mobility last 10 yrs 0.85
Active in the area of DGE last 10 yrs 1.02
Active in the area of wind energy last 10 yrs 0.59*
Active in the area of nuclear energy last 10 yrs 0.75 0.95 1.24
Activeness in politics 0.98 1.04 0.92
Activeness in media 1.46* 1.36* 1.50*
Technical aspects as challenges 0.42* 1.33* 0.42*
Voters, consumers, interest groups as challenges 0.82 1.05 1.14
Regulatory risks as challenges 0.86 1.27 0.87





Active in the area of HP energy last
10 yrs
0.92 0.89 0.64 0.97
Active in the area of nuclear energy last
10 yrs
1.21 2.33* 1.65 0.62
Activeness in politics 1.01 1.03 0.90 0.99
Activeness in media 0.93 0.68* 1.19 1.24
Technical aspects as challenges 2.04* 1.23 1.77* 0.83
Voters, interest groups as challenges 2.13* 1.72* 1.40 1.34
Regulatory risks as challenges 0.82 0.63 0.93 1.21
*Statistically significant estimates at the 95% confidence level
37In the analysis for EV, we included information deficits by consumers in this category.
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It turns out that being active in the sub-domain in question does not necessarily
lead the actors to similar views on target feasibility. Only for the case of wind
energy, being active in this domain systematically makes them think that the target is
less realistic compared to those outside of the field.38 The organization’s perceptions
on feasibility are not systematically linked to their level of political engagement.
However, those that are more active in the mediasphere are 1.36–1.50 times more
likely to respond that the EV, DGE, and wind energy target is realistic.
One might also ask whether the organization’s attention to a certain type of
challenge is more strongly linked to their feasibility assessment of the policy targets.
Interestingly, our results suggest that stakeholders might acknowledge the possibility
of facing opposition and regulatory risks, but these assessments do not systemati-
cally lead them to claim that the target is realistic or unrealistic. On the contrary, their
assessment of technical challenges seems more directly linked to their feasibility
assessment. However, as for DGE and HP, those that recognize greater techni-
cal challenges are the stakeholders that tend to claim that the policy target in question
is more realistic.
One finding that stands out is the perception of an HP target. With regard to the
question of whether HP generation capacity can be enhanced by expanding existing
facilities, actors in the nuclear energy domain are 2.3 times more likely to claim that
the goal is realistic. Similarly, those that recognize civil-society opposition groups as
a challenge are more likely to consider the goal realistic.
6 Discussion
This chapter has illustrated some of the initial findings from a large-scale energy
stakeholder survey in Switzerland (N ¼ 364). Compared to public opinion surveys,
recreuitment of participants into surveys with professional organizations is in general
more challenging. In this sense, the survey data we presented here might serve as a
reasonable entry point for practitioners and researchers who are interested in conducting
systematic analyses on the complex links between energy policymaking and the
influence of relevant stakeholders.
The discussion on the Energy Strategy 2050 began in 2011 and the policy was
finally adopted after the referendum in 2017. As studies on social (voter) accep-
tance of energy policy goals flourish, we have seen an increasing number of
insightful opinion surveys and survey experiments with population-representative
samples that can identify sources of acceptance. However, we are yet to gain a
systematic understanding about the landscape of energy stakeholders’ views and
activities around these goals. From the energy governance point of view, this is a
clear deficit both for practitioners and energy researchers, as a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the socio-political acceptance of the ES2050 and its various
38More specifically, for those active in the wind energy field, the odds of being more likely to say
that the target is realistic are 40% lower.
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implications may help address policy risks that could inhibit the realization of its
goals proactively.39
In this chapter, we addressed this gap between different sides of socio-political
acceptance by illustrating the diversity of energy stakeholders’ perceptions. For
multiple key policy goals associated with ES2050, we investigated how realistic
the actors perceived them to be. It is quite astonishing that there was no consensus
about the goal feasibility for any of the ES2050 policy goals. Moreover, on the
aggregate level, the sentiment is pessimistic—there are more actors who perceive the
goals to be unrealistic than those who perceive them as realistic. Given this senti-
ment, it also makes sense that the majority of stakeholders are in favor of extending
renewable energy subsidies (or similar market incentives) after 2022 when the
current incentives are planned to end.
However, it was challenging to pinpoint what types of actors (or what actor
characteristics) are behind the polarizing views on target feasibility. Our survey data
reveal that, for the most part, being active in the same energy subdomain does not
always make the actors see the feasibility in a similar way, implying that divergent
views do not only exist on the aggregate level but also within the sector. Most of the
surveyed organizations actively engage in multiple practices to represent their
political interests, too. Again, the degree of political activeness was not systemati-
cally linked to their feasibility perceptions either on the optimistic or the pessimistic
side, implying that coordination efforts by policymakers are required at every end of
the stakeholders’ attitude spectrum.
One concerning element of our findings is that, despite the high level of diversity
and the overall pessimistic views on policy goal feasibility, those that perceive the
goals to be realistic are more likely to undertake media-related strategies at the same
time. The public might receive a biased impression about the level of consensus
among the stakeholders. A more detailed classification of the sources of divergent
stakeholder views seems to be a fruitful avenue for future research. A systematic
investigation of stakeholders’ views and perceptions, as conducted in this study, may
also allow us to strengthen integrative efforts further. A good example along this line
might be the “Energy Transition Preparedness Index” proposed by Bürer et al.:40
They highlight crucial elements of the energy-society system area that determines
the pace of implementing energy system change.
Given that there is already a set of defined policy goals under the Energy Strategy
2050, perhaps one of the biggest challenges for politicians and the Federal Admin-
istration during the next years is to come up with effective modes of communication
with their own citizens that help them make sense of the divergent feasibility
perceptions that appear to exist “even” among the actors who are involved in energy
topics on a daily-basis. This is indeed a hefty task for the government. Such
communication by the government needs to be transparent to citizens, fair to diverse
stakeholders, and neutral given its public function in order to make sure that the
government is not mistaken as a user of manipulative narratives.
39Ebers Broughel and Wüstenhagen (2021).
40Bürer et al. (2021).
A Survey of Stakeholders’ Views and Practices 387
Table 3 List of items included in the Survey “Diversity of Swiss Energy Stakeholders” (June 2019)
Item Question
Welcome
Welcome and thank you for your participation. . .
1. Basic information (1)
In the first part we would like to ask you some questions about the employees and, if
applicable, about members of your organization. If you do not know the exact answers,
we ask you to estimate as accurately as possible.
Q5 How many paid employees does your organization have? Please provide your details in
full-time equivalents. If you do not know the exact number, please guess.
Q254 How many unpaid employees does your organization have? Please provide your details
in full-time equivalents. If you do not know the exact number, please guess.
Q6 How old are the employees of your organization on average? If you do not know the
answer, please guess.
Q7 What is the proportion of employees in your organization who have obtained a university
degree? If you do not know the answer, please guess.
Q8 How often do employees of your organization participate in multi-day personnel devel-
opment activities on average (e.g., internal training, professional development, executive
education)? If you do not know the answer, please guess.
Q10 So-called “member organizations” can have both individuals (e.g., in the case of political
parties) and/or other organizations (e.g., in the case of associations) as members. In
non-member organizations (e.g., companies) there are no members, only employees or
involved parties.
How many members of each type does your organization have? Please choose one entry
for each member type. In both drop down lists, there is also the option “None”. If you do
not know the exact numbers, please guess.
(Matrix Question)
2. Vision on ES2050 goals
Q19 According to the Energy Strategy 2050, around 800–900 wind turbines need to be
constructed in Switzerland by 2050. All things considered at this moment, from your
organization’s point of view, does this target look realistic or unrealistic?
Q20 Regardless of your answer above, which of the following do you see as the biggest
challenges to achieve this goal? (multiple answers possible)
Q22 According to the Energy Strategy 2050, deep geothermal energy (DGE) is a viable option
to produce baseload electricity. All things considered at this moment, from your organi-
zation’s point of view, does a substantial increase in electricity generation capacity by
DGE look realistic or more unrealistic?
Q23 Regardless of your answer above, which of the following do you see as the biggest
challenges for an increase of deep geothermal energy? (multiple answers possible)
Q25 According to the Energy Strategy 2050, feed-in tariffs for renewable energies will be
phased out in 2022, and investment contributions and one-time payments will be phased
out in 2030. All things considered at this moment, from your organization’s point of view,
do you think it is realistic that the targets of the Energy Strategy 2050 will be attained
in this policy environment?
Q26 Regardless of your answer above, which of the following options should be considered to
support the expansion of renewable energies in Switzerland? (multiple answers possible)
Q28 According to the recently published roadmap for the promotion of electric mobility, the
share of electric vehicles of newly registered cars ought to reach 15 percent in 2022. All
things considered at this moment, from your organization’s point of view, does this target
look realistic or unrealistic?
(continued)
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Table 3 (continued)
Item Question
Q29 Regardless of your answer above, which of the following do you see as the biggest
challenges to reach this goal? (multiple answers possible)
Q31 Hydropower represents an important part of the Swiss electricity generation mix. All
things considered at this moment, does your organization consider the following mea-
sures to expand HP capacity in Switzerland to be realistic? (please answer for each
measure: By new pumped storage, by new small hydropower plants, by expansion of
existing plants, by modernization of existing plants.) (Matrix Question)
Q32 Regardless of your answer above, which of the following do you see as the biggest
challenges for the expansion of hydropower generation capacity? (multiple answers
possible)
3. Political representation of interests—Collectively or individually
This block addresses the topic of political representation of interests. It can occur in
different forms. We speak of interest representation as a collective when two or more
actors agree on political positions and represent them together. This does not preclude a
simultaneous representation of interests as an individual organization, without collu-
sion with others. (by definition, membership organizations always act collectively. So
here, interest representation as a collective is defined as activities conducted with other
organizations that are not members of your organization. On the other hand,
representing interests as a single organization means that there is no consultation with
organizations that are not members of your organization.)
Q35 When you think about Swiss energy policy in general: has your organization undertaken
the following activities as a collective and/or as an individual organization over the last
10 years? (1) Definition of a political strategy regarding specific legislation. (2) Com-
munication of information and political views to policy makers and/or administration.
(3) Financial support of politicians. (4) Funding of institutions (e.g., political committees,
parties) and/or activities (e.g., research). (5) Thematization in the public sphere (e.g.,
media contributions, signatures collection) (Matrix Question)
Q36 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
In Swiss energy policy, our organization is, in principle, willing to adjust its political
demands, if this is necessary to enable collaboration with other organizations.
Q38 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement with regard to the
policy process of the ES2050?
My organization would have had to adapt its political demands to be able to cooperate
(more closely) with other organizations.
4. Efforts for policy goal attainment
The following part of the questionnaire deals with the question of how your organization
perceives its opportunities to represent its interests.
Q48 How important is political interest representation for your organization?
Q50 Please think about a typical legislative process of national energy policy, which con-
cludes in a referendum. What proportion of time and financial resources does your
organization devote to different phases within such a legislative process? Please select the
shares so they add up to a total of 100%.
Q51 Is your organization competing with other organizations to recruit new members, raise
income through donations, or secure funding?
Q52 Has your organization pursued the following activities during the last 10 years? (Multiple
answers possible) (1) Informal exchange with politicians. (2) Mandating other organi-
zations or experts to follow the political events or actively represent interests of the
organization. (3) Accessing non-public parts of the national parliament building
(continued)
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Table 3 (continued)
Item Question
(Wandelhalle). (4) Participation in hearings of parliamentary commissions. (5) Partici-
pation in an official working/expert group to draft new legislation. (6) Preparation and
publication of political opinions and position papers. (7) Financing or conducting
research. (8) Active involvement in media debates (e.g., opinion articles or interviews in
print media, radio, television, etc.). (9) Communication with the public via digital media
(e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc.). (10) Organization of expert conferences and/or
public debates. (11) Funding of political advertising. (12) Funding and/or collection of
signatures. (13) Demonstration call. (14) Other
Q53 Please indicate how many employees in your organization are commissioned to follow
political events in general (not only energy specific) or actively represent interests of the
organization (in full-time equivalents). If you do not know the exact answer, we ask you
to estimate as accurately as possible.
5. Basic information (2)
In the following penultimate part we ask you to answer a few questions about your
organization in general.
Q56 During the last 10 years, in which areas was your organization at least at some point
active? (1) Hydropower. (2) Nuclear energy. (3) Solar energy. (4) Wind energy. (5) Deep
geothermal energy. (6) Other energy production. (7) Energy efficiency. (8) Trade of
electricity. (9) Natural science research on energy. (10) Economic modeling research on
Energy. (11) Social science research on energy. (12) Consumer information.
(13) Transport/mobility. (14) International economic cooperation and development.
(15) Other (Multiple answers possible.)
Q57 In which year was your organization founded?
Q58 How many regional/local branches does your organization have?
Q60 Do representatives of these local branches have a say in your organization’s policy stance
on issues of national interest, such as the ES2050?*
(*This question is shown if the response category (1) of Q58 was not selected.)
Q61 Organizations can make decisions in different ways, such as unanimity among members
or board members, or other voting procedures.
Please indicate what kind of decision-making is mainly used for important decisions in
your organization.
Q62 What sources of funding are relevant to your organization? (Multiple answers possible)
Q63 What is the annual budget of your organization? If you do not know the answer, please
guess.
Q65 You have clicked that you do not want to provide any details about the annual budget of
your organization. We would like to point out once again that your information is treated
absolutely confidentially and in publications conclusions with regard to your organization
are in no way possible.By clicking on your budget category, you would provide infor-
mation that is central to our research results. Of course, if you do not want to provide any
information, we respect this.*
(*This question is shown if the response category of Q63 ¼ (9999))
Q66 What is the annual budget of your organization for political purposes (e.g., for political
advocacy, information brokerage, campaign financing, etc.)? If you do not know the
answer, please guess.
Q68 You have clicked that you do not want to provide any information about your organiza-
tion’s annual political budget. We would like to point out once again that your informa-
tion is treated absolutely confidentially and in publications conclusions with regard to
your organization are in no way possible.
(continued)
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Table 3 (continued)
Item Question
By clicking on your budget category, you would provide information that is central to our
research results. Of course, if you do not want to provide any information, we respect this.
* (*This question is shown if the response category of Q66 ¼ (9999))
Q69 What position do you hold in your organization?
Q70 How many years have you been working for your organization?
6. Influence
Q12 The final questions relate to your organization in the context of Swiss energy policy. In
the following, reference will always be made to other organizations. The term “organi-
zation” refers to all types of stakeholders in energy policy, such as energy companies,
NGOs, political parties, umbrella organizations or even cantons and municipalities.
Q13 Please list those organizations that you consider to be influential in Swiss energy policy
of the last 10 years. Please also list your own organization or individual members, if you
count them among the influential organizations. (You can list as many organizations as
you want. Additional text entry boxes will automatically appear. The order does not
matter.)
Q14 Listed are the organizations you mentioned that have influence on Swiss energy policy.
Please choose the most influential organizations; on the one hand, with respect to Swiss
energy policy in general and on the other hand, with respect to the Energy Strategy
2050 (ES2050) specifically. In both cases you can choose up to five organizations;
however, it is also possible to choose fewer.Energy strategy 2050 refers to new Energy
Act, which was drafted by the Federal Council in 2011/2012 and submitted to consulta-
tion at the end of 2012. Between 2013 and 2016, the parliament discussed the law and the
Swiss electorate approved it in 2017.
(Carry Forward Entered Choices—Entered text from “Q13”)
(Matrix Question)
Q16 Please assess the influence of your organization on Swiss energy policy.
7. Stakeholder networks
Q42 As a reminder, collective representation of interests is defined as activities in which two or
more actors agree on political positions, which are represented in consultation with each
other.
Please list those organizations with which your organization has represented its interests
collectively in legislative processes of Swiss energy policy over the last 10 years. (You
can list as many organizations as you want. Additional text entry boxes will automatically
appear. Please list only those partners who are not members of your organization. The
order does not matter.)
Q44 Scientific, technical and political information plays an important role in energy policy.
With which organization do you exchange such information with respect to the Swiss
energy policy of the last 10 years?
Below you can find those organizations with which your organization has represented
interests in the collective in the past. Please indicate those organizations in the list with
which you not only represented interests collectively but also exchanged information.
(Carry Forward Entered Choices—Entered text from “Q42”)
Q45 However, information can also be exchanged with organizations without representing
interests together. Such information may be exchanged between like-minded organiza-
tions as well as with representatives of the counterparty.
Please list additional organizations with which your organization exchanged information
in the context of Swiss energy policy of the last 10 years. (You can list as many actors as
you want. Additional text entry boxes will automatically appear. Please list only those
partners who are not members of your organization. The order does not matter.)
(continued)
A Survey of Stakeholders’ Views and Practices 391
References
Aklin M, Urpelainen J (2013) Debating clean energy: frames, counter frames, and audiences. Glob
Environ Change 23(5):1225–1232
Bauer C, Hirschberg S, Bauerle Y, Biollaz S, Calbry-Muzyka A, Cox B, Heck T, Lehnert M,
Meier A, Prasser H-M, Schenler W, Treyer K, Vogel F, Wieckert H, Zhang X, Zimmerman M,
Burg V, Bowman G, Erni M, Saar M, Tran M (2017) Potentials, costs and environmental
assessment of electricity generation technologies. Technical report for the Swiss Federal Office
of Energy. Paul Scherrer Institute, Bern
Baumgartner FR, Larsen-Price HA, Leech BL, Rutledge P (2011) Congressional and presidential
effects on the demand for lobbying. Polit Res Q 64(1):3–16. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1065912909343578
Bernauer T, Gampfer R, Kachi A (2014) European unilateralism and involuntary burden-sharing in
global climate politics: a public opinion perspective from the other side. Eur Union Polit 15
(1):132–151. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116513496878
Bernhagen P, Dür A, Marshall D (2014) Measuring lobbying success spatially. Interest Groups Adv
3(2):202–218. https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2014.13
Bidwell D (2016) Thinking through participation in renewable energy decisions. Nat Energy 1
(5):1–4. https://doi.org/10.1038/NENERGY.2016.51
Binderkrantz AS, Pedersen HH (2017) What is access? A discussion of the definition and mea-
surement of interest group access. Eur Polit Sci 16:306–321
Black D (1948) On the rationale of group decision-making. J Polit Econ 56:23–34. Available at
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu
Blumer YB, Braunreiter L, Kachi A, Lordan-Perret R, Oeri F (2018) A two-level analysis of public
support: exploring the role of beliefs in opinions about the Swiss energy strategy. Energy Res
Soc Sci 43:109–118
Box-Steffensmeier JM, Christenson DP, Hitt MP (2013) Quality over quantity: amici influence and
judicial decision making. Am Polit Sci Rev 107(3):446–460. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S000305541300021X
Breetz H, Mildenberger M, Stokes L (2018) The political logics of clean energy transitions. Bus
Polit 20(4):492–522
Bürer M, de Lapparent M, Capezzali M, Carpita M (2021) Governance drivers and barriers for
business model transformation. In: Hettich P, Kachi A (eds) Swiss energy governance. Springer,
New York
Cherp A, Vinichenko V, Jewell J, Brutschin E, Sovacool B (2018) Integrating techno-economic,
socio-technical and political perspectives on national energy transitions: a meta-theoretical
framework. Energy Res Soc Sci 37:175–190
Downs A (1957) An economic theory of political action in a democracy. J Polit Econ 65
(2):135–150. Available at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu





Q72 You have the opportunity to be informed about the results of our analysis. If you would
like to receive such a scientific report, please enter your email address here.
Q73 Do you have any further comments?
You have reached the end of the survey. Please click on “Submit” to complete the survey.
Thank you very much for your participation!
392 M. Duygan et al.
Dür A (2008) Interest groups in the European Union: how powerful are they? West Eur Polit 31
(6):1212–1230. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802372662
Duygan M, Stauffacher M, Meylan G (2021a) What constitutes agency? Determinants of actors’
influence on formal institutions in Swiss waste management. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 162.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120413
Duygan M, Kachi A, Oliveira TD, Rinscheid A (2021b) Introducing the endowment-practice-
institutions (EPI) framework for studying agency in the institutional contestation of socio-
technical regimes. J Clean Pro 296:126396
Ebers Broughel A, Wüstenhagen R (2021) The influence of policy risk on Swiss wind power
investment. In: Hettich P, Kachi A (eds) Swiss energy governance. Springer, New York
Ejderyan O, Ruef F, Stauffacher M (2019) Geothermal energy in Switzerland: highlighting the role
of context. In: Manzella A, Allansdottir A, Pellizzone A (eds) Geothermal energy and society,
lecture notes in energy, vol 67. Springer, Cham, pp 239–257
Gross C (2007) Community perspectives of wind energy in Australia: the application of a justice
and community fairness framework to increase social acceptance. Energy Policy 35
(5):2727–2736. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2006.12.013
Hacker JS, Pierson P (2014) After the “master theory”: downs, Schattschneider, and the rebirth of
policy-focused analysis. Perspect Polit 12(3):643–662. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1537592714001637
Hall RL, Deardorff AV (2006) Lobbying as legislative subsidy. Am Polit Sci Rev 100(1):69–84.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055406062010
Hansla A (2011) Value orientation and framing as determinants of stated willingness to pay for
eco-labeled electricity. Energ Effic 4(2):185–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-010-9096-0
Hillman AJ, Hitt MA (1999) Corporate political strategy formulation: a model of approach,
participation, and strategy decisions. Acad Manag Rev 24(4):825–842
Kollman K (1998) Outside lobbying: public opinion and interest group strategies. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ
Levy DL, Egan D (1998) Capital contests: national and transnational channels of corporate
influence on the climate change negotiations. Polit Soc 26(3):337–361. https://doi.org/10.
1177/0032329298026003003
Mahoney C (2007) Lobbying success in the United States and the European Union. J Publ Policy 27
(1):35–56. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X07000608
Morf P (2020) Die Stromversorgung ist gefährdet. Finanz und Wirtschaft, 27 May 2020. Available
at https://www.fuw.ch
Offe C, Wiesenthal H (1980) Two logics of collective action: theoretical notes on social class and
organizational form. Polit Power Soc Theory 1(1):67–115
Rinscheid A (2015) Crisis, policy discourse, and major policy change: exploring the role of
subsystem polarization in nuclear energy policymaking. Eur Policy Anal 1(2):34–70
Rinscheid A, Udris L (2021) Referendum campaigns in Swiss energy policy. In: Hettich P, Kachi A
(eds) Swiss energy governance. Springer, New York
Rinscheid A, Wüstenhagen R (2019) German voters would prefer a more ambitious timeline to
phase out coal. Nat Energy 4(12):1016–1017
Schaffer L, Levis A (2021) Public discourses on (sectoral) energy policy in Switzerland. In:
Hettich P, Kachi A (eds) Swiss energy governance. Springer, New York
Stalder H (2017) Wo Windräder wachsen werden. NZZ, 28 June 2017. Available at https://www.
nzz.ch
Stigler GJ (1971) The theory of economic regulation. Bell J Econ Manage Sci 2(1):3–21
Stutzer R, Rinscheid A, Oliveira TD, Loureiro PM, Kachi A, Duygan M (2021) Black coal, thin ice:
the discursive legitimisation of Australian coal in the age of climate change. Humanit Soc Sci
Commun 8:178
Suisse éole (2017) Gute Gründe für Schweizer Windenergie. Liestal, 28 March 2017. Available at
https://www.suisse-eole.ch
A Survey of Stakeholders’ Views and Practices 393
Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2017) Wichtigste Neuerungen im Energierecht ab 2018,
2 November 2017. Available at https://www.bfe.admin.ch
Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018a) Energiestrategie 2050 nach dem Inkrafttreten des neuen
Energiegesetzes. Presentation, available at https://www.bfe.admin.ch
Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2018b) Roadmap Elektromobilität. Available at http://www.
admin.ch
Tabi A, Wüstenhagen R (2017) Keep it local and fish-friendly: social acceptance of hydropower
projects in Switzerland. Renew Sust Energ Rev 68(1):763–773
Varone F, Ingold KM, Jourdain C (2016) Studying policy advocacy through social network
analysis. Eur Polit Sci Prev:1–15. https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2016.16
Walker ET, Rea CM (2014) The political mobilization of firms and industries. Annu Rev Sociol
40:281–304. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071913-043215
Weiler F, Brändli M (2015) Inside versus outside lobbying: how the institutional framework shapes
the lobbying behaviour of interest groups. Eur J Polit Res 54(4):745–766. https://doi.org/10.
1111/1475-6765.12106
Wüstenhagen R, Wolsink M, Bürer MJ (2007) Social acceptance of renewable energy innovation:
an introduction to the concept. Energy Policy 35(5):2683–2691. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.
2006.12.001
Mert Duygan is Research Associate at the Faculty of Business and Economics, University of
Basel, Basel, Switzerland and PostDoc at the Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and
Technology (Eawag), Department of Environmental Social Sciences, Dübendorf, Switzerland.
Aya Kachi is Associate Professor for International Political Economy and Energy Policy at the
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland.
Fintan Oeri is a Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel,
Basel, Switzerland.
Thiago D. Oliveira is a former member of the Faculty of Business and Economics, University of
Basel, Basel, Switzerland.
Adrian Rinscheid is International Postdoctoral Fellow and Lecturer at the Institute for Economy
and the Environment, University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
394 M. Duygan et al.
Part IV
Concluding Remarks
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Aya Kachi and Peter Hettich
Contents
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
The term energy transition at times gives the impression that it is a process that starts
with the incumbent regime and ends with the new regime at some point in time. This
simplistic notion could lead to clumsy debates about what ought to be the new
perfect regime, whether a newly-emerged system is indeed the one to which the
society aspired, and why so (or why not). In the context of research on political
regime transition—transitions between authoritarian and democratic regimes within
a state, which has resemblance to the current studies on energy transition—these
questions have fascinated political scientists for more than half a century. There is an
important lesson learned by researchers in this field; that is, studying such a
phenomenon by the normative or positive characterization of two end points
would lead to a fairly dysfunctional proliferation of regime sublabels. In their
seminal work “Democracy with Adjectives,” Collier and Levitsky counted more
than five hundred subtypes of democracy “precised” by adjectives that had eventu-
ally flooded the research field with little positive use.1
The work presented in this volume is a compilation of research highlights that
represent numerous studies carried out by researchers within the Energy Governance
Work Package (WP4) of the Swiss Competence Center for Energy Research, Society
and Transition (SCCER CREST). As our Introduction has illustrated in detail, these
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researchers worked together under common scientific interests in providing recom-
mendations to overcome governance challenges in the course of the energy transition
in Switzerland. Despite the variety of disciplines involved in this group, the con-
scious decision not to “over-precise” the shared notion of governance has success-
fully guided the 4-year collaboration. We did not only circumvent the type of
research inertia that the scholars of regime transition experienced previously, but
also enabled the analysis of good governance by applying various theoretical
frameworks and methods.
Researchers in the work package focused on identifying concrete challenges
associated with the governance of energy transitions. More precisely, we investi-
gated, given newly-available technologies and specific policy goals implied by the
Energy Strategy 2050, what specific legal, political, investor-related, and voter-
related challenges we need to overcome. One can view the findings of each contri-
bution in this volume as concrete steps that are incremental yet collectively critical to
the breakthrough of such a large-scale transition of energy systems—Charles
Lindblom’s distinction between comprehensive (“root analysis”) versus successive
limited comparisons (“branch analysis”) comes to mind.2 Naturally, when the Work
Package was launched in 2017, our initial task was to break down the overwhelming
objective into numerous but concrete issues to be tackled. As such, the findings
presented in this volume should help identify basic designs and structural principles
of good energy governance—i.e., governance that is more effective, efficient, and
transparent.
As we outlined in the introduction chapter, this book first focused on macro
perspectives in Part I, dealing with the interactions between the Swiss and European
energy systems and policies. Part II then shifted the focus to domestic institutions
through which interactions between state and non-state actors occur in ways that
could drive (or hinder) the energy transition. Here we employed a broader definition
of the relevant institutions and analyzed the implications of legal, political, and
economic institutions (if markets can be characterized as economic institutions).
Readers must have noticed that one of the most prominent focal points appearing in
many chapters of Part II was that Switzerland's federal system requires us to consider
the consequence of explicit multilevel governance. Finally, Part III put micro-level
analyses into the focus. The contributions in Part III shed light on some of the
emerging and more detailed issues to be considered concerning two types of key
actors: voters and other stakeholders, e.g., industry players and interest groups. This
section treated the institutional considerations mostly as a black box; instead, the
chapters focused on actors’ perceptions about policies and regulations, identifying
ways to mitigate policy acceptance risks that might arise in the course of an energy
transition in Switzerland.
Although this classification of the chapters by three relevant layers (macro, meso,
and micro) and by the institution-actor distinction is convenient (and necessary) in
laying out the contributions of the book, it is not necessarily helpful in providing
2Lindblom (1959), p. 79 et seq., 81.
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recommendations for future policy implementation. Therefore, in the remainder of
this conclusion section, we will summarize potential guiding principles that arise
from our research in ways that synthesize multiple contributions in this volume.
Many of the recommendations relate to political, legal, and economic institutional
structures and point to general considerations of good governance in network
industries. Network industries tend to create vertically-integrated monopolies,
which pose specific challenges when designing governance structures. More than
in markets where competition may be effective without government intervention,
competitive energy and electricity markets do not emerge without a design by the
government. When designing the governance structures of energy markets, it is
important to considert which level of government is best suited to effectively and
efficiently overcome challenges. Effective multilevel governance may make it easier
to strike a balance between concerns for the functioning of the system and the
interoperability of the different actors. This is true in particular for the provision of
fair and equitable access to the network for all users, as well as for concerns
regarding locally optimized regimes and innovative modes of local governance.
With the empowerment of local actors in ways that hold them accountable for poten-
tial failures, we might slowly overcome outdated modes of governance that are the
result of entrenched interests of particular actors or that reflect axiomatic views of
particular scientific disciplines, such as the current approaches to unbundling or to
grid charges. By having the functioning of the system take centerstage, we may
also deal with the fact that different administrative offices (independently based on
each office’s own motives) set diverse policy goals, which may result in inconsistent
signals to private actors, giving rise to policy risks that deter potential investors.
Changes of governance can induce substantial shifts in private actors’ behavior as
well. Generally, changes in governance should preserve a level playing field among
different types of actors in terms of market access and possibilities to innovate; in
other words, we recommend that any deviations from this general principle should be
accompanied by sufficient justification. For instance, this can mean that changes in
governance should foster investments by private actors with financial rewards that
are appropriate to the risks involved. Finally, our findings also implied that changes
in governance would generate redistributive effects that need to be taken into
account in the political process. Eventually, these first-order effects can also be
transmitted back to the governmental actors. The altered investment landscape leads
to heterogeneous and changing policy (outcome) assessments by the private actors.
Therefore, governmental actors must consider whether their efforts for policy-
industry coordination will be (re)allocated according to the changing level and
location of contestation by key private actors.
The new set of collective knowledge we gained through the work represented in
this volume also hints at the areas of energy governance that can benefit from further
elaboration. One such aspect might be communication. Most of the aforementioned
principles relate to economic and technical aspects of governance (including the
legal and institutional technicality). This primarily involves business, industry, and
governmental actors. However, some of the contributions in this volume vividly
illustrate the importance of voters and policy discourses as factors that shape energy
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governance. Here, the media plays a significant role in connecting energy profes-
sionals and voters. Without going into normative or paternalistic discussions as to
whether and to what extent voters need to be informed about the course of our energy
systems, the research findings involving citizens—together with our own experience
from the political debates that preceded the referendum voting for the Energy
Strategy 2050—imply that policymakers ought to be conscious about their proactive
communication design. One should note that such communication design benefits
from longer-term planning in order not to fall in the vicious pattern of constantly
reacting to inconsistent political narratives that are shot from left and right.
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